RELX gideon lens

RELX PLC (XNYS:RELX) - Production ER2 / Gideon Lens

Report date: 2026-08-23 **Price anchor:** USD 35.91 per 1:1 sponsored ADS, close on 2026-08-21 **TTM anchor:** 2026-06-30 **Exact horizon:** 2031-06-30, 5.0 calendar years **Reporting currency:** GBP; shareholder-return currency: USD per ADS

Executive underwriting conclusion

RELX clears the three ER2 underwriting gates. Management has compounded returns on capital, cash flow and per-share value over a long tenure; the moat test passes because Risk and STM retain proprietary data, trusted content and embedded workflow advantages that plausibly survive to 2046; and the independently reconciled base case produces USD 2.7683 of statutory diluted EPS at the exact five-year horizon. At 15x, that EPS supports USD 41.52 per ADS, 15.63% above the current USD 35.91 price.

That produces an ER2 **BUY** under the exhaustive gate rule, but it does not authorize capital. The security-return bridge is less emphatic than the binary P/E-15 entry test: base gross USD IRR is 13.10%, while probability-weighted gross IRR is 11.00%. After a deliberately conservative net-SGD overlay, base remains 11.56% but probability-weighted return is 9.47%, just below the mandate's 10% hurdle. Portfolio holdings, factor exposure and risk-budget data are unavailable to this research worker. CIO actionability is therefore **WATCH**, with no proposed sizing ceiling and no trade authority.

Verdict: BUY

Scorecard:

Gate	Result	Notes
Management	PASS	Long-tenured team compounded ROIC, cash flow and per-share value
Moat	PASS	Risk and STM support a credible 2046 durability pass
P/E <= 15 on confident EPS at TTM + 5 calendar years	PASS	Base value USD 41.52 gives 15.63% cushion
Compounder Score	Audited 74 / 100	Strong business, but 20% stretch underwriting remains price-sensitive
Business Quality Score	Audited 67 / 80	High-return, cash-generative assets clear dream-business quality threshold
20% Return UW Score	Audited 7 / 20	Current price does not support the 20% annual-return stretch

One-line thesis: RELX is a durable professional-workflow compounder whose current price clears the ER2 P/E-15 entry gate, but whose probability-weighted net-SGD return remains slightly below CIO core eligibility.

Security return underwriting

Security return underwriting (mandatory even when the verdict is PASS):

Measure	Result	Notes
Primary valuation method	P/E	Statutory diluted EPS is used consistently in every scenario, probability weighting and net-SGD overlay
Gross local-currency bear / base / bull IRR	-4.05% / 13.10% / 23.06%	Five-year annualized shareholder return in USD per ADS
Probability-weighted gross local-currency IRR	11.00%	CAGR of probability-weighted terminal wealth using 30% / 55% / 15% weights
Return bridge	USD 35.91 -> USD 29.21 / 66.46 / 101.33	Terminal EPS x 16x / 22x / 25x plus cumulative distributions; no second net-debt adjustment

Gross local-currency underwriting is in USD. The company had GBP 220m cash, GBP 8,906m gross debt, GBP 8,733m official net debt and 2.3x net-debt/adjusted-EBITDA at 2026-06-30. Those facts constrain quality and multiple selection, but are not added to or subtracted from an EPS-times-P/E value: statutory EPS already reflects finance and lease economics.

Applying a separate terminal debt adjustment would double count the capital structure. The quote-basis diluted share count starts at 1,794.1m ADS-equivalent shares and falls to 1,678.9m / 1,552.6m / 1,468.3m across Bear / Base / Bull.

The audited current reported P/E is 21.10x on TTM statutory diluted EPS of USD 1.70185. The comparable normalized current P/E is 22.33x on USD 1.60817, after excluding the GBP 94m swap fair-value gain and GBP 49m disposal/non-operating gain. The preflight selected 16x / 22x / 25x before return calculation. Bear is a stressed going-concern multiple below the provider-native historical range; Base is approximately flat with normalized current valuation and below the 27.58x historical median; Bull is also below that median despite superior execution. Neither a desired IRR nor the P/E-15 gate selected these exits.

The tables below reproduce the audited bridge. Start values are TTM revenue of GBP 9,720m, statutory operating income of GBP 3,122m, statutory diluted EPS of USD 1.70185, 1,794.1m listed-equivalent shares and USD 0.9208 annualized FY2025 dividend per ADS. Annual-dividend endpoints are the model's final distribution-cycle equivalents; cumulative distributions control shareholder wealth.

Bear-case operating and return bridge

Bear case	Start (2026-06-30)	Horizon (2031-06-30)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	GBP 9,720m	GBP 10,571.9m	1.69%	Legal/Exhibitions pressure and faster Print runoff offset Risk/STM resilience
Operating margin	32.12%	28.22%	-3.90 pp	Lower mix, AI cost and adverse segment margins reduce statutory profitability
Operating earnings	GBP 3,122m	GBP 2,983.7m	-0.90%	Statutory operating income after the complete group bridge
Diluted share count	1,794.1m	1,678.9m	-1.32%	Buybacks slow to 0.75% annually under leverage and earnings pressure
EPS	USD 1.70185	USD 1.50496	-2.43%	Statutory diluted EPS on the reconciled 1:1 ADS basis
Valuation denominator	Normalized EPS USD 1.60817	Statutory EPS USD 1.50496	Comparable	Normalized current and terminal denominators use the same listed-unit and claim perimeter
Valuation	22.33x normalized P/E	16.00x P/E	-6.33x	Going-concern stress below RELX's provider-native historical range
Share value	USD 35.91	USD 24.08	-7.68%	USD 1.50496 EPS x 16x; no net-debt adjustment
Annual dividend	USD 0.9208	USD 1.0664	2.98%	FY2025 anchor, then a 2% scenario growth path
Dividend yield	2.56%	4.43%	+1.87 pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	USD 5.13	cumulative	Five annual-equivalent distributions translated at sealed GBP/USD
Total ending value	USD 35.91	USD 29.21	-4.05% gross local IRR	Terminal share value plus distributions

Base-case operating and return bridge

Base case	Start (2026-06-30)	Horizon (2031-06-30)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	GBP 9,720m	GBP 13,101.4m	6.15%	Risk, STM and Legal workflows compound while Exhibitions normalizes and Print runs off
Operating margin	32.12%	34.32%	+2.20 pp	Mix and workflow operating leverage outweigh AI inference costs
Operating earnings	GBP 3,122m	GBP 4,496.8m	7.57%	Statutory operating income after the complete group bridge

Base case	Start (2026-06-30)	Horizon (2031-06-30)	CAGR / change	Justification
Diluted share count	1,794.1m	1,552.6m	-2.85%	1.5% annual buyback path, including dilution and price effects
EPS	USD 1.70185	USD 2.76830	10.22%	Statutory diluted EPS on the reconciled 1:1 ADS basis
Valuation denominator	Normalized EPS USD 1.60817	Statutory EPS USD 2.76830	Comparable	One-off normalization creates a like-for-like current-to-terminal comparison
Valuation	22.33x normalized P/E	22.00x P/E	-0.33x	Approximately flat to normalized current, below historical median
Share value	USD 35.91	USD 60.90	11.14%	USD 2.76830 EPS x 22x; no net-debt adjustment
Annual dividend	USD 0.9208	USD 1.2438	6.20%	FY2025 anchor, then a 6% scenario growth path
Dividend yield	2.56%	2.04%	-0.52 pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	USD 5.55	cumulative	Five annual-equivalent distributions translated at sealed GBP/USD
Total ending value	USD 35.91	USD 66.46	13.10% gross local IRR	Terminal share value plus distributions

Bull-case operating and return bridge

Bull case	Start (2026-06-30)	Horizon (2031-06-30)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	GBP 9,720m	GBP 14,923.4m	8.95%	Broad workflow adoption, pricing and event recovery reinforce one another
Operating margin	32.12%	37.42%	+5.30 pp	High-value AI mix, falling inference cost and segment leverage expand margins
Operating earnings	GBP 3,122m	GBP 5,584.0m	12.33%	Statutory operating income after the complete group bridge
Diluted share count	1,794.1m	1,468.3m	-3.93%	2.0% annual buyback path with modeled dilution and price effects
EPS	USD 1.70185	USD 3.82188	17.56%	Statutory diluted EPS on the reconciled 1:1 ADS basis
Valuation denominator	Normalized EPS USD 1.60817	Statutory EPS USD 3.82188	Comparable	Same listed unit, currency and parent-shareholder perimeter
Valuation	22.33x normalized P/E	25.00x P/E	+2.67x	Superior execution, yet still below the 27.58x historical median
Share value	USD 35.91	USD 95.55	21.62%	USD 3.82188 EPS x 25x; no net-debt adjustment
Annual dividend	USD 0.9208	USD 1.3404	7.80%	FY2025 anchor, then an 8% scenario growth path
Dividend yield	2.56%	1.40%	-1.16 pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	USD 5.78	cumulative	Five annual-equivalent distributions translated at sealed GBP/USD
Total ending value	USD 35.91	USD 101.33	23.06% gross local IRR	Terminal share value plus distributions

CIO actionability

CIO actionability (separate from ER2 underwriting):

Measure	Result	Notes
Status	WATCH	Quality and base return clear, but probability-weighted net-SGD return is below 10%
Bear / Base / Bull net SGD IRR	-5.58% / 11.56% / 21.46%	Same P/E method after explicit costs, distribution reserve and FX translation
Probability-weighted net SGD IRR	9.47%	CAGR of weighted net terminal wealth using 30% / 55% / 15%
10% mandate hurdle	FAIL	Base clears, probability-weighted case does not
15% stretch hurdle	FAIL	Base and probability-weighted cases do not clear
Downside and portfolio fit	UNAVAILABLE	Bear security downside is negative; current portfolio context is unavailable
Proposed sizing ceiling	none	No sizing authority and no portfolio risk-budget evidence

The net-SGD diagnostic reserves 0.35% at entry and exit for transaction costs, 10% of distributions for tax/custody uncertainty, USD 0.15 cumulative ADR fees and 5% USD depreciation versus SGD over five years. It does not change terminal EPS, exit P/E, share count or distributions. This is deliberately conservative and finite; missing investor-specific wrapper or portfolio data constrains only fit and sizing.

Trade execution authorized: NO

Principal debate, monitoring and triggers

The strongest bear thesis is that general-purpose AI agents gain control of the Legal and STM interface while data-access restrictions weaken Risk, reducing RELX to a lower-value content supplier. The most fragile base input is Legal revenue of GBP 2.689bn in 2031 because RELX does not disclose renewal, attach, realized pricing or inference-cost economics. The red team also challenged the base exit at 20x: that lowers base gross IRR to 11.15%, 1.95 percentage points below the audited case, but does not cross the workflow's two-point material reroute threshold. Its strongest rebuttal is that the Bear case already stacks franchise pressure across Legal, STM and Exhibitions with a 16x exit despite positive EPS and surviving Risk/STM moats.

Kill / trigger criteria:

- 20% stretch-price trigger: USD 26.71 or below, assuming the locked 22x Base exit and USD 5.55 distributions.
- Thesis-break trigger: two consecutive reporting periods with both Legal and STM underlying revenue growth below 4%, profit growth lagging revenue, and Risk underlying growth below 5%.
- Leverage trigger: net debt/adjusted EBITDA persistently above 2.5x without a clearly funded, high-return deployment path.
- CIO upgrade condition: a fresh governed bridge with both Base and probability-weighted net-SGD IRRs at or above 10%, an acceptable Bear drawdown, and verified portfolio risk-budget availability.

Research sizing if actionable: none. This report has no trade, broker, portfolio-mutation, ranking, messaging or sizing authority.

Evidence and confidence

Confidence is high in the official historical and TTM bridge, listed-unit mapping, share-count mechanics and scenario arithmetic; medium in five-year product mix, Legal AI monetization, buyback cadence and exit multiples. Official RELX FY2025 and H1 2026 disclosures control where FMP was incomplete or conflicted. The quantitative foundation, statutory bridge, data review, five segment reviews, management and moat assessments, 11/11 synthesis, five-foundation valuation preflight, scoring audit and red team all cleared. The remaining uncertainties are disclosed model risks, not hidden nulls or unresolved workflow failures.

Appendix A - Company Primer

RELX PLC — Company Primer

Security: NYSE: RELX sponsored American Depositary Share, one ADS per ordinary share **Reporting currency:** pound sterling; figures below are GBP millions unless stated otherwise **Information cutoff:** 23 August 2026 **Latest complete reporting period:** H1 2026 ended 30 June 2026 **TTM right edge:** 30 June 2026; exact five-year analytical horizon ends 30 June 2031 **Trade execution authorized:** false

1. Investor orientation

RELX is best understood not as a traditional publisher, but as a portfolio of professional decision systems. It owns or licenses difficult-to-replicate content and data, cleans and links those inputs, applies analytics and increasingly artificial intelligence, and inserts the resulting answers into high-value customer workflows. The economic proposition is simple: a RELX product may be a small part of a customer's cost base, but it can affect a much larger pool of losses, revenue, professional time, regulatory exposure, or scientific output. That asymmetry supports high willingness to pay, direct enterprise sales, recurring contracts, and attractive incremental margins.

Four operating franchises account for nearly all value creation. LexisNexis Risk Solutions helps insurers, banks, governments, healthcare organizations, and other enterprises authenticate identities, prevent fraud, comply with financial-crime rules, price risk, and automate decisions. Elsevier serves scientific research, corporate R&D, medical education, and clinical care. LexisNexis Legal & Professional provides legal research, drafting, analytics, regulatory information, news, and legal workflow software. RX operates business-to-business exhibitions supplemented by digital lead-generation and measurement tools. A fifth reported line contains the remaining print and print-related activities.

The central investment question is whether RELX can keep converting trusted content and proprietary data into higher-value workflow products faster than technology reduces the scarcity of basic information. The current evidence is constructive: at the 30 June 2026 TTM edge, the four principal businesses were growing their mix of analytics and decision tools, group adjusted operating margin was rising, and Legal was accelerating as customers adopted AI-enabled products. But the same transition creates real risks. Generative AI can lower the cost of search and drafting, enable new competitors, facilitate research fraud, increase compute expense, and test copyright and data-privacy boundaries. RELX therefore has to win on authoritative source material, accuracy, citations, security, domain-specific evaluation, and integration—not merely access to a large language model.

2. Business overview: who buys, what they buy, and why

RELX serves professional and business customers in more than 180 countries and territories. Products are generally sold directly by dedicated sales forces, usually on subscription or transactional terms and often under multi-year agreements. The buyer is typically an institution—an insurer, bank, law firm, corporate legal department, university, hospital, government agency, or exhibitor—while daily users are underwriters, fraud analysts, researchers, doctors, lawyers, students, marketers, and other specialists.

The products solve four recurring problems:

- **Finding the right authoritative information.** Elsevier and Legal organize scientific, medical, legal, regulatory, patent, company, and news sources that would otherwise be fragmented and time-consuming to search.
- **Turning information into a decision.** Risk scores a person, device, claim, business, or transaction; Legal analyzes precedent and litigation patterns; Elsevier helps researchers and clinicians synthesize evidence.
- **Executing inside a workflow.** Products connect through application programming interfaces, insurer systems, electronic health records, Microsoft Word, document-management systems, research platforms, and customer infrastructure. The output is used where work is performed, not merely read in a separate database.
- **Connecting fragmented markets.** RX aggregates buyers and sellers in specialized industries, then uses registration, matchmaking, lead-retrieval, mobile, and exhibitor-dashboard data to improve the measurable return on event spending.

This architecture creates more defensibility than a simple content library. Customer histories, trained users, compliance processes, API integrations, contributory databases, citations, and the cost of validating a replacement all raise switching costs. In Risk, every new identity signal, insurance claim, connected-car record, or consortium contribution can improve matching and prediction. In STM, journals, peer review, citation graphs, author records, and institutional usage reinforce Elsevier's research platforms. In Legal, case law, statutes, commentary, citator history, customer documents, and drafting workflows reinforce the Lexis platform. RX has weaker recurring characteristics, but event brands, sector communities, exhibitor relationships, and attendee data create local network effects.

3. Revenue architecture

The quantitative foundation is the controlling source for financial values. FY2025 is the latest complete fiscal year and therefore the appropriate FY-1 revenue architecture. Percentages below are calculated from the reconciled GBP9,590 million group total.

Reported segment	FY2025 revenue	Share of group	FY2025 adjusted operating profit	FY2025 margin
Risk	3,485	36.3%	1,305	37.4%
Scientific, Technical & Medical	2,714	28.3%	1,035	38.1%
Legal	1,806	18.8%	415	23.0%
Exhibitions	1,186	12.4%	410	34.6%
Print and print-related activities	399	4.2%	185	46.4%
Segment sum	9,590	100.0%	3,350	34.9%

The group also discloses revenue by delivery format. In FY2025, electronic products generated GBP8,070 million, face-to-face activities GBP1,121 million, and print GBP399 million. Thus approximately 84% of revenue was electronic, 12% face-to-face, and 4% print. The distinction matters: electronic delivery generally carries low physical distribution cost, but it does not mean the product is costless to maintain. RELX spends heavily on software engineers, data acquisition, content curation, security, cloud infrastructure, and sales. Face-to-face revenue has venue and event-execution costs; print is small and declining.

Risk

Risk is the largest segment. Its main verticals are Business Services, Insurance, Healthcare, Specialized Industry Data Services, and Government Solutions. Business Services and Insurance each represent roughly 40% of Risk revenue; specialized industry data is just over 10%, and Government just over 5%. Products include identity and fraud decisioning, anti-money-laundering and know-your-customer systems, insurance underwriting and claims tools, credit analytics, healthcare identity and provider data, ICIS commodity intelligence, Cirium aviation analytics, HR analytics, tax workflow, and government fraud and public-safety tools.

Risk is predominantly North American: the official 2025 report attributes 79% of revenue to North America, 13% to Europe, and 8% to the rest of the world. The revenue model is 39% subscription and 61% transactional, including long-term contracts with volumetric elements. This is recurring in an economic sense but not purely fixed subscription revenue. Insurance quotes, policy switching, identity checks, payment transactions, claims, and compliance screening drive usage. That creates upside when transaction volume and new use cases grow, but also exposes reported revenue to customer activity.

Scientific, Technical & Medical

STM is Elsevier. Customers include universities, libraries, researchers, governments, corporate R&D teams, hospitals, clinicians, medical and nursing students, funders, and authors. About 55% of segment revenue comes from Academic & Government Primary Research; databases, tools, electronic reference, and Corporate Primary Research account for roughly 45%. Major products include ScienceDirect, Scopus, SciVal, Reaxys, Embase, ClinicalKey, ClinicalPath, Sherpath, Pure, Interfolio, and new AI features built on those assets.

The official 2025 geographic split was 43% North America, 23% Europe, and 34% rest of world. Subscription revenue was 80% and transactional revenue 20%. Primary research has two payer models: pay-to-read subscriptions funded by institutions or individuals, and pay-to-publish open-access charges funded by authors, institutions, or research funders. The shift between those models changes who pays and can affect mix, but both can benefit from rising global research output if Elsevier maintains journal quality and author demand.

Legal

Legal serves law firms, corporate legal departments, governments, universities, and news and business-information users. Law Firms & Corporate Legal contributes about 70% of segment revenue; Government & Academic and News & Business contribute about 30%. Products include Lexis, Lexis+, Lexis+ AI, the Protégé assistant, Lexis Create+, Lex Machina, Practical Guidance, CounselLink+, InterAction+, Law360, Nexis, regulatory compliance tools, and patent analytics.

The official 2025 report attributes 68% of revenue to North America, 22% to Europe, and 10% to the rest of the world. Subscriptions represented 85% and transactions 15%, generally sold directly and often under multi-year contracts. This is the group's clearest AI monetization case: customers can pay more for faster research, cited answers, drafting, document analysis, litigation analytics, and personalized work product, while RELX reuses its platform across geographies and product lines.

Exhibitions

RX organized 274 face-to-face events across 41 industry sectors and 25 countries in 2025, with six million participants. It earns over 70% of revenue from exhibitor fees; the balance comes mainly from admissions, conferences, sponsorships, and digital tools. The official location-based geographic split was 20% North America, 36% Europe, and 44% rest of world. Digital tools represented 8% of segment revenue in 2025.

Exhibitions is a portfolio of local and global two-sided marketplaces. The customer buys access to relevant buyers, suppliers, content, leads, or deal flow in a compressed period. Digital directories, matchmaking, apps, lead retrieval, and performance dashboards extend engagement before and after an event and give exhibitors evidence of return on investment. Revenue is less recurring and more cyclical than the information businesses; results can also move because some events do not occur annually.

Print and print-related

Print is now separately reported. It is economically a run-off format rather than a growth franchise. FY2025 revenue of GBP399 million declined to GBP367 million on a TTM basis. The very high reported adjusted margin should not be extrapolated mechanically: shrinking mature products can retain attractive cash economics for a time, but fixed-cost allocation, customer attrition, and declining volumes can make the trajectory uneven. The investor should focus on cash harvesting and migration to digital, not growth.

4. Segment unit economics

Risk: data and analytics scale

A Risk revenue pound funds licensed and public data, contributory-data arrangements, data engineers, model development, cloud and processing capacity, cybersecurity, compliance, and a specialized sales organization. Once those systems and datasets exist, the marginal cost of an additional identity check, fraud score, insurance quote, or API call can be low. Scale also improves the product: more records and feedback can increase match accuracy and model usefulness, which supports retention and cross-selling.

The FY2025 adjusted operating margin was 37.4%, increasing to 37.8% on the June 2026 TTM basis. The strongest economic feature is not merely the margin but the combination of recurring contracts, transactional growth, embedded APIs, and high consequence of error. The limiting factors are data-acquisition cost, privacy restrictions, model accuracy, customer concentration in some verticals, and the need to keep investing as fraud patterns evolve.

STM: content brands plus workflow tools

STM bears costs for editorial teams, platform development, integrity controls, content production, sales, and the operation of publishing and clinical systems. Peer reviewers contribute substantial external expertise, but Elsevier must manage millions of submissions, thousands of journals, metadata, citations, peer-review workflows, hosting, discovery, and fraud detection. Distribution of an additional digital article is cheap; maintaining the trusted record is not.

The FY2025 adjusted margin was 38.1%, rising to 38.5% TTM. Subscription density and globally recognized journal brands create durable economics. Analytics products can raise value per customer beyond access to articles. Open access is both an opportunity and a risk: it expands article volume and shifts payment toward publication, but funder mandates, pricing pressure, research-integrity problems, or author dissatisfaction could weaken returns.

Legal: investment phase with margin runway

Legal's cost base includes jurisdiction-specific editorial work, licensed sources, citator maintenance, software and AI development, compute, data security, direct sales, and customer support. Unlike generic search, legal answers must be current, jurisdictionally correct, confidential, and linked to authority. Integration into Word, document-management systems, matter management, and customer workflows can make the product more valuable and harder to replace.

The segment's FY2025 adjusted margin was 23.0%, below Risk and STM, but rose to 23.3% TTM. That gap suggests both heavier reinvestment and potential operating leverage if higher-value AI and analytics revenue scales across a shared platform. The risk is that compute, model, content, and go-to-market costs consume much of the price uplift, or that credible new entrants unbundle drafting and research.

Exhibitions: marketplace yield and event execution

An exhibition revenue pound funds venues, event production, marketing, local teams, sales, technology, safety, and attendee acquisition. Strong event brands can have excellent economics because exhibitors pay for concentrated access to valuable audiences. Pricing, floor-space yield, sponsorship, visitor fees, and digital upsells can lift revenue faster than event cost. But variable cost is materially higher than for digital information products, and events are vulnerable to venue availability, travel disruption, economic cycles, geopolitics, and calendar timing.

FY2025 adjusted margin was 34.6%, while the TTM margin was 34.1%. The modest decline does not necessarily imply franchise deterioration because H1 comparisons are affected by event cycling and timing, but it highlights the need to normalize the portfolio over a full calendar.

5. Customer embedding, retention, and sales model

RELX usually sells direct through dedicated enterprise sales forces. This matters because salespeople can map products to customer economics, bundle capabilities, and negotiate multi-year terms. Self-service exists for some articles, books, individual reference products, event admissions, and open-access publication charges, but it is not the core group model.

Workflow embedding is the main retention mechanism. Insurance tools feed underwriting and claims decisions inside carrier infrastructure. Risk services are delivered through APIs, batch processes, and real-time decision platforms. Clinical products can integrate with electronic health records; research systems interoperate with institutional systems. Legal tools work within Microsoft Word and document-management environments, while regulatory and matter-management products hold customer processes and history. RX's dashboards combine registration, directory, matchmaking, and lead-retrieval data.

Switching cost comes from more than a contract. A replacement must recreate data coverage, accuracy, auditability, user training, integrations, permissions, security approval, and internal policy. In regulated or professional work, the downside of a missed fraud signal, incorrect precedent, incomplete medical evidence, or broken workflow can exceed the subscription price. That supports renewals, but investors should not confuse switching costs with immunity: customers can multi-source data, generic AI can change user expectations, procurement can challenge price increases, and large customers may build internal tools.

6. Competitive landscape

Competition varies by segment and product; RELX is not protected by a single group-wide moat.

Segment	Principal competitive set	Basis of competition
Risk	Specialist fraud, identity, compliance, insurance-data, credit, healthcare-data, and industry-information vendors; customer-built tools	Data breadth and freshness, match accuracy, decision performance, latency, workflow integration, regulatory compliance, and price
STM	Springer Nature, Clarivate, Wolters Kluwer, learned societies, specialist publishers, software vendors, customer-built tools	Journal quality, author preference, citations, content breadth, research workflow, analytics, institutional value, open-access terms
Legal	Thomson Reuters Westlaw, Wolters Kluwer CCH, Bloomberg, Harvey and other legal-AI vendors, customer-built systems	Authoritative coverage, citator quality, drafting and analytics, AI accuracy, citations, security, workflow integration, jurisdictional depth
Exhibitions	Informa, Clarion, German Messe operators, trade associations, venue owners, digital marketing channels	Event brand, audience quality, sector relevance, geography, exhibitor return, lead generation, price, and execution

RELX's broadest advantages are proprietary or hard-to-assemble data, trusted brands, domain taxonomies and knowledge graphs, customer distribution, and the ability to reuse technology across a large installed base. The annual report says the group analyzes more than 130 billion transactions annually and maintains over 105 million scientific publication records and more than 207 billion legal and news documents and records. Scale alone is not a moat; its value depends on rights, curation, linkages, outcome accuracy, and access at the point of decision.

AI changes the competitive boundary. Generic models make summarization and drafting abundant. They may reduce the value of undifferentiated search interfaces. Conversely, regulated professional users need grounding, citation, confidentiality, recency, and liability-aware workflows. RELX can therefore gain if AI shifts value from finding documents to producing trusted work. Partnerships such as Legal's integration with Harvey also show that RELX can distribute authoritative content through third-party interfaces rather than insisting that all users remain inside its own front end.

7. Cost structure, capital intensity, and cash conversion

RELX has low physical capital intensity but meaningful software and data investment. On the June 2026 TTM basis, net operating cash flow was GBP2,881 million. Purchases of property, plant and equipment were only GBP21 million, while internally developed intangible expenditure was GBP541 million. Total core capex was therefore GBP562 million, about 5.8% of TTM revenue and 19.5% of operating cash flow. Free cash flow after this capex was GBP2,319 million, a 23.9% margin.

This distinction is important. Describing RELX as asset-light can obscure the economic necessity of software development, content systems, data pipelines, AI, security, and cloud infrastructure. Some development spending is capitalized, so adjusted operating profit should be interpreted together with cash flow and capitalized development. The group also reported more than 12,000 technologists and approximately USD2 billion of annual technology spending in its 2025 annual report, underscoring that product investment is central rather than incidental.

TTM adjusted operating profit of GBP3,417 million reconciled to statutory operating profit of GBP3,122 million after acquired-intangible amortization and acquisition-related adjustments. Statutory profit is the better anchor for accounting comparability; adjusted profit is the issuer's segment-management measure and is useful for operating trends. Both need to be tracked.

Balance-sheet deployment has become aggressive. At 30 June 2026, net debt was GBP8,733 million and net debt to adjusted EBITDA was 2.3 times, versus GBP7,201 million and 2.0 times at year-end 2025. TTM share repurchases were GBP2,250 million and dividends were GBP1,208 million, together exceeding GBP2,319 million of post-core-capex free cash flow. The company retains investment-grade-oriented leverage discipline, but recent repurchases were partly debt-funded in economic terms. That can enhance per-share growth when valuation is attractive; it also reduces resilience and raises the importance of sustained cash conversion.

8. Regulation, data rights, and trust

Data rights are both an input moat and a potential constraint. Risk uses personal data from public records, government sources, partners, proprietary datasets, devices, and contributory databases. Changes in privacy legislation or enforcement could limit collection, matching, transfer, retention, or permissible use. The consequences can include reduced product effectiveness, higher compliance cost, fines, litigation, and reputational damage. Connected-car, identity, healthcare, and government applications are particularly sensitive because consent, purpose limitation, fairness, and explainability matter.

Intellectual property is equally central in STM and Legal. RELX relies on contracts, copyright, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. Legislative or judicial changes could weaken protection; third parties may use AI to copy, summarize, or substitute for proprietary content. RELX says customer contracts include provisions governing use of proprietary content by large language models. Enforcement may protect value, but overly restrictive access could also conflict with customer expectations or emerging policy on research and AI.

Primary research publishing faces regulation and funder mandates that favor open access. The commercial issue is not simply whether articles become open; it is whether Elsevier can preserve attractive economics, author preference, quality, integrity, and institutional relationships as the payer shifts. Research fraud is rising in sophistication, and generative AI lowers the cost of producing plausible but invalid submissions. Failure to detect fraud could harm journals and the broader Elsevier brand.

Cybersecurity is a group-wide operating requirement. RELX holds sensitive personal, professional, legal, and customer data and depends on cloud, network, software, data, and model providers. A breach or prolonged outage could interrupt customer decisions, expose confidential information, and trigger regulatory and contractual consequences. Reliance on third-party large

language models also creates supplier, cost, model-behavior, and continuity risk.

9. AI: opportunity and threat

RELX has more than 15 years of extractive-AI experience, especially in Risk. Its generative-AI approach combines multiple models with proprietary content, knowledge graphs, linking, context engineering, domain expertise, validation, citations, and privacy controls. This is strategically sensible: the durable asset is the governed decision system, not the model layer.

The opportunity differs by segment. In Risk, AI can improve entity resolution, fraud detection, authentication, and automated decisions across more use cases. In STM, it can help researchers search, compare, and synthesize literature; assist clinicians and students; improve publishing workflows; and detect integrity problems. In Legal, it can convert research into drafting and personalized work product, raising value per user. In RX, AI can improve marketing, matchmaking, recommendations, pricing, and event-team productivity.

Evidence of customer pull is strongest in Legal. The official 2025 report says more than half of new and renewing US customers were adopting Lexis+ AI, and H1 2026 commentary described continued double-digit growth in Law Firms & Corporate Legal. STM reported adoption and usage growth across Scopus AI, Sherpath AI, and newer tools. These signals support monetization, but investors need harder disclosure over time: paid penetration, price uplift, renewal rates, usage, compute cost, and whether AI products expand seats or merely defend existing subscriptions.

The threat has four layers. First, generic AI can commoditize basic search and summarization. Second, new legal and scientific software providers can own the user interface and pressure RELX into a content-supplier role. Third, hallucination or incorrect advice can damage trust and create liability. Fourth, AI-assisted cyberattacks, fraud, and fake research raise the cost of keeping systems safe and authoritative. The bear case is not that AI eliminates RELX overnight; it is that RELX must reinvest heavily while customers capture much of the productivity benefit and competitors erode pricing.

10. What the financial history says

The June 2026 right edge shows modest reported revenue growth with stronger profit and per-share progression. H1 2026 revenue was GBP4,871 million versus GBP4,741 million in H1 2025, an increase of 2.7%. Adjusted operating profit rose 4.5% to GBP1,727 million, taking the half-year adjusted margin from 34.8% to 35.5%. Statutory operating profit increased 6.4%, shareholder net income increased 20.2%, and diluted EPS rose from GBP0.526 to GBP0.654. The EPS growth benefited from both profit growth and a lower diluted share count.

At segment level, TTM revenue reached GBP9,720 million and adjusted operating profit GBP3,417 million. Compared with FY2025, the TTM construction shows Risk revenue up GBP62 million and profit up GBP37 million; STM revenue up GBP47 million and profit up GBP28 million; Legal revenue up GBP59 million and profit up GBP20 million; Exhibitions revenue down GBP6 million and profit down GBP8 million; and print revenue down GBP32 million. Because TTM and FY2025 overlap, these are trajectory indicators rather than conventional year-over-year growth rates.

The highest-quality signal is broad margin progression. Group adjusted margin improved from 34.85% in FY2025 to 35.15% TTM. Risk, STM, and Legal all expanded, consistent with management's strategy of holding underlying cost growth below revenue growth while shifting toward higher-value analytics. Legal's acceleration is particularly important because it combines the group's lowest principal-segment margin with the clearest generative-AI adoption, offering the greatest visible operating-leverage runway. Exhibitions should be judged across full event cycles, and print should be treated as a shrinking cash contributor.

Cash generation remains strong, but capital returns have outpaced internally generated free cash flow recently. Net debt rose and leverage reached 2.3 times adjusted EBITDA at H1 2026. This does not invalidate the quality case, but it raises the hurdle for buybacks and acquisitions. Per-share compounding will be strongest if organic analytics growth and margin expansion fund repurchases without further leverage drift.

11. Key risks and analytical watchlist

- **AI monetization versus defense:** track paid adoption, price uplift, renewal, usage, compute expense, and the share of growth that is genuinely incremental.
- **Data access and privacy:** watch regulation of personal, connected-car, healthcare, government, and identity data, plus customer consent and cross-border transfer rules.

- **Copyright and content substitution:** monitor licensing arrangements, litigation, model-training rules, and whether third-party AI interfaces weaken direct customer ownership.
- **Research integrity and open access:** rising fraudulent submissions, funder mandates, author preferences, and payment-model changes can affect both cost and brand value.
- **Competition and self-build:** large customers can multi-source data or build internal tools; new AI vendors can control workflow even when RELX supplies content.
- **Cybersecurity and supplier dependence:** sensitive datasets and reliance on cloud, software, data, and model providers make outages and breaches financially material.
- **Event cyclicality:** venue availability, travel, geopolitics, disease, weather, business confidence, and non-annual event timing create volatility in RX.
- **Capital allocation:** targeted acquisitions can add valuable datasets, but acquired-intangible charges, integration risk, and debt-funded buybacks can dilute returns.
- **Foreign exchange and geographic concentration:** accounts are in GBP, while North America dominates Risk and Legal; currency moves affect translation and US regulation matters disproportionately.
- **Talent and reinvestment:** RELX competes for engineers, data scientists, editors, salespeople, and domain experts. Underinvestment could protect near-term margin at the expense of product relevance.

12. Bottom-line primer conclusion

RELX is a high-margin, cash-generative professional information company whose competitive position comes from combining authoritative content, proprietary and contributory data, domain expertise, analytics, direct distribution, and workflow integration. Approximately 84% of FY2025 revenue was electronic, and Risk, STM, and Legal together generated more than 83% of group revenue. Their products are small relative to customer cost bases but consequential to decisions, supporting retention and pricing.

The company's current strategic transition is from access to information toward trusted, AI-enabled work. The June 2026 financial edge supports that direction: principal information segments expanded margins, Legal accelerated, and free cash flow remained strong. The core underwriting issue through 30 June 2031 is whether RELX's proprietary sources and embedded workflows let it capture enough of AI's productivity value to offset heavier reinvestment, new interfaces, privacy and copyright constraints, and the commoditization of basic search. If it does, Legal's margin runway and analytics growth across Risk and STM can sustain compounding. If it does not, today's high margins may attract more substitution and regulatory scrutiny than the market expects.

Sources

- **Primary financial source:** RELX PLC Quantitative Foundation, dated 23 August 2026, sections P0-P6, stored at C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\quant_foundation.md. Reconciliation status: 8/8 checks passed.
- **Independent financial verification:** RELX PLC Quantitative Foundation Review, dated 23 August 2026, stored at C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\quant_foundation_review.md. Verdict: cleared for Wave 1.
- **Primary qualitative source:** [RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), business model, segment reviews, and principal risks.
- **Current-period qualitative source:** [RELX H1 2026 interim results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), released 23 July 2026.

All quantitative figures in this primer are taken from, or arithmetically derived from, the sealed quantitative foundation. Official annual and interim reports are used for product descriptions, customer mix, sales channels, geographic context, competitive positioning, management commentary, and risks. No local warehouse cache was used.

Appendix M - Management Assessment

RELX PLC — Management Assessment

Information cutoff: 23 August 2026 **Management gate: PASS Framework note:** RELX is a UK-incorporated foreign private issuer, so the controlling governance and pay documents are its UK annual report, Directors' Remuneration Report, AGM materials and Form 20-F—not a US DEF 14A. Capital allocation and recent-action facts below are controlled by Sections 7 and 9 of the verified `data_package.md`; leadership, governance, incentives and question-handling were checked against freshly retrieved RELX primary sources.

1. Who is running the company

RELX is being run by an unusually seasoned central team. Erik Engstrom has been Chief Executive Officer since November 2009 and had already led Elsevier from 2004. Before RELX he was a General Atlantic partner, a senior publishing executive at Random House and Bantam Doubleday Dell, and a McKinsey consultant. He therefore owns the current portfolio architecture: the long shift from print/reference products toward embedded analytics and decision tools, the priority given to organic product development, and the use of small acquisitions to add data or functionality rather than transform the group.

Nick Luff has been CFO since September 2014. He was previously group finance director of Centrica and CFO of P&O, began at KPMG, and is a chartered accountant. Eleven-plus years in role means the current leverage range, dividend framework, buyback escalation, acquisition funding and adjusted-metric presentation are his record, not inherited policy.

The current operating bench is predominantly internal and long-tenured. In July 2026 Mike Walsh, with RELX since 2003 and CEO of Legal since 2011, also became CEO of Risk. Kumsal Bayazit, with RELX since 2004, has led Scientific, Technical & Medical since 2019. Hugh Jones, with RELX since 2011, has led Exhibitions since 2020. The dual-hatting of Risk and Legal under Walsh followed Mark Kelsey's long tenure and is a succession item to monitor, but the internal promotions argue for an institutional operating system rather than a CEO-dependent collection of divisions. ([Current business leaders](https://www.relx.com/our-business/business-leaders))

Paul Walker has chaired the board since March 2021; he previously chaired Halma and was CEO and CFO of Sage. Suzanne Wood, appointed in 2017, is the Senior Independent Director and leads the appraisal of the Chair. The current board has ten members: two executives, the Chair, and seven other non-executive directors. RELX considers every non-executive director independent and the Chair was independent on appointment. Four of ten directors are women. All directors stand for annual re-election. There is no director over the UK Code's usual nine-year independence threshold as of the cutoff. Several non-executives remain active executives elsewhere—Andy Halford at Aareal Bank, Charlotte Hogg at Alter Domus and Bianca Tetteroo at Achmea—but no reviewed biography showed a clearly disqualifying number of listed-company mandates. The main time-commitment issue is ordinary and monitorable, not a present red flag. ([Current board](https://www.relx.com/investors/corporate-governance/board-of-directors))

2. Tenure and track record

Engstrom has been CEO for more than 16 years, so attribution is unusually clean. Three decisions define the record.

Decision owned by current team	Observable result	Assessment
Shift business mix toward analytics and decision tools, sustained through AI transitions	FY2021–FY2025 revenue rose from £7.244bn to £9.590bn; statutory operating margin rose from 26.0% to 31.6%; simple statutory ROIC rose from 16.7% to 23.5%. RELX's broader adjusted ROIC rose from 11.9% to 15.4%.	Strong evidence of value creation, not merely rebranding.
Prioritise internal development and bolt-on M&A over large strategic deals	Core capex rose from £339m in 2021 to £525m in 2025, near 5% of revenue; Risk reached £3.485bn revenue and 37.4% adjusted margin in 2025, while Legal reached £1.806bn and 23.0%.	Investment is consistent with the stated product strategy and returns improved while spending increased.
Restructure Exhibitions after Covid and accelerate the print exit	Exhibitions revenue rose from £534m in 2021 to £1.186bn in 2025 and adjusted margin from 1.9% to 34.6%. Separately disclosed print revenue fell from £586m in 2023 to £399m in 2025 while management retained £185m of adjusted profit.	Management acknowledged the impaired operating model, removed weak events, lowered structural cost and made the residual print drag visible.

These decisions produced both growth and better capital efficiency. The five-year revenue gain was 32.4%, but statutory operating profit increased 60.7%, simple free cash flow rose from £1.677bn to £2.311bn, and diluted weighted-average shares

fell 4.9%. That combination is much harder to fake than adjusted EPS alone.

There is no recent large failed acquisition that management has hidden behind a write-off. The more relevant “decision that did not work” was the pre-Covid Exhibitions cost and event portfolio. Management discontinued weaker shows representing roughly 10% of revenue, later disposed of additional low-fit activities, and explicitly described the lower cost base and changed portfolio in calls. In print, the team separated the residual activities in 2025 and disclosed a 22.8% revenue decline rather than allowing the line to obscure STM and Legal growth. This is evidence of acknowledging and containing declining assets. The remaining weakness is that RELX rarely publishes deal-level post-acquisition returns, so investors can verify aggregate ROIC but not a full acquisition scorecard.

3. Capital allocation behavior

The verified package shows a conservative acquisition program and increasingly aggressive cash returns.

FY2021–FY2025 use	Five-year total	Pattern
Core capex	£2.264bn	Rose with revenue; 4.7%–5.5% of sales.
Share repurchases	£3.801bn	Increased from £1m in 2021 to £1.5bn in 2025.
Dividends paid	£5.264bn	Increased every year in the period.
Cash acquisitions	£0.996bn	Small relative to organic investment and cash return.

The hierarchy is coherent: organic development first, small acquisitions second, a dividend near half adjusted earnings, then surplus-capital buybacks while operating within a typical 2.0–2.5x net-debt/EBITDA range. In FY2025 RELX spent £270m on five acquisitions; acquired businesses contributed £12m of revenue and no adjusted operating profit during RELX ownership that year, too early to support an accretion claim. IDVerse, an identity-document verification platform, was the most significant disclosed deal. H1 2026 added two acquisitions for £103m and one small disposal. No material impairment or divestiture reversal was disclosed in the reviewed set.

Buybacks are the least compelling element. They have reduced the diluted share count, but official filings describe non-discretionary programs and do not show a valuation hurdle or evidence of purchases slowing when the shares are expensive. The 2026 authorization increased to £2.25bn; £1.75bn was completed in H1, another £100m after 1 July, and £400m remained. That helped push net debt to £8.733bn and leverage to 2.3x at June 2026. This remains inside the stated range, but it is mechanical capital return, not demonstrably price-sensitive repurchasing. A future move beyond 2.5x for buybacks, or continued repurchases while organic product investment fell below the historical 5%-of-revenue level, would weaken the stewardship case.

4. Compensation alignment

Alignment is strong in design and ownership, although 2026 maximum opportunity is high.

In 2025 the annual incentive was 90% financial—revenue, adjusted net profit after tax and cash flow, each at 30%—and 10% sustainability objectives. The outcome was 80.7% of maximum. Half was paid in cash and half deferred into shares for three years. The 2023–2025 LTIP was 40% adjusted EPS growth, 40% ROIC and 20% relative TSR; it vested at 89.8% after 9.8% average adjusted EPS growth, ROIC above 14%, and TSR between median and upper quartile across comparator groups. That is a better design than revenue/TSR optics alone because 80% of the long-term plan directly tests earnings and capital efficiency.

For 2026, shareholders approved a higher policy: CEO annual incentive up to 300% of salary, CFO up to 225%, and LTIP face value of 600% and 450% respectively. The LTIP remains 40% EPS, 40% ROIC and 20% TSR, with a three-year performance period and two-year post-vesting hold. The scale is rich, but the hurdles became more demanding—maximum ROIC for the 2026–2028 cycle is 15.4%—and the remuneration policy received 93.5% shareholder support at the April 2026 AGM. ([2026 AGM result](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/agm-information-for-relx-plc/agm-2026-results.pdf))

Actual skin in the game is substantial. At 31 December 2025 Engstrom directly held 1,180,001 ordinary-share interests excluding deferred AIP shares, and Luff held 289,260. Including eligible deferred shares, their holdings equalled 2,569% and 1,066% of salary, far above the then 450% and 300% requirements. Requirements rose in 2026 to 600% and 450%, and a two-year post-employment holding rule applies. ([2025 governance and remuneration report](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/2025-ar-sections/relx-2025-governance.pdf))

Malus and clawback cover material misstatement, erroneous calculation, misconduct, fraud, reputational damage, material financial harm, corporate failure and restrictive-covenant breaches; recovery runs three years after AIP cash payment and five years from each LTIP cycle's start. The Form 20-F also incorporates securities-dealing and restricted-person codes. The reviewed annual report does not state a simple US-style standalone prohibition on all personal hedging and pledging, so that exact protection is less transparent than ideal; no hedge or pledge by either executive was disclosed.

Stock-based compensation is disciplined. Fresh live FMP cash-flow pulls show £45m, £46m, £56m, £66m and £63m for 2021–2025, equal to approximately 0.62%, 0.54%, 0.61%, 0.70% and 0.66% of revenue. Buybacks far exceeded this expense and share count fell, so compensation has not produced chronic dilution.

5. Disclosure quality and candor

RELX reports full results semiannually rather than quarterly. I therefore reviewed the eight consecutive official results calls available over the equivalent four-year window: FY2022 through H1 2026. The pattern is direct, technically detailed and consistent, but guidance is deliberately qualitative.

Call	Tough topic and response	Candor assessment
FY2022	Acknowledged slowing personal-finance activity in Risk and weaker China JV profit; identified offsets in compliance and insurance.	Direct; did not hide sub-segment softness.
H1 2023	Quantified open-access submission growth above 20% and answered that interest-rate-cycle exposure in Risk was very low.	Good voluntary metrics.
FY2023	Gave pay-to-publish submissions above 30% and articles published in a 20%–30% range; explained inflation was not the pricing driver.	Specific and economically useful.
H1 2024	Said print declines were roughly twice normal, unlikely to reverse that year, and admitted research-integrity controls were not perfect.	Strong candor on adverse facts.
FY2024	Faced the question that STM had not accelerated since the 2022 investor day; blamed accelerated print exit and would not promise whether acceleration came in 2025.	Honest, but the answer lacked a dated proof point.
H1 2025	Said it was too early to give Protégé penetration, but quantified majority shares of both new sales and renewals on Lexis+ AI; denied a trend break in university cancellations.	Appropriate restraint with partial metrics.
FY2025	Addressed AI-native competition with enterprise subscriptions more than doubling, users in the hundreds of thousands, nearly 300 workflows, and Risk growth split 6 points new products / 2 points mature.	Excellent response to a load-bearing threat.
H1 2026	Quantified roughly 90% of Legal new-sales value and 75% of renewal value on Lexis+ with Protégé, LeapSpace active users nearly doubling in 90 days, and token cost below 1% of group costs.	Best disclosure in the series.

Hedged language is present but mostly bounded. "Too early" appeared at least once in five of eight calls, "uncertainty" in three, and "headwind" in only one. The first two were generally attached to genuinely immature adoption curves, event scheduling or country policy, not to current revenue declines. More importantly, later calls replaced early-stage language with adoption, usage and cost numbers. There was no recurrent "we do not disclose" response in the transcripts.

Guidance discipline is credible but not maximally informative. RELX typically guides to "strong" underlying revenue, profit and constant-currency EPS growth rather than point ranges. FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025 each delivered strong underlying outcomes after those outlooks, and the April and July 2026 updates reaffirmed the FY2026 outlook. There was no reviewed guidance miss. However, the broad verbal bands make the record easier to meet than a numeric guide would be. Disclosure is strongest on product adoption and segment drivers, weakest on acquisition returns and repurchase valuation.

Official transcripts:
[FY2022](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2022-transcript.pdf), [H1 2023](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/interim-results-2023-transcript.pdf), [FY2023](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2023-transcript.pdf), [H1 2024](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2024-transcript.pdf

), [FY2024](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2024-transcript.pdf), [H1 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2025-transcript.pdf), [FY2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2025-transcript.pdf),[H1 2026](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2026-transcript.pdf).

6. Strategic coherence

Management's repeated formulation is that its "strategic direction is unchanged": combine proprietary content and comprehensive datasets with advanced technology and deep customer understanding, then shift the mix toward higher-growth analytics and decision tools. The 2025 report says organic growth remains the priority, supported by targeted acquisitions; the board approved a 2026–2028 plan on that basis. ([2025 annual report](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf))

The investment pattern supports the claim. Development capex remains near 5% of revenue, M&A is small and capability-led, Risk is already over 90% machine-to-machine, Legal is migrating customers onto an AI-enabled core platform, STM is launching research-grade AI tools, and Exhibitions is adding digital services while retaining its face-to-face economics. This is a 10-year direction, not a sequence of pivots.

Management also names threats directly: general-purpose and AI-native competitors in Legal, open-access and research-integrity issues in STM, autonomous driving in insurance, privacy and FTC obligations in Risk, and geopolitical disruption in Exhibitions. The answers can be optimistic, but they identify why RELX believes trusted content, contributory data, workflow integration and customer embedding are defensible. The best falsifier is whether AI-product adoption continues to translate into renewal value and rising ROIC without a step-up in token, cloud or content-acquisition costs.

7. Governance flags

There is one ordinary share class with one vote per share and no controlling shareholder or dual-class arrangement. The Form 20-F says major shareholders have no different voting rights and RELX knows of no arrangement likely to produce a change of control. Related-party transactions were normal-course: £24.4m of sales to joint ventures and associates in 2025, £8.0m owed to RELX and £4.7m due from RELX; no executive-related transaction of comparable concern was disclosed.

Controls are clean. Management and EY concluded internal control over financial reporting was effective at 31 December 2025; the Form 20-F did not indicate an error correction or clawback-triggering restatement. There was no material weakness. ([2025 Form 20-F](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/20f/relx-form-20f-2025.pdf))

The main legacy issue is Risk's US privacy and consumer-information history. Subsidiaries remain subject to FTC consent orders dating from 2006 and 2008, and the filing describes ordinary-course privacy litigation and regulatory settlements with monitoring obligations. RELX says resulting compliance costs are not expected to be material. This is not a fresh enforcement event, but it is a real governance monitor: a breach of those orders, a material privacy penalty, or evidence the old controls are ineffective would directly challenge the PASS.

Director share interests increased modestly during 2025—Engstrom from 1,175,520 to 1,180,001 and Luff from 286,267 to 289,260—and no clustered discretionary insider-selling pattern appeared in the annual/20-F/current issuer disclosures reviewed. As a foreign issuer RELX does not provide the same Form 4 stream as a US domestic company, so UK PDMR notifications remain the better ongoing check.

8. Peer comparison

Current peer CEO	Five-year stewardship comparison	Relative conclusion
Steve Hasker, Thomson Reuters	Strong AI/product execution: 2025 organic revenue grew 7%, Big Three segments 9%, and adjusted EBITDA margin reached 39.2%. Communication is more numerically guided than RELX, but portfolio restructuring and acquisition intensity make per-dollar stewardship less clean.	RELX has the longer, more internally consistent capital record; Thomson Reuters is more explicit on numeric outlook.
Stacey Caywood, Wolters Kluwer	Became CEO in February 2026 after successful Legal & Regulatory and Health roles. Wolters Kluwer delivered 6% 2025 organic growth and 18.1% ROIC, but Caywood has not yet accumulated a five-year CEO record.	Strong bench and disclosure, but current-CEO evidence is too short to outrank Engstrom.

Current peer CEO	Five-year stewardship comparison	Relative conclusion
Lee Shavel, Verisk	Since 2022, Verisk simplified around insurance, reported about 27% ROIC and a 56.2% adjusted EBITDA margin in 2025, and returned more than $5bn over three years. It discloses tighter capital-return targets.	Verisk is arguably better on current per-dollar ROIC; RELX is more diversified and has the longer proof period.

Primary peer references: [Thomson Reuters 2025 annual report](https://ir.thomsonreuters.com/static-files/d4676c84-359c-42c3-9f84-8c62552d49a2), [Wolters Kluwer 2025 annual report](https://assets.contenthub.wolterskluwer.com/api/public/content/3210406-wolters-kluwer-2025-annual-report-pdf-8bb01b4e47?v=ddef685b), and [Verisk 2025 annual report](https://www.verisk.com/496732/siteassets/media/corporate-social-responsibility/downloads/verisk-2025-annual-report.pdf).

On five-year stewardship, Engstrom ranks first of the current set because both strategy and outcomes are unquestionably his. Verisk sets the harder present ROIC benchmark, and Thomson Reuters communicates numerical guidance more precisely, but neither dislodges RELX's combination of durability, rising returns, disciplined dilution and candid transition management.

9. Management-gate verdict

PASS. Engstrom and Luff have owned the strategy and capital structure long enough to be judged, and the evidence clears the bar: FY2021–FY2025 revenue, margins, free cash flow, ROIC and per-share value all improved while acquisition spend stayed modest and SBC stayed below 1% of revenue. Incentives place 80% of LTIP weight on EPS and ROIC, executive ownership is real, governance is one-share/one-vote, and eight consecutive official results calls show a pattern of answering difficult questions with increasingly specific operating metrics.

This is not an unqualified endorsement. Compensation opportunity rose sharply in 2026; buybacks are not visibly valuation-sensitive and accelerated leverage to 2.3x; deal-level return disclosure remains thin; and legacy US privacy consent orders require continued compliance. None currently outweighs the demonstrated 16-year stewardship record. The gate would be reconsidered if buyback-funded leverage exceeded the stated 2.5x ceiling, adjusted or statutory ROIC declined for two consecutive years while LTIP still paid materially, Mike Walsh's dual Risk/Legal role produced execution slippage, or a material breach of privacy/FTC obligations emerged.

Appendix W - Moat and 2046 Durability

RELX PLC — Moat and 2046 Durability

Assessment date: 2026-08-23. **Twenty-year test date:** 2046-08-23. **Financial anchor:** TTM ended 2026-06-30. **Trade execution authorized:** `false`.

RELX's moat is not "content" in the abstract and not its access to large language models. It is the combination of legally usable and hard-to-assemble source material, domain-specific data structures, outcome feedback, trusted brands, direct enterprise distribution, and workflow integration at decisions where an error is expensive. The combination is strongest in Risk, STM, and Legal, which represented 83.4% of FY2025 revenue and 82.2% of reportable-segment adjusted operating profit. Exhibitions has real but more local, cyclical marketplace advantages. Print is a profitable run-off, not a durable moat. The relevant test is whether customers still pay RELX for governed, auditable professional decisions when generic information retrieval and drafting become nearly free.

1. Moat taxonomy applied

Network effects — selective, not group-wide. Risk has the clearest data network effects. More than 25 contributory databases, transaction observations, insurance records, and customer outcome feedback can improve entity resolution, fraud detection, and underwriting signals, which in turn support usage and further contributions. The May 2026 Risk seminar disclosed about 145 billion digital transactions processed annually, more than 400 million observed daily, and more than one trillion sanctions checks; scale is useful because it refreshes patterns, not because the raw count itself is proprietary. RX exhibitions have local two-sided network effects: the event attracts exhibitors because relevant buyers attend and attracts buyers because important suppliers exhibit. STM's citations, authors, peer reviewers, institutional usage, and journals reinforce discoverability and prestige, but this is partly a reputation system rather than a pure network effect. Legal has little direct user-to-user network effect; its defensibility comes from authoritative coverage and embedding.

Switching costs — strong in Risk and Legal, moderate-to-strong in STM, event-specific in RX. A Risk replacement must pass data-quality, model-performance, security, compliance, and procurement reviews and be re-integrated into APIs or batch decision flows. Legal switching requires retraining, source and citator validation, workflow migration, document-security approval, and often changes to firm policy. STM institutions can change subscriptions and publishing arrangements, so access alone is not locked in; switching becomes harder where Scopus, ScienceDirect, research-management, clinical, education, and analytics tools touch institutional processes. RX has no contractual lock comparable with software: exhibitors can redirect marketing budgets, but abandoning a must-attend event can mean abandoning concentrated access to a sector. RELX's 2025 annual report says products are commonly sold under multi-year contracts, and the viability statement identifies a typical three-year term for many subscription agreements.

Scale economies — very strong across the information businesses. RELX can spread content acquisition, editorial work, data engineering, security, identity resolution, knowledge graphs, model evaluation, sales coverage, and a shared technology platform across a global installed base. The company reported more than 12,000 technologists and roughly US$2 billion of annual technology spending. An additional digital query or transaction can have low marginal delivery cost, although maintaining authoritative inputs and product quality is not costless. Scale also allows RELX to evaluate multiple external models, pre-process content once, and route tasks efficiently. Management said in July 2026 that token costs remained below 1% of the group cost base. Scale is an advantage only while product accuracy and customer outcomes remain superior; a large obsolete library is not a moat.

Brand — powerful where trust and status affect customer choice. Elsevier journal titles, ScienceDirect, Scopus, LexisNexis, Shepard's, Lexis, and leading RX event brands carry reputational capital. In STM, journal prestige influences author submissions, readership, citations, hiring, and funding decisions. In Legal, brand reduces perceived risk when a lawyer must rely on current authority. In exhibitions, brand is specific to each vertical and geography rather than transferable across the whole portfolio. Risk's corporate brand matters less than measured decision performance and data coverage. Brand therefore reinforces the underlying product but cannot substitute for accuracy or fair treatment of authors and customers.

Regulatory position — a barrier created by compliance capability, not a protected license. RELX generally does not possess an exclusive regulatory franchise. It does, however, operate where privacy, sanctions, financial-crime compliance, healthcare data, public records, legal confidentiality, and research integrity require governance that a new entrant must reproduce. High-trust procurement favors vendors with audit trails, privacy controls, explainability, security certifications, and long operating histories. The same regulation can destroy value: limits on collection, matching, retention, cross-border

transfer, copyright, or permissible model training can narrow RELX's data advantage. Regulation is therefore a moat amplifier and a material threat, not a stand-alone moat.

Intellectual property and exclusive rights — meaningful but incomplete. RELX relies on copyright, contracts, trademarks, trade secrets, patents, and licenses. Rights in journals, commentary, taxonomies, curated databases, software, and proprietary linkages prevent lawful one-click replication. The 2025 annual report says customer contracts govern the use of proprietary content by large language models. Yet public law, open-access articles, public records, and some scientific content are non-exclusive, while legal and policy changes could weaken copyright protection. The durable asset is the cleaned, linked, current, rights-cleared corpus plus workflow and evaluation—not the proposition that every underlying document is exclusive.

High-trust procurement — one of the strongest cross-segment barriers. A false fraud alert, missed sanctioned party, wrong precedent, incomplete clinical answer, or corrupted research record can impose losses far above the price of the product. Customers therefore buy provenance, citations, recency, confidentiality, uptime, and accountable support as well as an answer. This slows vendor substitution and makes a generic model with nominal access to the same public documents an inadequate replacement. The barrier is highest in Risk and Legal, meaningful in clinical and research products, and weaker in exhibitions and print.

2. Per-segment moat and break conditions

Risk — PASS; credible 20-year durability. The moat is a data-and-workflow loop: proprietary and contributory datasets, high-volume observations, entity resolution, domain models, embedded machine-to-machine delivery, and regulated-customer approval. More than 90% of Risk revenue has come from machine-to-machine interactions in the last four official reporting calls. Business Services serves more than 18,000 customers in over 180 countries and territories, while the top 30 contribute less than 30% of that unit's revenue. A competitor attacks by obtaining comparable permissible data, producing better decision lift at lower latency, and making migration safe. It fails if it cannot match coverage, feedback, fraud adaptation, integration, and auditability simultaneously. Earliest break signals are sustained Risk growth below the relevant transaction/end-market rate, margin compression despite stable volumes, loss of contributory datasets, weaker match or fraud outcomes, or large customers shifting production workloads to internal systems.

Scientific, Technical & Medical — PASS; credible 20-year durability, with named open-access and integrity risks. Elsevier's moat is the interlocking system of journal brands, author and reviewer relationships, editorial standards, publication workflows, ScienceDirect distribution, citation and author graphs, and institutional research/clinical tools. Its latest long-term market comparison attributes more than 18% of global research output and 29% of citations to Elsevier journal articles; the excess citation share is imperfect but observable evidence of quality concentration. A challenger can compete title by title, recruit editors, offer better economics, or use open content to build discovery tools. It is harder to recreate decades of trusted journal identity, peer-review infrastructure, linked metadata, and institutional integration. The moat breaks if authors and funders migrate decisively, fraudulent-paper incidence damages the brands, open-access economics compress without offsetting volume/tools, or third-party discovery captures the customer relationship while Elsevier becomes a commodity back-end. Watch submission-to-publication divergence, retractions and integrity cost, renewal/new-sale trends, and the share of growth from databases and tools.

Legal — YELLOW; strong 5-to-10-year moat, unresolved 20-year interface ownership. The moat is authoritative legal and news coverage, editorial updating, citators, jurisdictional taxonomies, customer content, security, direct distribution, and integration into drafting and matter workflows. Public case law alone is not a moat; trusted currentness, citations, proprietary commentary, firm-specific context, and workflow continuity are. The attack comes from Thomson Reuters, Wolters Kluwer, Bloomberg, Harvey and other AI-native interfaces that use customer documents and licensed authorities to own the lawyer's point of work. RELX wins if Lexis+ with Protégé remains the governed platform or if RELX preserves attractive economics as an authoritative-data partner in third-party interfaces. Upgrade to PASS requires AI-enabled renewal value to remain near or above the current 75% through two major renewal cycles, persistent spend uplift, and full-year margin expansion. Downgrade to FAIL if primary user engagement shifts to third-party platforms while Legal growth and margin weaken, or if model/serving cost absorbs the price uplift.

Exhibitions — YELLOW; 5-to-10-year advantages are event-specific, not a uniform 20-year moat. RX owns portfolios of vertical marketplaces with brands, attendee and exhibitor relationships, sector knowledge, local execution, and data that improve matchmaking and measurable lead generation. A rival must coordinate the same high-value participants at sufficient density, which is difficult for a leading event. But the industry is fragmented, RX itself reports global share below 10%, customer budgets are contestable, and venue owners, trade associations, Informa, Clarion, German Messe operators, or

digital channels can compete. The moat breaks event by event when attendee quality, rebooking, yield, or exhibitor return weakens. Earliest signals are repeated organic growth below sector activity, falling space yield or rebooking, discounts, sustained adjusted-margin compression outside event cycling, and digital lead generation substituting for attendance.

Print and print-related — FAIL as a 2046 moat, though it can remain a near-term cash harvest. Print revenue fell from £586 million in FY2023 on the current taxonomy to £399 million in FY2025 and £367 million TTM. The reported margin is high because the remaining base is mature and RELX has outsourced, partnered, or disposed of activities, not because the format has a durable growth advantage. The line breaks through customer migration and fixed-cost deleverage; the earliest sign is continued double-digit revenue contraction accompanied by profit declining faster than planned. The appropriate durability assumption is managed shrinkage toward immateriality, not persistence at a 40%-plus margin.

The blended moat is weaker than Risk or Elsevier alone, but still clears the group gate. Risk, STM, and Legal supplied 83.4% of FY2025 revenue and 82.2% of segment adjusted operating profit, so the equity is primarily exposed to the three information franchises rather than RX or Print. The completed segment work supports two PASS franchises—Risk's outcome-linked data and STM's trust/workflow system—plus a Legal YELLOW, event-specific RX YELLOW, and finite-life Print FAIL. Legal's faster growth is valuable but carries the most important AI ownership question; RX and Print do not upgrade the group durability claim.

3. Margin persistence evidence

The data package provides five years of official consolidated history, not a fully refreshed ten-year statutory series. Within that verified window, statutory operating margin expanded every year from 26.0% in FY2021 to 31.6% in FY2025. That 560-basis-point progression survived inflation, the exhibitions recovery, rapid technology spending, print contraction, open-access transition, and the arrival of generative AI. It is stronger evidence than a single high margin, although part of the expansion reflects post-pandemic normalization in RX and mix shift rather than pure pricing.

Margin evidence	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	TTM / latest
Group statutory operating margin	26.0%	27.2%	29.3%	30.3%	31.6%	32.1% TTM, calculated from £3,122m / £9,720m
Risk adjusted margin	37.0%	37.1%	36.3%	37.0%	37.4%	37.8% TTM
STM adjusted margin	37.8%	37.8%	36.4%	37.4%	38.1%	38.5% TTM
Legal adjusted margin	20.5%	20.9%	21.8%	22.2%	23.0%	23.3% TTM
Exhibitions adjusted margin	1.9%	17.0%	28.6%	32.1%	34.6%	34.1% TTM
Print adjusted margin	n/a	n/a	43.2%	42.0%	46.4%	48.8% TTM

FY2021–FY2022 segment data use the old taxonomy, while FY2023 onward use the current restated taxonomy, so the direction is informative but the boundary is not perfectly comparable. Risk and STM show the strongest moat evidence: both stayed near the high-30s despite active competition and reinvestment. Legal expanded by roughly 280 basis points from FY2021 to FY2025 while introducing AI products. Exhibitions' expansion mostly demonstrates recovery and improved event economics, not a decade-tested moat. Print's high margin alongside sharp revenue decline is harvesting evidence, not durability. The group pattern is consistent with pricing/mix plus scale, but not proof that every segment can hold margins under a major platform shift.

4. AI disruption stress test

Risk is the most protected segment. Its output can look like a prompt-to-answer workflow, but the economic chokepoint lies underneath: permissible identity and event data, contributory networks, continually refreshed fraud patterns, low-latency integration, validation, and regulated production deployment. A foundation model with the same data could reproduce parts of the analytics, but "the same data" is precisely the hard assumption. AI also expands the need for authentication and fraud defense. Risk is therefore platform-adjacent and a likely net beneficiary, provided regulation does not restrict critical inputs.

STM is split. Literature search and summarization are replicable workflows when the relevant content is open or licensed. Journal selection, peer review, research integrity, citation graphs, institutional systems, clinical safety, and authoritative provenance are harder chokepoints. AI may reduce the value of a search interface while increasing the value of integrity screening and evidence-grounded synthesis. The core risk is economic disintermediation: third-party assistants own discovery and pay RELX only for content access. Elsevier must monetize tools or preserve differentiated publishing economics rather than rely on article access alone.

Legal is the most exposed principal segment. Generic research summaries and first-draft documents are prompt-to-output workflows. RELX's moat has to reside in source rights, updating, citations, jurisdictional precision, confidentiality, firm-specific documents, evaluation, and integration—not model quality alone. Current evidence is encouraging: by H1 2026 roughly 90% of new Legal sales value and about three quarters of renewal value were moving through the AI-enabled Lexis+ with Protégé platform. That is product pull, but it is not yet proof of 20-year interface ownership. The downside is that an AI-native provider becomes the lawyer's primary workspace and treats LexisNexis as one replaceable data feed.

Exhibitions is augmented rather than dissolved by AI. Recommendation, pricing, sales productivity, marketing, and matchmaking improve, but physical access to concentrated sector communities remains scarce. Digital channels can substitute for some lead generation and weaken marginal events. Leading must-attend events retain a physical marketplace chokepoint; weaker shows do not.

Print is structurally displaced. AI is not the principal cause, but digital search, workflow products, and changing customer behavior accelerate the same run-off. It is the least protected segment. Overall, the AI case is PASS only because Risk's protected data/decisioning and STM/Legal's authoritative sources and workflow embedding outweigh the commoditization of basic search. Legal remains the lead downgrade watch.

5. The 2046 test

On **2046-08-23**, RELX is plausibly described as follows: RELX provides regulated identity, fraud, insurance, sanctions, legal, scientific, research-integrity, and clinical decision systems to enterprises, governments, professional firms, universities, funders, hospitals, researchers, and event participants. Risk has grown into the largest profit pool as synthetic identity, autonomous commerce, cyber-enabled fraud, and real-time compliance make verified entities and governed decisions more valuable. Elsevier still operates journals and research infrastructure, but revenue has shifted further from article access toward publishing services, integrity verification, linked research graphs, institutional analytics, and clinical/research workflows. Legal still supplies authoritative law and firm-specific decision systems, although the visible interface may be Lexis, a partner's agent, or both. RX retains a smaller portfolio of globally or regionally essential vertical marketplaces with continuous digital engagement around concentrated physical events. Print is immaterial or gone. Directionally, group adjusted margin is stable to modestly higher than today: Risk and scaled workflow tools offset lower-margin model, compute, integrity, and compliance costs, while Print no longer contributes an unusually high run-off margin. Customers still pay because RELX controls or governs current, rights-cleared, linked professional evidence; verifies provenance and identity; integrates into production decisions; and bears the cost of keeping those systems auditable.

The 2046 bear description is also concrete. RELX has become a lower-growth content wholesaler. Open-access mandates and alternative publishing platforms weaken journal pricing and author allegiance; third-party legal and scientific agents own the user interface; public-data policy and privacy rules narrow Risk's permissible inputs; customer-owned data and cheaper models equalize decision quality; and large institutions multi-source or self-build. RX loses marginal events to continuous digital marketplaces, and Print disappears. Adjusted margins fall because RELX must fund content, integrity, compute, and compliance while platforms capture the productivity rent. This outcome is plausible but not the base case—roughly a one-in-four qualitative risk over 20 years—because it requires erosion across several partly independent franchises. The more probable adverse path is selective: Legal or STM loses interface economics while Risk remains strong. That probability is high enough to demand monitoring, but not high enough to fail a company whose core data, trust, and workflow assets are already observable.

6. Competitive threat inventory

Threat	Mechanism	Segment(s) affected	Earliest observable signal	Plausibility
AI-native interface disintermediation	Third-party agents own research/drafting and reduce RELX to a content feed; basic search is commoditized	Legal; STM	AI-platform renewal conversion or spend uplift falls; user engagement shifts to partners; Legal/STM growth slows while compute and product costs rise	High
Data-rights and publishing reset	Privacy limits data use; copyright weakens; open access changes payer economics; research fraud harms journal trust	Risk; STM; Legal	Dataset loss, product-performance deterioration, major adverse regulation/litigation, author or funder migration, retractions and integrity cost rising faster than publication revenue	Medium-high

Threat	Mechanism	Segment(s) affected	Earliest observable signal	Plausibility
Customer self-build and specialist substitution	Large customers combine their data with cheaper models or best-of-breed vendors; event customers move spend to other channels	Risk; Legal; STM; Exhibitions	Lower renewals/new sales, vendor consolidation against RELX, sustained share loss, weaker event rebooking/yield, margin compression despite stable end markets	Medium

Cybersecurity is a severe cross-cutting operational threat rather than a separate competitive mechanism: a breach can destroy the trust on which all three information moats depend. Exhibitions also faces a distinct cycle/geopolitical threat; it can damage earnings without proving that the strongest events have lost their marketplace moat.

7. Pricing power verification

Pricing power is observable but disclosed unevenly. RELX does not publish group churn, net revenue retention, product ARR, renewal rates, or a clean price/volume bridge, so the case must not be overstated. The best direct evidence is in Legal; Risk and STM rely more on margin persistence, recurring contracts, adoption, and value-per-decision economics.

Segment	Observable evidence	Contract / adoption evidence	Calibration
Risk	8% underlying revenue growth and 10% adjusted-profit growth in FY2025 and H1 2026; margin rose to 38.5% in H1 2026	Subscription plus transactional/volumetric contracts; more than 90% machine-to-machine revenue; strong new sales in Business Services and Insurance	PASS, but no disclosed pure price/churn split
STM	FY2025 margin 38.1% versus 36.4% in FY2023; H1 2026 underlying revenue/profit growth 6%/8%	Roughly 80% subscription; new AI tools sold or packaged separately; strong renewals/new sales, but longer, fragmented adoption cycles	YELLOW on direct pricing proof
Legal	Management reported double-digit spend uplift on higher-value platforms in H1 2025; H1 2026 underlying revenue/profit growth 10%/13%	Roughly 85% subscription, often multi-year; about 90% of new-sales value and 75% of renewal value on Lexis+ with Protégé by H1 2026	PASS; strongest direct evidence
Exhibitions	FY2025 underlying revenue/profit growth 8%/9% and margin 34.6%; management is widening value-based visitor pricing	Rebooking and event-level yield are not disclosed; demand is transactional and cyclical	YELLOW; portfolio recovery and timing blur pure price
Print	High current margin but FY2023–FY2025 revenue fell 32%	Customer migration dominates; no retention or escalator evidence	FAIL as durable pricing power

Legal's evidence shows customers paying more for an integrated platform rather than simply accepting a list-price increase. That is economically stronger if renewal conversion holds. The three-year average subscription term delays both upgrades and competitive churn, so adoption metrics must be watched over several cycles. Risk's embedded, high-consequence usage and stable high-30s margin are persuasive indirect evidence, but without disclosed price/volume, retention, and contract escalators its pricing score should remain below "fully verified." STM's early AI tools show customer value and usage, yet direct price uplift and renewal disclosure are limited. RX's price sophistication is a strategy statement; event-level yield and rebooking would be better proof.

8. Moat verdict

- **Moat gate: PASS.** Risk has a concrete data/workflow moat; STM has brand, publishing infrastructure, linked evidence, and institutional workflow advantages; Legal has authoritative sources, citations, security, and rapidly adopting AI-enabled workflows but remains YELLOW on 20-year interface ownership. Five-year margin persistence and expansion support the claim, and direct Legal adoption/spend evidence shows that at least one major franchise is monetizing rather than merely defending against AI. The group PASS does not upgrade Exhibitions above YELLOW or Print above FAIL.
- **2046 test: PASS.** A specific 2046 RELX can still sell governed identity, fraud, legal, scientific, research-integrity, and clinical decision systems to named professional buyers at attractive margins. The intact moat is rights-cleared and linked evidence plus outcome data, trust, auditability, direct distribution, and production integration—not current interfaces or model ownership. The highest-probability downgrade path is Legal/STM interface disintermediation; the earliest signals are falling AI-platform renewal conversion or spend uplift, author/funder migration and integrity deterioration, or principal-segment margins compressing despite stable end markets.

Calibration conclusion: PASS is earned, not diplomatic. Risk is the anchor, STM is a separate PASS trust/workflow franchise, and Legal is explicitly YELLOW despite meaningful AI-era adoption. A downgrade to YELLOW is warranted if two of the three information businesses show weakening renewals/new sales or margins for reasons other than currency and deliberate investment; a downgrade to FAIL is warranted if Risk loses its data/decision-performance advantage or if third-party platforms commoditize both STM and Legal without RELX retaining workflow or content economics.

Sources

- [RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), including segment business models, competition, AI, contracts, and principal risks.
- [RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), [presentation](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/results/interim-presentations/2026-first-half-presentation.pdf), and [official transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2026-transcript.pdf).
- [RELX FY2025 official transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2025-transcript.pdf) and [H1 2025 official transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2025-transcript.pdf).
- [Risk Business Services investor seminar transcript, 13 May 2026](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/risk-business-services-seminar-2026-transcript-qa.pdf) and [RELX August 2026 investor overview](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/relx-overview-august-2026.pdf).
- ER2 source-of-truth files: `data_package.md` and `appendix_A_primer.md`, both built from live official/FMP evidence in this run. Quantitative statements above follow the data package; the primer is used only for competitive orientation.

Appendix B1 - Risk

RELX PLC — Risk Segment Deep Dive

Information cutoff: 23 August 2026 **TTM anchor:** 30 June 2026 **Exact five-year forecast horizon:** 30 June 2031 **Reporting currency:** GBP millions unless stated otherwise **Exact segment profit basis: Adjusted operating profit Trade execution authorized:** `false`

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

Risk is one of RELX's five currently modeled reportable lines and comprises Business Services, Insurance, Specialised Industry Data Services, Government Solutions, and a small commercial healthcare portfolio. The boundary changed in FY2025: RELX separated remaining print and print-related activities and moved a small commercial healthcare portfolio from STM to Risk. RELX restated FY2023 and FY2024 on this new basis, but did not restate FY2021-FY2022. Accordingly, all dollar comparisons and forecast anchoring in this appendix use the current-taxonomy FY2023-FY2025 series and H1 2026; FY2021-FY2022 old-basis figures are context only and are never spliced into the current segment series ([RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §1 and §3 Risk table). The sealed statutory bridge defines the segment profit metric as **Adjusted operating profit**. Unallocated central costs, acquired-intangible amortisation, acquisition and disposal items, joint-venture reclassifications, finance costs, tax, and non-controlling interests remain outside Risk and are not allocated here [statutory_bridge.json, FY2025 and TTM periods; data_package §3a forecast-driver ledger].

1. What this segment actually is

Risk is a decision-infrastructure business, not mainly a credit bureau and not simply a database sold through a website. It combines identity, public-record, insurance-claims, business, sanctions, payment, behavioural, industry, and government data with matching logic, predictive models, rules, orchestration software, and application programming interfaces. Customers use the resulting signals at moments when a wrong decision is expensive: onboarding an account, authenticating a returning user, approving a payment, screening a counterparty, pricing an insurance policy, investigating a claim, finding a person or asset, monitoring an industrial market, or allocating public-safety resources. More than 90% of Risk revenue comes from machine-to-machine interactions embedded in customers' real-time decision workflows, a share RELX described consistently across the four most recent results calls [data_package §0a, Workflow and adoption KPI history, Risk row].

Business Services is the largest economic engine at nearly 45% of Risk revenue in the [13 May 2026 Risk Business Services investor seminar](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/risk-business-services-seminar-2026-transcript-qa.pdf), slides 9-10. Its products help banks, fintechs, retailers, telecommunications companies, online platforms, corporates, and other enterprises establish identity, prevent fraud, comply with financial-crime rules, manage account risk, and reduce consumer friction. The product is usually consumed as a high-volume decision or data service through an API or integrated workflow. Revenue can be subscription-like, usage-based, or linked to multi-year volumetric contracts. That distinction matters: machine-to-machine does not mean every pound is a fixed subscription, but it does mean the service is woven into operating processes rather than bought as occasional research.

Insurance, at nearly 40% of Risk revenue in the same 13 May 2026 seminar, supplies underwriting, claims, loss-history, identity, vehicle, property, and related decision tools. Its contributory-database model is economically important. Participating insurers both contribute information and consume the broader industry dataset, increasing its coverage and making a new entrant's cold-start problem more severe. RELX identifies more than 25 contributory databases across Risk [13 May 2026 Risk Business Services investor seminar; data_package §0a operating-scale KPI table]. An insurer can build internal models, but it cannot cheaply recreate an industry-wide history of claims and exposures without participation from many counterparties.

Specialised Industry Data Services, just over 10% of Risk revenue in the 13 May 2026 seminar, provides domain-specific intelligence, data, software, and analytics to professional users in sectors such as chemicals, energy, commodities, aviation, and other complex industries. These workflows compete more directly with specialist price-reporting agencies, market-intelligence platforms, and vertical software. The sources, update cadence, benchmarks, and expert normalization matter as much as the user interface. Government Solutions, about 5% in the same source, serves public-sector investigation, identity, fraud, benefits-integrity, and public-safety use cases. It can be sticky once approved and integrated, but it also faces

procurement cycles, civil-liberties scrutiny, and political budget risk.

The go-to-market is enterprise and domain-led. RELX sells to risk, compliance, fraud, underwriting, claims, operations, and government teams rather than primarily to general IT. Salespeople and solution consultants must map products into regulated workflows, integrate data feeds, validate performance, and support auditability. New sales therefore have longer implementation and trust-building cycles than low-cost horizontal software, but deployments can persist because changing the provider creates model revalidation, operational, regulatory, and false-positive risks. Business Services alone serves more than 18,000 customers across more than 180 countries and territories, with the top 30 customers contributing less than 30% of that unit's revenue [data_package §0a, Latest Risk Business Services operating-scale KPIs]. That breadth limits single-account concentration, although the business remains geographically concentrated: 78% of H1 2026 Risk revenue came from North America [data_package §1].

The basic customer value equation is avoided loss plus improved conversion plus lower manual cost. A fraud tool that blocks more bad transactions is valuable, but a tool that also approves more good customers with less friction is more valuable still. Similarly, an insurance decision product can improve risk selection, shorten claims handling, reduce leakage, and support pricing consistency. That dual benefit creates room for value-based pricing, particularly when the fee is small compared with the transaction, loss, capital, or compliance cost being protected.

2. Current economics

Risk is RELX's largest business area. FY2025 revenue was £3,485m, 36.3% of RELX revenue, and FY2025 **Adjusted operating profit** was £1,305m, a 37.4% margin ([RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §1 and §3 Risk table). For the TTM ended 30 June 2026, Risk revenue is £3,547m, calculated strictly as FY2025 £3,485m less H1 2025 £1,748m plus H1 2026 £1,810m; TTM **Adjusted operating profit** is £1,342m, equal to FY2025 £1,305m less H1 2025 £660m plus H1 2026 £697m ([RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), business-area analysis; data_package §3, §3a and §5). The resulting TTM margin is £1,342m / £3,547m = 37.83%. This is the sole financial forecast anchor.

Reported-currency FY2025 revenue growth was 4.5%, but management's underlying growth measure was 8%, reflecting currency and portfolio effects. H1 2026 underlying revenue growth remained 8%, while underlying **Adjusted operating profit** growth was 10% and the reported H1 margin reached 38.5%, up from 37.8% in H1 2025 ([RELX H1 2026 presentation](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/results/interim-presentations/2026-first-half-presentation.pdf), Risk business-area slide; data_package §5 Risk rows). The cleanest interpretation is that demand and product momentum are stronger than the reported-currency annual comparison suggests and that the segment is currently delivering modest operating leverage. The forecast nevertheless compounds reported GBP from the verified TTM anchor; it does not apply an 8% “underlying” rate mechanically without considering currency, mix, competition, and maturity.

The current disclosed mix is approximate, not a dollar table: Business Services nearly 45%, Insurance nearly 40%, Specialised Industry Data Services just over 10%, and Government about 5% [13 May 2026 Risk Business Services investor seminar, slides 9-10; data_package §0a Risk segment mix]. This exact wording supersedes the less granular FY2025/H1 commentary that Business Services and Insurance were each about 40%; it does not constitute exact percentages. RELX does not disclose product revenue, ARR, NRR, RPO, seats, or product-level margins [data_package §4 and §10]. Therefore this appendix never labels modeled subsegment pounds as historical disclosure. For reconstructable forward arithmetic only, Section 8 normalizes those rounded shares to explicit planning weights of 44.0%, 39.0%, 11.5%, and 5.5%, respectively. The weights sum to 100% and are assumptions, not reported amounts.

Capital intensity is low in physical assets but not costless. Risk requires continuous investment in data rights, cybersecurity, identity resolution, model development, compliance, sales engineering, and platform integration. At group level, FY2025 core capex was £525m, or 5.5% of revenue, with £504m invested in internally developed assets; H1 2026 capex was £292m, including £280m of capitalized development cost ([RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), cash-flow and intangible-asset notes; [RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), cash-flow and capital-expenditure tables; data_package §7). RELX does not allocate this investment to Risk, so this appendix does not invent a segment capex number. The high **Adjusted operating profit** margin should be read after capitalized-development amortisation included in that metric, but before acquired-intangible and other group bridge items that sit below the segment measure.

3. Unit economics

Risk's gross economics begin with data reuse. A public record, contributed insurance claim, device signal, sanctions update, business linkage, or payment-behaviour observation can inform many decisions and many customers. Once acquired, cleaned, linked, governed, and made queryable, incremental machine-to-machine calls generally carry low direct delivery cost. That produces software-like contribution economics, but the analogy has limits. Data must be refreshed; contributory networks must be maintained; third-party rights must be renewed; models must be monitored; privacy and consumer-reporting obligations must be met; and an error can create customer losses or regulatory exposure. The relevant cost curve is “high fixed and recurring stewardship, low incremental delivery,” not “zero-cost data.”

Business Services monetizes four linked sources of customer value. First, identity resolution raises the probability that a customer knows whom it is dealing with. Second, fraud and financial-crime signals reduce expected losses and compliance failures. Third, orchestration and automation reduce manual review. Fourth, better precision can lower false positives and abandonment among legitimate consumers. The final point is strategically important. Customers will not maximize fraud catches at any cost; they optimize the trade-off between fraud loss, regulatory risk, review expense, and conversion. A provider with broader data and better models can earn pricing power because it improves several terms of that equation simultaneously.

The operating-scale indicators are consistent with substantial data-network effects. RELX reported more than 25 contributory databases, more than one trillion sanctions checks annually, about 145bn digital transactions processed annually—including 81bn logins, 2bn new-account creations, and 28bn payments—and more than 400m transactions observed daily [13 May 2026 Risk Business Services investor seminar; data_package §0a operating-scale KPI table]. Those are usage and data-density indicators, not revenue drivers to be multiplied by a price. Their economic significance is that more interactions can improve entity resolution, behavioural baselines, anomaly detection, and model validation. The feedback loop is not perfectly proprietary—customers and competitors possess their own data—but a large, permissioned, cross-customer network can increase signal breadth and time-to-detection.

Insurance economics are reinforced by contribution and workflow depth. Claims-history databases and underwriting information become more useful as participation and record depth increase. Integration into quote, underwriting, and claims systems creates operational switching costs; changing a provider can require mapping fields, recalibrating models, revalidating compliance, retraining users, and accepting a period of performance uncertainty. Revenue can also be sensitive to transaction volumes such as quotes, policies, claims, and mortgage or auto activity. The base case therefore separates structural share and product gains from cyclical volume rather than treating every pound as contracted recurring revenue.

Specialised Industry Data Services has a different cost and pricing structure. Expert editorial work, source relationships, benchmark governance, and vertical sales matter alongside software. Its lower planning margin reflects these content and domain-service costs, but authoritative prices, histories, and benchmarks can support strong retention. Government Solutions carries procurement, credentialing, security, and support costs and may have lumpy awards, yet approved datasets and embedded investigative workflows can be hard to replace.

Margins rise when recurring machine usage grows faster than platform and sales costs, when global solutions are reused across geographies, when manual or legacy infrastructure is consolidated, and when higher-value fraud and compliance products take share. Business Services already generates more than 45% of revenue from global solutions and nearly 30% outside the US, indicating room to reuse intellectual property across markets [data_package §0a]. Margins fall when data acquisition becomes more expensive, regulation requires more audit and remediation, cloud and cybersecurity costs grow faster than usage, customers demand lower unit prices at scale, or new competitors force RELX to spend more on model and workflow development.

The historic margin path supports gradual leverage, not an automatic march upward. On the current taxonomy, Risk's **Adjusted operating profit** margin was 36.3% in FY2023, 37.0% in FY2024, 37.4% in FY2025, and 37.83% for the June 2026 TTM ([RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; statutory_bridge.json TTM period; data_package §3 and §3a). The roughly 154bp improvement from FY2023 to TTM is meaningful but still consistent with incremental operating leverage. Base-case terminal expansion of about 148bp is therefore deliberately measured; the bull requires superior international reuse and product mix, while the bear assumes compliance, data, and competitive costs more than offset scale.

4. Competitive dynamics

Competition is best analyzed by workflow, because no single rival matches Risk's complete perimeter. In fraud, identity, and consumer-information services, competitors include Experian, TransUnion, Equifax, FICO, NICE Actimize, specialist fraud vendors, payment networks, cloud providers, and internally built bank capabilities. In insurance analytics, Verisk is the clearest focused peer, alongside carrier-owned data, insurtech vendors, and specialized modeling providers. In industry data, S&P Global, Bloomberg, LSEG, Argus, Kpler, Fastmarkets, and vertical specialists compete for professional workflows. Government customers can choose other commercial data providers, systems integrators, internally assembled public records, or narrower specialist tools.

Peer growth establishes a useful base-rate range. Verisk, a concentrated insurance-data peer, reported 6.6% organic constant-currency revenue growth and 8.5% adjusted EBITDA growth in 2025, followed by 5.8% and 7.4%, respectively, in Q2 2026. That pattern shows that a scaled, embedded insurance-data franchise can sustain mid-single-digit organic growth with profit growing faster than revenue, but it does not justify permanent double-digit growth ([Verisk 2025 Annual Report](https://www.verisk.com/496732/siteassets/media/corporate-social-responsibility/downloads/verisk-2025-annual-report.pdf); [Verisk Q2 2026 SEC release](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1442145/000143774926024748/ex_968691.htm)).

The credit and identity peers show a wider range because pricing, mortgage volumes, geography, and portfolio mix differ. Equifax grew 2025 revenue 7%; Workforce Solutions grew 6% and U.S. Information Solutions 10%, while Workforce Solutions operating margin expanded from 43.3% to 44.2%. Its Work Number database reached 209m active records and 813m total records, illustrating how contributed employment data can reinforce a verification network ([Equifax 2025 Annual Report](https://assets.equifax.com/assets/corp/2025-Annual-Report.pdf)). TransUnion's Q4 2025 revenue grew 12% organic constant currency, but its initial 2026 guide was 8%-9%, showing that a strong period should not simply be extrapolated ([TransUnion FY2025 results](https://newsroom.transunion.com/transunion-announces-strong-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2025-result/)). FICO's December 2025 quarter was bifurcated: Scores revenue grew 29%, supported by the economics of a dominant scoring standard, while Software ARR grew 5%. That contrast is a warning against assigning one growth rate to every Risk product ([FICO December 2025 Form 10-Q](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814547/000081454726000011/fico-20251231.htm)).

Specialised Industry Data Services competes in a market where scaled peers target mid-to-high-single-digit growth. S&P Global's November 2025 investor-day targets called for 6%-8% organic constant-currency annual growth in Market Intelligence and 6%-8% in Energy. Those are sensible comparative bounds for a mature specialist-data portfolio, not a direct forecast of RELX's smaller lines ([S&P Global 2025 investor-day targets](https://investor.spglobal.com/news-releases/news-details/2025/SP-Global-to-Present-Next-Phase-of-its-Growth-Strategy-and-Medium-Term-Financial-Targets-at-Investor-Day-2025/default.aspx)). Risk's current 8% underlying growth is at the upper end of these scaled-data comparables, which supports the base case but also argues for some deceleration as the segment grows.

RELX's competitive advantage is strongest when several capabilities must work together: permissioned data, historical depth, identity linking, fraud models, decision orchestration, regulatory controls, and low-latency delivery. A startup can outperform on one model or interface, but assembling broad, lawful, continuously updated data and proving performance across regulated enterprise workflows is harder. Conversely, modular architectures and cloud APIs reduce integration friction for challengers. Customers can route transactions across vendors, run challenger models, or retain a primary bureau while adding specialist signals. This makes the moat cumulative rather than absolute.

Pricing power is real but bounded by procurement and measurable return on investment. Risk products protect transactions and compliance outcomes whose economic value often dwarfs the query fee. That permits price increases when RELX demonstrates improved loss avoidance, conversion, or automation. Yet large financial institutions have sophisticated procurement, can benchmark vendors, and may demand volume discounts. Regulators can also constrain how certain data are collected or used. The base case assumes price plus volume and cross-sell produce high-single-digit Business Services growth, not that RELX can raise prices without customer response.

AI is both a product accelerant and a competitive equalizer. Better representation learning, entity matching, anomaly detection, document extraction, and agentic workflow can raise product value. RELX benefits because models need governed data, labels, outcomes, and deployment feedback. But open models and cloud tooling lower the cost of building interfaces and analytics. Banks, insurers, and governments may shift more modeling in-house while purchasing raw or narrow signals from several providers. The decisive question is whether RELX continues to own differentiated data and verified decision performance, rather than merely wrapping widely available information in proprietary software.

5. Moat at the segment level

The segment moat is strong, but it is a bundle of reinforcing advantages rather than one unassailable asset.

First, proprietary and contributory data density. More than 25 contributory databases, high transaction observation, and long histories create coverage and labels that are difficult to reproduce quickly [data_package §0a]. Insurance contributors benefit from the broader pool, while fraud and identity systems improve when they can connect identities, devices, businesses, payments, and outcomes. The defensibility depends on ongoing lawful access and contributor reciprocity; it weakens if data portability, regulation, or customer consortiums make equivalent datasets widely available.

Second, embedded workflow and validation costs. More than 90% machine-to-machine revenue means Risk decisions sit inside production processes [data_package §0a]. Replacing a vendor can require integration, parallel testing, model validation, governance approval, customer-notice changes, and operational retraining. Switching cost is especially high when a false negative creates fraud loss and a false positive blocks a legitimate consumer. Customers can still multi-source, so the moat is stronger in the primary decision layer than in optional supplemental signals.

Third, trust, auditability, and regulatory operating capability. Regulated customers need traceable sources, model monitoring, security, uptime, and documented permissible use. The EU AI Act classifies some creditworthiness and insurance-related applications as high-risk and imposes risk-management, documentation, accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity obligations, while specifically distinguishing certain fraud-detection uses ([EU AI Act](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689)). In the United States, the FCRA restricts who may receive consumer reports and for what purposes ([FTC FCRA overview](https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/statutes/fair-credit-reporting-act)). These obligations raise RELX's costs, but they also raise the minimum viable scale and credibility for competitors.

Fourth, cross-vertical product reuse. Business Services derives more than 45% of revenue from global solutions and serves customers across more than 180 countries and territories [data_package §0a]. Identity, sanctions, entity resolution, and fraud capabilities can be reused across banking, commerce, payments, insurance, and government. Reuse can improve R&D productivity and create more observations, although local data and regulation prevent a single global product from being deployed unchanged everywhere.

Fifth, domain sales and customer breadth. More than 18,000 Business Services customers and sub-30% revenue concentration among the top 30 reduce dependence on a handful of accounts [data_package §0a]. Domain sales, implementation expertise, and established procurement relationships make distribution difficult for a technically strong but unknown entrant. At the same time, a fragmented customer base increases support complexity and does not remove exposure to a common regulatory or platform shock.

The moat is most durable in insurance contributory databases, identity resolution at scale, and heavily validated real-time decision workflows. It is weaker in user interfaces, generic AI models, commoditized public-record aggregation, and some specialist-data niches where strong vertical rivals have their own proprietary sources. Over five to ten years, the central durability test is whether RELX's unique, permissioned, outcome-linked data grow in importance faster than generic models reduce software differentiation. A moat failure would not necessarily appear first as customer losses; it could show up as rising data and R&D costs, more multi-vendor routing, weaker price realization, or flat margins despite strong transaction volumes.

The moat verdict for the segment is **strong but conditional**. It can support high-single-digit growth and high-30s to low-40s **Adjusted operating profit** margins through 2031 if RELX sustains data access, product accuracy, and trusted deployment. It cannot support an assumption of frictionless pricing or permanently accelerating margins. Regulation, cybersecurity, and model accountability are simultaneously barriers to entry and sources of downside.

6. Historical growth rates reproduced from the data package

Only FY2023-FY2025 are comparable on the current taxonomy. The “historical CAGR” below is the two-year CAGR across three fiscal-year points because RELX did not disclose a current-taxonomy FY2022 base. Product and subsegment dollars are a true non-disclosure and are not back-solved from rounded shares [data_package §4, closing note].

Product or sub-segment	FY2023 revenue	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	Historical CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
Risk segment total	£3,224m	£3,336m	£3,485m	4.00% reported, FY2023-FY2025	4.5% reported FY2025; 8% underlying H1 2026	[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; [RELX H1 2026 presentation](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/results/interim-presentations/2026-first-half-presentation.pdf), Risk slide; data_package §3 and §5
Business Services	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Business Services row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Business Services row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Business Services row]	[DATA GAP: subsegment historical CAGR not disclosed] [data_package §4, Business Services row]	Qualitative strong growth [data_package §4, Risk Business Services trend row]	data_package §4 Business Services and trend rows
Insurance	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Insurance row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Insurance row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Insurance row]	[DATA GAP: subsegment historical CAGR not disclosed] [data_package §4, Insurance row]	Qualitative strong growth [data_package §4, Risk Insurance trend row]	data_package §4 Insurance and trend rows
Specialised Industry Data Services	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	[DATA GAP: subsegment historical CAGR not disclosed] [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	data_package §4 Risk mix row; §0a Risk segment mix
Government Solutions	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	[DATA GAP: subsegment historical CAGR not disclosed] [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Risk mix row]	data_package §4 Risk mix row; §0a Risk segment mix

Internal arithmetic checks. FY2023 £3,224m × 1.035 = £3,336.8m versus disclosed FY2024 £3,336m, a 0.02% difference from rounding. FY2024 £3,336m × 1.045 = £3,486.1m versus disclosed FY2025 £3,485m, a 0.03% difference. Both are well within the 2% tolerance. The CAGR tie-out is (£3,485m ÷ £3,224m)^(1/2) − 1 = 4.00%. The source for every disclosed pound value in this check is RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2, reproduced in data_package §3. No product-dollar back-solves are performed.

7. Management guidance from data_package §6

The data package explicitly labels its Risk call entries as source-verified paraphrases rather than verbatim quotations. They are reproduced below without quotation marks. The sole exact excerpt supplied by the package is group-wide: CEO Erik Engstrom said, **“we continue to see positive momentum across the group”** on 23 July 2026 [data_package §6, introduction].

- **FY2024 call, 13 February 2025 — data_package §6 Risk row 1.** Erik Engstrom said Risk growth remained broad-based and more than 90% of revenue came from machine-to-machine interactions. Interpretation: embedded usage supports retention and transaction growth, but does not by itself disclose contract duration or price.
- **H1 2025 call, 24 July 2025 — data_package §6 Risk row 2.** Full-year guidance called for continued strong underlying revenue growth and **Adjusted operating profit** growth slightly faster than revenue. Interpretation: the appropriate forecast anchor is modest operating leverage, not a one-time margin step.
- **FY2025 call, 12 February 2026 — data_package §6 Risk row 3.** Business Services and Insurance each represented about 40% of divisional revenue and both had strong new sales. Interpretation: two large engines are contributing; the forecast should not rely solely on fraud or solely on insurance.
- **H1 2026 call, 23 July 2026 — data_package §6 Risk row 4.** Full-year outlook called for continued strong underlying revenue growth with **Adjusted operating profit** growth exceeding it. Interpretation: an 8% current underlying revenue rate and measured margin expansion are defensible for the near term, subject to reported-currency and portfolio effects.

[DATA GAP: data_package §6 does not provide Risk-specific verbatim transcript quotations beyond the one group-wide excerpt above. To preserve source integrity, paraphrases are not presented as quotes.]

8. Forward growth assumptions

The forecast runs exactly five calendar years from TTM 30 June 2026 to 30 June 2031. Because subsegment dollars are not disclosed, the TTM starting allocations below are explicit analyst planning weights derived from management's approximate current mix and normalized to 100%. They are not represented as reported revenue. Business Services receives 44.0%, Insurance 39.0%, Specialised Industry Data Services 11.5%, and Government Solutions 5.5% of the verified £3,547m TTM segment total. That creates model-only starting amounts of £1,560.7m, £1,383.3m, £407.9m, and £195.1m, which sum exactly to £3,547.0m. The small transferred commercial-healthcare portfolio is not assigned an invented fifth weight because management did not separately quantify it; the four seminar categories are treated as the complete approximate planning perimeter, not as exact disclosed dollars [13 May 2026 Risk Business Services investor seminar, slides 9-10; data_package §0a and §4].

Base case growth

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Business Services	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Qualitative strong; Risk total 8% underlying	Strong Risk growth; profit faster	8.5%	Fraud, identity, FCC, new sales, and non-US reuse sustain high-single digits; peer ranges argue against acceleration forever.
Insurance	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Qualitative strong	Strong Risk growth; profit faster	7.0%	Contributory databases and solution extension outgrow mature insurance-data peers modestly, then normalize.
Specialised Industry Data Services	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Not disclosed	No line-specific guide	5.5%	Embedded vertical data grows near scaled market-intelligence peers; cyclical industries and strong specialists cap upside.
Government Solutions	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Not disclosed	No line-specific guide	4.5%	Identity and public-safety demand is durable, offset by procurement cycles and scrutiny.

Base rationale. The segment's 4.0% reported FY2023-FY2025 CAGR understates the 8% underlying rate disclosed for FY2025 and H1 2026 because currency and perimeter effects matter [data_package §3; §5]. Business Services gets the highest base rate because management identified strong new sales, Financial Crime Compliance, and digital Fraud & Identity as drivers, while nearly 30% non-US mix and more than 45% global-solution mix provide expansion runways [data_package §0a; §6]. The 8.5% CAGR is close to current momentum, not a reacceleration. Insurance at 7.0% is slightly above Verisk's 2025 6.6% OCC growth but below a double-digit assumption, reflecting Risk's new sales and broader solution adoption. Specialised Industry Data Services at 5.5% sits just below S&P Global's 6%-8% medium-term Market Intelligence and Energy targets to allow for smaller niches and cyclical exposure. Government at 4.5% recognizes mission-critical use cases but discounts procurement and policy risk.

Bull case growth

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Business Services	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Qualitative strong; Risk total 8% underlying	Strong Risk growth; profit faster	12.0%	Fraud intensity, AI-enhanced accuracy, payments growth, and international cross-sell sustain low-double-digit growth.
Insurance	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Qualitative strong	Strong Risk growth; profit faster	10.0%	Contributory adoption accelerates and workflow expansion drives price, volume, and cross-sell above Verisk's current rate.
Specialised Industry Data Services	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Not disclosed	No line-specific guide	8.0%	Trusted benchmarks and AI-enabled workflow reach the top of scaled-peer target ranges.

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Government Solutions	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Not disclosed	No line-specific guide	7.0%	Identity, benefits-integrity, and public-safety wins overcome procurement friction.

Bull rationale. Business Services benefits from a positive flywheel: more transactions improve signal quality, better precision wins more customer routing, and more routing generates more data. International expansion reduces reliance on the mature US market, while financial-crime and fraud spending remain priority budgets. Insurance adds new contributors and extends solutions deeper into underwriting and claims. The bull does not assume FICO-like 29% Scores growth, which reflects unusually strong pricing and standard-setting economics; it uses 10%-12% as a demanding but plausible outcome for RELX's broader mix. Specialised Industry Data Services and Government reach high-single digits only if AI improves customer productivity without commoditizing RELX's data.

Bear case growth

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Business Services	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Qualitative strong; Risk total 8% underlying	Strong Risk growth; profit faster	4.0%	Customer insourcing, multi-vendor routing, price pressure, regulation, and lower transactions halve the current underlying pace.
Insurance	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Qualitative strong	Strong Risk growth; profit faster	3.5%	Mature US volumes, carrier bargaining, and Verisk or internal alternatives slow adoption.
Specialised Industry Data Services	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Not disclosed	No line-specific guide	2.0%	Commodity and industrial cycles weaken usage while vertical rivals pressure renewals.
Government Solutions	[DATA GAP: not disclosed]	Not disclosed	No line-specific guide	1.0%	Budget pauses, procurement delays, civil-liberties restrictions, and contract losses nearly flatten revenue.

Bear rationale. The bear is not a collapse scenario; the installed base and machine-to-machine usage should still produce some growth. It assumes, however, that generic AI and cloud tools let customers build more decision logic internally, regulators narrow permissible data use, transaction volumes soften, and specialized vendors take incremental routing. Business Services falls to 4.0%, below Equifax's 2025 7% group growth and TransUnion's current guide. Insurance falls below Verisk's recent rate. The smaller lines become near-GDP businesses. These assumptions are deliberately distinct from base and bull and do not reuse management's “strong” description uncritically.

Year-by-year growth cadence

The following cadences compound to the CAGRs above within rounding and make deceleration or acceleration explicit rather than hiding it in one endpoint.

Case and product	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Equivalent five-year CAGR
Bear Business Services	5.0%	4.5%	4.0%	3.5%	3.0%	4.0%
Bear Insurance	4.5%	4.0%	3.5%	3.0%	2.5%	3.5%
Bear Specialised Industry Data Services	3.0%	2.5%	2.0%	1.5%	1.0%	2.0%
Bear Government Solutions	2.0%	1.5%	1.0%	0.5%	0.0%	1.0%
Base Business Services	9.5%	9.0%	8.5%	8.0%	7.5%	8.5%
Base Insurance	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	6.5%	6.0%	7.0%
Base Specialised Industry Data Services	6.5%	6.0%	5.5%	5.0%	4.5%	5.5%
Base Government Solutions	5.5%	5.0%	4.5%	4.0%	3.5%	4.5%
Bull Business Services	13.0%	12.5%	12.0%	11.5%	11.0%	12.0%
Bull Insurance	11.0%	10.5%	10.0%	9.5%	9.0%	10.0%
Bull Specialised Industry Data Services	9.0%	8.5%	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	8.0%

Case and product	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Equivalent five-year CAGR
Bull Government Solutions	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	6.5%	6.0%	7.0%

The base Business Services cadence starts above Risk's current 8% segment rate because management identified that unit as a leading driver, then decelerates as scale rises. The weighted segment result is a 7.38% CAGR, below the 8% current underlying rate but above the recent reported-currency CAGR. No deceleration is sharper than the peer evidence requires: Verisk moved from 6.6% OCC in FY2025 to 5.8% in Q2 2026, while TransUnion moved from 12% OCC in Q4 2025 toward an 8%-9% 2026 guide. The bear represents a more adverse five-year drift, not an unsupported overnight break.

9. Forward Adjusted operating profit margin assumptions

The verified TTM segment margin is £1,342m divided by £3,547m, or 37.83%. Product-level margins are not disclosed, so the terminal product margins below are explicit analyst assumptions used only to calculate a reconstructable weighted segment margin. They are not historical estimates. No corporate costs or statutory bridge adjustments are inserted.

Case	Product	TTM margin anchor	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	Change mechanism
Bear	Business Services	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	35.5%	Higher data, compliance, cloud, and sales costs plus pricing pressure overwhelm scale.
Bear	Insurance	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	38.0%	Database value remains, but carrier bargaining and model competition limit leverage.
Bear	Specialised Industry Data Services	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	28.0%	Expert-content cost and weak cyclical volumes create negative operating leverage.
Bear	Government Solutions	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	29.5%	Procurement delays and contract-specific support dilute profitability.
Base	Business Services	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	40.0%	Global product reuse, transaction scale, and mix offset continued AI and compliance investment.
Base	Insurance	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	41.5%	Contributory data and workflow extension create steady price and scale leverage.
Base	Specialised Industry Data Services	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	31.5%	Subscription and workflow mix improve, partly offset by expert-content investment.
Base	Government Solutions	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	32.5%	Contract scale helps, but procurement and service intensity cap margins.
Bull	Business Services	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	42.0%	Cross-border reuse and automated delivery create strong incremental margins.
Bull	Insurance	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	44.0%	Network effects and product extension support premium pricing and high retention.
Bull	Specialised Industry Data Services	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	34.0%	AI raises analyst productivity while trusted proprietary data retains pricing power.
Bull	Government Solutions	Segment 37.83%; product N/D	35.0%	Larger reusable deployments reduce support cost per contract.

The bear's weighted margin is 35.38%, down about 245bp from TTM. The specific mechanism is not arbitrary de-rating: regulatory documentation and remediation increase, data-source costs rise, customer procurement becomes more aggressive, and slower growth reduces fixed-cost absorption. Business Services and Insurance still earn attractive margins because their networks and embedded workflows survive; the bear does not assume the moat disappears completely.

The base weighted margin is 39.32%, up about 148bp from TTM. That is consistent with management's repeated expectation that **Adjusted operating profit** grows faster than revenue and with the segment's FY2023-to-TTM improvement, but it is not a cost-free AI thesis. RELX must continue funding product development, cybersecurity, data stewardship, and compliance. Margin expansion comes from mix toward higher-value decision tools, reuse of global solutions, and transaction scale, not from allocating group costs away from the segment.

The bull weighted margin is 41.61%, up about 378bp. This requires more than normal scale: Business Services must expand internationally with limited localization cost, Insurance must deepen contributory adoption, AI must raise development and customer productivity, and price realization must hold. Peer margins show such economics are possible—Equifax Workforce Solutions reported a 44.2% 2025 operating margin and Verisk a 56.2% adjusted EBITDA margin—but the measures differ from RELX **Adjusted operating profit** and are not substituted as direct comparables. The bull remains an upside case rather than the base.

10. Segment rollup built bottoms-up

Starting allocation and terminal revenue

Product	Modeled TTM revenue	Bear TTM+5y revenue	Base TTM+5y revenue	Bull TTM+5y revenue
Business Services	£1,560.7m	£1,898.8m	£2,346.7m	£2,750.5m
Insurance	£1,383.3m	£1,643.0m	£1,940.2m	£2,227.9m
Specialised Industry Data Services	£407.9m	£450.4m	£533.1m	£599.3m
Government Solutions	£195.1m	£205.0m	£243.1m	£273.6m
Risk segment total	£3,547.0m	£4,197.2m	£5,063.1m	£5,851.3m

Terminal Adjusted operating profit tie-out

Case and product	TTM+5y revenue	Adjusted operating profit margin	Adjusted operating profit
Bear Business Services	£1,898.8m	35.5%	£674.1m
Bear Insurance	£1,643.0m	38.0%	£624.3m
Bear Specialised Industry Data Services	£450.4m	28.0%	£126.1m
Bear Government Solutions	£205.0m	29.5%	£60.5m
Bear Risk total	**£4,197.2m**	**35.38%**	**£1,485.0m**
Base Business Services	£2,346.7m	40.0%	£938.7m
Base Insurance	£1,940.2m	41.5%	£805.2m
Base Specialised Industry Data Services	£533.1m	31.5%	£167.9m
Base Government Solutions	£243.1m	32.5%	£79.0m
Base Risk total	**£5,063.1m**	**39.32%**	**£1,990.8m**
Bull Business Services	£2,750.5m	42.0%	£1,155.2m
Bull Insurance	£2,227.9m	44.0%	£980.3m
Bull Specialised Industry Data Services	£599.3m	34.0%	£203.8m
Bull Government Solutions	£273.6m	35.0%	£95.8m
Bull Risk total	**£5,851.3m**	**41.61%**	**£2,435.0m**

All four modeled starting lines sum to the verified £3,547m TTM segment anchor. Each terminal revenue equals its modeled TTM allocation compounded for exactly five years at the scenario CAGR in Section 8. Each product profit equals terminal revenue multiplied by the Section 9 terminal margin. Product profits sum to scenario Risk **Adjusted operating profit** with differences at or below £0.1m from visible rounding. The segment CAGR tie-outs are 3.42% bear, 7.38% base, and 10.53% bull. Probability-weighted terminal revenue is £5,004.3m and probability-weighted terminal **Adjusted operating profit** is £1,953.2m using 25% bear, 55% base, and 20% bull weights; these probability-weighted amounts are diagnostics, not a fourth scenario.

No group bridge item is included. In particular, the model does not allocate TTM unallocated central costs of £4m, acquired-intangible amortisation of £243m, acquisition and disposal items of £37m, joint-venture reclassifications, finance costs, tax, or non-controlling interests to Risk [statutory_bridge.json, TTM corporate-unallocated and operating-bridge rows; data_package §3a TTM bridge]. Those items belong once in consolidated synthesis.

11. Key risks and wildcards

[Bear] Data-rights and privacy restriction. Risk's differentiation depends on lawful access to broad personal, business, insurance, and public-record data. A rule that narrows permissible purposes, forces deletion, increases consumer-access and dispute obligations, or limits cross-context matching could reduce model coverage and raise compliance cost. U.S. FCRA enforcement focuses on permissible purpose and accuracy, while the EU AI Act increases obligations for certain high-risk decision systems. Regulation may also entrench a scaled compliant provider, but the downside arrives first if RELX must withdraw signals or remediate records.

[Bear] Accuracy, bias, and explainability failure. False matches, stale records, discriminatory outcomes, or opaque models can create customer losses and deny consumers access to services. A material model failure could lead to litigation, regulatory action, remediation cost, and customer-routing reductions. The most important signal is not merely a fine; it is a sustained decline in approval precision, higher dispute volumes, or a large customer moving primary decision traffic elsewhere.

[Bear] Cybersecurity and data exfiltration. Risk aggregates sensitive information and provides credentials into important workflows. A breach could impose direct cost, restrict data access, damage contributor trust, and trigger customer churn. The segment's scale funds strong controls, but the attack surface grows with more APIs, cloud services, customers, and third-party sources.

[Bear] Customer insourcing and multi-vendor orchestration. Better cloud tooling and open models allow sophisticated banks, insurers, and governments to build their own decision layers. They may still buy RELX data, but shift value from a bundled decision product to lower-priced signals, or route different transactions to several vendors. That outcome can preserve volume while reducing price and margin, which is why flat margins despite transaction growth is an important moat-warning indicator.

[Bear/Base] Transaction and end-market cyclicality. Mortgage, insurance, hiring, payments, commodities, and other activities affect query volumes. The business is diversified and some fraud intensity rises during stress, but multi-year volumetric contracts do not eliminate all volume exposure. Reported GBP growth also faces currency translation because most Risk revenue is North American.

[Bear/Base] Competitive pricing. Verisk, Equifax, Experian, TransUnion, FICO, specialist fraud vendors, and vertical data providers can attack individual workflows. Procurement teams can benchmark providers or demand volume discounts. RELX must demonstrate better total economics—loss reduction, conversion, compliance, and automation—not simply more data.

[Base/Bull] AI productivity and product lift. AI can improve entity linking, anomaly detection, investigative summaries, and orchestration. If RELX converts data depth into demonstrably better outcomes, it can raise price, cross-sell, and reduce customer friction. The bull requires those product gains to exceed the cost of models, compute, governance, and competition. Generic model improvement alone is not a moat.

[Bull] International reuse. Nearly 30% of Business Services revenue is already outside the US and more than 45% comes from global solutions [data_package §0a]. Faster rollout across geographies could create revenue growth with attractive incremental margins. The constraint is local data availability, regulation, language, and the need to establish contributor and customer networks market by market.

[Bull] Contributory-network acceleration. More insurer or ecosystem participation can improve coverage and product value, attracting still more use. The upside is greatest where RELX can add new datasets or decision points without proportional cost. The risk is reciprocal: a major contributor withdrawal or rival consortium can weaken network breadth.

[Bear/Bull] Government policy and procurement. Government Solutions can benefit from fraud prevention, benefits integrity, public safety, and constrained budgets that reward automation. It can also be limited by procurement pauses, data-use restrictions, civil-liberties challenges, or political changes. Because it is only about 5% of segment revenue, it is more likely to influence mix and reputation than to determine Risk's whole outcome, unless an adverse policy spills into commercial data use.

Scenario summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	£4,197.2m	Adjusted operating profit	35.38%	£1,485.0m	25%
Base	£5,063.1m	Adjusted operating profit	39.32%	£1,990.8m	55%
Bull	£5,851.3m	Adjusted operating profit	41.61%	£2,435.0m	20%

The distribution is intentionally non-uniform. Base receives 55% because current 8% underlying growth, broad strength in both large units, machine-to-machine embedding, and management's profit-outgrowth guidance support continued compounding. Bear receives 25% because data regulation, cybersecurity, insourcing, and multi-vendor pressure can damage both growth and margins even without immediate churn. Bull receives 20% because low-double-digit segment growth plus nearly 400bp of margin expansion requires several favorable outcomes—international reuse, contributory-network growth, AI productivity, and pricing—to occur together.

Data gaps carried forward

- [DATA GAP: current-taxonomy FY2021-FY2022 Risk revenue and **Adjusted operating profit** were not restated after the 2025 reporting change.]
- [DATA GAP: Business Services, Insurance, Specialised Industry Data Services, and Government Solutions revenue dollars and historical growth rates are not disclosed.]
- [DATA GAP: product-level **Adjusted operating profit** and margins are not disclosed; terminal product margins are analyst assumptions tied to the disclosed segment total.]
- [DATA GAP: Risk-specific ARR, NRR, RPO, customer-count history, pricing, seats, retention, and per-product AI revenue are not disclosed.]
- [DATA GAP: quarterly Risk revenue and **Adjusted operating profit** are not disclosed; the recency series uses annual and half-year periods.]
- [DATA GAP: exact Risk-specific capex, capitalized development, data-acquisition cost, and cash conversion are not disclosed.]
- [DATA GAP: exact Risk-specific verbatim transcript quotations are not included in data_package §6 beyond one group-wide excerpt.]

Appendix B2 - Scientific, Technical & Medical

RELX PLC — Scientific, Technical & Medical Segment Deep Dive

TTM anchor: 30 June 2026. **Exact five-year horizon:** 30 June 2031. **Currency:** GBP millions unless stated otherwise. **Exact segment profit basis: Adjusted operating profit**. **Trade execution authorized:** `false`.

This appendix forecasts only the Scientific, Technical & Medical segment on RELX's issuer-disclosed **Adjusted operating profit** basis. It does not allocate unallocated central costs, acquired-intangible amortisation, acquisition and disposal items, joint-venture reclassifications, interest, tax, or any other group bridge line into STM. Those lines remain for the group synthesis model, exactly as required by the sealed statutory bridge.

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

STM combines Primary Research with databases, tools and electronic reference products. The comparable boundary changed in 2025: RELX separated all remaining print and print-related activities into a standalone reporting line and moved a small commercial healthcare portfolio from STM to Risk. The FY2025 annual report restated FY2023 and FY2024 on this new basis, but FY2021 and FY2022 remain on the old four-area basis. Consequently, this appendix uses FY2023-FY2025 for clean dollar comparisons and treats earlier figures as context only. No old-taxonomy dollar is spliced into the modeled series. [data_package §1, Taxonomy change; §3, STM table]

1. What this segment actually is

STM is best understood as two related but economically distinct engines joined by a common research workflow. **Primary Research** manages the submission, peer-review, production, publication and dissemination of journal articles. Authors and research institutions supply the intellectual content and peer-review labor; RELX supplies brands, editorial systems, workflow, integrity controls, distribution and the curated version of record. Revenue can ultimately be funded by institutional reading subscriptions, article-processing charges, national or institutional read-and-publish arrangements, and other transactional publishing services. Management describes Primary Research as a little over half of divisional revenue. [data_package §4, STM Primary Research row; §6, 2026-02-12 STM row]

The second engine, **Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference**, includes Scopus, ScienceDirect, clinical and education products, and research workflow tools. Management describes it as around 40% of divisional revenue. These products convert a deep corpus, citation graph, metadata, taxonomies and domain expertise into search, discovery, analytics, decision support and workflow. Revenue is predominantly recurring or repeat-use in character, although RELX does not disclose STM subscription dollars, annual recurring revenue, net revenue retention, remaining performance obligations, paid seats or product-level pricing. [data_package §4, STM Databases row; §10, product-metric gap]

The customer map is unusually broad. University libraries and consortia buy access and negotiate publishing arrangements; individual researchers submit and consume research; corporate R&D departments search the literature; hospitals and clinicians use reference and decision-support tools; educators and students use digital courseware and electronic reference; funders and governments influence which publishing models are permitted. The economic buyer, end user and content contributor are therefore often different people. That separation supports institutional purchasing and workflow entrenchment, but also creates political tension when authors supply content and review labor while libraries and funders bear rising costs.

Go-to-market is consequently hybrid. Large institutions and consortia negotiate multi-year or annually renewed contracts covering reading, publishing or both. Individual authors select journals based on reputation, relevance, speed and career incentives. Workflow tools can be sold into institutions or embedded within broader research and clinical processes. The commercial model depends less on consumer-style traffic acquisition than on journal prestige, discoverability, editorial quality, corpus depth, reliable metadata, and integration into how institutions evaluate and perform research.

The segment is digital-first but not development-free. RELX-wide electronic delivery was £8,070m in FY2025, while remaining print was separated into its own business line; STM therefore no longer carries the group’s long print run-off in the current taxonomy. [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §0a format table and §1] That separation improves the interpretability of STM growth and margin, but it also means the new series starts at FY2023 and provides only two historical growth intervals.

2. Current economics

The exact TTM revenue anchor is **£2,761m**, calculated as FY2025 revenue of £2,714m less H1 2025 revenue of £1,323m plus H1 2026 revenue of £1,370m. The exact TTM **Adjusted operating profit** is **£1,063m**, calculated as £1,035m less £491m plus £519m and independently reproduced in the sealed statutory bridge. The resulting TTM margin is **38.5%**. [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 Interim Results, note 2; data_package §3/§3a/§5]

Recency is stronger than the reported-currency FY2023-FY2025 history suggests. STM underlying revenue growth was 5% in H1 2025, 5% for FY2025 and 6% in H1 2026. Underlying Adjusted operating profit growth was 7%, 7% and 8%, respectively. The H1 2026 profit growth premium over revenue indicates roughly measured operating leverage, not a discontinuous margin step. [RELX official H1 2025, FY2025 and H1 2026 presentations; data_package §5 STM rows]

Primary Research is a little over half of revenue, while databases, tools and electronic reference are around 40%. Exact product dollars are not disclosed, and this appendix does not present rounded shares multiplied by revenue as historical facts. For forward arithmetic only, Section 10 introduces an explicit **analyst modeling allocation** of 55%, 40% and 5% for Primary Research, Databases/Tools/Electronic Reference and other/residual STM activities. That allocation is a scenario mechanism, not an issuer disclosure. [data_package §4, STM rows]

The key disclosed volume indicators are strong but diverging. Article submissions grew more than 20% in each of the FY2024, H1 2025, FY2025 and H1 2026 calls, while articles published slowed from about 15% to 10%, 10% and 7%. [Erik Engstrom, official calls dated 2025-02-13, 2025-07-24, 2026-02-12 and 2026-07-23; data_package §0a/§4] This divergence matters. It indicates a large supply of manuscripts and potentially durable demand for publishing services, but it does not mean revenue can grow at submission rates. Editorial selectivity, journal fit, peer-review capacity, integrity screening and customer budgets constrain monetized publication volume.

Capital intensity is low in physical assets but meaningful in software and content infrastructure. RELX-wide core capex was £525m, or 5.5% of revenue, in FY2025; £504m was internally developed intangible investment. H1 2026 capex was £292m, including £280m of capitalized development. [RELX Annual Report 2025, cash-flow and capex disclosures; RELX H1 2026 Results, cash-flow and capex tables; data_package §7] RELX does not disclose STM-specific capex, capitalized development, R&D expense or cash conversion. **[DATA GAP: STM-specific development investment, capital expenditure and cash conversion are not disclosed.]** This prevents a precise segment ROIC calculation and makes the 38.5% Adjusted operating profit margin an incomplete proxy for economic profitability.

3. Unit economics

Primary Research

Primary Research has attractive but not frictionless economics. The publisher does not pay authors for most journal articles and relies substantially on external peer reviewers, but it must fund editorial operations, submission systems, production, hosting, sales, customer support, journal development, rights administration and increasingly intensive integrity checks. The marginal cost of electronically distributing one more article is low; the marginal cost of responsibly processing one more submission is not. When submissions rise more than 20% but publications rise 7%, the rejected-manuscript workload can grow much faster than monetized output.

Revenue per published article or per institutional relationship depends on the model. Subscription and read-and-publish contracts offer visibility and renewal economics. Article-processing-charge models make revenue more volume-sensitive and can broaden access, but they expose the publisher to author funding availability, waiver policy, regional affordability, funder rules and competition from lower-price open-access venues. Transformative agreements can protect aggregate institutional spend during the transition, yet they also make pricing more transparent and consolidate bargaining power in national consortia.

Primary Research margin expands when journal brands sustain price and author demand, publication volume grows faster than fixed editorial and platform expense, standardized platforms reduce handling cost, and open-access arrangements scale without excessive waivers or price concessions. Margin contracts when low-quality or AI-generated submissions raise screening cost, reviewer scarcity lengthens cycles, institutions demand price caps, research-integrity failures trigger retractions and remediation, or open-access mandates shift value away from reading access before publication services are repriced.

Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference

The database and tools engine has a more conventional recurring-workflow profile. A large fixed investment creates and curates the corpus, citation graph, metadata, ontologies, product interface and integrations. Once built, incremental query and

seat economics can be attractive, but modern AI changes the cost curve. Retrieval-augmented generation, summarization, semantic search and agentic workflows improve willingness to pay only if the answer is trusted, attributable and embedded. They also add model inference, evaluation, security, licensing and product-development costs.

Scopus and ScienceDirect benefit from content depth, metadata quality and entrenched institutional workflows. Clinical and educational tools benefit when they become part of professional decision-making rather than passive repositories. Switching costs are highest where integrations, evaluation frameworks, institutional reporting and user habits depend on the product. They are lower for a simple search box that a free discovery engine or general-purpose AI assistant can imitate.

Margin expands when higher-value analytics and AI-enabled workflow layers are sold into the installed base, contract price grows faster than support and cloud costs, and a common platform spreads development across products. Margin contracts if AI functionality is bundled without price, inference cost scales with usage, open corpora make discovery substitutable, a rival achieves comparable citation coverage, or customers demand interoperable data rather than proprietary interfaces.

Segment-level operating leverage

The current 38.5% TTM Adjusted operating profit margin embeds both engines and is already high. The clean current-taxonomy margin rose from 36.4% in FY2023 to 37.4% in FY2024, 38.1% in FY2025 and 38.5% TTM. [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 Interim Results, note 2; data_package §3/§3a] This is evidence of mix and scale leverage, but it is not a license to extrapolate 100 basis points annually. Base-case expansion to 40.1% over five years assumes databases and tools outgrow Primary Research, automation absorbs some submission workload, and cost growth remains below revenue growth. It also assumes continued spending on integrity, AI and platform modernization.

The segment's Adjusted operating profit includes amortisation of internally developed intangible assets but excludes the group bridge items identified in the sealed statutory bridge. Acquired-intangible amortisation and all corporate or statutory adjustments are intentionally absent from this appendix. Treating the segment margin as statutory operating margin would overstate comparability and violate the bridge.

4. Competitive dynamics

Competition operates separately in journal publishing, research discovery, clinical information and workflow.

In research publishing, the most relevant scaled competitors include Springer Nature, Wiley, Taylor & Francis, SAGE and large open-access publishers such as MDPI and Frontiers, alongside many learned societies and university presses. Journal competition is not a simple market-share contest: authors choose at the journal-title level, institutions negotiate at portfolio level, and funders set rules at system level. High-prestige titles can retain author demand even when content becomes freely readable because validation, editorial selection and career signaling remain scarce.

Springer Nature provides a useful scale and growth reference, but not a directly comparable margin benchmark. Its 2025 **Research segment** revenue was €1,517.2m, underlying revenue growth was 7.4%, and adjusted operating profit was €486.4m. Journals, particularly full open access, drove Research growth. ([Springer Nature Annual Report 2025, p. 36](https://annualreport.springernature.com/2025/files/sn-annual-report-2025-en.pdf)) This validates a base case in which scaled primary-research publishing can grow mid-single digits through open access, but it also shows that open access changes the revenue mix rather than necessarily destroying it.

Springer Nature received 3.1m submissions and published 539,000 primary research articles in 2025, implying intense screening and selectivity; it also reported more than half of primary research published open access. ([Springer Nature research hub](https://www.springernature.com/gp/advancing-discovery)) These figures are competitor facts, not RELX figures. They support the view that rising manuscript supply creates both volume opportunity and integrity cost. Springer Nature's use of AI for reviewer suggestions, journal finding and anomaly detection also demonstrates that workflow automation is an industry requirement, not a unique RELX advantage.

In discovery and analytics, Scopus competes most directly with Clarivate's Web of Science and related research-intelligence products, while Google Scholar, Semantic Scholar, PubMed, Crossref, OpenAlex and institutional repositories provide free or low-cost discovery alternatives. Clarivate's FY2025 organic subscription growth was only 0.8%, and its recurring organic revenue grew 0.6% across a broader portfolio. ([Clarivate FY2025 results](https://ir.clarivate.com/news-events/press-releases/news-details/2026/Clarivate-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2025-Results/default.aspx)) That weak peer trajectory is a warning against assuming database growth merely because the category is recurring. RELX must win through product quality, integrated workflow, new analytics and trusted data, not just annual price increases.

In clinical information, competitors include Wolters Kluwer's UpToDate and Ovid products, specialized medical publishers, guideline providers and increasingly AI-enabled clinical search products. In educational reference and research workflow, competition includes publisher platforms, institutional software, reference managers, preprint services and general AI tools. The risk is highest where customers perceive the product as a content lookup layer. It is lower where provenance, rights, auditability, institutional governance and domain-specific workflow are essential.

Exact market shares for STM overall, Primary Research, Scopus, ScienceDirect, clinical tools and educational reference are not provided in the verified data package, and heterogeneous market definitions make third-party estimates easy to misuse. **[DATA GAP: RELX does not disclose STM product revenue or market share, and this appendix does not invent either.]** The competitive judgment therefore relies on disclosed scale, product roles and observed competitor trajectories rather than a false precision share table.

Pricing power is strongest in differentiated journal portfolios, trusted clinical decision support, citation analytics embedded in institutional evaluation, and tools integrated into research administration. It is weakest in undifferentiated access to article text. Negotiating power is shifting toward library consortia, national agreements and funders, but publisher scale can also reduce transaction costs for those buyers. A large portfolio can offer broad coverage and one contract; it can also become a visible target for budget scrutiny.

5. Moat at the segment level

STM has a real moat, but it is layered and uneven rather than absolute.

The first layer is the **prestige and trust network** around journal titles. Authors seek journals with reputation, appropriate readership, recognized editorial standards and citation impact. Reviewer, editor and author participation reinforces those brands. A new entrant can build a publishing platform quickly; it cannot instantly recreate decades of title-level reputation, editorial networks and institutional recognition.

The second layer is **corpus, metadata and graph depth**. Scopus and ScienceDirect combine a large body of research with structured metadata, citation relationships, identifiers and usage history. Generative AI makes this layer more valuable when provenance matters because useful scientific answers must trace back to reliable sources. Yet open metadata projects and increasingly capable foundation models reduce the scarcity of basic discovery. The durable moat is not possessing text alone; it is trusted curation, rights, structure, evaluation and workflow integration.

The third layer is **institutional workflow and switching cost**. Universities use citation databases and publishing platforms in evaluation, discovery, research management and library processes. Clinicians and researchers incorporate tools into daily decisions. Replacement entails retraining, integration changes, coverage comparisons, governance review and procurement risk. These costs support retention, but customers can dual-source or require interoperability, so switching cost is not captivity.

The fourth layer is **scale in integrity and product investment**. Rising submissions and AI-generated content make fraud detection, image analysis, reference checking and editorial triage more important. Springer Nature reported 75 dedicated research-integrity staff and expanded AI-enabled screening in 2025, showing that credible publishing increasingly requires fixed investment. ([Springer Nature Annual Report 2025](https://annualreport.springernature.com/2025/files/sn-annual-report-2025-en.pdf)) RELX's scale can spread comparable investment across a large portfolio. The same trend can hurt margins if bad submissions grow faster than automation improves.

The moat's weakest point is **access scarcity**. The NIH policy effective 1 July 2025 requires accepted manuscripts arising from NIH funding to be made available in PubMed Central without embargo upon publication. ([NIH Public Access Policy](https://www.grants.nih.gov/policy-and-compliance/policy-topics/public-access/nih-public-access-policy-overview)) cOAlition S likewise requires immediate open access through compliant venues or repositories and, as a principle, ended member financial support for transformative arrangements after 2024, while allowing individual-funder exceptions. ([cOAlition S policy on transformative arrangements after 2024](https://www.coalition-s.org/coalition-s-confirms-the-end-of-its-financial-support-for-open-access-publishing-under-transformative-arrangements-after-2024/)) These policies reduce the defensibility of charging purely for access. They do not eliminate the need for validation, publishing services, metadata, workflow or analytics, but they force the value proposition toward those services.

Over five to ten years, the moat should remain strong enough to support above-average margins if RELX preserves trust and moves value into workflow. It will weaken if AI assistants become the primary research interface without paying for or differentiating RELX data, if open citation graphs become functionally equivalent to Scopus, or if integrity failures damage

journal brands. The base case therefore assumes moat evolution, not stasis.

6. Historical growth rates

Only FY2023-FY2025 is cleanly comparable on the current reporting boundary. The “three-year span CAGR” below covers the two annual intervals from FY2023 to FY2025. Product-level revenue dollars and growth rates are not disclosed, so no historical product dollars are back-solved from rounded mix descriptions.

Product / sub-segment	FY2023 revenue	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	Three-year span CAGR	Most recent disclosed growth	Data package cite
STM total	£2,581m [§3 STM Revenue row]	£2,624m [§3 STM Revenue row]	£2,714m [§3 STM Revenue row]	2.56% [calculated from same row]	3.4% reported-currency FY2025; 6% underlying H1 2026 [§3 and §5]	RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 presentation, slide 16; data_package §3/§5
Primary Research	Not disclosed [§4 STM row]	Not disclosed [§4 STM row]	Not disclosed [§4 STM row]	Not calculable [§4 STM row]	Articles published +7%; submissions more than +20% in H1 2026 [§0a KPI table]	data_package §4 STM Primary Research row; §0a Workflow KPI table
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	Not disclosed [§4 STM row]	Not disclosed [§4 STM row]	Not disclosed [§4 STM row]	Not calculable [§4 STM row]	Revenue growth not disclosed [§4 KPI table]	data_package §4 STM Databases row; §10 product-metric gap
Other / residual STM activities	Not disclosed [§4 STM rows]	Not disclosed [§4 STM rows]	Not disclosed [§4 STM rows]	Not calculable [§4 STM rows]	Not disclosed [§4 STM rows]	data_package §4 product disclosure table

Arithmetic tie-out: £2,581m × 1.0167 = £2,624m and £2,624m × 1.0343 = £2,714m, both within rounding tolerance. The CAGR is `(£2,714m / £2,581m)^(1/2) - 1 = 2.56%`. No product row is back-solved because the verified package explicitly classifies product dollars as a true non-disclosure.

The TTM bridge is £2,714m – £1,323m + £1,370m = **£2,761m** revenue and £1,035m – £491m + £519m = **£1,063m Adjusted operating profit**. The latter matches the sealed statutory bridge exactly. [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 Interim Results, note 2; statutory_bridge.json TTM period; data_package §3a/§5]

7. Management guidance and forward anchors

The verified package uses source-verified paraphrases rather than representing transcript text as direct quotations. The following are therefore reproduced as paraphrases, exactly preserving that evidence status.

- **FY2024 call, data_package §6 STM row:** Management said analytics and product development offset a faster decline in remaining print, while submissions rose more than 20%. The clean current taxonomy later removed remaining print, so the forecast emphasizes analytics, product cadence and research volume rather than carrying a print decline inside STM.

- **H1 2025 call, data_package §6 STM row:** Management said new-product introductions were increasing, with renewals and new sales ahead of the prior year. This supports an acceleration from the 2.56% reported-currency FY2023-FY2025 CAGR, but not an immediate double-digit segment rate because product revenue and sales metrics are undisclosed.

- **FY2025 call, data_package §6 STM row:** Management said Primary Research was a little over half of revenue and databases, tools and reference around 40%, while the outlook improved to good-to-strong growth. This is the basis for modeling the two engines separately and for using 55% and 40% only as analyst allocation points, never as historical disclosed dollars.

- **H1 2026 call, data_package §6 STM row:** Management said the step-up to strong growth was supported by new products and strong sales, and Adjusted operating profit was expected to outgrow revenue. The base case starts with 6.34% modeled growth for the first forward year and decelerates as comparison bases rise; it does not extrapolate the more-than-20% submission rate into revenue.

- **Volume anchor, data_package §0a and §4:** submissions remained above 20% growth across four disclosed result periods, while publications decelerated to 7% in H1 2026. This supplies both upside and risk: a large manuscript funnel can sustain publishing growth, but integrity and processing workload can rise faster than paid outputs.

[DATA GAP: Management does not provide numerical STM FY2026 revenue growth, product revenue, ARR, retention, price, seat, or margin guidance.] The “good-to-strong” and “strong growth” language is directional; scenario numbers below are analyst assumptions, not company guidance.

8. Forward growth assumptions

Base case growth

Product	Historical evidence	Latest indicator	Management FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Primary Research	Product revenue CAGR not disclosed; STM span CAGR 2.56%	Publications +7%; submissions more than +20%	Strong growth direction; new products and sales	5.02%	Publication growth moderates while OA and pricing support monetization; integrity and peer-review capacity prevent volume from tracking submissions.
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	Product revenue CAGR not disclosed; STM span CAGR 2.56%	Revenue growth not disclosed	New products, renewals and sales supportive	6.52%	AI-enabled workflow and analytics lift price and adoption; Clarivate’s weak subscription growth keeps the assumption below a software-like rate.
Other / residual STM activities	No disclosed history	No disclosed indicator	No separate guide	2.00%	Small residual grows below the core engines because its composition and economics are not disclosed.

The base-year paths are deliberately non-constant. Primary Research grows 5.8%, 5.4%, 5.1%, 4.6% and 4.2%; Databases/Tools grows 7.5%, 7.0%, 6.5%, 6.0% and 5.6%; other grows 3.0%, 2.5%, 2.0%, 1.5% and 1.0%. The resulting segment growth path is 6.34%, 5.91%, 5.53%, 5.04% and 4.64%, a 5.49% five-year CAGR. This explicitly decelerates from H1 2026 momentum as the installed base and comparison hurdle rise.

Bull case growth

Product	Historical evidence	Latest indicator	Management FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Primary Research	Product revenue CAGR not disclosed; STM span CAGR 2.56%	Publications +7%; submissions more than +20%	Strong growth direction	7.02%	Publication growth holds near current levels, OA agreements monetize more authors, and platform automation expands capacity without lowering selectivity.
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	Product revenue CAGR not disclosed; STM span CAGR 2.56%	Revenue growth not disclosed	New-product cadence and strong sales	9.02%	Trusted-data AI assistants and workflow integration create incremental willingness to pay; tools gain share versus slower incumbents.
Other / residual STM activities	No disclosed history	No disclosed indicator	No separate guide	4.00%	Favorable product mix and cross-selling produce moderate growth, still below the two named engines.

The bull paths are Primary Research at 8.0%, 7.5%, 7.0%, 6.5% and 6.1%; Databases/Tools at 10.5%, 9.5%, 9.0%, 8.2% and 7.9%; other at 5.0%, 4.5%, 4.0%, 3.5% and 3.0%. Segment growth decelerates from 8.85% to 6.72%, producing a 7.70% five-year CAGR. The case requires successful paid AI workflow, not merely adding free AI features.

Bear case growth

Product	Historical evidence	Latest indicator	Management FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Primary Research	Product revenue CAGR not disclosed; STM span CAGR 2.56%	Publications +7%; submissions more than +20%	Strong growth direction	1.50%	Immediate-access mandates pressure reading economics, APC budgets tighten, and integrity workload absorbs much of the article-volume benefit.
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	Product revenue CAGR not disclosed; STM span CAGR 2.56%	Revenue growth not disclosed	New products and strong sales	2.50%	Open citation graphs and general AI compress price; trusted workflow prevents outright decline but limits upsell.

Product	Historical evidence	Latest indicator	Management FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Other / residual STM activities	No disclosed history	No disclosed indicator	No separate guide	-1.00%	Unidentified residual offerings shrink under rationalization and substitution.

The bear paths are Primary Research at 3.0%, 2.0%, 1.5%, 0.7% and 0.3%; Databases/Tools at 4.0%, 3.0%, 2.5%, 1.7% and 1.3%; other at -1.0% each year. Segment growth decelerates from 3.20% to 0.65%, producing a 1.78% five-year CAGR. This is not a sudden collapse: STM's brands and workflow entrenchment preserve positive growth, while OA and AI gradually reduce monetization.

Thesis-consistency check

The model does not use submission growth as revenue growth. In base, the first-year 6.34% segment rate is close to the latest 6% underlying result, and the terminal-year 4.64% remains supported by product cadence and publication growth. In bull, the first-year 8.85% is above current segment growth but below submission growth and only modestly above current publication growth. In bear, growth fades over five years as contract renewals and workflow inertia delay pressure. Springer Nature Research's 7.4% underlying revenue growth in 2025 supports the feasibility of mid-single-digit publishing growth under OA, while Clarivate's 0.8% organic subscription growth demonstrates that database recurrence alone does not guarantee it.

9. Forward Adjusted operating profit margin assumptions

The exact profit metric in every table below is **Adjusted operating profit**. Product margins are analyst allocations used to make the segment rollup reconstructable; RELX does not disclose product margins. The TTM anchor is calibrated to 38.5% exactly using 38.0% for Primary Research, 40.0% for Databases/Tools and 32.0% for other at the 55%/40%/5% modeling weights.

Product	TTM modeled margin	Bear TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	Base TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	Bull TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	Mechanism
Primary Research	38.0%	34.0%	38.5%	40.0%	Bear absorbs OA price pressure, waivers, reviewer scarcity and integrity screening; base automation offsets those costs; bull scales OA volume and platforms.
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	40.0%	38.0%	43.0%	47.0%	Bear bundles AI without sufficient price and incurs inference cost; base earns workflow upsell and scale; bull monetizes trusted-data AI with strong reuse.
Other / residual STM activities	32.0%	26.0%	32.0%	35.0%	Bear rationalization and negative mix reduce leverage; base is stable; bull benefits from cross-selling and portfolio simplification.
Segment blended	38.5%	35.3%	40.1%	42.8%	Revenue-weighted product result; no corporate or statutory bridge allocation.

The **bear** margin declines about 320 basis points. That is intentionally more severe than a simple growth slowdown. Primary Research faces lower monetization per unit at the same time as AI-generated or low-quality submissions raise handling cost; Databases/Tools must invest to defend discovery while open alternatives cap price. The segment remains very profitable because digital distribution, brands and recurring institutional workflows do not disappear.

The **base** margin rises about 160 basis points. The specific mechanism is favorable mix toward Databases/Tools, platform reuse, and cost growth modestly below revenue, partially offset by continued AI, cloud and integrity investment. This is consistent with recent Adjusted operating profit growth two points faster than revenue but assumes that the differential narrows rather than compounds indefinitely.

The **bull** margin rises about 430 basis points. This requires more than volume: databases and tools must command higher price for trusted, attributable AI workflow; Primary Research must automate triage and production while retaining human editorial control; and integrity costs must scale sublinearly. The 47% Databases/Tools margin is an aggressive analyst assumption, not a disclosed current margin. It is therefore assigned only a 20% probability.

10. Segment rollup

Modeling anchors

Because RELX does not disclose product dollars, the TTM segment revenue is allocated solely for prospective scenario arithmetic. The 55% Primary Research and 40% Databases/Tools weights translate management's rounded descriptions into explicit model inputs; the 5% residual ensures the allocations sum to the segment. None should be cited as historical reported revenue.

Product	TTM analyst allocation	Share used	Anchor status	TTM modeled Adjusted operating profit margin	TTM modeled Adjusted operating profit
Primary Research	£1,518.6m	55.0%	Analyst allocation from "little over half"	38.0%	£577.0m
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	£1,104.4m	40.0%	Analyst allocation from "around 40%"	40.0%	£441.8m
Other / residual STM activities	£138.1m	5.0%	Analyst residual	32.0%	£44.2m
Segment total	£2,761.0m	100.0%	Disclosed TTM bridge total	38.5%	£1,063.0m

Rounded product profit sums to £1,063.0m and ties the sealed TTM Adjusted operating profit. The calibration does not assert that RELX's true product margins equal these values; it ensures transparent scenario mechanics.

Bear rollup at 30 June 2031

Product	TTM revenue anchor	Five-year CAGR	TTM+5y revenue	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit
Primary Research	£1,518.6m	1.50%	£1,635.5m	34.0%	£556.1m
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	£1,104.4m	2.50%	£1,249.3m	38.0%	£474.7m
Other / residual STM activities	£138.1m	-1.00%	£131.3m	26.0%	£34.1m
Segment total	£2,761.0m	1.78%	£3,016.1m	35.3%	£1,064.9m

Base rollup at 30 June 2031

Product	TTM revenue anchor	Five-year CAGR	TTM+5y revenue	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit
Primary Research	£1,518.6m	5.02%	£1,939.8m	38.5%	£746.8m
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	£1,104.4m	6.52%	£1,514.4m	43.0%	£651.2m
Other / residual STM activities	£138.1m	2.00%	£152.4m	32.0%	£48.8m
Segment total	£2,761.0m	5.49%	£3,606.6m	40.1%	£1,446.8m

Bull rollup at 30 June 2031

Product	TTM revenue anchor	Five-year CAGR	TTM+5y revenue	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit margin	TTM+5y Adjusted operating profit
Primary Research	£1,518.6m	7.02%	£2,131.6m	40.0%	£852.6m
Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	£1,104.4m	9.02%	£1,700.5m	47.0%	£799.2m
Other / residual STM activities	£138.1m	4.00%	£167.9m	35.0%	£58.8m
Segment total	£2,761.0m	7.70%	£4,000.1m	42.8%	£1,710.7m

All three cases reconcile product revenue to segment revenue and product Adjusted operating profit to segment Adjusted operating profit within rounding. The segment CAGR is calculated from the exact £2,761m TTM anchor to the exact 30 June 2031 endpoint. No group bridge line has been used as a balancing plug.

11. Key risks and wildcards

Open-access economics — predominantly bear

Immediate-access policies reduce the defensibility of paywalled reading. NIH's no-embargo requirement and Plan S routes can shift bargaining power toward funders and repositories. The offset is that publishers can charge for validation, production, hosting, metadata, workflow and gold OA. The bear case assumes the shift happens faster than pricing models adapt; base assumes read-and-publish and APC economics preserve aggregate value; bull assumes open access expands funded publication volume.

AI interface disintermediation — bear and base

Researchers may begin with general AI assistants rather than ScienceDirect, Scopus or a journal site. If an assistant can retrieve open manuscripts and open citation data with adequate quality, RELX can lose interface control and pricing leverage. The countervailing opportunity is that reliable scientific answers require provenance, licensing, current content, evaluation and domain-specific workflow. The base case requires RELX to be a paid data and workflow layer, not merely a content destination.

AI-enabled product monetization — predominantly bull

Trusted-data copilots, semantic discovery, literature synthesis, reviewer tools and research-administration agents can increase willingness to pay and deepen usage. The bull case requires measurable paid adoption or contract uplift. Free feature bundling, high inference cost or weak differentiation belongs in bear, not bull.

Research integrity and paper mills — predominantly bear

Submission growth far above publication growth increases triage burden. Generative AI can create plausible but false papers, citations, images and data. Detection tools help, but false positives, human review and remediation remain costly. A major integrity failure could damage journal brands, trigger retractions, and undermine the segment's core trust moat.

Reviewer and editor capacity — bear and base

Peer review relies on scarce expert labor. If submission volume remains above 20%, reviewer fatigue can lengthen publication times or force more editorial investment. Automation can triage and match reviewers but cannot fully substitute expert judgment without threatening trust. Base margin expansion is therefore modest in Primary Research.

Institutional budget and consortium bargaining — predominantly bear

Universities face budget constraints while national consortia can negotiate as concentrated buyers. Portfolio scale is an advantage, but large contracts attract scrutiny. A shift from subscription bundles toward transparent per-article economics can expose cross-subsidies and compress price.

Competitive execution — all cases

Springer Nature demonstrates strong OA growth and platform investment; Clarivate remains a direct discovery competitor despite slower recent subscription growth; free discovery layers keep improving. RELX must maintain journal quality, content coverage, metadata and product cadence simultaneously. The base case assumes share stability, the bull case modest share gain in workflow, and the bear case gradual share erosion.

Regulation, copyright and model licensing — bear and bull

Rules governing text-and-data mining, training rights, author licenses and AI outputs could either strengthen RELX's ability to license trusted content or reduce its control over how content is used. A favorable licensing regime supports the bull Databases/Tools case; mandated broad reuse without compensation supports bear.

Mix and disclosure opacity — all cases

RELX does not disclose STM product dollars, ARR, retention, price, seats, product margins or segment capex. The analyst allocation makes the model transparent but cannot replace disclosure. A mix shift different from 55%/40%/5% would change the blended growth and margin even if product assumptions were individually correct. Monitoring should prioritize product growth, paid AI adoption, OA mix, renewal/new-sales commentary, publication versus submission growth, and segment margin.

Scenario summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	£3,016m	Adjusted operating profit	35.3%	£1,065m	25%
Base	£3,607m	Adjusted operating profit	40.1%	£1,447m	55%
Bull	£4,000m	Adjusted operating profit	42.8%	£1,711m	20%

The non-uniform probabilities reflect a strong installed moat and current acceleration, balanced against material uncertainty in open-access economics, AI interface control and research-integrity cost. Base receives 55% because it extends current 6% underlying momentum with explicit deceleration and measured leverage. Bear receives 25% because access mandates and AI substitution are already observable pressures. Bull receives 20% because paid AI workflow and 430 basis points of margin expansion require execution beyond current disclosure.

Data gaps carried forward: [DATA GAP: STM-specific development investment, capital expenditure and cash conversion are not disclosed.] [DATA GAP: RELX does not disclose STM product revenue or market share.] [DATA GAP: Management does not provide numerical STM FY2026 revenue growth, product revenue, ARR, retention, price, seat, or margin guidance.]

Appendix B3 - Legal

RELX PLC — Legal Segment Deep Dive

Information cutoff: 23 August 2026 **TTM anchor:** 30 June 2026 **Exact forecast horizon:** 30 June 2031, five calendar years from the TTM anchor **Reporting currency:** GBP millions unless stated otherwise **Exact segment profit basis: Adjusted operating profit Trade execution authorized:** `false`

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

Legal is one of RELX's four operating business areas, alongside a separately managed print and print-related line. The current five-line reporting taxonomy begins with RELX's FY2023 restatement: from 2025, the company separated all remaining print and print-related activities, including some electronic delivery, from Risk, Scientific, Technical & Medical, and Legal. RELX restated FY2023 and FY2024 on that basis, but did not restate FY2021 and FY2022. This appendix therefore treats FY2023-FY2025 as the only clean current-taxonomy dollar history and uses FY2021-FY2022 only as old-basis context. It does not splice the old and new segment perimeters. The sealed statutory bridge identifies **Adjusted operating profit** as the common issuer-disclosed segment profit metric. Corporate costs and the adjusted-to-statutory bridge remain outside Legal and are not allocated here.

1. What this segment actually is

Legal sells information, analytics, drafting, research, and workflow systems to professional users whose decisions must be supported by authoritative legal sources. The customer base spans law firms, corporate legal departments, courts and government agencies, law schools and academics, and users of news and business-information products. The commercial core is not a generic search engine. It combines jurisdiction-specific primary law, editorially enhanced secondary materials, citators such as Shepard's, practical guidance, analytics, document tools, and increasingly generative and agentic AI in a controlled professional workflow.

Lexis+ is the platform layer. Its value proposition begins with comprehensive content and search, then extends into practical guidance, citation checking, analytics, drafting, and document analysis. Protégé is the AI assistant and workflow layer now being integrated across LexisNexis products. The current product positioning emphasizes secure workspaces, answers grounded in LexisNexis content and customer documents, verifiable citations, personalized drafting style, and repeatable workflows. LexisNexis says pricing is tailored to features, premium content, jurisdictions, organization size, and seats rather than set as a single public list price for large customers. That architecture permits both core subscription repricing and premium feature packaging, but it also obscures attach rates and makes externally measured AI monetization impossible. [LexisNexis describes Lexis+ pricing factors and customer scope here](https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-plus.page), while [the official Protégé page describes the integrated research, drafting, document, and workflow capabilities](https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/protege.page).

The go-to-market differs by customer. Large law firms buy multi-year, negotiated platforms covering content, jurisdictions, practice areas, seats, training, security, and integrations. Smaller firms are more price sensitive and have more viable point-solution alternatives. Corporate legal departments buy for productivity, risk reduction, predictable spend, and the ability to keep work in-house; they may compare the platform cost with outside-counsel savings rather than lawyer billable hours. Government and academic buyers generally face procurement cycles and budget constraints but can be sticky once content, citations, curricula, and workflows are standardized.

The critical economic question is whether AI deepens the platform relationship or unbundles it. If Protégé becomes the interface through which lawyers research, draft, check authorities, use internal knowledge, and automate multi-step work, Lexis can capture more wallet share and reduce switching. If high-quality reasoning becomes abundant, rival platforms offer similarly grounded answers, and customers treat authoritative content as interchangeable retrieval input, the AI interface becomes table stakes and bargaining power shifts toward buyers. The investment case depends on the first outcome dominating without requiring inference, evaluation, and product costs that absorb most of the price uplift.

2. Current economics

Legal generated FY2025 revenue of **£1,806m**, FY2025 Adjusted operating profit of **£415m**, and an Adjusted operating profit margin of **23.0%** [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2 business-segment analysis; reproduced in data_package §3]. On the exact TTM convention, revenue is **£1,865m** and Adjusted operating profit is **£435m**, calculated by the verified schedule as

FY2025 minus H1 2025 plus H1 2026. The resulting TTM margin is **23.32%**. The revenue arithmetic is £1,806m - £900m + £959m = £1,865m; the profit arithmetic is £415m - £188m + £208m = £435m [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 results presentation dated 23 July 2026, business-area table; QFR-sealed TTM bridge reproduced in data_package §3a].

Momentum is materially stronger than the reported-currency historical CAGR. H1 2026 underlying revenue growth was 10% and underlying Adjusted operating profit growth was 13%, after FY2025 underlying revenue growth of 9% and profit growth of 12% [RELX FY2025 results presentation dated 12 February 2026 and H1 2026 results presentation dated 23 July 2026, Legal business-area tables; reproduced in data_package §5]. Management attributes the step-up to strong renewals, new sales, a richer analytics mix, and adoption of the integrated AI-enabled platform. Law Firms & Corporate Legal together represent around 70% of divisional revenue and grew at a double-digit underlying rate in FY2025 and H1 2026 [official FY2025 transcript dated 12 February 2026 and H1 2026 transcript dated 23 July 2026, Erik Engstrom; reproduced in data_package §§4 and 6].

That 70% is an approximate combined share, not a disclosed dollar schedule and not a disclosed split between law firms and corporate legal. This appendix uses a **70% core / 30% residual analyst allocation only for forward modeling**. Applied to the TTM total, it creates a model opening balance of £1,305.5m for Law Firms & Corporate Legal and £559.5m for Government & Academic plus News & Business. Those amounts are not represented as issuer-disclosed product revenue.

The segment is less profitable than RELX's Risk and STM businesses. Its 23.3% TTM margin compares with high-30s margins in those areas, which suggests meaningful content, product, sales, and technology intensity but also possible operating leverage. H1 2026's reported segment margin was 21.7%, below FY2025's 23.0%, even as underlying profit outgrew revenue. Currency, half-year seasonality, and investment timing can distort a single half, but the number is a useful warning against treating AI adoption as costless.

Legal-specific capital expenditure, capitalized development, AI inference expense, gross margin, R&D, and sales-and-marketing expense are not separately disclosed. RELX-wide core capex was 5.5% of revenue in FY2025, and most of it was capitalized development, but assigning that group ratio to Legal would be invented precision [RELX Annual Report 2025, cash-flow statement and note 14; reproduced in data_package §7 FY2025 row]. Adjusted operating profit already includes amortization of internally developed intangibles, so the model does not add that expense back or create a second amortization charge.

[DATA GAP: RELX does not disclose Legal product or customer-group revenue dollars, AI-platform revenue or ARR, seats, NRR, RPO, product usage, attach rates, or per-product profitability.]

[DATA GAP: RELX does not disclose Legal-specific capex, capitalized development, inference expense, gross margin, R&D, or sales-and-marketing cost.]

3. Unit economics

3.1 Revenue formation

Most Legal revenue should be thought of as access to a maintained decision system rather than payment for isolated documents. A customer pays for some combination of content scope, jurisdictions, practice modules, users, analytics, drafting, document capability, security, integrations, service, and contract duration. The disclosed combined Law Firms & Corporate Legal mix of about 70% means renewal pricing, cross-sell, seat changes, and AI feature adoption in professional workflows dominate segment growth. Government, academic, news, and business products form a slower and more budget-sensitive residual.

Law-firm willingness to pay is tied to lawyer productivity, risk control, and the economics of client delivery. AI can shorten research and drafting time, but hourly billing complicates value capture: the firm benefits only if it increases matter volume, improves realization, raises rates, moves toward value pricing, or frees scarce senior time. Clio's 2025 Legal Trends work finds that wide AI adopters are changing pricing more frequently, while many firms have not yet adjusted billing models; among wide adopters that changed pricing, increases, decreases, and new AI fees all occur. That is evidence for dispersion rather than an automatic vendor price umbrella. [Clio's official report discusses AI, billing, and pricing adaptation](https://www.clio.com/resources/legal-trends/read-online/).

Corporate legal departments have a different economic comparison. Their budgets are usually cost centers, and a legal platform can be justified by avoiding external counsel, accelerating contracts, improving consistency, or coping with more work without proportional headcount. Thomson Reuters markets CoCounsel to corporate teams with explicit productivity and

outside-counsel-spend claims and publishes starting monthly prices for several packages, creating a visible competitive reference point. [Thomson Reuters' corporate plan comparison shows product packaging and public starting prices](https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/compare-cocounsel-plans-for-your-legal-team). LexisNexis retains bespoke pricing for larger organizations. Bespoke packaging helps monetize complex needs, but buyers can increasingly benchmark value against transparent alternatives.

3.2 Cost formation

The classic cost base includes editorial and legal expertise, content acquisition and licensing, data ingestion, taxonomy, citation and linking systems, platform engineering, product development, sales, customer success, hosting, security, and amortization of internally developed software. Generative AI adds model inference, retrieval, embeddings, storage, evaluation, guardrails, red-teaming, monitoring, and human quality-control costs. Agentic workflows can make several model calls, retrieve many documents, and produce long outputs for one user-visible task, so cost per completed workflow can be materially higher than cost per chat turn.

Raw model inference is only one layer and is likely to get cheaper. Amazon Bedrock publishes token-based prices, cheaper cache reads, service tiers, and batch inference at discounts to on-demand usage; these mechanisms show how scale, routing, caching, and workload design can reduce unit cost. They do not prove RELX's realized cost because model mix, negotiated rates, token volumes, retrieval architecture, and usage are undisclosed. [Amazon Bedrock's official pricing page describes per-token, cache, batch, and tier economics](https://aws.amazon.com/bedrock/pricing/). The modeled inference drag therefore covers the full serving stack, not an invented tokens-times-list-price calculation.

The more durable cost is quality assurance. Legal users need current sources, jurisdiction control, citation links, confidentiality, auditability, and predictable behavior. Model upgrades can require regression testing across many practice areas. Each new workflow creates evaluation and support obligations. This is both a moat and a margin burden: a trusted platform can charge more, but maintaining trust prevents the software from converging immediately to generic SaaS incremental margins.

3.3 What moves margin

Margin rises when subscription price and premium AI attach outpace seat contraction; higher-value analytics and workflows replace low-value products; renewal and cross-sell improve; content and engineering are reused across more users; inference is routed to fit-for-purpose models; prompt and retrieval caching reduce repeated work; and sales or onboarding cost per account falls. Margin falls when AI is bundled without adequate price, users generate far more inference than assumed, multi-step agents create long and repeated calls, customers demand enterprise integrations and bespoke evaluations, competitors discount, lower-cost tools cap renewal increases, or legal accuracy failures require extensive remediation.

The key distinction is between gross value delivered and vendor value captured. If Protégé saves a lawyer an hour, RELX does not automatically receive the value of that hour. Capture depends on packaging, buyer procurement, competitive alternatives, measurable ROI, and the customer's own billing model. The base case assumes RELX captures enough value through renewal pricing and platform breadth to expand margin modestly, while continuing to fund model, product, and quality costs. The bull case requires broad workflow adoption and disciplined usage economics. The bear case assumes AI becomes expected functionality and buyers resist paying enough to cover higher serving and development cost.

4. Competitive dynamics

4.1 The incumbent contest

The closest direct competitor is Thomson Reuters, combining Westlaw, Practical Law, CoCounsel, drafting, and document analysis. CoCounsel is positioned as a unified AI legal experience grounded in trusted content, with one-, two-, and three-year subscription terms and new features included during the initial contract term. That packaging can encourage adoption, but it also signals that AI capability may be bundled into a platform relationship rather than priced as unlimited successive add-ons. [The official CoCounsel pricing page describes contract terms and included feature updates](https://sales.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/products/cocounsel-legal/700/plans-pricing).

Wolters Kluwer is also strengthening legal AI through VitalLaw Expert AI and the European rollout of Libra. Its product emphasizes proprietary authoritative content, retrieval-augmented generation, editorial oversight, citations, and secure enterprise use—the same trust attributes on which Lexis relies. [Wolters Kluwer's VitalLaw Expert AI page describes grounded research, drafting, summaries, and editor-in-the-loop

controls](https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/solutions/vitallaw-law-firms/ai), while [its May 2026 release documents Libra's multi-country European expansion](https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/news/wolters-kluwer-advances-legal-ai-strategy-with-successful-multi-country-launch-of-libra).

This convergence matters. In 2023, grounding, citations, and secure legal workflows were differentiators over general-purpose chat. By 2026 they are baseline claims across leading vendors. RELX can still win on content breadth, Shepard's, workflow depth, distribution, integrations, and execution, but cannot assume that merely adding RAG and citations creates durable pricing power.

4.2 Specialist and platform challengers

Harvey targets major law firms and in-house teams with professional AI and is expanding geographically. Its 2026 announcements show firmwide deployments and demand moving from experimentation into everyday use. [Harvey's June 2026 Singapore announcement describes scaled adoption by APAC law firms and in-house teams](https://www.harvey.ai/blog/harvey-opens-in-singapore), and [its Milan announcement cites a firmwide deployment at a major Italian law firm](https://www.harvey.ai/blog/harvey-is-expanding-with-a-team-in-milan). vLex's Vincent AI offers citation-linked research across a broad global legal database and document-oriented workflows. [vLex's official Vincent documentation shows cited research answers linked to primary and secondary sources](https://knowledge.vlex.com/en/features/vincent/ask-a-research-question).

Practice-management platforms, drafting tools, contract-lifecycle systems, document-management vendors, and general AI suites also compete for workflow ownership. Microsoft integration is especially important because lawyers already spend much of the day in Word, Outlook, Teams, and document systems. If the user interface moves away from the legal database and toward an orchestration layer that can call multiple content sources, the incumbent content platform risks becoming a supplier instead of the primary customer relationship.

4.3 Adoption is real; monetization is unresolved

Thomson Reuters' 2026 AI in Professional Services report says organizational GenAI usage reached 40%, up from 22% in 2025, more than 80% of current users engage weekly, and over 90% expect GenAI to become central within five years. Yet only 18% say their organizations track ROI, and agentic AI is still used by 15%, with a much larger group planning or considering it. [The official 2026 report summarizes adoption, workflow, agentic, and ROI findings](https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/reports/2026-ai-in-professional-services-report). That is a favorable adoption backdrop for Lexis+ and Protégé, but a weak basis for extrapolating current 10% Legal growth through 2031. Trials and weekly use can precede broad paid deployment; buyers can consolidate vendors; and productivity gains may be shared through lower prices.

Clio reports similarly rapid AI use among law firms, alongside changes in billing and a growing role for flat fees. This supports the view that AI is becoming central to legal delivery. It also creates second-order pressure: if law firms use AI to deliver work faster, corporate clients may demand lower external spend, and firms may scrutinize technology subscriptions more aggressively. Legal AI vendors must prove that their product increases throughput, realization, or quality rather than merely consuming a larger software budget.

4.4 Pricing power and commoditization

Lexis has real pricing power because a professional legal platform is deeply embedded, content scope is difficult to replicate globally, citations and editorial enhancements matter, and switching can disrupt workflows and training. Multi-year contracts, bespoke packages, and customer-specific content create friction. The current growth and renewal commentary suggests that customers are accepting richer offerings.

Pricing power is nevertheless bounded. Large firms often dual-source or negotiate aggressively. Corporate departments can compare against outside-counsel savings and point solutions. Smaller customers can use lower-priced software and general models for non-critical work. Competitors publish packages and starting prices. Model capabilities diffuse, and enterprise buyers increasingly expect access to multiple foundation models. LexisNexis itself markets Protégé as bringing leading general models into its secure environment, which is strategically sensible but confirms that the foundation model is not proprietary.

The likely equilibrium is not total commoditization or unrestricted pricing. Authoritative content, citators, editorial systems, integrations, and customer data permissions remain differentiated. The AI interface, however, becomes competitive table stakes. The base case assumes mid-single-digit net pricing plus adoption and mix can sustain high-single-digit growth in the

core, but not that AI supports double-digit price increases indefinitely. The bear case assumes lower net pricing, concessions, or bundling while inference and quality costs remain material. The bull case assumes workflow depth and proprietary content allow value-based packaging without triggering material churn.

5. Moat at the segment level

Legal has a defensible but changing moat. The strongest asset is the combination of authoritative content, editorial enhancement, citation networks, jurisdictional breadth, and decades of workflow integration. A raw corpus of cases and statutes is not equivalent to a maintained professional system: legal authority changes, treatment relationships matter, secondary sources need expert upkeep, and users require confidence that they can verify an answer. Shepard's, practical guidance, analytics, and customer integrations deepen the system.

The second layer is distribution and installed workflow. Large institutions have contracts, permissions, matter systems, templates, training, procurement approvals, and security reviews around LexisNexis. Protégé can use these assets to personalize drafting and connect internal documents with external authority. The more workflows users configure and the more firm knowledge they connect, the more costly switching becomes—provided customers trust RELX with that layer.

The third layer is data and evaluation. Usage feedback, search behavior, editorial corrections, citations, and domain-specific test sets can improve retrieval and product design. RELX can spread product development over a global customer base. However, it should not be assumed that private usage data automatically creates a proprietary model advantage; privacy rules constrain reuse, and foundation-model progress is external.

The moat is weaker at the presentation layer. Natural-language interaction, summarization, drafting, document upload, and agentic workflow builders can be replicated. Rivals already claim grounded answers, citations, secure environments, and internal-knowledge integration. Customers may want model choice rather than dependence on one vendor's stack. AI lowers the cost of building a credible user experience even if it does not eliminate the cost of creating trusted content.

Over five to ten years, Legal should remain advantaged if it owns the trusted answer, workflow, and verification loop. It is vulnerable if it becomes only a content endpoint behind another platform's assistant. The moat therefore depends less on having an AI feature and more on controlling the professional workflow, maintaining superior source coverage and citation quality, proving measurable productivity, and pricing below the point where customers assemble alternatives.

6. Historical growth rates reproduced from the data package

The clean current-taxonomy history is limited to FY2023-FY2025. The two-year CAGR from FY2023 to FY2025 is 4.46%; it is labeled below as the table's three-observation historical CAGR. Underlying growth accelerated to 9% in FY2025 and 10% in H1 2026, but those underlying percentages are not current-taxonomy dollar series and are not used to rewrite reported revenue.

Product or sub-segment	FY2023 revenue	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	Historical CAGR	Most recent growth	Data package cite
Legal segment total	£1,655m [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2]	£1,718m [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2]	£1,806m [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2]	4.46% calculated from the cited FY2023 and FY2025 cells	5.1% reported FY2025 [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2]; 10% underlying H1 2026 [RELX H1 2026 results presentation, 23 July 2026]	RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; H1 2026 results presentation business-area table; reproduced in data_package §§3 and 5
Law Firms & Corporate Legal	Not separately disclosed [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2]	Not separately disclosed [same source]	Not separately disclosed [same source]	Not calculable	Double-digit directional growth [official FY2025 transcript, 12 February 2026, Erik Engstrom]	RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; official FY2025 and H1 2026 transcripts; reproduced in data_package §4
Government & Academic; News & Business	Not separately disclosed [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2]	Not separately disclosed [same source]	Not separately disclosed [same source]	Not calculable	Not separately disclosed [official FY2025 and H1 2026 transcripts]	RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; official FY2025 and H1 2026 transcripts; reproduced in data_package §4

Historical arithmetic checks. FY2023 £1,655m × 1.038 = £1,717.9m, which rounds to FY2024 £1,718m. FY2024 £1,718m × 1.051 = £1,805.6m, which rounds to FY2025 £1,806m. Both checks are within 0.1%, comfortably inside the required 2% tolerance. The FY2023-FY2025 CAGR check is (£1,806m / £1,655m)^(1/2) - 1 = 4.46%. No product dollars were back-solved.

The TTM anchor is separate from this fiscal-year history: £1,806m - £900m + £959m = **£1,865m**. The model compounds exactly five years from 30 June 2026 to 30 June 2031; it does not compound from FY2025 or extend the horizon to a sixth

year.

7. Management guidance from data_package section 6

The data package explicitly classifies the Legal rows as **source-verified paraphrases**, not transcript-verbatim quotations. The text below reproduces the package wording exactly and does not misattribute it as a direct quote by the speaker.

Source artifact, date, and speaker	Exact artifact text	Interpretation
Official FY2024 results transcript, 13 February 2025, Erik Engstrom; data_package §6 Legal	"Legal growth improved as business mix shifted toward higher-value analytics; Lexis+ AI and Protégé adoption progressed"	The growth mechanism is mix and platform adoption, but there is no attach rate or AI revenue. The forecast captures this through core growth and price/mix rather than a fabricated AI line.
Official H1 2025 results transcript, 24 July 2025, Erik Engstrom; data_package §6 Legal	"Growth stepped up and adjusted profit grew faster than revenue as costs were held below revenue growth"	This supports measured operating leverage. It does not justify a straight-line margin ramp because H1 2026 reported margin remained below FY2025.
Official FY2025 results transcript, 12 February 2026, Erik Engstrom; data_package §6 Legal	"Law Firms & Corporate Legal, about 70% of revenue, grew double digits with adoption of the integrated AI-enabled platform"	The majority of the segment has a faster engine. The 70% is rounded and combined; the model does not invent a law-firm versus corporate split.
Official H1 2026 results transcript, 23 July 2026, Erik Engstrom; data_package §6 Legal	"Legal reached 10% underlying revenue growth and 13% adjusted profit growth, with strong renewals and new sales"	This is the strongest near-term anchor. The base case decelerates gradually as adoption penetrates and competitive features converge.

[DATA GAP: data_package §6 Legal contains verified paraphrases rather than transcript-verbatim speaker quotations and gives no numerical full-year Legal guidance.]

[DATA GAP: management provides no numeric Lexis+, Protégé, AI attach-rate, paid-seat, usage, renewal-price, retention, or inference-cost guidance.]

8. Forward growth assumptions

Modeling setup

The product decomposition starts with the TTM Legal total of £1,865m. For scenario mechanics only, 70% or £1,305.5m is assigned to Law Firms & Corporate Legal and 30% or £559.5m to Government & Academic plus News & Business. This matches management's approximate current combined share but is not a disclosed dollar history. All case CAGRs are geometric outcomes of the year-by-year paths below.

Base case growth assumptions

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest growth	Management FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Law Firms & Corporate Legal	Not disclosed; total Legal 4.46%	Double-digit directional; total H1 10%	No numeric guide; strong renewals and new sales	9.00%	Starts from current double-digit adoption, then slows as AI penetrates. Pricing, analytics mix, and workflow cross-sell beat segment history, while CoCounsel, Harvey, vLex, and VitalLaw prevent indefinite acceleration.
Government & Academic; News & Business	Not disclosed; total Legal 4.46%	Not disclosed	No numeric guide	4.00%	Budget and procurement cycles limit price; platform upgrades and digital mix sustain modest growth. This line does not receive the full AI premium of the core franchise.
Legal segment total	4.46% reported-currency history	10% underlying H1 2026	No numeric guide	7.59%	A 70/30 weighted opening mix produces high-single-digit growth, with total annual growth easing from 8.2% toward 7.0%.

Base interpretation: the forecast gives credit for real adoption but requires no heroic reacceleration. Law Firms & Corporate Legal grows 10%, 10%, 9%, 8%, and 8%. That path assumes Lexis+ with Protégé moves from feature adoption into broader paid workflow use; renewals absorb a low-to-mid-single-digit aggregate price-and-mix contribution—an analyst assumption, because management discloses neither realized price nor AI attach; corporate departments use the product to reduce external spend; and law firms capture enough productivity through volume, realization, or alternative fees to preserve

technology budgets. It also assumes competitive parity prevents price from becoming the sole growth engine.

Bull case growth assumptions

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest growth	Management FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Law Firms & Corporate Legal	Not disclosed; total Legal 4.46%	Double-digit directional; total H1 10%	No numeric guide; integrated AI platform adoption	12.20%	Protégé becomes the primary work interface, attach and usage broaden, enterprise integrations deepen switching, and value-based packaging sustains low-double-digit growth despite competition.
Government & Academic; News & Business	Not disclosed; total Legal 4.46%	Not disclosed	No numeric guide	5.60%	AI-assisted access and cross-sell improve demand, while public and academic budgets still cap the outcome below the core.
Legal segment total	4.46% reported-currency history	10% underlying H1 2026	No numeric guide	10.38%	The core compounds faster and rises in mix, keeping total growth near 10% through the horizon.

Bull interpretation: Law Firms & Corporate Legal grows 13%, 13%, 12%, 12%, and 11%. This requires paid deployment beyond pilots; continued strong new sales; high renewal acceptance; successful incorporation of customer documents and repeatable agents; and measurable ROI. Law firms adapt pricing so productivity does not shrink matter economics, while corporate teams redirect outside-counsel budgets toward software. RELX uses model routing, caching, and scale to prevent usage cost from outrunning price. The bull case does not assume competitor failure; it assumes the market expands fast enough and Lexis executes well enough to sustain share and premium positioning.

Bear case growth assumptions

Product	Historical CAGR	Latest growth	Management FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Law Firms & Corporate Legal	Not disclosed; total Legal 4.46%	Double-digit directional; total H1 10%	No numeric guide	2.19%	Initial renewals carry momentum, then rival grounded AI becomes interchangeable, buyers consolidate tools, seat pressure offsets price, and AI is bundled rather than separately monetized.
Government & Academic; News & Business	Not disclosed; total Legal 4.46%	Not disclosed	No numeric guide	-1.20%	Procurement pressure, budgets, news substitution, and lower-value product rationalization produce gradual decline.
Legal segment total	4.46% reported-currency history	10% underlying H1 2026	No numeric guide	1.22%	The core slows sharply but not instantaneously; residual decline pulls total revenue almost flat by the final year.

Bear interpretation: Law Firms & Corporate Legal grows 5%, 3%, 2%, 1%, and 0%. That is not an arbitrary cliff from H1's 10%: the first year retains contracted renewals and pipeline, then deterioration appears as pilots fail to expand, generic and specialist tools improve, procurement demands multi-vendor concessions, and seat counts fall as junior work changes. The residual path is 0%, -1%, -1%, -2%, and -2%. The bear is severe because AI functionality becomes table stakes, but it does not assume Lexis's content franchise vanishes within five years.

Year-by-year thesis-consistency and deceleration table

Case	TTM+1 growth	TTM+2 growth	TTM+3 growth	TTM+4 growth	TTM+5 growth	TTM+5 revenue
Bear	3.50%	1.84%	1.15%	0.17%	-0.54%	£1,981.2m
Base	8.20%	8.27%	7.62%	6.93%	6.96%	£2,689.1m
Bull	10.78%	10.88%	10.26%	10.33%	9.65%	£3,055.8m

The base deceleration is milder than a generic maturation curve because the segment is only beginning to monetize an integrated workflow and the latest reported momentum is broad. The bear deceleration is more aggressive because it combines three specific mechanisms: commoditization of the conversational interface, seat compression from workflow automation, and buyer resistance to paying twice for overlapping AI products. The bull remains close to the current run rate

because adoption moves from individual features to repeatable organizational workflows.

9. Forward Adjusted operating profit margin assumptions

The TTM starting margin on the exact sealed basis is **23.32% Adjusted operating profit**. Product-level margins are not disclosed. The line margins below are scenario mechanics used to compute the segment total, not claims about current product profitability.

Case	Modeled line	TTM+5 revenue	TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit margin	TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit	Mechanism
Bear	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	£1,454.5m	18.0%	£261.8m	Bundling and discounts reduce realized price; high agent usage, evaluation, support, and product spending remain.
Bear	Government & Academic; News & Business	£526.7m	19.8%	£104.3m	Lower investment intensity helps, but budget pressure and decline prevent scale leverage.
Bear	Legal segment blended	£1,981.2m	18.48%	£366.1m	Revenue stagnation and AI cost absorption drive a 484bp decline from TTM.
Base	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	£2,008.3m	25.5%	£512.1m	Price, premium mix, and workflow reuse offset inference and product investment.
Base	Government & Academic; News & Business	£680.7m	23.4%	£159.3m	Stable digital economics with limited mix benefit and constrained pricing.
Base	Legal segment blended	£2,689.1m	24.97%	£671.4m	Scale and price/mix deliver 165bp expansion while AI cost remains visible.
Bull	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	£2,321.1m	28.0%	£649.9m	High attach, usage efficiency, enterprise workflows, and premium value-based packaging create leverage.
Bull	Government & Academic; News & Business	£734.7m	24.0%	£176.3m	Moderate price and digital leverage; public-sector constraints remain.
Bull	Legal segment blended	£3,055.8m	27.04%	£826.2m	Mix shifts toward the core and strong scale offsets serving cost, expanding 372bp.

Explicit margin bridge

Margin bridge from 23.32% TTM	Bear	Base	Bull
Starting Adjusted operating profit margin	23.32%	23.32%	23.32%
Pricing, attach, and customer mix	-2.75 ppt	+2.10 ppt	+3.00 ppt
Scale and workflow reuse	+0.60 ppt	+1.50 ppt	+2.25 ppt
Inference, retrieval, evaluation, and guardrails	-1.65 ppt	-1.10 ppt	-0.80 ppt
Product, integration, sales, and customer success	-1.04 ppt	-0.85 ppt	-0.73 ppt
TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit margin	18.48%	24.97%	27.04%

The bridge is an underwriting decomposition, not a disclosed cost schedule. In the bear case, lower realized price and more expensive usage hit simultaneously. This can occur if customers demand broad AI access in renewals, usage grows faster than contract revenue, and RELX must continue spending to remain competitive. In the base case, reusable content, platform engineering, and sales infrastructure create leverage, but more than half of that gross benefit is reinvested or consumed by the AI serving stack. In the bull case, routing and caching lower effective inference cost, workflow adoption improves retention and packaging, and the core rises from 70% to about 76% of segment revenue.

The margin forecast deliberately rejects two simplistic views. First, AI is not assumed to be pure software gross margin: retrieval, long-context processing, agent loops, evaluation, security, and support consume resources. Second, inference cost

is not assumed to rise without limit: public cloud pricing, caching, batch processing, smaller specialized models, and volume negotiations create a credible efficiency curve. What remains uncertain is who captures the savings—RELX, customers through lower pricing, or foundation-model suppliers.

No unallocated central costs, acquired-intangible amortization, acquisition items, joint-venture reclassifications, finance cost, tax, or NCI are included in these margins. Those lines belong to the sealed group bridge and must be forecast once in synthesis.

10. Segment rollup and arithmetic tie-out

Case	Modeled line	Opening TTM model revenue	Five-year CAGR	TTM+5 revenue	TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit margin	TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit
Bear	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	£1,305.5m	2.19%	£1,454.5m	18.0%	£261.8m
Bear	Government & Academic; News & Business	£559.5m	-1.20%	£526.7m	19.8%	£104.3m
Bear	Legal segment total	£1,865.0m	1.22%	£1,981.2m	18.48%	£366.1m
Base	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	£1,305.5m	9.00%	£2,008.3m	25.5%	£512.1m
Base	Government & Academic; News & Business	£559.5m	4.00%	£680.7m	23.4%	£159.3m
Base	Legal segment total	£1,865.0m	7.59%	£2,689.1m	24.97%	£671.4m
Bull	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	£1,305.5m	12.20%	£2,321.1m	28.0%	£649.9m
Bull	Government & Academic; News & Business	£559.5m	5.60%	£734.7m	24.0%	£176.3m
Bull	Legal segment total	£1,865.0m	10.38%	£3,055.8m	27.04%	£826.2m

All three cases tie exactly within rounding. Each blended margin is revenue-weighted as `sum(line revenue × line margin) / sum(line revenue)`, not a simple average of the line margins. Bear revenue: £1,454.5m + £526.7m = £1,981.2m. Bear Adjusted operating profit: £261.8m + £104.3m = £366.1m; £366.1m / £1,981.2m = 18.48%. Base revenue: £2,008.3m + £680.7m = £2,689.0m before display rounding and £2,689.1m at unrounded precision. Base profit: £512.1m + £159.3m = £671.4m; £671.4m / £2,689.1m = 24.97%. Bull revenue: £2,321.1m + £734.7m = £3,055.8m. Bull profit: £649.9m + £176.3m = £826.2m; £826.2m / £3,055.8m = 27.04%. No case uses a balancing plug.

Adoption, price, mix, and inference scoreboard

Driver	Bear	Base	Bull
Lexis+ and Protégé adoption	Pilots renew selectively; limited firmwide expansion	Broad paid adoption in core workflows	Protégé becomes primary interface across research, drafting, and internal knowledge
Law-firm economics	Seat contraction and billable-hour pressure limit software budget	Firms capture efficiency via throughput, realization, and mixed fees	Value pricing and higher matter capacity support premium platform spend
Corporate legal economics	Procurement consolidates vendors and demands concessions	Outside-counsel avoidance supports cross-sell	In-house workflow automation expands addressable spend materially
Pricing and packaging	AI becomes bundled table stakes; effective net price weak	Mid-single-digit price and mix with negotiated enterprise packages	Premium workflow and value-based packages with low churn
Competition and commoditization	CoCounsel, Harvey, vLex, VitalLaw, and general AI narrow differentiation	Trusted content and workflow preserve differentiation despite feature parity	Lexis content, integrations, and execution sustain premium position
Inference and quality cost	Usage intensity and agent loops outrun efficiency	Routing, caching, and scale partly offset greater usage	Cost per completed workflow falls while paid usage grows

Probability discipline

Probabilities are deliberately non-uniform: **Bear 30%, Base 55%, Bull 15%**. The base receives the highest weight because current renewals, new sales, double-digit core growth, and the breadth of professional AI adoption support continued above-history expansion. Bear receives twice the bull probability because monetization evidence is far thinner than adoption evidence: RELX discloses no AI revenue, attach rate, usage, pricing, or ROI; rival capabilities are converging; and Legal's H1 margin shows that investment is real. Bull is possible but requires sustained low-double-digit growth and margin expansion

while formidable competitors invest simultaneously.

The probability-weighted TTM+5 revenue diagnostic is £2,531.7m, calculated as 30% × £1,981.2m + 55% × £2,689.1m + 15% × £3,055.8m. Probability-weighted TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit is £603.0m, calculated from the same scenario weights. These expected values are diagnostics only and do not replace the three cases in synthesis.

11. Key risks and wildcards

- **AI feature commoditization — Bear.** Grounded answers, citations, document upload, drafting, and workflow builders are now claimed across multiple vendors. If customers perceive comparable quality, the interface loses pricing power and content becomes an input behind another assistant.

- **Inference and agent-cost intensity — Bear and Base.** Multi-step legal workflows can retrieve many sources and invoke models repeatedly. Usage can rise faster than subscription revenue. Public token prices do not include all retrieval, evaluation, guardrail, support, and enterprise-service cost.

- **Law-firm business-model adaptation — all cases.** AI reduces time per matter. Law firms that cannot replace hours with volume, better realization, higher rates, or value pricing may resist premium software spend even when the product improves productivity. Successful adaptation supports the bull; weak adaptation supports the bear.

- **Corporate legal insourcing — Base and Bull.** Corporate departments can use AI to keep more work inside, expanding the software budget and increasing the value of integrated research, drafting, and internal knowledge. This can shift spend from outside counsel to LexisNexis. It also makes procurement more demanding and ROI-focused.

- **Seat compression — Bear.** If AI reduces junior legal headcount or the number of researchers needed per matter, seat-based pricing can face volume pressure. RELX must move toward enterprise, workflow, usage, or value-based pricing without alienating customers.

- **Accuracy, confidentiality, and professional responsibility — Bear.** A material hallucination, citation defect, data leak, or inconsistent jurisdictional answer could slow deployment and raise evaluation cost. Trust is a moat only while quality remains demonstrably superior.

- **Workflow control — all cases.** Lexis benefits if users start and finish work inside Protégé. It loses strategic control if Microsoft, document-management platforms, or specialist agents become the orchestration layer and call Lexis content as one source among many.

- **Content rights and primary-law access — Bear.** AI increases the strategic importance of broad, current, machine-readable content. Licensing disputes, regulation, or court restrictions could raise cost or reduce coverage. Conversely, exclusive editorial materials and citation networks support the moat.

- **International localization — Base and Bull.** Legal content and workflows are jurisdiction-specific. RELX can reuse platform technology globally, but must localize sources, editorial systems, evaluation, language, and compliance. Successful rollout expands the addressable market; slow localization limits scale benefits.

- **Competitive response — Bear.** Thomson Reuters can bundle CoCounsel with Westlaw and Practical Law; Wolters Kluwer is expanding VitalLaw and Libra; Harvey and vLex are growing; general models improve quickly. Sustained double-digit growth requires RELX to win budgets, not merely participate in market growth.

- **Pricing opacity — all cases.** Bespoke pricing helps segment customers and capture value, but it obscures realized price and can mask discounts, bundled AI, or costly implementation obligations. Without disclosed ARR, NRR, attach, or usage, reported growth and margin remain the only hard economic scorecard.

- **Current momentum extrapolation — Bear.** H1 2026's 10% underlying revenue growth and 13% underlying profit growth are strong, but one half-year can reflect launch cycles, renewals, and comparisons. The base path decelerates; the bull requires evidence that growth persists after the adoption wave.

Investment interpretation

Legal is not a weak legacy information business being rescued by AI. It entered the current cycle with authoritative content, citators, professional distribution, and embedded workflows. Those assets give Protégé a better chance of becoming a trusted production system than a standalone general model. The recent move to 10% underlying growth and 13% underlying Adjusted operating profit growth is consistent with customers paying for a richer platform.

The segment is also the clearest place where RELX's moat can be tested by AI. The model layer is externally supplied and increasingly substitutable. Every major competitor is building grounded, cited, secure legal workflows. Customer adoption is rising faster than proven ROI, and law-firm economics may pass some efficiency benefits to clients. Margin upside exists because Legal begins below RELX's other analytics businesses, but that gap should not be treated as automatic convergence; content, product, model, evaluation, and service costs are structurally meaningful.

The base case earns a 55% probability because it balances current evidence and competitive reality: 7.59% revenue CAGR, 165bp margin expansion, and £671.4m of TTM+5 Adjusted operating profit. The bear is not a collapse in legal content; it is a more subtle failure of monetization, where AI becomes expected, seats and pricing weaken, and cost remains elevated. That produces only 1.22% revenue CAGR and a 18.48% margin. The bull requires Protégé to become the workflow hub and converts adoption into price, cross-sell, and retention while cost per completed task falls; it yields 10.38% revenue CAGR and a 27.04% margin.

The most important monitoring evidence is therefore not another feature announcement. It is sustained Legal underlying revenue growth after the first adoption wave, Adjusted operating profit growth that exceeds revenue over full-year periods, explicit adoption or paid-usage metrics, and evidence that large law-firm and corporate deployments expand rather than merely renew. A material slowdown in core Legal growth accompanied by lower margin would validate the commoditization-and-cost bear even if user counts continued to rise.

Scenario summary

Case	Segment TTM+5 Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5 Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5 Profit	Probability
Bear	£1,981.2m	Adjusted operating profit	18.48%	£366.1m	30%
Base	£2,689.1m	Adjusted operating profit	24.97%	£671.4m	55%
Bull	£3,055.8m	Adjusted operating profit	27.04%	£826.2m	15%

`trade_execution_authorized=false`

Appendix B4 - Exhibitions

RELX PLC — Exhibitions Segment Deep Dive

Segment: Exhibitions, operated as RX. **Reporting currency:** GBP millions. **Forecast anchor:** TTM ended 30 June 2026. **Forecast horizon:** 30 June 2031, exactly five calendar years. **Exact segment-profit basis: Adjusted operating profit**. It is RELX's issuer-disclosed segment measure, not statutory operating income. **Trade execution authorized:** `false`.

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

RELX describes Exhibitions as the business that organizes major face-to-face industry events and supplies related digital services. The economic perimeter of RX is stable enough for forecasting, but the group reporting boundary changed in 2025 when RELX separated all remaining print and print-related activities and restated FY2023-FY2024. The clean current-taxonomy dollar history therefore begins in FY2023. FY2021 and FY2022 Exhibitions figures are useful only as post-pandemic recovery context and must not be spliced into a current-taxonomy CAGR. The FY2023 boundary matters less mechanically for Exhibitions than for the information businesses, but this appendix nonetheless uses only FY2023 onward for like-for-like reported-dollar comparisons [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §1 taxonomy change and §3 Exhibitions table].

1. What this segment actually is

RX creates temporary marketplaces. It convenes suppliers, buyers, distributors, investors, regulators, experts, and fans around a defined industry or community at a particular place and time. The product is not merely rented floor space. A strong event compresses months of prospecting, product demonstration, education, relationship maintenance, and competitive intelligence into a few days. The organizer owns or controls the event brand, curates the participant mix, markets the event, sells stand and sponsorship inventory, contracts the venue and service ecosystem, manages registration, and increasingly supplies the data layer that connects activity before, during, and after the physical gathering.

The customer set has two economic sides. Exhibitors and sponsors pay primarily for access to qualified demand: stand space, prominent positioning, sponsorship, product promotion, speaking opportunities, lead capture, and related services. Visitors pay admission and sometimes premium conference or experience fees; even when admission is free, registered visitors are the scarce audience that makes exhibitor inventory valuable. In H1 2026, RELX disclosed that exhibitors generated 73% of Exhibitions revenue and visitors and other sources generated 27%. Those are rounded shares, not separately disclosed pounds [data_package §4, Exhibitions rows]. This asymmetry makes exhibitor return on investment the central economic variable.

The core pricing unit varies by event but can be understood as yield per unit of scarce commercial access: price per square metre, price per stand package, sponsorship yield, ticket yield, or price per qualified interaction. Volume comes from occupied space, number of exhibitors, sponsorship inventory sold, attendance, event frequency, new launches, and geographic editions. Mix improves when a portfolio shifts toward high-value marquee brands, premium sponsorship, growing industries, and locations where capacity or access is scarce. Reported revenue also moves with the calendar because some events are biennial or change dates and because a large event may cross a half-year boundary.

Go-to-market is relationship-intensive. Event directors and specialist sales teams sell to industry suppliers months before opening day, frequently using prior participation, registration data, and rebooking patterns to build visibility. Marketing teams recruit the audience whose quality determines exhibitor value. A mature event can enjoy a favorable self-reinforcing loop: more important exhibitors attract more visitors; more relevant visitors increase exhibitor ROI; higher ROI supports rebooking, larger stands, sponsorship, and higher yield. Yet this loop belongs to each event brand, not automatically to the corporate parent. A poorly curated show can lose relevance quickly even if the overall RX portfolio is strong.

Digital services support rather than replace the marketplace. RX describes Lead Manager, Lead Booster, Exhibitor Dashboard, searchable profiles, recommendations, and QR-based content or lead capture as tools that make contacts measurable and follow-up faster. RX NOW reported doubled exhibitor leads at PGA Show 2026 versus 2025, while another RX account says dashboard adoption rose to 70% at events where it had previously been 20% ([RX NOW](https://rxglobal.com/rx-now-event-tech-thats-redefining-visitor-experience); [RX digital event technology](https://rxglobal.com/digital-event-tech-view-driving-seat)). These are selected product examples, not divisional KPIs, and this model does not convert them into revenue. Their relevance is strategic: better measurement can defend physical-event budgets and support bundled value pricing.

2. Current economics

The TTM financial anchor is mechanically reconstructed from verified formal periods because RELX reports business-area dollars half-yearly and annually, not quarterly. TTM Exhibitions revenue equals FY2025 £1,186m minus H1 2025 £581m plus H1 2026 £575m, or **£1,180m**. TTM Adjusted operating profit equals £410m minus £234m plus £226m, or **£402m**. The resulting TTM Adjusted operating profit margin is **34.07%** [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX Results for the Six Months to 30 June 2026, business-area table; data_package §3 and §5; statutory_bridge.json, TTM Exhibitions line].

FY2025 revenue was £1,186m, down 4.3% in reported currency from FY2024's £1,239m, while management reported 8% underlying revenue growth. FY2025 Adjusted operating profit was £410m, producing a 34.6% margin, and management reported 9% underlying profit growth. The apparent conflict is not an arithmetic error. Reported pounds embed currency and event cycling, while RELX's underlying measure adjusts for portfolio, currency, and timing effects. H1 2026 revenue was £575m with 6% underlying growth; Adjusted operating profit was £226m with 2% underlying growth and a 39.3% first-half margin. Management attributed the softer profit growth to event timing and travel disruption, with Middle East uncertainty still relevant to the full year [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2 and business review; RELX H1 2026 presentation, Exhibitions slide; official 23 July 2026 transcript; data_package §5-§6].

The segment has recovered far beyond its pandemic trough. Margin rose from 28.6% in FY2023 to 32.1% in FY2024 and 34.6% in FY2025 [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §3]. That improvement reflects restored event density, yield, mix, and operating leverage. It should not be read as permission to extrapolate the 2021-2024 recovery slope. The current 34.1% TTM margin is the normalized starting point here [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 results business-area table; statutory_bridge.json]. It is already above the approximately 28.6% adjusted operating margin of Informa's much larger 2025 B2B Live Events business, calculated from £858m adjusted operating profit on £3,003m revenue ([Informa Annual Report 2025](https://www.informa.com/globalassets/documents/investor-relations/2026/2025-informa-annual-report.pdf)). That peer gap is evidence of attractive current economics and also a reason to be conservative about further expansion.

Capital intensity is mixed. The event organizer usually contracts rather than owns venues, so direct fixed-asset intensity can be modest. It nevertheless needs continual spending on registration platforms, data products, marketing systems, event launches, content, security, and staff capability. Venue deposits and advance sales can create favorable working-capital timing, but cancellation, force-majeure, and refund exposure can reverse it. RELX reports group core capex, not Exhibitions-specific investment, and group capitalized development expense is dominated by information products. **[DATA GAP: RELX does not disclose Exhibitions-specific capex, cash conversion, working capital, event count, net square metres, attendance, rebooking, price/yield, occupancy, digital revenue, or customer concentration.]** This prevents a directly observed return-on-capital calculation for RX and is an important limitation on confidence.

The disclosed H1 2026 mix places roughly three quarters of revenue on exhibitor economics. A customer will tolerate price increases if incremental cost per qualified lead or transaction remains attractive. Conversely, an exhibitor can cut a whole show budget rapidly if buyers stop attending or measurable leads disappoint. Revenue visibility therefore resembles repeat transactional revenue rather than a contractual subscription. The brand may recur annually, but each year's booking must earn renewal.

3. Unit economics

3.1 Revenue equation

A practical revenue identity is:

Event revenue = exhibitor capacity × occupancy × stand yield + sponsorship inventory × sponsorship yield + paying visitors × ticket yield + ancillary and digital services.

Each term has a different ceiling. Capacity can rise through larger venues, added halls, longer duration, better floor planning, or a new geographic edition. Occupancy cannot exceed available inventory, so a mature sold-out event must grow through price, sponsorship, premium services, or expansion. Stand yield reflects nominal price, premium location, bundled lead products, and event quality. Sponsorship is often high-margin but finite because too much inventory dilutes visibility. Visitor revenue depends on attendance, pricing, content value, and the free-versus-paid structure. Digital services can add yield and protect retention, though RELX does not disclose whether they are separately monetized or bundled.

This appendix separates five growth engines rather than hiding them in one CAGR:

- **Price and mix.** Mature, high-ROI events can raise stand and sponsorship yield. The ceiling is exhibitor acquisition economics, not inflation alone. Informa says future growth in its comparable Markets business should come from both volume and yield, with yield—including price per square metre and added services—expected to provide more than half of growth ([Informa 2024 strategic report](https://www.informa.com/globalassets/documents/investor-relations/2025/informa-annual-report-2024-strategic-report.pdf)). That supports a 2%-3% sustainable yield assumption, not unconstrained annual hikes.
- **Same-event volume.** More exhibitors, larger stands, fuller sponsorship, and higher visitor density lift revenue. This is strongest when end markets are growing and venue capacity exists. It can turn negative quickly when marketing budgets tighten.
- **Portfolio development.** New launches, new geographic editions, partnerships, and small acquisitions create capacity outside mature brands. Execution risk is higher and early events can dilute margin.
- **Digital and service yield.** Lead capture, recommendations, searchable profiles, dashboards, and pre/post-event engagement can improve exhibitor ROI. The economic value may appear as retention and price rather than separately reported digital sales.
- **Calendar and disruption.** Biennial events, moved dates, venue availability, strikes, travel restrictions, geopolitical shocks, and public-health events shift or destroy revenue. This is the largest source of short-period noise and should never be smoothed away.

3.2 Cost structure and operating leverage

Costs combine event-specific and platform expenses. Venue rent, temporary labor, security, contractors, freight coordination, utilities, insurance, production, and local marketing scale with event size but are often committed before final attendance is known. Sales teams, event directors, vertical expertise, global leadership, and software platforms are more fixed over the event cycle. A large event therefore has a high contribution margin on incremental stand yield once fixed venue and organizational costs are covered. A cancellation or 10% revenue shortfall can cause a much larger percentage decline in Adjusted operating profit.

The historic margin pattern demonstrates that operating leverage. FY2023 revenue of £1,115m generated £319m Adjusted operating profit and a 28.6% margin. FY2024 revenue rose 11.1% in reported pounds to £1,239m, while Adjusted operating profit rose 24.8% to £398m and margin expanded 350 basis points to 32.1%. FY2025 reported revenue declined because of currency and cycling, but underlying growth remained 8%; Adjusted operating profit increased to £410m and margin expanded another 250 basis points to 34.6% [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §3 Exhibitions table]. The TTM margin eased to 34.1% as H1 2026 absorbed timing and disruption. That sequence argues for scenario-dependent margins rather than a straight line.

Costs that matter at the margin are venue and labor inflation, launch expense, digital product investment, marketing needed to maintain audience quality, and portfolio mix. Passing venue inflation into stand yield preserves margin only if exhibitor ROI remains robust. Reducing marketing to defend near-term margin may undermine attendance and next year's rebooking. Digital investment can depress near-term profit but strengthen pricing and retention. The base case therefore allows only 193 basis points of margin expansion over five years, from 34.07% to 36.0%, even though profit is modeled to grow faster than revenue.

3.3 Exhibitor economics

An exhibitor compares the fully loaded cost of space, stand construction, travel, staff time, samples, sponsorship, and follow-up with sales pipeline, orders, distributor relationships, product launches, and brand exposure. The organizer captures only part of that economic surplus. The moat is strongest when the show supplies scarce, concentrated access to decision makers and lets the exhibitor prove ROI through qualified leads. RX's Lead Manager and Exhibitor Dashboard are strategically valuable because they make interactions measurable. At PGA Show 2026, RX reported that RX NOW doubled leads generated through two tools compared with 2025, but this is a case study rather than portfolio evidence ([RX NOW](https://rxglobal.com/rx-now-event-tech-thats-redefining-visitor-experience)).

The pricing loop is healthy when lead quality rises faster than total exhibitor cost. It becomes fragile when nominal stand price rises while attendance quality falls. Smaller exhibitors are especially sensitive to cash budgets, and larger exhibitors can shift spending to their own user conferences, digital demand generation, channel partners, or a rival event. Since RELX does not disclose rebooking, net promoter scores, leads per exhibitor, or share of customers expanding space, this appendix gives only

a 55% probability to the base case.

3.4 Digital substitution versus digital augmentation

Pure virtual events can deliver content cheaply and reach a broad audience, but they struggle to reproduce product handling, spontaneous discovery, trust building, and dense multi-party meetings. Digital demand-generation platforms can substitute for some lead acquisition, especially for software and information products. The important distinction is whether RX's digital tools improve the physical product or become an independent alternative to it.

The base and bull cases treat digital as augmentation: better matching, lead capture, scheduling, follow-up, and ROI proof increase the value of attendance and allow modest yield. The bear case treats digital partly as substitution: exhibitors reallocate a portion of budgets toward lower-cost always-on channels, while AI improves targeting outside events. Even in the bear case, RX's digital tools contribute modest positive growth because customers still value measurement. The loss comes through reduced physical space, slower price, and weaker attendance—not an assumption that digital revenue disappears.

4. Competitive dynamics

The closest public comparator is Informa's B2B Live Events portfolio, which is larger and spans transaction-led exhibitions, content-led conferences, and experience-led festivals. Informa reported 9.5% underlying B2B Live Events growth in 2025, targets at least 7% in 2026, and targets 6% or more across its 2025-2028 plan, with faster profit growth and a 30% group operating-margin ambition by the end of the plan ([Informa Annual Report 2025](https://www.informa.com/globalassets/documents/investor-relations/2026/2025-informa-annual-report.pdf)). These rates are a useful independent ceiling and base-rate check. RELX's recent 6%-8% underlying Exhibitions growth sits within the peer range, while its margin already exceeds Informa's blended live-events margin.

Informa's 2024 disclosure also describes a fragmented exhibition market in which the top ten organizers represented less than 20% and cites an expected market size of about $40bn by 2030, growing around 5% annually ([Informa 2024 strategic report](https://www.informa.com/globalassets/documents/investor-relations/2025/informa-annual-report-2024-strategic-report.pdf)). This is a competitor-supplied industry estimate, not a neutral third-party forecast, so the model uses it as context rather than a fact to force the CAGR. Fragmentation creates acquisition and partnership opportunities, but also means RX competes with hundreds of local specialists, trade associations, venue-backed organizers, and corporate-owned events.

Other meaningful rivals include large international organizers such as Clarion, Messe Frankfurt, Messe Düsseldorf, Comexposium, Emerald, Hyve, and numerous category specialists. Competitive boundaries are local and vertical. A global ranking matters less than whether RX owns the indispensable event for a specific buyer community. Two organizers can both succeed if they serve different geographies, seasons, or sub-verticals; conversely, a new event can destabilize an incumbent if anchor exhibitors or buyers move.

Competition occurs on several fronts:

- **Event brand and calendar position.** An established annual gathering becomes embedded in customers' planning cycles. The date, location, and reputation can be hard to dislodge.
- **Audience quality.** Exhibitors pay for decision makers, not raw footfall. Better registration data and curation can outweigh a larger but less relevant audience.
- **Venue access and capacity.** Scarce dates at major venues can constrain supply and protect incumbents, though contracts eventually renew.
- **Vertical expertise.** Event teams need credibility with industry associations, major suppliers, regulators, speakers, and buyers. Poor curation erodes relevance.
- **Data and digital capability.** Matching, lead analytics, and measurable ROI increasingly differentiate otherwise similar shows.
- **Portfolio and geographic scale.** A global organizer can follow industries into new markets, share technology, cross-sell international exhibitors, and amortize platforms.
- **Price.** Smaller entrants can discount stands, but a cheap empty event is not a substitute for a liquid marketplace. Price competition becomes dangerous only when audience quality converges.

Substitutes include corporate roadshows, user conferences, online marketplaces, webinars, digital advertising, specialist media, distributors, and AI-driven prospecting. None needs to eliminate exhibitions to hurt economics. If they improve enough to reduce booth size or sponsorship spend by 5%-10%, the high fixed cost base can compress profit sharply. The competitive test is therefore share of exhibitor budget and lead outcomes, not whether physical attendance remains nonzero.

5. Moat at the segment level

RX has a real but conditional moat. Its strongest event brands exhibit local network effects: suppliers attend because buyers attend, and buyers attend because relevant suppliers, products, peers, and content are concentrated there. The event's trusted name, recurring calendar slot, relationships, registration history, and venue know-how reinforce that network. Global scale adds a second layer through shared technology, cross-border sales, and the ability to launch a successful vertical in new geographies. Digital tools can deepen the data loop by showing what visitors search, scan, and engage with, improving recommendations and exhibitor ROI.

The moat is not a group-wide blanket. It varies event by event. Customers typically do not face contractual switching costs comparable to enterprise software. An exhibitor can skip a show next year. A visitor can attend a rival event. Venue contracts, event teams, and digital features can be copied. What cannot be copied quickly is the dense community around a leading brand, but that community can migrate if curation weakens or an industry shifts geographically.

The 5-10 year durability case rests on five conditions. First, RX must preserve audience quality rather than chase low-value attendance. Second, price must track provable exhibitor value. Third, its event portfolio must stay aligned with growing verticals and regions. Fourth, digital services must strengthen the live network rather than become a low-return technology cost center. Fifth, management must manage calendar and geopolitical exposure without sacrificing strategic events after one weak period.

On balance, the segment moat is **moderate to strong**, with higher confidence at marquee brands and lower confidence in the long tail. The margin evidence is encouraging: a 34% TTM Adjusted operating profit margin exceeds the public peer's blended level. The missing event-level KPIs prevent a stronger conclusion. If rebooking, yield, or attendance quality deteriorated while management continued to report only portfolio-level underlying growth, the moat assessment would need to be cut quickly.

6. Historical growth rates

The following table reproduces the clean current-taxonomy segment history. Three annual observations provide only two compounding intervals; accordingly, the table labels the mathematically correct FY2023-FY2025 two-year CAGR rather than pretending that three observations create a three-year interval. FY2021-FY2022 are excluded because the verified package identifies them as old-taxonomy context.

Product / sub-segment	FY2023 revenue	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	Clean-period CAGR	Most recent reported YoY	Specific source
Exhibitions total	£1,115m [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §3]	£1,239m [same source]	£1,186m [same source]	3.13% [calculated from cited FY2023 and FY2025 cells]	-4.3% [calculated from cited FY2024 and FY2025 cells]	RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §3
Exhibitor revenue	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Exhibitions Exhibitor revenue row]	Not separately disclosed [same row]	Not separately disclosed [same row]	N/D [same row]	H1 2026 share 73%; growth N/D [data_package §4, Exhibitions Exhibitor revenue row]	data_package §4, Exhibitions Exhibitor revenue row
Visitors and other	Not separately disclosed [data_package §4, Exhibitions Visitors and other row]	Not separately disclosed [same row]	Not separately disclosed [same row]	N/D [same row]	H1 2026 share 27%; growth N/D [data_package §4, Exhibitions Visitors and other row]	data_package §4, Exhibitions Visitors and other row

Arithmetic checks: £1,115m × 1.111 = £1,238.8m, which rounds to the disclosed £1,239m. £1,239m × 0.957 = £1,185.7m, which rounds to the disclosed £1,186m. Both ties are within 0.1%, comfortably inside the 2% tolerance. The reported-currency CAGR of 3.13% is distorted by event cycling and FX. It should be read alongside underlying growth of 11% at the FY2024 boundary, 8% in FY2025, and 6% in H1 2026 [RELX FY2024 results release; RELX FY2025 presentation; RELX H1 2026 presentation; data_package §5 Exhibitions rows]. The FY2024 underlying rate was published on the old four-area taxonomy and is directional only, as the data package warns.

The pre-boundary series is retained only to show event-cycle sensitivity and the post-pandemic recovery; it is not part of the current-taxonomy CAGR:

Historical context	Revenue	Adjusted operating profit	Adjusted operating profit margin	Comparability and citation
FY2021 old four-area basis	£534m	£10m	1.9%	Pandemic-affected and print embedded; RELX Annual Report 2022, note 2; data_package §3
FY2022 old four-area basis	£953m	£162m	17.0%	Reopening recovery and print embedded; RELX Annual Report 2022, note 2; data_package §3
FY2023 current taxonomy starts	£1,115m	£319m	28.6%	Restated onto the current five-line taxonomy; RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; data_package §1 and §3

The £10m-to-£319m profit recovery is event-cycle evidence, not a sustainable growth rate. It is why the forecast anchors on the current TTM margin and uses explicit disruption cadences rather than extrapolating FY2021-FY2023 operating leverage.

The TTM anchor also ties: £1,186m FY2025 revenue – £581m H1 2025 + £575m H1 2026 = £1,180m. Adjusted operating profit ties at £410m – £234m + £226m = £402m. The TTM margin is £402m ÷ £1,180m = 34.07%. No sub-product dollars are back-solved in the historical table [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 results business-area table; data_package §3 and §5; statutory_bridge.json].

[DATA GAP: product and subsegment revenue dollars, historical exhibitor/visitor mix, event count, attendance, space, occupancy, price, rebooking, and digital revenue are true non-disclosures in the verified package.]

7. Management guidance

The verified data package deliberately preserves the Exhibitions items as source-verified paraphrases, not verbatim quotations. This appendix does not add quotation marks that would falsely convert them into quotes.

Data package row	Period	Source-verified management commentary	Interpretation
Official FY2024 results transcript, 2025-02-13; data_package §6	FY2024 call; Erik Engstrom, CEO	Event-portfolio growth improved and digital initiatives progressed; management expected strong growth and higher margin.	Recovery had matured into portfolio growth, but cycling adjustments remain necessary. Higher margin was credible from the 32.1% FY2024 base, not indefinitely from the pandemic trough.
Official H1 2025 results transcript, 2025-07-24; data_package §6	H1 2025 call; Erik Engstrom, CEO	Growth above pre-pandemic levels was established and margins were significantly above the earlier base.	The normalized margin anchor should be current economics, not 2021-2022 recovery margins. This supports using approximately 34% TTM as the starting point.
Official FY2025 results transcript, 2026-02-12; data_package §6	FY2025 call; Erik Engstrom, CEO	Strong ongoing growth and digital initiatives supported further margin improvement expectations.	A base case can carry mid-to-high-single-digit underlying growth and modest leverage, provided digital investment improves exhibitor value.
Official H1 2026 results transcript, 2026-07-23; data_package §6	H1 2026 call; Erik Engstrom, CEO	Event timing and travel disruption slowed first-half profit; Middle East uncertainty remained for the full year.	The forecast needs a visible disruption and calendar path. It cannot assume every half-year follows the long-run CAGR.

The only short exact group-level excerpt retained in the verified package is CEO Erik Engstrom's statement that “we continue to see positive momentum across the group” on 23 July 2026 [data_package §6 introductory paragraph; official H1 2026 transcript linked there]. It supports broad group momentum but is not Exhibitions-specific guidance and does not override the explicit timing and travel caveat.

[DATA GAP: the data package does not preserve verbatim Exhibitions-specific guidance, numeric event-volume guidance, pricing guidance, bookings or rebooking, or a digital-revenue target.] The absence of these metrics lowers forecast confidence and is reflected in the scenario probabilities.

8. Forward growth assumptions

8.1 Modeling convention

The financial projection begins with verified TTM Exhibitions revenue of £1,180m and ends on 30 June 2031 [RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 results business-area table; data_package §3 and §5]. RELX discloses only a rounded H1 2026 mix of 73% exhibitor and 27% visitor and other revenue [RELX H1 2026 presentation; data_package §4]. To make operating drivers explicit without misrepresenting history, the growth tables use those shares as a **forecast weighting convention only**. Section 10 shows the implied modeled allocations and labels them as analyst proxies, not disclosed revenue. The total segment projection remains the controlling forecast.

Base case growth

Product / driver	Historical growth evidence	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 anchor	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Exhibitor engine, 73% forecast weight	Product dollars and CAGR N/D; total clean-period CAGR 3.13%	Total H1 2026 underlying growth 6%; exhibitor growth N/D	Strong ongoing growth; digital progress; timing caveat	6.2%	Yield near 3%, moderate space growth, portfolio additions, and better ROI tools sustain growth; this is below Informa's 9.5% 2025 result and near its 6%+ plan.
Visitors and other, 27% forecast weight	Product dollars and CAGR N/D	Total H1 2026 underlying growth 6%; visitor growth N/D	Growth above pre-pandemic levels; travel disruption remains	5.4%	Attendance and ticket yield grow, but travel cost, event maturity, and free-entry formats limit monetization. Digital improves discovery but mostly supports exhibitor value.
Exhibitions total	FY2023-FY2025 reported CAGR 3.13%; underlying trend 11%, 8%, then 6%	6% underlying in H1 2026	Continued strong growth with explicit calendar/geopolitical noise	5.99%	The 73%/27% weighted engine produces 5.99%. It converges toward the peer-indicated roughly 5% market and 6%+ leading-organizer range.

Bull case growth

Product / driver	Historical growth evidence	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 anchor	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Exhibitor engine, 73% forecast weight	Product dollars and CAGR N/D; total underlying growth reached 8% in FY2025	Total H1 2026 underlying growth 6%; exhibitor growth N/D	Strong ongoing growth and digital progress	8.9%	Marquee brands take more space, Middle East disruption clears, high-value sponsorship and digital bundles lift yield, and launches scale. The rate remains below a perpetual double-digit claim.
Visitors and other, 27% forecast weight	Product dollars and CAGR N/D	Total H1 2026 underlying growth 6%; visitor growth N/D	Growth above pre-pandemic levels	7.4%	Strong industry travel, premium content, and new geographies lift attendance and ticket mix. Digital augments rather than cannibalizes physical engagement.
Exhibitions total	FY2023-FY2025 reported CAGR 3.13%; underlying growth 8% in FY2025	6% underlying in H1 2026	Strong growth and higher margin	8.50%	The weighted result approximates recent leading-peer growth but fades from 10% in year one to about 7% by year five as capacity and price mature.

Bear case growth

Product / driver	Historical growth evidence	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 anchor	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Exhibitor engine, 73% forecast weight	Product dollars and CAGR N/D; reported FY2025 revenue fell despite underlying growth	Total H1 2026 underlying growth 6%; exhibitor growth N/D	Travel and Middle East uncertainty explicitly flagged	1.1%	A recession and digital substitution reduce booth size and sponsorship; weak lead ROI constrains price. Recovery after the shock leaves only modest five-year growth.
Visitors and other, 27% forecast weight	Product dollars and CAGR N/D	Total H1 2026 underlying growth 6%; visitor growth N/D	Timing and travel disruption remain	2.6%	Attendance recovers from an initial shock, but travel budgets and virtual content cap growth. Some ticket yield and consumer/fan formats remain resilient.

Product / driver	Historical growth evidence	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 anchor	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Exhibitions total	Clean reported CAGR 3.13%; severe historical pandemic sensitivity	6% underlying in H1 2026	No numeric floor; disruption caveat	1.51%	The segment suffers a 5% first-year fall, one flat-to-down year, then recovers. This is a cyclical stress, not a permanent disappearance of face-to-face trade.

8.2 Five-year operating-driver bridge

These contributions are normalized annualized attributions to each scenario CAGR, not separately disclosed line items. They force volume, pricing, exhibitor economics, cyclicality, and digital substitution to remain visible.

CAGR contribution	Bear	Base	Bull	Economic interpretation
Price and premium mix	1.2%	2.8%	3.2%	Bear pricing trails cost as ROI weakens; base uses measured value pricing; bull adds scarce premium inventory.
Same-event exhibitor volume and space	-0.5%	1.6%	2.4%	Booth downsizing in bear; steady occupancy and expansion in base; strong capacity use in bull.
Visitor volume and ticket or other yield	0.2%	0.7%	1.0%	Travel pressure limits bear; content and international attendance support base and bull.
New launches, editions, and portfolio development	0.2%	0.6%	0.9%	Launch risk limits bear; disciplined geographic extension contributes more in bull.
Digital tools and ancillary services	0.6%	0.6%	1.1%	Digital partly substitutes for space in bear but still supports ROI; bull monetizes data and sponsorship better.
Calendar, churn, disruption, and residual mix	-0.2%	-0.3%	-0.1%	Biennials, Middle East risk, and churn remain visible rather than smoothed.
Total segment CAGR	1.5%	6.0%	8.5%	Rounded to one decimal; exact product-weighted outputs are 1.51%, 5.99%, and 8.50%.

The price, event-volume, and exhibitor-ROI assumptions are constrained as follows. These are analyst guardrails, not issuer-disclosed KPIs:

Scenario	Price and premium-mix contribution	Same-event exhibitor volume and space	Event-cycle path	Exhibitor-ROI condition
Bear	1.2% a year	-0.5% a year	Revenue falls 5.0% in year one and 1.0% in year two before recovery	Price trails venue and labor cost; booth and sponsorship demand contract because qualified-lead economics worsen.
Base	2.8% a year	1.6% a year	Growth fades from 6.5% to 5.4% across five years	Price is sustainable only if lead quality, measured interactions, or conversion value at least offsets the higher exhibitor bill; no separate digital revenue is assumed.
Bull	3.2% a year	2.4% a year	Growth fades from 10.0% to 7.0% as capacity tightens	Scarce premium inventory, broader lead-product adoption, and more qualified attendance preserve or improve exhibitor payback despite higher yield.

Failure to observe portfolio-wide rebooking, space, yield, or lead-quality data keeps these as low-precision assumptions. In particular, the base case is not validated merely by attendance growth: pricing plus booth expansion must coexist with stable customer outcomes, or the ROI loop is weakening.

8.3 Year-by-year revenue cadence

Scenario	TTM Jun-2026	Jun-2027	Jun-2028	Jun-2029	Jun-2030	Jun-2031	Pattern
Bear	£1,180.0m	£1,121.0m	£1,109.8m	£1,143.1m	£1,200.2m	£1,272.1m	-5.0%, -1.0%, +3.0%, +5.0%, then about +6.0%; shock and recovery.
Base	£1,180.0m	£1,256.7m	£1,335.9m	£1,416.0m	£1,496.7m	£1,578.1m	+6.5%, +6.3%, +6.0%, +5.7%, then about +5.4%; measured maturation.
Bull	£1,180.0m	£1,298.0m	£1,414.8m	£1,535.1m	£1,657.9m	£1,774.6m	+10.0%, +9.0%, +8.5%, +8.0%, then about +7.0%; capacity and yield fade gradually.

The base cadence is deliberately below the recent 8% FY2025 underlying growth and broadly consistent with Informa's 6%+ multi-year live-events target. The bear is non-linear because event economics are non-linear: cancellations and budget cuts hit immediately, then the calendar and repeat communities support recovery. The bull does not hold double-digit growth for five years; it fades as prime venue capacity, sponsor inventory, and customer budgets become constraints.

9. Forward Adjusted operating profit margin assumptions

No corporate, unallocated, amortization, acquisition, tax, finance, or statutory-bridge item is allocated to Exhibitions. The margin below is solely **Adjusted operating profit margin**, matching the sealed bridge.

Case	TTM Adjusted operating profit margin	Jun-2031 margin	Change	Specific mechanism
Bear	34.07%	29.0%	-507 bps	Negative event leverage, lower sponsorship and booth density, weak price-cost recovery, cancellation or rescheduling expense, and continued digital investment despite weaker revenue.
Base	34.07%	36.0%	+193 bps	Price and premium mix, platform scale, higher digital attachment, and cost growth below revenue; partly offset by launch expense, venue inflation, and continued product investment.
Bull	34.07%	38.0%	+393 bps	Strong occupancy, premium sponsorship, better event mix, scalable digital tools, and high incremental contribution on mature events; 38% is a ceiling, not an indefinite trend.

The bear decline exceeds 100 basis points because the cost base is committed in advance and a physical event cannot remove venue, staffing, security, and marketing costs in proportion to a sudden revenue loss. Margin troughs at 28.5% in year three even as revenue begins to recover; this reflects launch and audience-rebuilding spending. The base expansion also exceeds 100 basis points, but over five years it is only about 39 basis points annually. The bull assumes excellent execution yet stops at 38%, recognizing that a 34% starting margin already compares favorably with Informa's blended live-events economics.

Because RELX does not disclose profitability by exhibitor versus visitor/other revenue, the product margins below are explicit analyst allocations calibrated to—not independent of—the controlling segment margin. Exhibitor revenue is assigned the higher margin because mature stand and sponsorship yield should carry stronger incremental economics; visitor/other absorbs a larger share of audience recruitment, content, and service costs. These proxies must not be treated as disclosed product margins.

Case and modeled line	Jun-2031 revenue	Analyst Adjusted operating profit margin	Implied Adjusted operating profit	Weighted-margin check
Bear exhibitor engine	£909.8m	31.000%	£282.0m	Input to bear weighted margin

Case and modeled line	Jun-2031 revenue	Analyst Adjusted operating profit margin	Implied Adjusted operating profit	Weighted-margin check
Bear visitors and other	£362.2m	24.000%	£86.9m	Input to bear weighted margin
Bear segment total	£1,272.1m	29.000%	£368.9m	(£282.0m + £86.9m) / £1,272.1m = 29.0% within display rounding
Base exhibitor engine	£1,163.7m	38.500%	£448.0m	Input to base weighted margin
Base visitors and other	£414.4m	28.980%	£120.1m	Input to base weighted margin
Base segment total	£1,578.1m	36.000%	£568.1m	(£448.0m + £120.1m) / £1,578.1m = 36.0% within display rounding
Bull exhibitor engine	£1,319.3m	40.500%	£534.3m	Input to bull weighted margin
Bull visitors and other	£455.3m	30.756%	£140.0m	Input to bull weighted margin
Bull segment total	£1,774.6m	38.000%	£674.3m	(£534.3m + £140.0m) / £1,774.6m = 38.0% within display rounding

Scenario and period	Revenue	Adjusted operating profit margin	Adjusted operating profit
Bear Jun-2027	£1,121.0m	31.0%	£347.5m
Bear Jun-2028	£1,109.8m	29.5%	£327.4m
Bear Jun-2029	£1,143.1m	28.5%	£325.8m
Bear Jun-2030	£1,200.2m	28.8%	£345.7m
Bear Jun-2031	£1,272.1m	29.0%	£368.9m
Base Jun-2027	£1,256.7m	34.5%	£433.6m
Base Jun-2028	£1,335.9m	35.0%	£467.6m
Base Jun-2029	£1,416.0m	35.4%	£501.3m
Base Jun-2030	£1,496.7m	35.7%	£534.3m
Base Jun-2031	£1,578.1m	36.0%	£568.1m
Bull Jun-2027	£1,298.0m	35.5%	£460.8m
Bull Jun-2028	£1,414.8m	36.5%	£516.4m
Bull Jun-2029	£1,535.1m	37.2%	£571.1m
Bull Jun-2030	£1,657.9m	37.7%	£625.0m
Bull Jun-2031	£1,774.6m	38.0%	£674.3m

The table uses rounded displayed revenue and margin, so interim profit may differ by £0.1m from unrounded multiplication. Horizon values are calculated from the unrounded product-weighted revenue model and the stated margin. The base horizon profit CAGR from £402m to £568.1m is approximately 7.2%, faster than the 6.0% revenue CAGR but far below the extraordinary post-pandemic recovery rate.

10. Segment rollup and arithmetic tie-outs

To expose exhibitor economics without fabricating reported history, the following table applies the disclosed rounded 73%/27% H1 2026 mix to the verified £1,180m TTM anchor as an **analyst modeling allocation** [RELX H1 2026 presentation; RELX Annual Report 2025, note 2; RELX H1 2026 results business-area table; data_package §3-§5]. The £861.4m and £318.6m values are not issuer-disclosed subsegment revenue. Their sole purpose is to make the weighted forecast reconstructable.

Modeled line	TTM analyst allocation	Bear CAGR	Bear Jun-2031	Base CAGR	Base Jun-2031	Bull CAGR	Bull Jun-2031
Exhibitor engine, 73% proxy	£861.4m	1.1%	£909.8m	6.2%	£1,163.7m	8.9%	£1,319.3m
Visitors and other, 27% proxy	£318.6m	2.6%	£362.2m	5.4%	£414.4m	7.4%	£455.3m
Exhibitions segment total	£1,180.0m	1.51%	£1,272.1m	5.99%	£1,578.1m	8.50%	£1,774.6m

Revenue tie-outs are exact within display rounding: bear £909.8m + £362.2m = £1,272.0m versus £1,272.1m using unrounded values; base £1,163.7m + £414.4m = £1,578.1m; bull £1,319.3m + £455.3m = £1,774.6m. Every residual is £0.1m or less, far below the 1% tolerance. The starting allocation ties exactly: £861.4m + £318.6m = £1,180.0m.

Case	Segment Jun-2031 revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment Jun-2031 profit margin	Segment Jun-2031 profit	Arithmetic tie-out
Bear	£1,272.1m	Adjusted operating profit	29.0%	£368.9m	£1,272.1m × 29.0% = £368.9m
Base	£1,578.1m	Adjusted operating profit	36.0%	£568.1m	£1,578.1m × 36.0% = £568.1m
Bull	£1,774.6m	Adjusted operating profit	38.0%	£674.3m	£1,774.6m × 38.0% = £674.3m

The rollup contains no allocation of RELX unallocated central costs or acquired-intangible amortization. Those remain separate lines for the synthesis stage under data_package §3a. The Exhibitions output is therefore directly additive to the other four segment forecasts on the exact common Adjusted operating profit basis.

Probability framework

The probabilities are deliberately non-uniform: **25% bear, 55% base, and 20% bull**. The base receives the greatest weight because recent underlying growth, management's outlook, and Informa's comparable target support mid-single-digit compounding. Bear weight exceeds bull weight because event revenue is transactional, disruption can be abrupt, and essential operating KPIs are undisclosed. Bull retains 20% because leading event brands can combine capacity, premium yield, and digital ROI tools for high-single-digit growth with strong incremental margins.

Probability-weighted Jun-2031 revenue is £1,540.9m, calculated as 25% × £1,272.1m + 55% × £1,578.1m + 20% × £1,774.6m. Probability-weighted Adjusted operating profit is £539.5m, calculated as 25% × £368.9m + 55% × £568.1m + 20% × £674.3m. These expected values are diagnostics, not a fourth operating scenario.

11. Key risks and wildcards

Event timing and portfolio cycling — Bear and Base

Biennial events, moved dates, and the half-year placement of large shows can cause reported revenue and profit to diverge from underlying growth. FY2025 reported revenue fell 4.3% despite 8% underlying growth, and H1 2026 profit growth lagged revenue because of timing and disruption. The forecast explicitly uses a non-linear cadence, but without an event calendar it cannot fully normalize individual years. A synthesis model should not interpret a single reported decline as structural without checking the calendar; equally, it should not dismiss repeated misses as cycling.

Geopolitics and travel disruption — Bear

Management specifically flagged Middle East uncertainty in H1 2026. Events concentrate people at fixed locations and dates, making them exposed to war, airspace closure, visa restrictions, strikes, terrorism, and public-health measures. Insurance and rescheduling recover only part of lost economics. The bear's first-year revenue decline and 310-basis-point initial margin compression reflect this convex risk.

Exhibitor budget cyclicality and ROI — Bear

Exhibitor spending competes with digital advertising, direct sales, channel incentives, product launches, and corporate events. A recession, credit shock, or sector downturn can reduce booth size and sponsorship before visitor interest visibly falls. The most important unavailable measures are rebooking, space growth, yield, and qualified leads per exhibitor. If stand price grows faster than verified customer outcomes, the segment may preserve revenue briefly while weakening the next cycle.

Digital substitution and AI-enabled prospecting — Bear

AI can improve list building, targeting, demonstrations, and remote sales. Always-on digital marketplaces and webinars can reduce the need for some physical lead generation. The bear assumes this pressure lowers exhibitor volume and pricing. It does not assume the disappearance of events because demonstrations, trust, serendipity, and community remain difficult to reproduce online. The monitoring question is budget share, not attendance alone.

Digital augmentation and monetization — Bull

RX can use registration and engagement data to improve matching, lead capture, sponsor targeting, and post-event follow-up. Selected RX examples show sharply higher tool adoption and leads, but RELX reports no portfolio KPI or digital revenue. If those results generalize, digital can increase retention and yield with attractive marginal economics. If not, software development becomes a cost that competitors can imitate. The bull requires evidence of widespread adoption and customer ROI, not more product announcements.

Venue, labor, and service inflation — Bear and Base

Venue rent, temporary labor, security, contractors, freight, utilities, and travel can rise faster than general inflation. Passing those costs to exhibitors is possible only when the event remains indispensable. Capacity constraints can be favorable for price but can also cap volume and force expensive venue expansion. The base assumes measured price-cost recovery; the bear assumes incomplete recovery.

Portfolio quality and long-tail dilution — Bear

The strongest brands likely produce higher margins and growth than smaller events, as Informa reports for its marquee brands. RELX does not disclose RX concentration by event, vertical, or geography. Launches and acquisitions can add runway, but weak additions may consume marketing and management resources. A portfolio-level 34% margin could obscure underperforming events supported by a few highly profitable franchises.

Competitive entry and venue-backed challengers — Bear

The industry is fragmented. Local associations, venues, specialists, and global organizers can launch competing events or acquire brands. The moat is strong only where network density and industry-calendar status remain superior. Loss of an anchor exhibitor or association can trigger a negative network loop.

Data rights, privacy, and cybersecurity — Base and Bear

Digital ROI tools rely on permissioned participant data. Privacy regulation, consent friction, cyber incidents, or poor data quality could limit personalization and lead sharing. A breach around a marquee event could damage both attendance and exhibitor trust. The base assumes compliant deployment; the bear includes slower digital benefit and higher cost.

Climate and travel policy — Bear

Corporate carbon budgets, extreme weather, and local infrastructure can reduce long-haul attendance or raise event costs. Regional editions can mitigate travel but may fragment audience liquidity. This is a slow-moving risk until it becomes a sudden cancellation or policy shift.

Monitoring and falsification conditions

The base case should be challenged if any of the following occurs: two consecutive formal periods below 3% underlying Exhibitions growth without a clear calendar explanation; Adjusted operating profit margin below 30% after cycling normalizes; repeated profit growth below revenue growth despite claimed digital progress; evidence that exhibitors are shrinking space or moving budgets to digital channels; loss of a major venue slot, association, or anchor customer; or a competitor gaining the industry's primary calendar position. Positive evidence needed for the bull includes disclosed rebooking or space growth, sustained price/mix above inflation with stable customer outcomes, broad adoption of lead products, successful geographic launches, and margin expansion that does not come from underinvesting in audience quality.

Scenario summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y profit margin	Segment TTM+5y profit	Probability
Bear	£1,272.1m	Adjusted operating profit	29.0%	£368.9m	25%
Base	£1,578.1m	Adjusted operating profit	36.0%	£568.1m	55%
Bull	£1,774.6m	Adjusted operating profit	38.0%	£674.3m	20%

The nine controlling scenario outputs are therefore: bear revenue £1,272.1m, margin 29.0%, profit £368.9m; base revenue £1,578.1m, margin 36.0%, profit £568.1m; bull revenue £1,774.6m, margin 38.0%, profit £674.3m. Each scenario compounds from 30 June 2026 to 30 June 2031—exactly five calendar years—and preserves **Adjusted operating profit** without any group bridge allocation.

Appendix B5 - Print

Print and print-related products — Segment Deep Dive

Company: RELX PLC **Modeled reportable line:** Print & print-related activities **TTM anchor:** 30 June 2026 **Exact horizon:** 30 June 2031, exactly five calendar years after the TTM anchor **Reporting currency:** GBP millions unless stated otherwise **Exact segment profit basis: Adjusted operating profit Trade execution authorized:** `false`

This appendix models the small, separately reported legacy print line. It is deliberately conservative about precision. RELX does not disclose its product, customer, geography, contract, unit-volume, price, or capex mix inside this line. The forecast therefore uses one disclosed aggregate revenue line and one disclosed aggregate **Adjusted operating profit** line. It does not manufacture sub-products, back-solve rounded shares, allocate group costs, or treat group-wide physical-print format data as if it were this segment. That discipline matters because the segment includes “print-related” activities, including some electronic delivery, and because outsourcing, joint ventures, disposals, and changing revenue recognition can alter reported margins even while the underlying customer demand continues to decline.

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

The clean current-taxonomy boundary is **FY2023**. Beginning with the FY2025 report, RELX separated remaining print and print-related activities from Risk, Scientific, Technical & Medical, and Legal and restated FY2023 and FY2024 on that five-line basis. The restated segment revenue sequence is £586m in FY2023, £517m in FY2024, and £399m in FY2025; the corresponding **Adjusted operating profit** is £253m, £217m, and £185m [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §1 taxonomy change and §3 Print table]. FY2021 and FY2022 remain on the old four-area taxonomy, with print embedded in other divisions. They are not used in any dollar comparison, CAGR, margin path, or forecast anchor here.

The distinction between this current reportable segment and RELX-wide physical-print format revenue is equally important. The contemporaneous format table shows physical print of £476m in FY2023, £421m in FY2024, and £399m in FY2025, whereas the current print-separated segment is £586m, £517m, and £399m [live FMP `revenue-product-segmentation` RELX `period=annual` pull for the contemporaneous-format series; [RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2, for the restated segment; data_package §0a]. The convergence at FY2025 does not make the earlier series interchangeable. The reportable line includes print-related activities and some electronic delivery that the old format series classified elsewhere. Accordingly, the model never splices FY2021–FY2022 physical-print history into the restated segment and never uses contemporaneous FY2023–FY2024 physical-format dollars to infer the segment’s decline.

1. What this segment actually is

Print & print-related activities is the remaining delivery and service tail of RELX’s long migration from physical publishing to electronic information, analytics, and workflow tools. It is not a fifth growth platform comparable with Risk or Legal. RELX manages it separately so the four operating businesses can be evaluated without legacy-format decline obscuring their underlying growth, while customers that still require a physical or print-associated form can continue to be served. The data package paraphrases the strategy as managing the line for customer service and value while the long print transition winds down [data_package §1, reporting-structure paragraph].

The segment’s economic purpose is therefore preservation and harvesting, not expansion. Customers may still value printed reference works, journals, books, archival copies, specialized professional materials, or another print-associated service even when the core information also exists electronically. The segment label also explicitly encompasses print-related activities rather than only sheets of paper. The FY2025 restatement moved all remaining print and print-related activities, including some electronic delivery, into this line [data_package §0a, current-restatement paragraph]. This is why the segment’s revenue cannot be inferred by multiplying group physical-print format percentages by group revenue.

RELX does not disclose a segment-level split by original business area, title, product family, customer type, geography, delivery format, or route to market. It also does not disclose units, copies, subscribers, renewal rates, contract duration, average price, price increases, returns, or customer concentration for the segment [data_package §4, product-disclosure discussion; §10, Product or subsegment revenue dollars gap]. The most honest operating picture is therefore a single pooled run-off book. Some revenue likely behaves like recurring fulfillment attached to longstanding information relationships, while

some may be transactional. That is an economic interpretation, not an issuer-disclosed contract mix, and it is not converted into modeled dollars.

Go-to-market is best understood as service continuity around RELX-owned content and customer relationships rather than acquisition of standalone print customers. The customer's primary reason to remain is access to authoritative professional or scientific content, not an undifferentiated printing service. This limits direct price competition with commercial printers, but it does not protect the format from digital substitution. When a customer stops needing physical or print-associated delivery, the relevant alternative is usually electronic access, an institutional archive, open-access content, or a workflow product—not the same title printed by another vendor.

RELX's operating response is to shrink the burden along with the revenue. The verified data package says the company has outsourced or partnered parts of the footprint and used joint ventures and targeted disposals to reduce operational distraction [data_package §6, Print and group strategy; §9, Print restructuring]. These actions can preserve cash and service continuity without requiring RELX to carry a fully owned production network at subscale volumes. They also make reported revenue and margin less intuitive: a partner arrangement can change whether economics appear gross or net, while the value RELX retains may not fall at the same pace as reported revenue.

Pricing is not separately disclosed. The model therefore does not assume a recurring list-price escalator. In principle, specialized professional content can tolerate selective price increases, and lower print volume can justify pass-through of paper, postage, and short-run costs. In practice, raising price against a structurally shrinking format can accelerate cancellations. Base-case pricing is therefore assumed to offset only part of unit-cost inflation and volume loss. The bull case assumes better retention and contract repricing; the bear case assumes customers reject further increases and migrate faster.

2. Current economics at the TTM anchor

The TTM ended 30 June 2026 is calculated as FY2025 minus H1 2025 plus H1 2026, exactly matching the group's sealed TTM convention. Segment revenue is **£367m**, calculated as £399m − £189m + £157m [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; [RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), segment note and H1 comparatives; data_package §3 and §5]. Segment **Adjusted operating profit** is **£179m**, the exact value in the QFR-sealed statutory bridge [data_package §3a, TTM bridge; statutory_bridge.json, TTM `segment_profit_lines`, source `relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule`]. The resulting TTM margin on **Adjusted operating profit** is **48.8%**.

The TTM revenue decline is not presented as an issuer-defined underlying rate because RELX excludes print and print-related revenue from its underlying growth measure. The nearest current demand signal is H1 2026 revenue of £157m versus £189m in H1 2025, a reported decline of **16.9%** [[RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), segment note and H1 comparatives; data_package §5 Print rows]. The full-year restated decline was **11.8%** in FY2024 and **22.8%** in FY2025 [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §3 Print YoY row]. These observations describe a steep but uneven run-off, not a stable constant-growth series.

The TTM margin is unusually high for a shrinking physical-delivery activity and should not be read as a conventional manufacturing gross margin. FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 margins were 43.2%, 42.0%, and 46.4% [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §3 Print table], while H1 2025 and H1 2026 were 44.4% and 49.7% [[RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), segment note and central-cost footnote; data_package §5 Print rows]. Revenue fell sharply while margin rose, which is consistent with perimeter change, outsourcing, joint ventures, pricing, cost removal, and a favorable retained-economics mix. It is not evidence that a 49% margin will survive indefinitely as volume approaches the end of the tail.

Capital intensity is not disclosed for this segment. Group core capex was £525m in FY2025, including £504m of internally developed assets, but none is allocated to Print & print-related activities [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), cash-flow and intangible-asset notes; data_package §7]. Assigning a share of group capitalized development to print would be especially misleading because the bulk of that spend supports digital products. Outsourcing likely reduces RELX-owned plant needs, yet the company may still face working-capital, contract, systems, content-production, and transition costs. [DATA

GAP: segment-level capex, depreciation, working capital, restructuring cash cost, and outsourced production commitments are not disclosed in the verified data package.]

No product share can be responsibly stated. The data package explicitly says that product or subsegment revenue dollars are a true non-disclosure and that approximate shares are not multiplied into segment revenue [data_package §4, opening and closing paragraphs; §10, Product or subsegment revenue dollars gap]. Therefore the financial model has one line: **Print & print-related activities**. That is less visually granular, but it is more accurate than inventing “journals,” “legal books,” and “other” allocations whose economics cannot be audited.

The segment is only 4.2% of RELX FY2025 revenue and 5.5% of reportable-segment adjusted operating profit before central costs [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §1]. Its revenue decline can still subtract roughly half to one percentage point from consolidated reported growth in individual years, but the group’s digital businesses increasingly dominate the result. For valuation, the key question is not whether print returns to growth; it is how quickly the remaining £179m of TTM adjusted profit decays and whether cost and perimeter actions prevent an abrupt collapse.

3. Unit economics

At a high level, revenue equals retained customer demand for print or print-associated delivery multiplied by price and the gross-versus-net recognition perimeter. Profit equals that revenue less content preparation, physical production or partner charges, distribution, customer service, systems, title maintenance, contract-management, and residual overhead. Unlike an ordinary high-growth software segment, there is no reason to expect scale leverage from expanding volume. The central unit-economics challenge is to remove costs and obligations at least as fast as the customer base shrinks.

The revenue driver can be decomposed conceptually into five effects. First is **unit attrition**: customers cancel physical delivery, reduce copies, or move to electronic access. Second is **price and mix**: the remaining customers may be less price-sensitive or may require specialized, higher-value products, which can raise average revenue per retained unit. Third is **title and product rationalization**: RELX can discontinue uneconomic formats or migrate customers, causing a near-term revenue step-down but potentially improving retained profit. Fourth is **portfolio actions**: disposals, outsourcing, and joint ventures can shrink reported revenue without an equivalent loss of retained economics. Fifth is **foreign exchange and recognition**: segment dollars are reported in GBP, and changes in whether partner activity is gross or net can move reported margins. The data package provides no quantitative decomposition, so the model captures these drivers through scenario-specific revenue and margin paths rather than unsupported unit assumptions.

The cost base has both variable and quasi-fixed elements. Paper, printing, freight, postage, and certain partner payments can vary with units. Editorial systems, title maintenance, rights administration, fulfillment platforms, minimum production commitments, management, and customer-service capacity may not fall immediately. This produces a classic end-of-life risk: margins can hold while volumes remain above operational thresholds and then fall sharply when the next plant, contract, distribution route, or system becomes uneconomic. The bear case is built around that threshold behavior.

Outsourcing changes the shape of the curve. If RELX transfers physical production to a partner with a larger pooled volume base, it can replace owned fixed costs with a more variable per-unit charge. That can protect adjusted profit and free cash flow even as reported revenue declines. Joint ventures or net presentation may also mechanically reduce recognized revenue while preserving a portion of profit. This is why historical revenue and margin should not be interpreted as a pure price-volume series. The base case assumes outsourcing and simplification continue to remove costs, but not perfectly. The bull case assumes those actions keep margin near the current band. The bear case assumes partner repricing, minimum commitments, fragmented small runs, and incomplete overhead removal overwhelm the cost savings.

The historical margin pattern demonstrates both resilience and instability. From FY2023 to FY2025, segment revenue fell 31.9%, yet adjusted operating profit fell only 26.9%. Margin rose from 43.2% to 46.4% [[RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), note 2; data_package §3 Print table]. Between H1 2025 and H1 2026, revenue fell 16.9%, while derived adjusted operating profit fell 7.1%, lifting margin from 44.4% to 49.7% [[RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf), segment note and central-cost footnote; data_package §5 Print rows]. This is favorable retained-economics evidence, but the two-year span is too short and too affected by perimeter actions to extrapolate indefinitely.

Cash conversion cannot be measured separately. Adjusted operating profit excludes acquired-intangible amortization and acquisition/disposal-related items at group level, while corporate and statutory bridge adjustments are modeled separately by synthesis [data_package §3a, forecast-driver ledger]. This appendix therefore does not allocate amortization, restructuring, acquisition costs, central costs, interest, or tax into print. It also does not claim that £1 of print adjusted operating profit equals £1 of free cash flow. The exact task here is to forecast the issuer's sealed segment-profit basis, nothing more.

The economic break-even point is unknown. No plant count, outsourced volume schedule, minimum order, partner contract, title count, or fixed-cost disclosure is available. `[DATA GAP: no segment-level unit volume, price, retention, title count, fixed-cost/variable-cost split, partner economics, or break-even threshold is disclosed.]` The absence of these metrics lowers confidence in any five-year terminal margin. The scenario spread is intentionally wide—30% to 47%—to reflect that uncertainty rather than hiding it behind a single smooth extrapolation.

4. Competitive dynamics

This line has no clean standalone peer set. A commercial printer cannot reproduce RELX's proprietary content, while another information provider generally competes for the customer relationship at the content or workflow level rather than bidding to print the same title. The segment's direct rivalry is therefore limited, but its **substitution risk is extreme**. Electronic delivery, searchable databases, integrated workflow products, institutional repositories, free primary-law sources, open-access articles, and internal digital archives can eliminate the need for a physical copy altogether.

The most relevant competitive benchmark is the pace of format migration, not the growth rate of a printer. Group electronic-format revenue was £8,070m in FY2025 and represented 86% of H1 2026 group mix, while physical print represented about 3% of H1 2026 mix [data_package §0a, Material KPI history]. Those are group measures, not segment dollars, but they show where RELX invests and where customer engagement is moving. Digital products offer search, links, updates, analytics, machine readability, collaboration, and workflow integration that static print cannot match.

Public-access policy adds another substitution vector for scientific content. The NIH's 2024 Public Access Policy became effective on 1 July 2025 and requires covered research outputs to be made available without the prior embargo framework, strengthening the digital availability of funded research ([NIH policy implementation page](https://www.grants.nih.gov/policy-and-compliance/policy-topics/public-access/contacts)). UK policy likewise supports immediate open access for funded research ([UKRI open-access announcement](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/science-minister-announces-ukris-open-access-policy)). These policies do not directly reveal RELX print revenue and do not eliminate demand for authoritative versions, books, or curated products. They do, however, reduce the scarcity value of physical access and reinforce electronic discovery.

Industry publishing statistics must be used carefully. The UK Publishers Association reported flat overall print revenue and 7% digital growth in 2025, while consumer print remained resilient ([Publishers Association 2025 statistics](https://www.publishers.org.uk/publishing-reaches-highest-ever-revenue-in-2025/)). That market includes consumer books and education, so it is not a forecast base for RELX's specialized legacy line. Its relevance is directional: print can retain pockets of preference even while digital grows faster. This supports a declining bull case rather than a zero-decline or growth case.

Pricing power is mixed. RELX's brands, content rights, editorial authority, and professional relevance can support price increases for customers who still need a specific title or format. But pricing power belongs primarily to the content franchise, not to the paper format. The closer the customer is to indifference between print and digital, the more a price increase accelerates cancellation. The segment may therefore display high margin on a shrinking pool precisely because low-value customers have already left and remaining demand is specialized. That favorable selection can persist for a while but cannot be assumed to reverse the structural decline.

Supplier power may rise as volumes fall. Paper and postage are commodity-like, yet specialized short runs, international fulfillment, and declining print-industry capacity can increase per-unit costs. Outsourcing reduces owned fixed assets but creates dependence on partners. A partner with scale can deliver savings; a partner facing its own volume decline can demand higher prices or minimum commitments. No supplier concentration or contract-duration data is disclosed, so the model treats supplier power as a key bear-case mechanism rather than a quantified cost line.

Entry barriers are paradoxical. It would be difficult for a new entrant to recreate the RELX content and customer relationships underlying the remaining products, so direct entry is low. It is easy, however, for a customer to substitute away from the **format** when an authorized digital version or alternative workflow is available. The segment thus has high barriers around content ownership and low barriers around format replacement. That combination supports orderly harvesting but not durable

volume growth.

5. Moat at the segment level

The print segment has a **residual moat**, not a 20-year compounder moat. Its protection comes from proprietary content, recognized brands, established customer relationships, archival continuity, product-specific habits, and the inconvenience of changing established professional routines. For some users, a physical reference can remain operationally convenient, required by policy, preferred for reading, or valued as a stable archival artifact. These characteristics can make the final customer tail unusually sticky.

The strongest protection is that RELX is not selling generic print capacity. It is delivering its own information products. A rival printer cannot simply underbid and supply the same copyrighted or curated content. A competing publisher would need to displace the underlying title or information franchise. This supports retention and selective pricing among customers who still need the format.

The weakness is that the reportable segment no longer owns the full economics of those growth franchises. Risk, STM, and Legal now exclude print and print-related activities on the current taxonomy [data_package §1, taxonomy-change paragraph]. The print line receives the run-off economics; the digital product innovation, workflow integration, and expanding user value are reported elsewhere. It would therefore be a category error to award Print the full moat of LexisNexis, ScienceDirect, or Risk solutions. The segment benefits from their content heritage but is structurally displaced by their electronic successors.

Outsourcing and joint ventures can extend the economic moat by lowering the minimum efficient scale. If a partner pools volume across customers, RELX can continue serving a small tail without maintaining dedicated capacity. This turns what might have been a fixed-cost cliff into a longer variable-cost runoff. The benefit is operational flexibility, not customer growth. It preserves value by slowing profit erosion relative to revenue.

Over five years, the moat is sufficient to justify a nonzero terminal segment. The bull case still has £242m of revenue in June 2031 because specialized and print-related demand decays slowly, not because the segment returns to growth. The base case retains £165m, reflecting a managed tail. The bear case retains £105m rather than going to zero because even severe substitution usually leaves contracts, archives, and specialized use cases that take time to unwind.

Over ten years, durability is much weaker. The customer cohort shrinks, fewer new users adopt print-first workflows, suppliers consolidate, and the cost to maintain low-volume titles rises. At some point RELX may migrate, dispose of, partner, or discontinue most remaining activities. A margin near 50% is not evidence of a perpetual franchise; it may be the temporary result of harvesting a selected tail and changing the reporting perimeter.

The segment-level moat verdict is therefore **narrow and declining**. It can protect cash extraction and service continuity during the forecast horizon, but it does not support a long-run growth premium. For group valuation, this line should be treated as a finite-life runoff asset whose value depends on disciplined cost removal. Any model that capitalizes current adjusted profit at the same duration or terminal multiple as Risk or Legal would overstate its economic quality.

6. Historical growth rates — current taxonomy only

The historical table uses only the FY2023-restated reportable segment. Because RELX discloses no product dollars inside the segment, the finest valid forecast line is the segment itself. FY2021–FY2022 are not separately reported and are excluded. The “FY2023–FY2025 annualized change” below uses three disclosed observations but correctly spans two compounding intervals; it is not mislabeled as a three-year holding period.

Product / sub-segment	FY2023 restated revenue	FY2024 restated revenue	FY2025 revenue	Annualized change FY2023–FY2025	Most recent YoY	Primary source and package cite
Print & print-related activities, single disclosed line	£586m	£517m	£399m	-17.5%	-16.9% H1 2026 vs H1 2025	RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; RELX H1 2026 results segment note and comparatives; data_package §1, §3, and §5

Arithmetic checks pass. FY2023 to FY2024: £586m × 0.882 = £516.9m, which rounds to £517m. FY2024 to FY2025: £517m × 0.772 = £399.1m, which rounds to £399m. H1 2025 to H1 2026: £189m × 0.831 = £157.1m, which rounds to £157m. All are within the required 2% tolerance.

The segment’s two-year annualized revenue decline is 17.5%, but the year-to-year rates range from 11.8% to 22.8%. This dispersion is economically meaningful. Customer migration is lumpy, and portfolio or outsourcing actions can shift the

recognition perimeter. The base forecast therefore does not apply -17.5% uniformly. It starts near the recent pace and moderates as the remaining cohort becomes more specialized.

The contemporaneous physical-print format series is intentionally omitted from the table. It is not an older history of the current segment; it is a different classification. The only valid historical forecast base is the FY2023-restated reportable line, followed by the TTM calculation from current-taxonomy annual and half-year figures.

7. Management guidance

Management provides no segment-specific numerical revenue, adjusted-profit, margin, unit, price, or timing guide for Print & print-related activities in verified data_package §6. The source-verified strategy commentary says the long print transition is largely complete and that remaining print is managed separately for service and value, with outsourcing, joint ventures, and targeted disposals reducing operational distraction [data_package §6, Print and group strategy]. The modeling implication is an orderly but continuing decline, not stabilization at the current revenue level.

The only short exact group-level excerpt retained by the verified package is CEO Erik Engstrom's statement that **"we continue to see positive momentum across the group"** on 23 July 2026 [[official H1 2026 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2026-transcript.pdf); data_package §6 introductory paragraph]. It is not a print guide. Group positive momentum is driven by the electronic and workflow businesses, while print is excluded from underlying revenue growth [data_package §5, Print rows]. This appendix therefore does not use the quote to raise the print forecast.

`[DATA GAP: the verified data package contains no verbatim segment-specific print guidance and no numerical FY+1 print guide. The source-verified strategy paraphrase is used without inventing quotation marks or forecast figures.]`

The management anchor is nevertheless informative in mechanism. Outsourcing and joint ventures can decouple reported revenue decline from adjusted-profit decline, and disposals can create discrete steps. The model reflects that through a faster decline in revenue than in profit in the early years, followed by margin pressure as the residual cost base becomes harder to remove.

8. Forward growth assumptions

All cases start from **£367m TTM revenue at 30 June 2026** and end exactly on **30 June 2031**. There is one forecast line because there is one disclosed line. "Management FY+1 guide" is shown as not numerically disclosed rather than replaced with the group's strong-growth outlook.

Base case growth

Product	Historical CAGR FY2023–FY2025	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Print & print-related activities	-17.5% [RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; data_package §3]	-16.9% H1 [RELX H1 2026 results segment note; data_package §5]	No numerical print guide; managed for service and value [data_package §6]	**-14.8%**	Decline starts near recent attrition, then moderates as outsourcing, targeted migration, and a stickier residual cohort reduce the percentage loss. Some electronic delivery inside the line also prevents a pure physical-print extrapolation.

The base cadence is -18%, -16%, -15%, -13%, and -12%. The first year accepts that the FY2025 and H1 2026 run-off has not stopped. The later moderation is not a digital-growth assumption; it reflects selection. Customers most willing to migrate leave first, while specialized or contractually embedded demand remains longer. Pricing partly offsets unit decline, but not enough to stabilize revenue. Portfolio actions continue in an orderly fashion without a major disposal that abruptly removes most of the segment.

Bull case growth

Product	Historical CAGR FY2023–FY2025	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Print & print-related activities	-17.5% [RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; data_package §3]	-16.9% H1 [RELX H1 2026 results segment note; data_package §5]	No numerical print guide; managed for service and value [data_package §6]	**-8.0%**	Specialized customers prove sticky, price/mix is favorable, print-related electronic delivery declines more slowly, and partners keep small-run fulfillment economical. The case still declines every year because digital substitution remains structural.

The bull cadence is -11%, -9%, -8%, -7%, and -5%. It assumes the recent steep decline partly reflected one-time perimeter rationalization and that the remaining cohort is more durable than the FY2023–FY2025 average suggests. It also assumes selective pricing is accepted and no major content category is discontinued. This is not a return-to-growth case. Even the favorable scenario loses one-third of TTM revenue by the horizon.

Bear case growth

Product	Historical CAGR FY2023–FY2025	Latest YoY	Management FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Print & print-related activities	-17.5% [RELX Annual Report 2025 note 2; data_package §3]	-16.9% H1 [RELX H1 2026 results segment note; data_package §5]	No numerical print guide; managed for service and value [data_package §6]	**-22.1%**	Customer migration, open-access and workflow substitution, title rationalization, and a disposal or net-recognition shift accelerate the first two years. The rate later moderates only because the revenue base is much smaller.

The bear cadence is -28%, -24%, -22%, -19%, and -17%. It explicitly allows a discontinuity rather than forcing a constant -22% rate. The first-year drop captures a large customer migration, product rationalization, disposal, or accounting-perimeter change. Persistent double-digit declines continue because low volumes raise prices and reduce convenience, encouraging further digital conversion. The case does not assume zero revenue by 2031 because a residual specialist tail can survive even under severe stress.

The three mechanisms are genuinely distinct. Base is an orderly managed runoff with partial cost and price adaptation. Bull is a sticky-tail outcome in which outsourcing and print-related electronic delivery preserve more activity. Bear is a threshold outcome in which migration and perimeter change reinforce each other. None reuses the historical CAGR uncritically, and none assumes growth.

9. Forward margin assumptions — Adjusted operating profit

The current anchor is **48.8% on Adjusted operating profit**, calculated from £179m of sealed TTM adjusted operating profit and £367m of TTM revenue. This appendix does not project statutory operating income, allocate unallocated central costs, or add group bridge adjustments. Those items remain separate for the synthesis agent under data_package §3a.

Case	TTM margin on Adjusted operating profit	TTM+1	TTM+2	TTM+3	TTM+4	TTM+5 margin	Specific mechanism
Bear	48.8%	46.0%	42.0%	38.0%	34.0%	**30.0%**	Partner repricing, minimum-volume thresholds, fragmented short runs, price resistance, and incomplete overhead removal create severe fixed-cost deleverage.
Base	48.8%	48.0%	47.0%	45.0%	43.5%	**42.0%**	Outsourcing and simplification offset most early volume loss, but the residual overhead and partner cost per unit rise as the pool shrinks.

Case	TTM margin on Adjusted operating profit	TTM+1	TTM+2	TTM+3	TTM+4	TTM+5 margin	Specific mechanism
Bull	48.8%	49.0%	49.0%	48.5%	48.0%	**47.0%**	Favorable price/mix, net recognition, and variable partner economics preserve the current margin band despite lower revenue.

Every case changes by more than 100 basis points from current over the five-year horizon, so the mechanisms are explicit. The bear contraction of 1,880 basis points is the operating-threshold risk: a shrinking manufacturing and fulfillment tail cannot always remove capacity smoothly. The base contraction of 680 basis points assumes management continues the actions already described but cannot maintain a near-50% margin indefinitely. The bull contraction of 180 basis points assumes partner economics and customer mix remain favorable, yet it still avoids perpetual margin expansion.

These margins are not product-weighted because RELX discloses no product revenue or product profit inside the line. A fabricated journals/legal-books/other margin mix would not improve the forecast. The segment margin is directly applied to the one disclosed segment-revenue line.

The margin confidence is lower than the revenue-direction confidence. Structural decline is clear; exact retained profitability is not. Reported margin can rise when a low-margin activity is outsourced, sold, or recognized net, even if end-customer demand worsens. Conversely, a partner contract or stranded overhead can cause a sudden step-down. The broad 30%–47% horizon range is intended to capture that accounting and operational convexity.

10. Segment rollup — bottom-up tie-out

Because there is only one disclosed product line, product revenue equals segment revenue in every period and case. The rollup is nevertheless shown year by year so the five-year cadence, margin path, and adjusted-profit arithmetic can be reconstructed.

Case and period	Revenue growth	Product-line revenue	Segment revenue	Margin on Adjusted operating profit	Adjusted operating profit	Revenue tie-out
Bear TTM anchor	n/a	£367.0m	£367.0m	48.8%	£179.0m	0.0%
Bear TTM+1	-28.0%	£264.2m	£264.2m	46.0%	£121.5m	0.0%
Bear TTM+2	-24.0%	£200.8m	£200.8m	42.0%	£84.3m	0.0%
Bear TTM+3	-22.0%	£156.6m	£156.6m	38.0%	£59.5m	0.0%
Bear TTM+4	-19.0%	£126.9m	£126.9m	34.0%	£43.1m	0.0%
Bear TTM+5	-17.0%	**£105.3m**	**£105.3m**	**30.0%**	**£31.6m**	0.0%
Base TTM anchor	n/a	£367.0m	£367.0m	48.8%	£179.0m	0.0%
Base TTM+1	-18.0%	£300.9m	£300.9m	48.0%	£144.4m	0.0%
Base TTM+2	-16.0%	£252.8m	£252.8m	47.0%	£118.8m	0.0%
Base TTM+3	-15.0%	£214.9m	£214.9m	45.0%	£96.7m	0.0%
Base TTM+4	-13.0%	£186.9m	£186.9m	43.5%	£81.3m	0.0%
Base TTM+5	-12.0%	**£164.5m**	**£164.5m**	**42.0%**	**£69.1m**	0.0%
Bull TTM anchor	n/a	£367.0m	£367.0m	48.8%	£179.0m	0.0%
Bull TTM+1	-11.0%	£326.6m	£326.6m	49.0%	£160.0m	0.0%
Bull TTM+2	-9.0%	£297.2m	£297.2m	49.0%	£145.6m	0.0%
Bull TTM+3	-8.0%	£273.5m	£273.5m	48.5%	£132.6m	0.0%
Bull TTM+4	-7.0%	£254.3m	£254.3m	48.0%	£122.1m	0.0%
Bull TTM+5	-5.0%	**£241.6m**	**£241.6m**	**47.0%**	**£113.6m**	0.0%

Terminal arithmetic ties exactly before display rounding. Bear: £105.3m × 30.0% = £31.6m. Base: £164.5m × 42.0% = £69.1m. Bull: £241.6m × 47.0% = £113.6m. Product-line revenue and segment revenue are identical, so every rollup residual is zero and comfortably inside the required 1% tolerance.

The model's most important implication is that profit declines faster than revenue in bear and base despite early cost flexibility. From the £179m TTM anchor, horizon adjusted profit falls 82% in bear, 61% in base, and 37% in bull. This is a runoff asset, and current margin should not be capitalized as a stable annuity.

No central cost or statutory bridge allocation is included. The synthesis should add this segment's **Adjusted operating profit** to the other four segment forecasts, then apply unallocated central costs and each statutory bridge line exactly once under data_package §3a.

11. Key risks and wildcards

Bear — digital substitution accelerates. The clearest risk is faster migration from printed or print-associated products to electronic delivery, workflow tools, repositories, or free primary sources. The H1 2026 decline of 16.9% already shows that the runoff remains active. A major institutional migration or title rationalization can produce a step-down larger than a smooth CAGR suggests.

Bear — end-of-life cost cliffs. A segment can maintain high margins while volume exceeds contract or capacity thresholds, then lose margin abruptly. Minimum print runs, partner commitments, distribution routes, systems, and residual staff may not shrink continuously. This is the principal reason the bear margin reaches 30% rather than extrapolating recent improvement.

Bear — supplier and postage inflation. Declining print-industry capacity, short-run complexity, paper costs, and international fulfillment can raise per-unit cost. RELX may pass through some inflation, but price increases can accelerate customer cancellation. Outsourcing transfers plant ownership but not all supplier power.

Bear/Base — portfolio and revenue-recognition discontinuity. Outsourcing, joint ventures, targeted disposals, or net presentation can shrink reported revenue sharply without a proportionate economic loss. This can make revenue forecasts look wrong even when retained profit is close. The reverse can also occur if a partner arrangement worsens. Analysts should focus on both revenue and adjusted profit, not margin alone.

Base — inadequate cost removal. The base case assumes continued simplification but a gradual margin decline. If corporate systems, title maintenance, customer service, or partner-management costs remain stranded, profit can track the bear case even when revenue follows base.

Bull — sticky specialist demand. Physical or print-related delivery may remain valuable for archives, professional use, education, regulated settings, or reader preference. A highly selected tail can decline more slowly and accept price increases. This is the main mechanism behind the bull case, but no segment-level retention or customer data verifies it.

Bull/Base — favorable partner economics. Outsourcing or joint-venture partners may pool scale and convert fixed costs to variable costs, preserving adjusted margin. This is plausible given the strategy described in data_package §6 and §9. It is not guaranteed because contract terms are undisclosed.

All cases — some electronic delivery inside the segment. The reportable line is broader than physical print. If the electronic component is durable, aggregate revenue may decline more slowly than pure print. If it is divested or reclassified, reported revenue may fall faster without equivalent customer attrition. `[DATA GAP: RELX does not quantify physical print versus print-related electronic delivery within the segment.]`

All cases — foreign exchange. Revenue and profit are reported in GBP and the customer base is likely international, but the segment's geography is undisclosed. Scenario growth rates are modeled in reported GBP from the sealed anchor, with no unsupported geographic or FX decomposition.

The most useful monitoring signals are: the next annual or half-year print revenue and adjusted-profit decline; disclosure of another outsourcing, joint venture, or disposal; whether margin stays above 40% as revenue approaches £250m; any new segment split between physical and print-related electronic delivery; and any segment-level capex or partner-commitment disclosure. A base-to-bear trigger would be revenue falling more than 25% for two consecutive disclosed periods combined with margin below 40%. A base-to-bull trigger would be decline moderating below 10% without margin erosion or a disclosed partner structure that demonstrably makes costs variable.

Scenario summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	**£105.3m**	Adjusted operating profit	**30.0%**	**£31.6m**	**25%**
Base	**£164.5m**	Adjusted operating profit	**42.0%**	**£69.1m**	**55%**
Bull	**£241.6m**	Adjusted operating profit	**47.0%**	**£113.6m**	**20%**

The probabilities are deliberately non-uniform. Base receives 55% because the observed strategy and historical decline support an orderly managed runoff. Bear receives 25% because end-of-life thresholds and perimeter actions create meaningful downside convexity. Bull receives 20% because sticky specialist demand and outsourcing can protect value, but neither changes the secular direction. Probability-weighted horizon revenue is £165.1m and probability-weighted horizon **Adjusted operating profit** is £68.6m; these are scenario diagnostics, not a fourth case and not a portfolio action.

Bottom line: Print & print-related activities is small, profitable, and potentially cash-generative, but it is not a durable growth moat. The underwriting question is how well RELX harvests the tail. The base case assumes revenue declines about 15% annually and margin settles at 42%; the bear case captures operational thresholds and a faster perimeter unwind; the bull case captures sticky specialist demand and highly variable partner economics. All three preserve the exact **Adjusted operating profit** basis and leave group bridge adjustments to synthesis.

Appendix S - Synthesis (Combined Earnings Model)

RELX PLC — Synthesis (Combined Earnings Model)

Model status and scope

This appendix mechanically consolidates the five reviewed business-area forecasts into statutory operating income, net income, and diluted EPS. Every business forecast retains RELX's exact disclosed segment metric, **Adjusted operating profit**. That metric is not relabeled as statutory operating income. Unallocated costs, each operating bridge item, finance, other non-operating items, tax, and non-controlling interests are projected once at group level. The model compounds from the TTM ended 30 June 2026 to 30 June 2031, exactly 5.0 calendar years. It does not use FY2025 as the forecast base.

The quote-packet validator was run at `2026-08-23T19:59:54+08:00`. It returned `QUOTE_PACKET_VALID`, and an independent byte hash matched the QFR seal. The statutory validator returned `STATUTORY_BRIDGE_VALID`, its byte hash matched the QFR and DR seal, and `gate_manifest.json` contains the durable records `DATA PACKAGE VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR WAVE 2` and `STATUTORY BRIDGE VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING`. All five business-area appendices have named peer-review verdicts of `no issues remain`; management, moat, and the 2046 test are PASS. No upstream classification is altered here.

1. Anchors

- Today: 2026-08-23.
- RELX fiscal year-end: 31 December.
- TTM anchor: 30 June 2026.
- TTM construction: FY2025 minus H1 2025 plus H1 2026, economically equivalent to Q3 2025 plus Q4 2025 plus Q1 2026 plus Q2 2026.
- Latest completed FY used only for historical tie-out: FY2025 ended 31 December 2025.
- Horizon: 30 June 2031, exactly 5.0 calendar years after the TTM anchor.
- Forecast and statutory reporting currency: GBP. Figures in operating tables are GBP millions unless stated otherwise.
- Valuation security: `XNYS:RELX`, one RELX PLC American Depositary Share. Each ADS represents one RELX PLC ordinary share. The depositary ratio is 1.0 and the share-class factor is 1.0, so one listed unit equals one financial share.
- Valuation price: USD 35.91 per ADS, raw exchange close, session 2026-08-21. Actionability expiry is `2026-08-25T04:00:00+08:00`.
- Quote raw-source SHA-256: `b36c32516d4fbbd17c081c8e5f63405815d1967ed1349bf0fc0a8af099f6cd82`.
- QFR-sealed quote-packet SHA-256: `75a0dbadc342e3639c3af5ca4b7ea4367f70a05cd3c5dac935396bb7cdb80971`.
- QFR/DR-sealed statutory-bridge SHA-256: `662e8442070eea961b6fdf19bc25b065e1a9f7a82e98e3b41ec87c3ad31b6814`.
- Financial-statement diluted shares: 1,794.1 million at 30 June 2026. Split factor from that basis date to the quote session is 1.0 because there was no intervening split. Quote-basis diluted financial shares are therefore `1,794.1m x 1.0 = 1,794.1m`.
- Listed-unit equivalents at the anchor are `1,794.1m / (1.0 x 1.0) = 1,794.1m ADS equivalents`.
- FX is USD 1.36411 per GBP for 2026-08-21, sourced from the packet's archived FMP GBPUSD historical EOD record, SHA-256 `839be3d3ad90d7c15da2800d6ddc81678697a51f914235607ded4778aa7b792d`.
- The exact quote-date translated ordinary-share price used only for forward repurchase-share mechanics is `USD 35.91 / 1.36411 = GBP 26.3248565` per ordinary share. It is not a second valuation price.

- `trade_execution_authorized=false`. This appendix does not authorize a trade, order, message, ranking, sizing, portfolio action, or queue mutation.

2. Segment-level forward assumptions

The table reproduces reviewed Section 10 endpoints and Section 9 margins without re-deriving the segment forecasts. There are no revenue eliminations in the sealed package. Segment margins are on **Adjusted operating profit**, not statutory operating income.

Segment	Exact profit metric	TTM revenue GBPbn	Bear TTM+5y revenue GBPbn	Base TTM+5y revenue GBPbn	Bull TTM+5y revenue GBPbn	Bear margin	Base margin	Bull margin	Reviewed source
Risk	Adjusted operating profit	3.5470	4.1972	5.0631	5.8513	35.38%	39.32%	41.61%	`appendix_B_risk.md` Sections 8-10
Scientific, Technical & Medical	Adjusted operating profit	2.7610	3.0161	3.6066	4.0001	35.3%	40.1%	42.8%	`appendix_B_stm.md` Sections 8-10
Legal	Adjusted operating profit	1.8650	1.9812	2.6891	3.0558	18.48%	24.97%	27.04%	`appendix_B_legal.md` Sections 8-10
Exhibitions	Adjusted operating profit	1.1800	1.2721	1.5781	1.7746	29.0%	36.0%	38.0%	`appendix_B_exhibitions.md` Sections 8-10
Print and print-related activities	Adjusted operating profit	0.3670	0.1053	0.1645	0.2416	30.0%	42.0%	47.0%	`appendix_B_print.md` Sections 8-10

The economic spread is deliberate. Risk is the largest growth and profit engine, with base revenue compounding 7.38% and a 39.32% terminal adjusted margin. STM compounds 5.49% in base as research volume and workflow tools offset open-access and integrity cost. Legal compounds 7.59% in base, but carries the widest principal-franchise interface risk: its 24.97% margin assumes paid AI adoption creates price and scale benefits while model, retrieval, evaluation, security, and support costs remain visible. Exhibitions compounds 5.99% in base from the verified TTM anchor and includes event timing and geopolitical noise. Print contracts 14.8% annually in base and is treated as a finite runoff asset rather than a stable high-margin annuity.

No segment contains central costs, acquired-intangible amortisation, acquisition/disposal items, JV reclassifications, finance costs, tax, or NCI. Those lines are applied once in Sections 4 and 5.

3. Combined revenue build

TTM segment revenue is `3,547 + 2,761 + 1,865 + 1,180 + 367 = GBP 9,720m`, exactly equal to consolidated TTM revenue in `data_package.md`. The horizon build is the direct sum of the reviewed segment endpoints.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
Sum of segment TTM+5y revenue, GBPm	10,571.9	13,101.4	14,923.4
Corporate eliminations, GBPm	0.0	0.0	0.0
Combined TTM+5y revenue, GBPm	**10,571.9**	**13,101.4**	**14,923.4**
TTM 2026 to TTM 2031 CAGR over exactly 5.0 years	1.69%	6.15%	8.95%

The combined base endpoint of GBP 13.101bn is not a top-down target. It is driven by GBP 5.063bn Risk, GBP 3.607bn STM, GBP 2.689bn Legal, GBP 1.578bn Exhibitions, and GBP 0.165bn Print. The large Print contraction reduces the combined growth rate but does not overwhelm the four electronic and event businesses.

4. Combined operating-income build

Every historical bridge classification is preserved. The first subtotal is the sum of the five segment forecasts on **Adjusted operating profit**. Unallocated central costs then produce the consolidated adjusted segment-profit metric. The four operating adjustments then bridge to statutory operating income.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
Risk Adjusted operating profit	1,485.0	1,990.8	2,435.0
STM Adjusted operating profit	1,064.9	1,446.8	1,710.7
Legal Adjusted operating profit	366.1	671.4	826.2
Exhibitions Adjusted operating profit	368.9	568.1	674.3
Print Adjusted operating profit	31.6	69.1	113.6
Sum of segment Adjusted operating profit	**3,316.5**	**4,746.2**	**5,759.8**
Unallocated central costs	-10.0	-5.0	0.0
Consolidated segment-profit metric	**3,306.5**	**4,741.2**	**5,759.8**
Amortisation of acquired intangible assets	-243.0	-188.0	-143.5
Acquisition and disposal related items	-55.0	-35.0	-20.0
Reclassification of tax in joint ventures and associates	-19.8	-21.3	-17.3
Reclassification of JV and associate net finance income or costs	-5.0	0.0	5.0
Combined statutory TTM+5y operating income	**2,983.7**	**4,496.8**	**5,584.0**
Statutory operating margin	28.22%	34.32%	37.42%

The driver ledger governs each line. Central costs use the sealed GBP -10m, -5m, and zero scenario rule. Bear acquired-intangible amortisation holds the TTM GBP 243m charge; base declines 5% annually to `243 x 0.95^5 = GBP 188.0288m`; bull declines 10% annually to `243 x 0.90^5 = GBP 143.4891m`. Acquisition and disposal expenses remain nonzero at GBP 55m, GBP 35m, and GBP 20m. The tax-in-JV reclassification is 0.60%, 0.45%, and 0.30% of the consolidated adjusted segment-profit subtotal, giving GBP 19.839m, GBP 21.3354m, and GBP 17.2794m of expense. The JV finance reclassification is GBP -5m, zero, and GBP +5m. These are operating lines because the sealed bridge classifies them there; they are not moved below statutory operating income.

The statutory margin rises above the 32.12% TTM anchor only in base and bull. Base reaches 34.32% because Risk, STM, Legal, and Exhibitions scale faster than central and acquired-intangible bridge costs. Bear falls to 28.22% because Legal, Exhibitions, and Print lose margin while acquired-intangible amortisation remains fixed. The model therefore does not assume that consolidated operating leverage survives every scenario.

5. Net income and exact EPS bridge

The net-finance line follows the sealed driver: gross-debt path multiplied by the scenario average cost. The TTM gross-debt anchor is GBP 8.906bn. For the earnings model, debt endpoints are explicit analyst paths tied to management's observed 2.0x-2.5x leverage range: Bear GBP 10.0bn, Base GBP 8.0bn, and Bull GBP 6.5bn. Terminal-year average balances are GBP 9.9bn, GBP 8.1bn, and GBP 6.7bn; multiplying by 4.5%, 3.8%, and 3.3% gives finance expense of GBP 445.5m, GBP 307.8m, and GBP 221.1m. These earnings-only paths are not treated as a source-bound terminal enterprise-to-equity bridge in Section 5a.

Debt-path point, GBPbn	Bear	Base	Bull
30 Jun 2026 anchor	8.906	8.906	8.906
30 Jun 2027	9.200	8.800	8.400
30 Jun 2028	9.400	8.600	7.900
30 Jun 2029	9.600	8.400	7.400
30 Jun 2030	9.800	8.200	6.900
30 Jun 2031	10.000	8.000	6.500
Terminal-year average debt	9.900	8.100	6.700
Average interest cost	4.5%	3.8%	3.3%
Net finance expense, GBPm	-445.5	-307.8	-221.1

Total tax is computed once as the scenario tax rate applied to pretax income. The deferred-tax credit is displayed separately under the sealed ledger, with current tax as the balancing formula within total tax: current tax expense equals total tax expense minus the positive deferred-tax credit. This is an arithmetic decomposition, not an analyst plug to net income.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
Combined statutory TTM+5y OI, GBPm	2,983.661	4,496.836	5,584.032
Net finance costs, GBPm	-445.500	-307.800	-221.100
Disposals and other non-operating items, GBPm	-25.000	0.000	25.000
Pretax income, GBPm	2,513.161	4,189.036	5,387.932
Total tax rate	25.5%	24.5%	23.5%
Total tax, GBPm	-640.856	-1,026.314	-1,266.164
Current tax, GBPm	-640.856	-1,046.314	-1,301.164
Deferred tax credit, GBPm	0.000	20.000	35.000
Non-controlling interests, GBPm	-20.000	-12.000	-8.000
Net income attributable to shareholders, GBPm	**1,852.305**	**3,150.722**	**4,113.768**
Quote-basis diluted financial shares at TTM+5y, millions	1,678.947	1,552.554	1,468.291
GBP EPS per quote-basis financial share	1.103254	2.029380	2.801738
Financial shares per listed unit	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
GBP EPS per listed unit	1.103254	2.029380	2.801738
FX, USD per GBP	1.364110	1.364110	1.364110
USD EPS per listed ADS at TTM+5y	**1.504959**	**2.768298**	**3.821879**

The mandatory equations reproduce exactly. Bear is `GBP 1,852.304945m / 1,678.947372m = GBP 1.103253727`, then `1.103253727 x 1.0 x 1.36411 = USD 1.504959441`. Base is `GBP 3,150.722053m / 1,552.553708m = GBP 2.029380392`, then `2.029380392 x 1.0 x 1.36411 = USD 2.768298087`. Bull is `GBP 4,113.767620m / 1,468.291265m = GBP 2.801738128`, then `2.801738128 x 1.0 x 1.36411 = USD 3.821878997`. No currency is attached to issuer EPS without the 1:1 ADS bridge and dated FX multiplication.

5a. Return-method input bridge

Stage S supplies method inputs but does not choose the primary security-return method, select exit multiples, calculate terminal values, or calculate IRRs. VP and CS must make those decisions after valuation preflight. Normalized NOPAT below is purely `statutory OI x (1 - normalized cash tax rate)`.

Input	Bear	Base	Bull	Availability and source path
Statutory operating income, GBPm	2,983.661	4,496.836	5,584.032	Fully reconciled in Section 4
Normalized cash tax rate	25.5%	24.5%	23.5%	Sealed driver ledger in `data_package.md` Section 3a
Normalized NOPAT, GBPm	2,222.827	3,395.111	4,271.784	Mechanical OI after normalized cash tax
Terminal cash	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	GBP 220m anchor exists; no source-bound scenario terminal path
Terminal gross debt	Unavailable for valuation control	Unavailable for valuation control	Unavailable for valuation control	Earnings-only path is GBP 10.0bn, GBP 8.0bn, GBP 6.5bn; not source-bound enough for EV bridge
Terminal lease liabilities	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	GBP 119m anchor exists; no terminal scenario path
Preferred equity	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No complete terminal preferred-claim schedule in upstream package

Input	Bear	Base	Bull	Availability and source path
Minority interest balance	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	Income attribution is modeled; terminal balance is not sourced
Other senior claims	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No complete terminal scenario schedule
Separately valued non-operating assets	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No asset proved absent from both statutory EPS and a future multiple
Diluted listed-equivalent shares, millions	1,678.947	1,552.554	1,468.291	Section 6; one financial share per ADS

The earnings bridge fully supports reconciled statutory diluted EPS inputs. The terminal enterprise-to-equity bridge is incomplete because terminal cash, leases, minority interests, and other senior claims lack source-bound scenario paths. Therefore EV/NOPAT cannot control on this appendix alone. This is an availability conclusion, not a selection of P/E or any other primary method. No residual net-debt plug is created, and no non-operating asset is added to earnings.

5b. Insurer lane

`NOT TRIGGERED — issuer is not a P&C insurer or reinsurer.` RELX is a professional information, analytics, workflow, and exhibitions company. No insurance float, underwriting carrier economics, managed third-party capital, retained-investment bridge, insurer common-equity roll-forward, or insurer valuation method applies. No `insurer_return_bridge.json` is created.

6. Share-count path

The financial-statement and quote-basis share count is 1,794.1m because the split factor is 1.0. The model never runs in ADS units even though the 1:1 ratio makes the numerical count identical. Repurchases are divided by an explicit GBP average price to obtain ordinary shares retired. SBC issuance uses the latest disclosed FY2025 share-based compensation expense of GBP 63m divided by the same average price and grows the expense proxy 3% annually. TTM SBC expense was not separately disclosed upstream, so FY2025 is identified as the latest available proxy rather than mislabeled as TTM.

The historical calibration is strong. RELX reported 1,861.2m shares in issue net of treasury at the start of FY2025, issued 2.2m ordinary shares, repurchased 39.5m, and ended with 1,824.0m. The exact flow is `1,861.2 + 2.2 - 39.5 = 1,823.9m`, a 0.1m display-rounding difference. GBP 1.5bn of repurchases divided by 39.5m shares implies GBP 37.9747 per share. The SBC cash proxy gives `GBP 63m / GBP 37.9747 = 1.659m` shares, 0.541m below actual issuance, only 0.03% of starting shares. That difference is consistent with options exercise value and the fact that expense is not cash proceeds; the actual issued-share disclosure controls the historical tie-out.

Forward average repurchase prices begin with the packet price translated at packet FX and rise 5% nominally, using a half-year convention. This is a share-mechanics assumption, not an exit-price forecast: `GBP 26.3248565 x 1.05^(year - 0.5)`. Annual repurchases are GBP 0.75bn in Bear, GBP 1.50bn in Base, and GBP 2.00bn in Bull. Bear preserves cash under earnings pressure, Base holds the FY2025 cash pace, and Bull remains below the GBP 2.25bn 2026 authorization despite stronger earnings. All are cross-checked against the five-year capital-allocation history and management review.

Case / year	Starting financial shares M	Buyback GBPbn	Avg GBP price	Shares retired M	SBC issuance M	Ending financial shares M
Bear 2027	1,794.100	0.750	26.975	27.804	2.336	1,768.632
Bear 2028	1,768.632	0.750	28.324	26.480	2.291	1,744.443
Bear 2029	1,744.443	0.750	29.740	25.219	2.247	1,721.472
Bear 2030	1,721.472	0.750	31.227	24.018	2.205	1,699.659
Bear 2031	1,699.659	0.750	32.788	22.874	2.163	1,678.947
Base 2027	1,794.100	1.500	26.975	55.607	2.336	1,740.828
Base 2028	1,740.828	1.500	28.324	52.959	2.291	1,690.160
Base 2029	1,690.160	1.500	29.740	50.437	2.247	1,641.970
Base 2030	1,641.970	1.500	31.227	48.036	2.205	1,596.139
Base 2031	1,596.139	1.500	32.788	45.748	2.163	1,552.554
Bull 2027	1,794.100	2.000	26.975	74.143	2.336	1,722.293
Bull 2028	1,722.293	2.000	28.324	70.612	2.291	1,653.971

Case / year	Starting financial shares M	Buyback GBPbn	Avg GBP price	Shares retired M	SBC issuance M	Ending financial shares M
Bull 2029	1,653.971	2.000	29.740	67.250	2.247	1,588.969
Bull 2030	1,588.969	2.000	31.227	64.047	2.205	1,527.126
Bull 2031	1,527.126	2.000	32.788	60.998	2.163	1,468.291

The cumulative equation ties in every case. Bear is `1,794.1 - 126.394 + 11.241 = 1,678.947m`. Base is `1,794.1 - 252.787 + 11.241 = 1,552.554m`. Bull is `1,794.1 - 337.050 + 11.241 = 1,468.291m`. Dividing by the 1.0 depositary and 1.0 class factors gives identical listed-unit equivalents. The path makes the P/E gate sensitive to capital allocation rather than assuming a flat share count.

7. Binary P/E 15 test

Required EPS at the immutable packet price is `USD 35.91 / 15 = USD 2.394000` per ADS. Cushion is `(EPS x 15 - USD 35.91) / USD 35.91`. The Base case controls the verdict.

Case	USD EPS per ADS at TTM+5y	EPS x 15	Packet price per ADS	Cushion	Pass?
Bear	1.504959	22.5744	35.9100	-37.14%	FAIL
Base	2.768298	41.5245	35.9100	15.63%	PASS
Bull	3.821879	57.3282	35.9100	59.64%	PASS

P/E 15 gate: PASS — base-case cushion 15.63%. This is an entry-price arithmetic gate only. It neither chooses a primary terminal valuation method nor supplies an exit multiple. The bear failure remains important: the current price has no protection if Legal and Exhibitions margin pressure coincide, Print runoff accelerates, and finance costs rise.

8. Reflexivity check

The TTM revenue anchor ties exactly: Risk GBP 3,547m plus STM GBP 2,761m plus Legal GBP 1,865m plus Exhibitions GBP 1,180m plus Print GBP 367m equals consolidated GBP 9,720m, a zero residual and 0.00%. TTM segment **Adjusted operating profit** equals `1,342 + 1,063 + 435 + 402 + 179 = GBP 3,421m`. Adding central costs of GBP -4m produces GBP 3,417m; operating adjustments of GBP -243m, GBP -37m, GBP -15m, and zero then produce GBP 3,122m statutory operating income. The residual is zero versus the sealed bridge and zero versus consolidated TTM statutory operating income.

FY2025 provides the independent historical sanity check. Segment revenue is `3,485 + 2,714 + 1,806 + 1,186 + 399 = GBP 9,590m`, exactly consolidated FY revenue. Segment Adjusted operating profit is `1,305 + 1,035 + 415 + 410 + 185 = GBP 3,350m`. Central costs of GBP -8m produce GBP 3,342m; operating adjustments of GBP -248m, GBP -54m, GBP -14m, and GBP +1m produce GBP 3,027m statutory operating income. Again the residual is zero, within the packet tolerance of GBP 1m and the broader 2% reflexivity limit.

9. Latest interim bridge reconciliation

The cumulative interim bridge is triggered because RELX reports half-years rather than four standalone quarters. The TTM uses the exact non-overlapping formula `FY2025 - H1 2025 + H1 2026`, with both H1 periods covering 1 January through 30 June. Revenue is `GBP 9,590m - GBP 4,741m + GBP 4,871m = GBP 9,720m`. Statutory operating income is `GBP 3,027m - GBP 1,490m + GBP 1,585m = GBP 3,122m`. Pretax income is `GBP 2,750m - GBP 1,283m + GBP 1,523m = GBP 2,990m`. Shareholder net income is `GBP 2,065m - GBP 976m + GBP 1,173m = GBP 2,262m`. Because diluted weighted-average shares are period averages rather than flows, the equal-half-year denominator is `1,843.5m - 0.5 x 1,854.9m + 0.5 x 1,794.1m = 1,813.1m`; TTM statutory EPS is `GBP 2,262m / 1,813.1m = GBP 1.247587`. The quote packet properly uses the official H1 2026 1,794.1m diluted basis for security-unit reconciliation and forward share mechanics. No H1 amount overlaps another H1 amount, and FY2025 is reduced by its exact comparable prior-year half before the current half is added.

10. Sensitivity

The sensitivity holds all other base inputs constant. Risk revenue varies by plus or minus 200 basis points around its 7.38% five-year segment CAGR while its 39.32% terminal margin holds. STM margin varies by plus or minus 200 basis points

around 40.1%. Ending base shares vary by plus or minus 5%. Tax varies by plus or minus 300 basis points around 24.5%.

Variable change from base	Downside EPS USD	Base EPS USD	Upside EPS USD	Downside change	Upside change
Risk five-year revenue CAGR -200bp / +200bp	2.6505	2.7683	2.8956	-0.1178	0.1273
STM Adjusted operating profit margin -200bp / +200bp	2.7207	2.7683	2.8159	-0.0476	0.0476
Ending diluted shares +5% / -5%	2.6365	2.7683	2.9140	-0.1318	0.1457
Tax rate +300bp / -300bp	2.6579	2.7683	2.8787	-0.1104	0.1104

Share count is the largest single tested mechanical sensitivity, narrowly ahead of Risk growth. A 5% increase in ending shares reduces base EPS by USD 0.132; a 200bp reduction in Risk CAGR reduces it by USD 0.118. Tax is also material at USD 0.110 per 300bp. STM margin is less powerful in isolation at USD 0.048 per 200bp, but simultaneous margin disappointment across STM, Legal, and Exhibitions could be much larger. The P/E gate therefore depends not only on durable operating growth but also on continued buyback capacity without leverage exceeding management's stated range.

11. Combined earnings summary

Scenario probabilities are Bear 30%, Base 55%, and Bull 15%. The weights are not uniform. Base is dominant because Risk remains strong, STM and Legal have accelerating recent underlying growth, management is PASS, and the moat and 2046 test pass. Bear receives twice the Bull weight because Legal's long-run AI interface ownership is unresolved, Exhibitions is cyclical and geopolitically exposed, Print is structurally declining, and terminal capital-structure inputs remain incomplete. Bull requires simultaneous high execution across all four growth businesses and sustained aggressive buybacks.

Case	Revenue GBPbn	OI GBPbn	OI margin	NI GBPbn	EPS USD per ADS	Probability	EPS x 15	Versus USD 35.91 per ADS
Bear	10.572	2.984	28.22%	1.852	1.504959	30%	22.574	-37.14%
Base	13.101	4.497	34.32%	3.151	2.768298	55%	41.524	15.63%
Bull	14.923	5.584	37.42%	4.114	3.821879	15%	57.328	59.64%
Probability-weighted EPS	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.547334	100%	38.210	6.41%

Probability-weighted EPS is `30% x 1.504959441 + 55% x 2.768298087 + 15% x 3.821878997 = USD 2.547333630`. Its P/E-15 diagnostic is USD 38.2100, 6.41% above the packet price. This expected-EPS diagnostic is not a probability-weighted return and is not an IRR.

Tie-out checks

Forecast-row compounding replay

The following table independently recomputes every modeled product endpoint from the displayed TTM allocation and five-year CAGR. The three recomputed columns are Bear, Base, and Bull; every residual is below 1%. Non-constant annual cadences can create small differences because displayed equivalent CAGRs are rounded.

Modeled product	TTM GBPm	Bear recomputed / shown	Base recomputed / shown	Bull recomputed / shown	Maximum residual
Risk Business Services	1,560.7	1,898.8 / 1,898.8	2,346.8 / 2,346.7	2,750.5 / 2,750.5	0.002%
Risk Insurance	1,383.3	1,642.9 / 1,643.0	1,940.1 / 1,940.2	2,227.8 / 2,227.9	0.004%
Risk Specialised Industry Data Services	407.9	450.4 / 450.4	533.1 / 533.1	599.3 / 599.3	0.010%
Risk Government Solutions	195.1	205.1 / 205.0	243.1 / 243.1	273.6 / 273.6	0.025%
STM Primary Research	1,518.6	1,636.0 / 1,635.5	1,940.0 / 1,939.8	2,131.9 / 2,131.6	0.028%
STM Databases and Tools	1,104.4	1,249.5 / 1,249.3	1,514.5 / 1,514.4	1,700.8 / 1,700.5	0.019%
STM Other	138.1	131.3 / 131.3	152.5 / 152.4	168.0 / 167.9	0.071%
Legal Law Firms and Corporate	1,305.5	1,454.9 / 1,454.5	2,008.7 / 2,008.3	2,321.4 / 2,321.1	0.024%
Legal Government, Academic, News	559.5	526.7 / 526.7	680.7 / 680.7	734.7 / 734.7	0.005%
Exhibitions exhibitor engine	861.4	909.8 / 909.8	1,163.7 / 1,163.7	1,319.3 / 1,319.3	0.003%

Modeled product	TTM GBPm	Bear recomputed / shown	Base recomputed / shown	Bull recomputed / shown	Maximum residual
Exhibitions visitors and other	318.6	362.2 / 362.2	414.4 / 414.4	455.3 / 455.3	0.008%
Print single disclosed line	367.0	105.3 / 105.3	164.8 / 164.5	241.9 / 241.6	0.161%

Eleven mandatory checks

Check	Result	Reproduced arithmetic and evidence
1	PASS	TTM revenue sums to GBP 9,720m. TTM segment profit GBP 3,421m less GBP 4m central and GBP 295m operating bridge equals GBP 3,122m OI. FY2025 revenue sums to GBP 9,590m. FY2025 segment profit GBP 3,350m less GBP 8m central and GBP 307m net operating adjustments equals GBP 3,027m OI. Both residuals are zero against `statutory_bridge.json`, within its GBP 1m tolerance.
2	PASS	For each case, NI divided by quote-basis diluted financial shares gives GBP EPS; multiplying by 1.0 financial share per ADS and USD 1.36411 per GBP gives USD 1.504959, USD 2.768298, and USD 3.821879. Full arithmetic is in Section 5.
3	PASS	Horizon revenue equals the segment sum because corporate eliminations are zero: GBP 10,571.9m, GBP 13,101.4m, and GBP 14,923.4m. Each ratio of combined to segment sum is exactly 100.00%.
4	PASS	Risk product endpoints sum to GBP 4,197.2m, GBP 5,063.1m, and GBP 5,851.3m. STM sums to GBP 3,016.1m, GBP 3,606.6m, and GBP 4,000.1m. Legal, Exhibitions, and Print similarly tie within GBP 0.1m display rounding in their reviewed Section 10 tables. All residuals are below 1%.
5	PASS	Revenue-weighted product profits reproduce segment margins. Risk gives 35.38%, 39.32%, and 41.61%; STM 35.3%, 40.1%, and 42.8%; Legal 18.48%, 24.97%, and 27.04%; Exhibitions 29.0%, 36.0%, and 38.0%. Print is one disclosed line, so weighted margin is not triggered there.
6	PASS	`1,794.1m x split factor 1.0 = 1,794.1m`; dividing by ADS ratio 1.0 and class factor 1.0 gives 1,794.1m listed equivalents. Forward paths satisfy start plus SBC minus retirements equals 1,678.947m, 1,552.554m, and 1,468.291m. No ADR-unit repurchase path is used.
7	PASS	Risk base 7.38% is below recent 8% underlying momentum; STM base 5.49% is near 6% H1 momentum; Legal base 7.59% is below 10% H1 momentum; Exhibitions base 5.99% matches 6% H1 momentum; Print remains negative. Where product history is undisclosed, each reviewed appendix provides current-trend and comparable-company justification.
8	PASS	All 12 modeled product lines were recomputed as TTM revenue times one plus CAGR to the fifth power. The maximum endpoint residual is 0.161%, caused by rounded Print equivalent CAGR, below 1%. The compounding exponent is five, never six.
9	PASS	Base first-forward-year revenue is Risk GBP 3,843.2m plus STM GBP 2,936.0m plus Legal GBP 2,017.9m plus Exhibitions GBP 1,256.7m plus Print GBP 300.9m, totaling GBP 10,354.8m. This is 6.53% above the GBP 9,720m TTM run-rate, within the 10% bound and consistent with recent underlying trends.
10	PASS	TTM is FY2025 minus like-for-like H1 2025 plus H1 2026, each H1 covering 1 January to 30 June. Revenue, OI, pretax, NI, and share diagnostics are reproduced in Section 9. Horizon is exactly 30 June 2026 to 30 June 2031, 5.0 calendar years.

Check	Result	Reproduced arithmetic and evidence
11	PASS	Exact packet hashes independently match both seals. Listing is XNYS:RELX ADS; split, depositary, and class factors are 1.0; FX is dated 2026-08-21. EPS times 15 reproduces USD 22.5744, USD 41.5245, and USD 57.3282. Probabilities sum to 100%, and weighted EPS recomputes to USD 2.547333630. Base controls the 15.63% P/E-15 pass.

SYNTHESIS CLEARED — 11/11 TIE-OUTS PASSED. The quantitative base case produces GBP 13.101bn revenue, GBP 4.497bn statutory operating income, GBP 3.151bn shareholder net income, and USD 2.7683 diluted EPS per ADS at 30 June 2031. At USD 35.91, the required EPS for a 15x entry bar is USD 2.3940, leaving a 15.63% base cushion. The most important remaining downstream issue is not synthesis arithmetic: it is valuation-method preflight and terminal capital-structure support. Stage S has intentionally not selected a method or calculated any return.

Appendix CS - Compounder Score

RELX PLC — Compounder Score and Security-Return Underwriting

Analysis date: 23 August 2026 **Security:** XNYS:RELX sponsored ADS; one ADS represents one RELX PLC ordinary share **Current price:** USD 35.91 per ADS as of 21 August 2026 **TTM anchor:** 30 June 2026 **Exact horizon:** 30 June 2031, exactly 5.0 calendar years **Primary valuation method: P/E Diagnostic classification: Buy only at lower price Trade execution, ranking, sizing, messaging, broker, and portfolio-mutation authority: none**

1. Executive Verdict

RELX earns a **Compounder Score of 74/100**, comprising **67/80 for Business Quality** and **7/20 for 20% Return Underwriting**. The evidence supports a high-quality professional-information and workflow company. It does not support calling the shares an attractive 20%-return security at USD 35.91. The distinction matters. RELX has rising statutory returns, strong cash conversion, durable positions in Risk and Scientific, Technical & Medical, falling diluted shares, and a management team that has improved mix and margins for more than a decade. Yet the locked valuation bridge produces only a **13.10% base gross local-currency IRR** and **11.56% base net-SGD diagnostic IRR** over the exact five-year horizon. The probability-weighted results are **11.00% gross local** and **9.47% net SGD**.

The preflight-controlled assumptions are not selected to manufacture that conclusion. The required valuation preflight at `C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\valuation_preflight.json` was recomputed at SHA-256 `eb948ea2da2e27a1a6fdc61aadb73f6ec8c6b083436e44bce42a573f22a15ddc`, passed its evidence-file validator, reported `status = CLEARED`, cleared all five foundations, and had no blockers. This appendix copies its method, normalized denominator and exit multiples without alteration. Bear, Base and Bull use **16x, 22x and 25x P/E**, respectively. The same P/E method controls scenario wealth, probability weighting, the reverse-return diagnostic, maximum buy price and every net-SGD calculation.

The return dispersion is wide. Bear terminal EPS of USD 1.504959 at 16x plus USD 5.127168 of cumulative distributions creates USD 29.206519 of terminal wealth and a **-4.05%** annualized gross return. Base terminal EPS of USD 2.768298 at 22x plus USD 5.553824 of distributions creates USD 66.456382 and a **13.10%** return. Bull terminal EPS of USD 3.821879 at 25x plus USD 5.779942 creates USD 101.326917 and a **23.06%** return. A 20% annualized return at the locked 22x base exit P/E requires USD 3.809170 of terminal EPS, a 17.48% CAGR from current statutory diluted EPS. The base earnings model compounds EPS at only 10.22%. Alternatively, the base wealth supports a maximum entry price of **USD 26.707330** for a 20% return, 25.63% below the current price.

This is therefore not a rejection of the business. It is a price discipline conclusion. Risk and STM have real data, trust, distribution and workflow advantages; Legal retains valuable content and customer integration but faces unresolved AI-interface ownership; Exhibitions is a cyclical marketplace; Print is a finite runoff. The balance sheet is serviceable but less forgiving after accelerated repurchases: official net debt was GBP 8.733bn and net debt/adjusted EBITDA was 2.3x at 30 June 2026. The evidence supports a quality watch at a lower price, not a current 20%-hurdle pass.

2. Data Source Map

The scoring uses the sealed ER2 chain before any secondary diagnostic. No source is silently promoted above a reconciled filing figure.

Evidence need	Governing source	Period / basis	Use in this appendix
Price and listing units	`quote_packet.json`; `quant_foundation.md`	USD 35.91 on 21 Aug 2026; one ADS to one ordinary	Current price, market value, listed-unit arithmetic
Market capitalization	Quote packet and official H1 diluted quote-basis shares	1,794.1m shares at H1 2026	USD 64.426bn diagnostic market cap
Enterprise value	Quote-basis market cap plus official H1 net debt	GBP 8.733bn net debt; USD/GBP 1.36411	USD 76.339bn diagnostic EV; not terminal method
Income statement and statutory EPS	`statutory_bridge.json`; `quant_foundation.md`; official FY2025 and H1 2026 reports	TTM ended 30 Jun 2026	Reported and normalized current EPS
Balance sheet and leverage	`data_package.md`; official H1 2026 report	30 Jun 2026	Cash, debt, leases, net debt and leverage

Evidence need	Governing source	Period / basis	Use in this appendix
Cash flow and capex	`quant_foundation.md`; official annual/interim reports	FY2021–FY2025 and TTM	FCF conversion and reinvestment proxies
Diluted shares and SBC	`appendix_synthesis.md`; `data_package.md`; official filings	Historical and 2031 scenarios	Dilution, buyback and per-share value paths
Segment data	Reviewed `appendix_B_risk.md`, `appendix_B_stm.md`, `appendix_B_legal.md`, `appendix_B_exhibitions.md`, `appendix_B_print.md`	TTM to 2031	Revenue, margin and terminal earnings inputs
Management and capital allocation	`appendix_management.md`	FY2021–H1 2026	Incentives, acquisitions, buybacks, disclosure quality
Moat, competitors and end markets	`appendix_moat.md` and five reviewed segment appendices	Current through 2046 durability test	Runway, competition, disruption and pricing evidence
Terminal statutory EPS and shares	`appendix_synthesis.md`	30 Jun 2031	Bear/Base/Bull P/E return bridge
Method and exit multiples	`valuation_preflight.json`	Cleared 23 Aug 2026	Frozen P/E method and 16x/22x/25x exits

The verified structured annual data covers FY2018–FY2025, eight years. A full ten-year machine-readable history was not present in the sealed bundle, so the report does not invent two additional years. The core trend calculations use the better reconciled FY2021–FY2025 official series and show the FY2018 share count where the seven-year comparison is helpful. The source-confidence assessment is high for price, statutory earnings, shares and terminal scenario values; it is medium for ROIIC proxies, future distributions and the net-SGD overlay because those require transparent analytic assumptions.

3. Key Financial and Quality Metrics

RELX's verified five-year financial path is strong. Revenue rose from GBP 7.244bn in FY2021 to GBP 9.590bn in FY2025, a 7.27% CAGR over four annual compounding intervals. Statutory operating margin expanded from 26.0% to 31.6%. Statutory NOPAT, calculated as statutory operating income times one minus the contemporaneous tax rate, rose from GBP 1.542bn to GBP 2.287bn, a 10.36% CAGR. Simple free cash flow after core capex rose from GBP 1.677bn to GBP 2.311bn, an 8.35% CAGR. Aggregate FY2021–FY2025 FCF divided by aggregate statutory NOPAT was 101.72%.

Metric	Latest / measured value	Interpretation
FY2021–FY2025 revenue CAGR	7.27%	Healthy mix of organic growth, recovery and modest acquisitions
FY2021–FY2025 statutory NOPAT CAGR	10.36%	Margin growth outpaced revenue
FY2021–FY2025 simple FCF CAGR	8.35%	Cash growth broadly follows operating economics
Aggregate FCF / NOPAT	101.72%	Strong five-year cash conversion
Median simple statutory ROIC, FY2021–FY2025	20.9%	High, but not the only valid capital definition
Issuer adjusted ROIC, FY2021 / FY2025	11.9% / 15.4%	Broader denominator confirms improvement at a lower level
Gross organic deployment ROIIC proxy, FY2022–FY2025	33.51%	Delta NOPAT divided by cumulative core capex
Acquisition-inclusive deployment ROIIC proxy, FY2022–FY2025	24.55%	Adds cash acquisitions to the denominator
Diluted share CAGR, FY2021–FY2025	-1.26%	Buybacks more than offset issuance
FY2025 SBC / revenue	0.66%	Low, but treated as a real cost
FY2025 SBC / FCF	2.73%	Limited dilution burden
TTM FCF yield on quote-basis market cap	4.91%	Reasonable cash yield, not a 20% return setup by itself
FY2025 dividend yield at USD 35.91	2.56%	Cash distributions help but do not close the return gap
TTM gross buyback yield	4.76%	Material; funded partly by higher leverage
H1 2026 net debt / adjusted EBITDA	2.3x	Within stated range, but near the upper end

The ROIC evidence needs disciplined interpretation. The transparent simple statutory measure rose from 16.7% to 23.5%, with a 20.9% median, while RELX's broader adjusted ROIC rose from 11.9% to 15.4%. Goodwill plus intangibles was GBP 11.213bn at H1 2026 and tangible book was negative GBP 9.975bn. A thin accounting equity base and prior buybacks can

flatter simple ROIC. That is why Category 1A receives four points rather than five and why the issuer's broader denominator is shown beside the statutory calculation.

The ROIIC estimates are deliberately described as gross-deployment proxies. Over FY2022–FY2025, delta NOPAT divided by FY2023–FY2025 core capex was 33.51%; adding cash acquisitions to the denominator reduced the result to 24.55%. Over FY2021–FY2025, using FY2022–FY2025 deployment, the corresponding proxies were 38.71% and 26.08%. RELX does not disclose a complete maintenance-versus-growth split for capitalized development or a clean working-capital reinvestment series, so the evidence does not justify false precision. Still, both the organic and acquisition-inclusive readings exceed a conventional cost of capital, and the direction of statutory and issuer-adjusted ROIC is positive.

4. Rubric Scorecard

Category	Score	Maximum	Evidence-based conclusion
Incremental returns on capital	21	25	High and improving returns; denominator and reinvestment-data limits prevent a top score
Reinvestment runway	17	20	Large workflow opportunities in Risk, STM and Legal; Print runoff and incomplete product KPIs cap confidence
Durability of moat	12	15	Risk and STM strong; Legal interface ownership and Exhibitions cyclicality remain material
Accounting and financial quality	9	10	Cash supports earnings, SBC is low, disclosures reconcile; leverage costs one point
Capital allocation	8	10	Organic investment and small deals are rational; buyback price discipline and deal-level returns are weakly disclosed
Price and 20% underwriting	7	20	Base return is 13.10%, bear is negative, and the reverse hurdle is well above base EPS
Total	**74**	**100**	**Buy only at lower price**

The 67/80 Business Quality score is above the 65-point quality threshold. Incremental returns plus runway total 38/45, also above the 35-point threshold. The security fails the overall 80-point threshold because valuation earns only 7/20. The scorecard does not allow strong quality to erase weak entry-price underwriting.

The valuation subscore is mechanical. Base gross IRR of 13.10% earns two of six points. The independently justified 22x base exit is essentially flat to the 22.33x comparable normalized current P/E, earning three of four points; the fourth point requires clearing the return hurdle at a lower multiple, which RELX does not. The negative bear IRR earns zero. The reverse-return test earns zero because required terminal EPS of USD 3.809 is materially above the base USD 2.768. Price-not-perfection earns one point because value can compound without expansion but 20% requires much stronger earnings. Cash returns earn one point because dividends add real wealth but remain too small to bridge the gap.

5. ROIIC and Reinvestment Analysis

The core economic evidence supports reinvestment above the cost of capital. RELX spent GBP 2.264bn on core capex and GBP 0.996bn on cash acquisitions across FY2021–FY2025. Much of core capex is internally developed software and data products: FY2025 core capex was GBP 525m, including GBP 504m of internally developed intangible investment. This is genuine investment, not free growth. It also means simplistic expensing or capitalization choices can distort both operating margins and invested capital. This appendix counts the cash deployment once and retains the related amortization in earnings where appropriate.

The business converted that deployment into higher profit and per-share value. Statutory NOPAT increased by roughly GBP 745m from FY2021 to FY2025. Diluted shares fell from 1,939.4m to 1,843.5m even as SBC remained a real economic cost. The acquisition-inclusive proxy is lower than the organic proxy, which is the correct direction and a useful discipline: acquisitions do not receive free credit. Deal-level return disclosure is insufficient to prove every bolt-on cleared RELX's aggregate hurdle, so Category 5B receives one of two points.

Reinvestment intensity also looks sustainable. Core capex averaged about 5% of revenue, and management continued to fund product development while paying a growing dividend. Acquisitions were generally small: FY2025 consideration was GBP 270m and H1 2026 consideration was GBP 103m. The evidence does not show persistent external financing for operating growth. The main capital-structure concern is that buybacks accelerated faster than internally generated surplus cash. RELX completed GBP 1.75bn of the GBP 2.25bn 2026 authorization by 30 June, contributing to net debt rising to GBP 8.733bn and leverage to 2.3x.

That buyback program creates both value and risk. The synthesis explicitly models repurchases and SBC issuance, producing terminal diluted shares of 1,678.947m, 1,552.554m and 1,468.291m in Bear, Base and Bull. This is better than assuming a flat share count. Yet management does not publish a price hurdle, and official descriptions emphasize program execution rather than valuation sensitivity. Buybacks therefore receive one of two points. They help EPS and per-share wealth, but they are not counted again as cash distributions: doing so would double count the same capital return.

6. Runway Analysis

Risk is the clearest runway. Its contributory data, identity, fraud, compliance, insurance and government decision systems sit inside workflows where mistakes are expensive. The base segment forecast compounds Risk revenue at 7.38% to GBP 5.063bn and reaches a 39.32% adjusted operating margin. The evidence supports continued expansion in digital identity, fraud detection, insurance analytics and compliance, with the caveat that autonomous driving, regulation and privacy obligations can alter specific product pools.

STM also has a durable reinvestment set. Elsevier combines journal brands, author and reviewer networks, linked metadata, ScienceDirect distribution, databases and research or clinical workflow products. The base forecast compounds revenue at 5.49% to GBP 3.607bn and reaches a 40.11% adjusted margin. Open access, research integrity and third-party AI discovery are real threats, but the value proposition extends beyond static articles to trusted, structured, auditable research systems.

Legal has attractive near-term growth and the largest strategic uncertainty. The base forecast reaches GBP 2.689bn of revenue at a 24.97% adjusted margin. Lexis+ and Protégé can monetize authoritative legal sources, citators, customer content and drafting workflows. However, Thomson Reuters, Wolters Kluwer, Bloomberg and AI-native interfaces can compete for the lawyer’s point of work. RELX may remain the governed platform, or it may become a valuable data layer beneath another interface. Those outcomes have different margin and pricing implications. This uncertainty costs runway and moat points even though the five-year forecast remains investable.

Exhibitions is a real marketplace business but cyclically exposed. The base forecast reaches GBP 1.578bn of revenue at a 36.0% margin. Event timing, travel disruption, geopolitics and venue cost can produce large half-year swings. Print is not a runway. Base revenue declines to GBP 164.5m and is managed as a finite service and value runoff. The group runway is therefore substantial but not uniform, and the four growth businesses must absorb the runoff while maintaining reinvestment economics.

7. Moat Analysis

The moat can be stated in one paragraph: RELX combines legally usable and difficult-to-assemble source material, domain-specific structures, outcome and contributory data, trusted brands, direct enterprise distribution, and deep workflow integration at professional decisions where error is costly. A generic model can retrieve or draft information, but reproducing rights, provenance, update cadence, identity resolution, auditability, customer-specific context and production integration is harder. The moat is strongest when those elements reinforce one another, not when RELX merely owns content.

Risk and STM pass the long-duration test. Legal is yellow because long-term interface ownership is unsettled. Exhibitions has local network effects but lower structural durability. Print fails as a durable moat and is treated as runoff. The overall 2046 durability test passed because a future RELX can plausibly sell governed identity, fraud, legal, scientific, research-integrity and clinical decision systems. Low disruption risk receives zero of one point because the AI transition is not low risk; a high moat can coexist with material interface and cost uncertainty.

Pricing power is evidenced by sustained growth and margin improvement, but it must be verified through customer outcomes. The most important falsifiers are AI-product renewal value, spend uplift, principal-segment margins after model and cloud costs, author and funder behavior, research-integrity trends, and whether professional users remain inside RELX interfaces. If engagement moves to third-party platforms while Legal or STM growth and margins weaken, the moat score should fall even if current revenue remains stable.

8. Accounting and Capital Allocation Analysis

Accounting quality is strong enough for the P/E method. TTM statutory shareholder net income was GBP 2.262bn and TTM diluted weighted-average shares were 1,813.1m, producing GBP 1.247587 and USD 1.701846 statutory EPS per ADS. Normalized current EPS excludes a GBP 94m cross-currency-swap fair-value gain and GBP 49m disposal/non-operating gain, while retaining acquired-intangible amortization, acquisition/disposal operating costs, tax, NCI and the statutory diluted-share perimeter. The result is USD 1.608165 and a normalized current P/E of 22.329793x. This denominator is comparable with terminal statutory diluted EPS.

Cash conversion supports earnings. Aggregate simple FCF/NOPAT was 101.72%. SBC was GBP 63m in FY2025, 0.66% of revenue and 2.73% of FCF, and shares declined. RELX's recurring bolt-on acquisition model means acquired-intangible amortization and acquisition-related costs cannot simply be ignored; the terminal statutory bridge retains nonzero amounts. The evidence does not show a restatement, auditor, related-party or governance problem that impairs trust.

Capital allocation is coherent but not flawless. The hierarchy is organic development, small acquisitions, a growing dividend, then buybacks. CEO Erik Engstrom and CFO Nick Luff have long records. The 2023–2025 LTIP weighted 40% adjusted EPS growth, 40% ROIC and 20% relative TSR, a better design than pure revenue or share-price incentives. Management also separated Print rather than hiding its decline. Against that, 2026 compensation opportunity increased materially, deal-level acquisition returns remain thinly disclosed, and buybacks are not visibly price-sensitive.

The balance-sheet disclosure is essential to the return model. At 30 June 2026, cash was GBP 220m, gross debt was GBP 8.906bn including GBP 119m of lease liabilities, official net debt was GBP 8.733bn, and leverage was 2.3x. The earnings model's terminal gross-debt paths are GBP 10.0bn, GBP 8.0bn and GBP 6.5bn, but terminal cash and a complete source-bound net-debt bridge are unavailable. Under P/E, no cash is added and no debt is subtracted after EPS times P/E. Interest, lease and capital-structure economics already affect statutory EPS and the equity multiple. This explicit non-adjustment is the required no-double-count treatment, not an omission.

9. 20% Return Underwriting

9.1 Frozen denominator and method

Primary valuation method: P/E. The reported current multiple is 21.100618x on USD 1.701846 of TTM statutory diluted EPS. The comparable normalized current multiple is 22.329793x on USD 1.608165 of normalized statutory diluted EPS. Reported and normalized earnings differ by only 5.83%, and both retain the statutory shareholder perimeter, so the normalized current denominator is comparable with terminal statutory EPS. The preflight independently selected 16x, 22x and 25x before CS calculated any IRR.

The bear 16x multiple is below both current normalized P/E and the preserved provider-native FY2018–FY2025 range. It is not lowered further because terminal EPS remains positive and Risk/STM moats survive. The base 22x is near normalized current P/E and below the provider-native historical median of 27.58x. The bull 25x is above current but below that historical median; it requires strong execution while recognizing five-year uncertainty. Both excessive-optimism and excessive-bearishness challenges passed in the sealed preflight. CS does not change these multiples after observing returns.

9.2 Distributions and scenario wealth

FY2025 ordinary dividend was GBP 0.675 per share and the H1 2026 interim dividend grew 7%. The diagnostic starts with a GBP 0.72225 FY2026 full-year equivalent and models five annual-equivalent distributions through the terminal date. Dividend growth is 2%, 6% and 8% in Bear, Base and Bull. Cumulative distributions are translated at the sealed USD 1.36411 per GBP. Buybacks are excluded from distributions because their benefit is already embedded in terminal diluted shares.

Return input	Bear	Base	Bull
Scenario probability	30%	55%	15%
Terminal statutory diluted EPS, USD	1.504959	2.768298	3.821879
Exit P/E	16.0x	22.0x	25.0x
Terminal diluted ADS-equivalent shares, m	1,678.947	1,552.554	1,468.291
Terminal equity value, USDm	40,427.963	94,554.492	140,290.789
Terminal equity value per ADS, USD	24.079351	60.902558	95.546975
Cumulative distributions per ADS, USD	5.127168	5.553824	5.779942
Terminal shareholder wealth per ADS, USD	29.206519	66.456382	101.326917

Return input	Bear	Base	Bull
Gross local-currency annualized IRR	**-4.05%**	**13.10%**	**23.06%**

The gross formula is `(terminal shareholder wealth / USD 35.91)^(1/5) - 1`. Probability weighting is performed on wealth, not IRRs: `30% × 29.206519 + 55% × 66.456382 + 15% × 101.326917 = USD 60.512004`. The probability-weighted gross local return is therefore `(60.512004 / 35.91)^(1/5) - 1 = 11.00%`. An arithmetic average of the three scenario IRRs is not used.

9.3 Net-SGD diagnostic

The net-SGD overlay uses the same P/E method, terminal EPS, exit multiples, shares and distributions. It assumes 35 basis points of entry cost, 35 basis points of exit cost, zero statutory UK dividend withholding, an additional 10% distribution tax/custody reserve, cumulative ADR fees of USD 0.15 per ADS, and a 5% cumulative depreciation of USD against SGD over five years. The spot USD/SGD level cancels in the return ratio. These are conservative diagnostic assumptions, not account-specific tax or custody advice.

Net-SGD result	Bear	Base	Bull
Net terminal wealth, relative USD-equivalent before entry FX cancellation	27.036549	62.260949	95.251283
Net-SGD annualized IRR	**-5.58%**	**11.56%**	**21.46%**

Probability-weighted net terminal wealth is 56.642179 on the same scenario weights. Relative to the cost-loaded entry price, the probability-weighted net-SGD IRR is **9.47%**. Missing portfolio context does not make these returns null; it only means the report cannot opine on account-specific fit or sizing.

9.4 Reverse-return hurdle

A 20% annualized return requires terminal shareholder wealth of `USD 35.91 × 1.20^5 = USD 89.355571`. Subtracting base distributions of USD 5.553824 leaves USD 83.801747 of required terminal equity value. At the locked 22x base exit P/E, required terminal EPS is **USD 3.809170**. From current statutory diluted EPS of USD 1.701846, that is a **17.48% EPS CAGR**. The modeled base reaches only USD 2.768298, a 10.22% CAGR. The reverse hurdle is not beatable on base evidence.

At the modeled base wealth of USD 66.456382, the maximum entry price for a 20% return is `66.456382 / 1.20^5 = USD 26.707330`. The 20% case therefore needs either a 25.63% lower entry price or materially stronger earnings than the base model. It does not need multiple expansion—the base exit is slightly below current normalized P/E—but that fact alone does not make the current price attractive.

10. Hard Veto Checklist

Veto	Status	Evidence
ROIIC below cost of capital	Pass	Organic and acquisition-inclusive deployment proxies remain above an ordinary cost of capital
ROIC is only an accounting artifact	Watch	Negative tangible book can flatter simple ROIC; broader issuer adjusted ROIC confirms improvement at a lower level
Growth requires external financing	Pass	Operating growth is cash funded; debt increase principally reflects accelerated buybacks
Material dilution without value creation	Pass	Diluted shares declined 1.26% annually over FY2021–FY2025; SBC was 0.66% of revenue
Undisclosed serial acquisition failure	Watch	Deals are modest but deal-level post-acquisition returns are not disclosed
Structural FCF shortfall	Pass	Aggregate FCF/NOPAT conversion is 101.72%
Concentration, regulation or cyclicality can permanently impair equity	Watch	Legal AI interface, privacy and Exhibitions risks are material but not presently equity-threatening
20% case requires multiple expansion	Pass	Base exit 22x is below normalized current 22.33x; the hurdle fails because earnings/price are insufficient
Flawless execution required to justify current price	Pass	Base preserves value and compounds at 13.10%; 20%, not value preservation, requires exceptional execution

Veto	Status	Evidence
Moat cannot be explained	Pass	Rights-cleared evidence, domain structure, trust, data and workflow integration form a coherent moat
Accounting or governance trust impaired	Pass	No material restatement, auditor, related-party or governance blocker identified
Balance sheet can wipe out equity in downturn	Watch	2.3x leverage is manageable but reduces flexibility; bear equity value remains positive

There is no active hard veto that forces `Reject`. Watches constrain the score and classification. The negative bear return and low valuation score prevent `Investable now under this rubric`, while business quality above 65/80 supports `Buy only at lower price` rather than `Watchlist` or `Reject`.

11. Final Decision

Score-implied classification: Buy only at lower price. RELX clears the business-quality and ROIIC-plus-runway thresholds but fails total score, valuation score, base 20% IRR and bear-return thresholds. The conclusion is diagnostic and does not authorize a trade, rank, size, message, broker instruction, or portfolio change.

Compounder Score note: 74/100. Strong information-workflow economics are offset by a 7/20 return-underwriting score at USD 35.91.

Business Quality Score note: 67/80. Rising statutory ROIC, strong cash conversion, falling shares and durable Risk/STM assets clear the quality bar; Legal AI interface ownership, Exhibitions cyclicality and leverage-funded buybacks cap the score.

20% Return UW Score note: 7/20. The locked base case earns 13.10% gross local and 11.56% net SGD; 20% requires USD 3.809 terminal EPS or a USD 26.71 entry price at the locked 22x base exit P/E.

The most important monitoring variables are Risk and Legal organic growth, Legal AI renewal value and interface ownership, STM research-integrity and open-access economics, Exhibitions disruption, group statutory margin, share retirement versus leverage, and whether buybacks remain inside the stated leverage range. Evidence of durable AI monetization without margin dilution could improve earnings confidence. A further buyback-funded leverage increase, Legal margin compression, or loss of professional interface ownership would weaken the case.

12. Machine-Readable JSON

The governed structured artifact is `C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\compounder_score.json`. It preserves full-precision scenario EPS, multiples, shares, total and per-share terminal equity values, distributions, wealth, gross local IRRs, net-SGD IRRs, expected-wealth probability weighting, reverse-return requirements, category and subcategory scores, preflight path and seal, source confidence, veto states, and explicit no-authority flags. Numeric IRRs in JSON are decimal annualized returns. Terminal equity values are USD millions; diluted listed-equivalent shares are millions; per-share values are USD per ADS.

Appendix CSA - Scoring Audit

RELX PLC - Independent Scoring Audit

Analysis date: 2026-08-23 **Security:** XNYS:RELX sponsored ADS, one ADS per RELX PLC ordinary share **Current price:** USD 35.91 as of 2026-08-21 **TTM end / terminal date:** 2026-06-30 / 2031-06-30, exactly 5.0 years **Audited primary valuation method:** P/E **Audit status: CLEARED**, subject to the separate downstream red-team stage **Authority:** no trade, broker, ranking, sizing, messaging, or portfolio-mutation authority.

1. Original vs Audited Scores

The original score is fair. Independent reconstruction did not find an inflated numerical score, a method mismatch, or a return calculation error. The business-quality score is already restrained for the thin invested-capital denominator, incomplete working-capital and maintenance/growth data, deal-level acquisition opacity, Legal AI-interface risk, Exhibitions cyclicality, Print runoff, leverage-funded repurchases, and weakly disclosed buyback price discipline. I therefore preserve all three headline scores.

Item	Original	Audited	Notes
Business Quality Score / 80	67	67	Strong quality clears 65/80, but it is not allowed to offset entry-price weakness.
Valuation / 20% Return UW Score / 20	7	7	Base IRR is 13.10%, Bear is negative, and the 20% reverse hurdle is not met.
Total Score / 100	74	74	Arithmetic is 67 + 7 = 74.
Classification	Buy only at lower price	Buy only at lower price	Strong business quality, but current price does not support a 20% base return.

Original and audited scenario results are identical: Bear **-4.0482544025%**, Base **13.1004305200%**, Bull **23.0557423846%**, and probability-weighted gross local-currency **11.0005742674%**. The audited net-SGD results are Bear **-5.5844138207%**, Base **11.5569393560%**, Bull **21.4584153011%**, and probability-weighted **9.4665507615%**. The maximum entry price for a 20% base return is USD 26.7073295474.

2. Score Reductions and Reasons

There are **no score reductions**. That is not a rubber stamp: the original scorer already applied the relevant discounts. Category 1B receives 6/8 rather than 8/8 even though the five-year gross organic deployment proxy is 38.71%, because maintenance versus growth capex and working-capital reinvestment are not separately disclosed. Acquisition-inclusive ROIIC is explicitly calculated at 26.08% over the five-year window and 24.55% over the three-year window. Category 5B and 5C each receive only 1/2 because deal-level returns and a valuation-sensitive buyback hurdle are absent. Category 3F is zero because AI disruption is not low risk. Category 6 earns only 7/20 because the security fails the actual return hurdle.

The evidence-by-rubric replay is below. “Partly supported” means the claim is bounded by a disclosed evidence limitation, not that the points must automatically be zero.

Subcategory	Audit status	Original / max	Audit action
1A normalized ROIC	Supported	4/5	Preserve; five-year median simple statutory ROIC is 20.9%, while issuer adjusted ROIC is lower and disclosed.
1B ROIIC	Partly supported	6/8	Preserve; 3-year gross organic proxy is 33.51%, with acquisition-inclusive 24.55%; proxy limits prevent 8/8.
1C ROIIC trend	Supported	3/3	Preserve; statutory and issuer-adjusted ROIC rise through FY2025.
1D unit economics	Partly supported	3/3	Preserve narrowly; margin and product evidence support it, while pure unit economics are not disclosed.
1E cash conversion	Supported	3/3	Preserve; five-year aggregate FCF/NOPAT is 101.72%.

Subcategory	Audit status	Original / max	Audit action
1F accounting artifact	Partly supported	2/3	Preserve; negative tangible book can flatter simple ROIC and is explicitly penalized.
2A market opportunity	Partly supported	5/5	Preserve narrowly; multiple professional workflows provide a broad runway, but no management TAM is treated as a forecast fact.
2B reinvestment at scale	Supported	4/5	Preserve; capex remains near 5% of revenue and returns rose, with incomplete product-level disclosure costing one point.
2C organic growth	Supported	4/4	Preserve; Risk, STM, and Legal growth is source-bound.
2D repeatable playbook	Partly supported	2/3	Preserve; the portfolio record is long, but granular cohort economics are absent.
2E market structure	Partly supported	1/2	Preserve; strong in Risk/STM, less so in Exhibitions and Print.
2F growth without ROIC collapse	Supported	1/1	Preserve; both statutory and issuer-adjusted ROIC improved with growth.
3A clear advantage	Supported	4/4	Preserve; data rights, workflow integration, trust, and distribution are specific.
3B pricing power	Partly supported	3/3	Preserve narrowly; margins and Legal spend uplift support pricing, but Risk/STM pure price-volume data are absent.
3C competitive evidence	Partly supported	2/3	Preserve; named peers and attack paths are present, but customer share evidence is incomplete.
3D stickiness	Supported	2/2	Preserve; subscription mix and embedded machine-to-machine workflows are evidenced.
3E stress resilience	Partly supported	1/2	Preserve; five-year margin evidence is good, but Exhibitions recovery and AI transition limit certainty.
3F low disruption risk	Supported	0/1	Preserve zero; Legal/STM interface disintermediation is a real risk.
4A revenue and earnings quality	Supported	2/2	Preserve; statutory bridge retains recurring amortization and acquisition costs.
4B cash-flow support	Supported	2/2	Preserve; the five-year test clears.
4C SBC and dilution	Supported	2/2	Preserve; SBC is treated as a cost and diluted shares fell 1.26% annually.
4D balance sheet	Supported	1/2	Preserve; 2.3x leverage is serviceable but less forgiving.
4E disclosure	Supported	1/1	Preserve; reconciliations are strong, with explicit true non-disclosures.
4F governance	Supported	1/1	Preserve; no material accounting or governance red flag was found.
5A reinvestment priority	Supported	2/2	Preserve; organic development precedes small M&A and distributions.
5B acquisition discipline	Partly supported	1/2	Preserve; spend is modest, but deal-level returns are missing.
5C buyback discipline	Partly supported	1/2	Preserve; shares fall, but no disclosed price hurdle exists and leverage rose.
5D incentive alignment	Supported	2/2	Preserve; 80% of LTIP weight is EPS and ROIC, despite high opportunity levels.
5E owner mentality	Partly supported	1/1	Preserve narrowly; tenure and ownership support it, but this remains qualitative.

Subcategory	Audit status	Original / max	Audit action
5F past decisions	Supported	1/1	Preserve; mix shift, Print separation, and weaker-show exits are observable.
6A base IRR	Supported	2/6	Preserve; 13.10% is in the 10%-15% band.
6B exit multiple	Supported	3/4	Preserve; 22x is effectively equal to normalized current 22.33x, independently selected, but the hurdle still fails.
6C Bear case	Supported	0/3	Preserve zero; Bear loses 4.05% annually.
6D reverse-return hurdle	Supported	0/3	Preserve zero; required EPS CAGR is 17.48% versus 10.22% modeled.
6E price not perfection	Partly supported	1/2	Preserve; value can compound without expansion, but 20% requires much stronger EPS.
6F cash returns	Supported	1/2	Preserve; dividends add wealth but cannot close the hurdle gap.

3. Unsupported Claims

No material scored claim is wholly unsupported. The evidence does not support treating an undisclosed TAM, product ARR, NRR, churn, event rebooking, price-volume split, or deal-level acquisition return as a known fact; the scorer does not do so. The claims that Risk and STM have long runways and that Legal can monetize AI are underwriting judgments, not primary-source facts. They remain acceptable because the report labels the operational evidence and the falsifiers, and scores uncertainty rather than presenting management language as proof.

The most important caution is 2A at 5/5 and 3B at 3/3. Those full scores are defensible only as group-level judgments supported by breadth, organic growth, margin persistence, subscription/workflow embedding, and Legal spend uplift. They should be reduced in a future refresh if Risk or STM growth and margins weaken without direct price/retention disclosure, or if Legal AI renewal value falls after two renewal cycles.

4. Calculation Errors

No calculation error was found.

NOPAT and returns on capital. Replaying official operating profit with contemporaneous tax rates gives NOPAT of GBP 1,542.217m in FY2021 and GBP 2,287.311m in FY2025. The FY2025 calculation is `3,027 x (1 - 672/2,750) = 2,287.311`. The five-year organic deployment proxy is `(2,287.311 - 1,542.217) / (439 + 477 + 484 + 525) = 38.7062%`. Adding FY2022-FY2025 cash acquisitions of GBP 932m gives 26.0796%. The three-year organic and acquisition-inclusive proxies replay to 33.5070% and 24.5519%. Five-year aggregate FCF/NOPAT replays to 101.7246%; revenue, NOPAT, and FCF CAGRs replay to 7.2655%, 10.3557%, and 8.3470%. Diluted-share CAGR is -1.2598%. SBC remains an expense and forward issuance is added to scenario shares.

Valuation-preflight replay. The exact SHA-256 of `valuation_preflight.json` is `eb948ea2da2e27a1a6fdc61aadb73f6ec8c6b083436e44bce42a573f22a15ddc`. The validator returned `VALUATION_PREFLIGHT_VALID`, with status CLEARED, all five foundations passed, and zero blockers. CS copies the same path, hash, P/E method, normalized EPS denominator, capital-structure treatment, and 16x/22x/25x exit multiples. CS input hashes also match the dispatch: Markdown `e502f0e1973df14b7b6685cbd40aac88b11c266835069542721c33e467ace67f`; JSON `70456c0369a1f77424adcd3af4b680990a6cf3b461e989e0da0bc4d2574e3ca3`.

P/E denominator and bridge. Reported current P/E is `35.91 / 1.7018459103 = 21.1006177365x`. Normalized current P/E is `35.91 / 1.6081653871 = 22.3297928733x`. The terminal denominator is statutory diluted EPS on the same one-ADS-to-one-ordinary claim perimeter. Each scenario uses `terminal EPS x exit P/E`; Bear, Base, and Bull terminal equity values per ADS are USD 24.079351056, USD 60.902557914, and USD 95.546974925. No cash is added and no debt is subtracted after applying P/E. Debt and lease economics affect statutory earnings, so a second net-debt adjustment would be double counting; none is made. Buybacks affect diluted shares and are not also treated as distributions.

Distributions. The FY2026 annual-equivalent dividend starts at GBP 0.72225. Summing five payments growing at 2%, 6%, and 8%, then translating at USD 1.36411/GBP, exactly reproduces USD 5.1271684076, USD 5.5538243454, and USD 5.7799421559. This is a transparent modeled assumption, not a portfolio-specific cash-flow promise.

Gross returns and probability weighting. Terminal wealth is equity value per ADS plus distributions: USD 29.2065194636, USD 66.4563822594, and USD 101.3269170809. Applying `(wealth / 35.91)^(1/5)-1` reproduces every scenario IRR. Expected terminal wealth is `0.30 x 29.2065194636 + 0.55 x 66.4563822594 + 0.15 x 101.3269170809 = USD 60.5120036439`; annualizing that wealth produces 11.0005742674%. The arithmetic probability-weighted average of scenario IRRs would be only 9.4491% and is correctly not used.

Net-SGD overlay. The same P/E bridge remains frozen. For each scenario, terminal equity value is reduced by the 35bp exit cost, distributions by the 10% reserve, USD 0.15 of cumulative ADR fees is deducted, and the result is multiplied by 0.95 for USD depreciation versus SGD. Entry wealth is USD 35.91 times 1.0035. This reproduces net terminal wealth of 27.0365486494, 62.2609488285, and 95.2512830304 and all four audited net-SGD IRRs. There is no method, multiple, share-count, or capital-structure change in the overlay.

Exit-multiple economic coherence. The provider historical P/E rows retain their native basic-EPS denominators and are not relabeled as statutory diluted comparables. The directly computed normalized current 22.33x P/E is the controlling current comparison. Bear 16x is an adverse but solvent going-concern valuation: EPS remains positive, Risk/STM moats survive, and the multiple sits below the observed provider range, so a still lower distress multiple would be excessive bearishness without an event path. Base 22x is essentially flat to comparable current P/E and below the provider-native historical median. Bull 25x requires 8.95% revenue CAGR, 37.42% statutory margin, lower finance cost, and sustained buybacks; the 15% probability, below-median exit, and explicit Legal/Exhibitions risks keep this from becoming an unchecked favorable stack. The multiples were sealed before return scoring and were not chosen to satisfy the hurdle or verdict. Both directional challenges pass, with Medium rather than High confidence for the long-horizon multiple evidence.

RELX is not a P&C insurer or reinsurer, and P/B-ROE is not the controlling method. The insurer-specific and common-equity roll-forward audits are therefore not applicable.

5. Missing Data

The most important missing evidence is a clean maintenance-versus-growth capex split and a complete working-capital reinvestment series. These gaps make ROIIC a gross-deployment proxy. Deal-level post-acquisition returns are also absent. Product-level ARR, NRR, churn, event rebooking, and clean price-volume data are not disclosed. Only eight years of machine-readable annual FMP history are sealed, rather than ten. Terminal cash, leases, NCI balance, and other senior claims lack a complete source-bound scenario path, correctly preventing EV/NOPAT from controlling. Net-SGD assumptions are diagnostics rather than account-specific tax or custody inputs. These limitations lower confidence in selected quality subcategories and overlays, but none makes the P/E shareholder-return bridge incomplete.

6. Hard-Veto and Threshold Test Audit

No hard veto is active. The business-quality threshold passes at 67/80, and ROIIC plus runway passes at 38/45. The total score fails 80/100, valuation fails 15/20, Base IRR fails 20%, and Bear fails the 8%-10% downside threshold. The base 22x exit does not require expansion versus comparable normalized current 22.33x, but that single pass cannot overcome inadequate earnings compounding and price. The score-implied classification is therefore **Buy only at lower price**, not Investable now. It is also not Watchlist or Reject because evidence and business quality are sufficient, total score is above 70, and no hard veto exists.

7. Final 20% Hurdle Pass/Fail

FAIL. At a 22x exit, 20% requires terminal shareholder wealth of USD 89.3555712 and terminal EPS of USD 3.8091703116 after base distributions. That is a 17.4849% EPS CAGR from current statutory diluted EPS, versus 10.2195% in the Base model. Alternatively, modeled Base wealth implies a maximum entry price of USD 26.7073295474. The 20% case requires a lower entry price or earnings substantially above Base; it does not pass through a scoring convention.

8. Dream Business / Dream Investment Classification

RELX is a **dream business, but not a dream investment at USD 35.91 under this rubric**. The single biggest reason is entry valuation relative to supportable earnings compounding: a strong business produces only a 13.10% Base gross return and 11.00% probability-weighted gross return, while Bear is negative.

9. Stage 7 Scorecard Notes

- **Compounder Score note:** 74/100: strong professional-information economics are offset by weak 20% return underwriting at USD 35.91.
- **Business Quality Score note:** 67/80: high returns, cash conversion, falling shares, and durable Risk/STM assets clear the quality bar; AI-interface, cyclicality, leverage, and disclosure gaps cap it.
- **20% Return UW Score note:** 7/20: Base earns 13.10% gross and 11.56% net SGD; 20% needs USD 3.809 terminal EPS or a USD 26.71 entry price at 22x.

10. Auditor JSON

The controlling structured audit is `C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\compounder_score_audit.json`. It binds the validated preflight hash, audited scores, method-consistent gross and net-SGD returns, expected-wealth probability weighting, exit-multiple integrity, no-double-count result, data gaps, and no-authority boundaries.

Appendix RT - Red Team

RELX PLC — Independent Red Team

Analysis date: 2026-08-23 **Security and horizon:** XNYS:RELX 1:1 ADS; USD 35.91 on 2026-08-21 to 2031-06-30, governed as the exact five-year TTM-to-TTM+5 underwriting horizon **Frozen valuation lock:** `valuation_preflight.json`, SHA-256 `eb948ea2da2e27a1a6fdc61aadb73f6ec8c6b083436e44bce42a573f22a15ddc`; validator result `VALUATION_PREFLIGHT_VALID` **Frozen method and exits:** P/E; 16x Bear, 22x Base, 25x Bull **Frozen audited scores:** 74/100, comprising 67/80 business quality and 7/20 return underwriting **Authority:** analytical challenge only. No trade, order, broker, portfolio, ranking, sizing, messaging, or queue authority.

1. The most fragile assumption

The most fragile Stage 5 assumption is not a revenue CAGR. It is the **Base diluted-share path**, specifically the assumption that GBP 1.5bn is repurchased every year at prices beginning at GBP 26.32 and rising only 5% annually. That retires 252.8m shares before 11.2m of modeled issuance and takes diluted shares from 1,794.1m to 1,552.6m. Management has demonstrated willingness to execute buybacks, but not a valuation-sensitive price rule: the FY2025 realized repurchase price was about GBP 37.97, and H1 2026 leverage rose to 2.3x after GBP 1.75bn of repurchases. The model's 5% repurchase-price appreciation is also slower than the audited Base terminal-equity price appreciation implied by USD 35.91 becoming USD 60.90 before dividends.

This is fragile rather than fatal. Replaying the same GBP 1.5bn annual repurchases and SBC mechanism with repurchase prices rising 11.1% instead of 5% produces about 1,582.5m terminal shares, not 1,552.6m. Holding the audited Base net income, P/E, and distributions fixed, EPS falls from USD 2.7683 to about USD 2.7159 and gross IRR from 13.10% to 12.71%, a 0.40 percentage-point reduction. Stage 5's own simpler `+5% ending shares` sensitivity lowers Base EPS by USD 0.132. The practical lesson is that per-share compounding depends on buying stock at the assumed price while maintaining the dividend, organic investment, acquisitions, and the Base debt path; RELX has not published the price hurdle needed to prove that outcome.

2. The most-likely-to-be-optimistic Stage 5 number

The number most likely to be revised down is **Base Legal revenue of GBP 2.689bn at June 2031**, a 7.59% five-year CAGR from GBP 1.865bn. H1 2026's 10% underlying growth and strong renewals are real, but RELX discloses neither ARR, NRR, AI attach, realized price, usage cost, nor seat movement. Stage 5 assumes the adoption wave matures gently: Law Firms & Corporate grows 10%, 10%, 9%, 8%, and 8%, while the blended margin rises to 24.97% from 23.32%.

The competitive evidence cuts both ways. Thomson Reuters reported 10% Q2 2026 organic growth in Legal Professionals, with Westlaw and CoCounsel driving 9% recurring growth, while its 48.1% adjusted EBITDA margin was flat. That validates professional-AI demand but also proves Lexis is not enjoying an uncontested adoption curve. A non-controlling sensitivity using 4.5% Legal revenue CAGR and 22.5% terminal Legal margin yields about GBP 2.324bn revenue and GBP 523m adjusted operating profit versus GBP 671m audited Base. Holding all other audited inputs fixed, Base EPS falls to roughly USD 2.670 and gross IRR to 12.35%. That is a meaningful earnings miss, but only 0.75 percentage point of return—below the routing threshold by itself.

3. Strongest bear case

RELX's moat can remain operationally intact while the equity de-rates because AI moves the economic interface away from proprietary destinations. Third-party legal and scientific agents can own the user's starting point, force RELX into a licensed-content or data-feed role, and make premium AI features table stakes rather than incremental revenue. That pressure first hits Legal's realized price and inference/support cost, then STM's discovery economics; at the same time, privacy and permissible-purpose rules can raise Risk data costs, and a cyclical shock can expose Exhibitions' committed cost base. Within two renewal cycles, the observable result would be Legal and STM revenue slowing below 4% while their combined adjusted-profit growth trails revenue and Risk no longer sustains high-single-digit underlying growth. The audited Bear expresses this mechanism strongly: Legal revenue CAGR 1.22% and margin 18.48%, STM 1.78% and 35.3%, Risk 35.38% margin, an Exhibitions shock, higher finance expense, and only 16x terminal P/E.

4. Cross-examination of management commentary

“We continue to see positive momentum across the group,” Erik Engstrom said in the official 23 July 2026 transcript. That statement is true at the current observation point but too broad to carry a five-year forecast. Print is shrinking rapidly; Exhibitions had timing and travel disruption; and the principal uncertainty is whether Legal and STM AI economics remain attractive after the first renewal wave. The first contradiction would be two consecutive formal periods in which principal information-segment adjusted profit fails to outgrow revenue despite continuing AI adoption claims.

For Risk, management's source-verified guidance calls for continued strong underlying revenue growth with adjusted profit growing faster. The skeptical reading is that more than 90% machine-to-machine delivery demonstrates embedding, not immunity. Regulation, customer orchestration, and internal decision layers can preserve query volume while shifting value from a bundled decision product to lower-priced data. The first warning is Risk growth below 5% with at least 100bp margin compression despite stable transaction markets.

For Legal, management attributes 10% underlying growth and 13% adjusted-profit growth to strong renewals, new sales, and the integrated AI platform. The overpromise risk is duration: roughly three-year subscriptions delay competitive churn, while Thomson Reuters is simultaneously reporting 10% Legal Professionals organic growth driven by Westlaw and CoCounsel. The first failure signal is not lower user adoption; it is renewals that preserve access but no longer produce spend uplift, accompanied by Legal margin below 22%.

For STM, management says new products and strong sales support strong growth with profit outgrowing revenue. Yet submissions rose more than 20% while publications rose about 7%. If integrity screening, peer-review scarcity, open-access waivers, and inference costs scale with submissions rather than monetized articles, volume becomes work before it becomes revenue. The first break is publication growth slowing below 4% while integrity and platform investment prevent adjusted-profit growth from matching revenue.

5. Stage 5 tie-out reverification

The recency anchor is sound. RELX reports half-years, so Stage 5 correctly uses FY2025 less H1 2025 plus H1 2026 rather than inventing quarters. Revenue ties at GBP 9.720bn, statutory operating income at GBP 3.122bn, pretax income at GBP 2.990bn, and shareholder net income at GBP 2.262bn. There is no sharp disclosed sequential quarterly deceleration hidden by a stale annual base; there are only half-year disclosures and explicit event-timing caveats.

The share path is arithmetically sound but economically less secure. Each scenario applies repurchases and SBC once; CS does not add repurchases again as distributions. The fragile element is affordable price and funding, not the equation. Base allocates GBP 7.5bn to repurchases over five years while continuing dividends and reducing terminal debt in the earnings path. Historical FCF conversion is strong, but the buffer against acquisitions, working-capital needs, or higher repurchase prices is not explicitly bridged.

Product growth does not obviously outrun recent competitors without explanation. Risk Base at 7.38% is below current 8% underlying growth and comparable to scaled data peers. STM Base at 5.49% is near current momentum and deliberately decelerates. Legal Base at 7.59% is below current 10% but remains the aggressive line because direct competitor growth is also about 10%, making rivalry—not market demand—the limiting factor. Exhibitions Base at 5.99% is consistent with Informa's June 2026 disclosure of 7.6% live-events growth and 7%+ guidance, while Informa's rescheduling of more than 15 brands confirms the same calendar/geopolitical convexity embedded in RELX Bear.

6. The score-derived 20% return claim

The audited score correctly says the 20% hurdle **does not clear**. At 22x, a 20% Base return requires USD 3.809 terminal EPS after Base distributions, a 17.48% EPS CAGR from normalized current EPS versus 10.22% modeled. The maximum entry price is USD 26.71, well below USD 35.91. The red team agrees.

The assumption most likely to make a hypothetical 20% claim wrong is not the 22x multiple; it is the combined demand for faster NOPAT growth and continued low-price buybacks. The audited Base terminal EPS of USD 2.768 is already far below the hurdle EPS. Trying to close that gap through share count would require repurchases far beyond the modeled GBP 1.5bn annual program or execution at implausibly low prices, likely conflicting with leverage and organic investment. The 7/20 return score is therefore appropriately severe and should not be upgraded because the business-quality score is 67/80.

7. Two-sided valuation challenge

Strongest reason the model is too optimistic. The 22x Base exit assumes no material de-rating from today's normalized 22.33x even though the terminal business is larger, more mature, and still has unresolved Legal/STM interface ownership. A 20x sensitivity—inside the preflight's own 20x–24x mature-quality range—reduces terminal equity value from USD 60.90 to USD 55.37 per ADS and gross Base IRR from 13.10% to 11.15%, a 1.95 percentage-point reduction. That nearly exhausts the materiality allowance. Separately, changing probabilities from 30%/55%/15% to 40%/50%/10% lowers expected-wealth IRR from 11.00% to 8.92%. That is a genuine fragility disclosure, but not an evidence-bound correction: no observed frequency base proves that 40% Bear is more correct than 30%, so it does not invalidate the audited bridge.

Strongest reason the model is too bearish. Bear stacks a Legal monetization failure, STM access/integrity pressure, slower Risk, an Exhibitions shock, accelerated Print runoff, higher tax and finance cost, more debt, and a 16x exit. Several can coincide, but the combination is punitive relative to the fact that terminal EPS remains positive and Risk/STM still pass their moat tests. Raising only the Bear multiple from 16x to 18x—still well below the current normalized P/E—raises terminal equity from USD 24.08 to USD 27.09 and gross Bear IRR from -4.05% to -2.15%, a 1.90-point improvement. The audited 16x is defensible as a stress valuation; treating an even lower distress multiple as Base would be excessive bearishness without a solvency or franchise-break event.

The frozen audited gross USD IRRs remain Bear **-4.0482544025%**, Base **13.1004305200%**, Bull **23.0557423846%**, and probability-weighted **11.0005742674%**. The frozen net-SGD IRRs remain Bear **-5.5844138207%**, Base **11.5569393560%**, Bull **21.4584153011%**, and probability-weighted **9.4665507615%**. Expected-wealth CAGR, not the arithmetic average of scenario IRRs, controls both probability-weighted results.

RETURN_MODEL_OBJECTION_STATUS: IMMATERIAL. No denominator, P/E method, ADS claim perimeter, dilution equation, distribution arithmetic, expected-wealth calculation, or capital-structure double count failed. The strongest evidence-bound single-input challenges move audited annual returns by less than 2 percentage points and do not change the 20% hurdle failure. No upstream reroute is required.

8. Insurer return bridge

Not applicable. RELX is not a P&C insurer, reinsurer, specialty carrier, or substantially similar risk-bearing business; `insurer_return_bridge.json` is appropriately absent. The governing shareholder bridge is statutory diluted EPS times a frozen P/E, not P/B–ROE or an insurer common-book roll-forward.

9. Observable exit / kill signal

The single kill signal is: **over the next two consecutive formal reporting periods, both Legal and STM underlying revenue growth fall below 4%, while their combined adjusted operating profit grows more slowly than revenue, and Risk underlying growth also falls below 5% without a disclosed cyclical volume explanation.** This threshold would show that AI-related investment is failing to preserve interface economics in two information franchises while the supposed Risk anchor is also decelerating. That would invalidate the diversification premise behind the 55% Base weight and require a fresh Production ER2 rather than an adjustment to this locked model. This is an analytical invalidation threshold, not trade or portfolio authority.

10. Conviction after red team

Thesis survives, but only as a strong business purchased at an unexceptional return. The reconciliation, positive terminal EPS in every scenario, P/E claim perimeter, and cash distributions survive challenge. The score is right to deny the 20% case. The central disagreement is not whether RELX is durable; it is whether a 22x 2031 exit and 55% Base weight adequately price AI-interface, repurchase, and maturity risk. With Base gross IRR 13.10%, probability-weighted gross IRR 11.00%, and a negative Bear, valuation offers too little room for those assumptions to be wrong. The red-team outcome supports preserving the audited scores and returns while carrying the Legal/STM interface and repurchase-price path as the lead monitored objections.

Sources consulted

- RELX official FY2025 and H1 2026 publications and transcript, sealed in `data_package.md` and `valuation_preflight.json`.
- [Thomson Reuters Q2 2026 results](https://ir.thomsonreuters.com/news-releases/news-release-details/thomson-reuters-reports-second-quarter-2026-results), including Legal Professionals organic growth and margin.

- [Informa June 2026 trading update](https://www.informa.com/globalassets/documents/investor-relations/2026/informa-2026-agm-trading-update.pdf), including live-events growth, guidance, and schedule disruption.

Appendix D - Data Package (Raw Historicals)

RELX PLC (RELX) — Production ER2 Data Package

Information cutoff: 2026-08-23. **Fiscal year end:** 31 December. **Latest complete period:** H1 2026 ended 30 June 2026. **TTM:** FY2025 – H1 2025 + H1 2026. **Exact forward horizon:** 30 June 2031. **Reporting currency and scale:** GBP millions unless stated otherwise. **Trade execution authorized:** `false`.

`trade_execution_authorized=false`

This file uses only live FMP pulls and live RELX-hosted primary sources retrieved in this run. No local data-warehouse cache or prior report was read. Official RELX disclosures control where FMP is empty, stale, normalized, or taxonomy-inconsistent. Raw D-stage evidence is archived under `C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\raw\d-20260823T185500+0800`.

0a. Industry classification and disclosure inventory

RELX is a UK foreign private issuer and global information-based analytics, workflow, scientific-information, legal-information, risk-decisioning, and exhibitions provider. It files a Form 20-F annually and reports reviewed half-year results rather than quarterly 10-Qs. The controlling source set is the [RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), [H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-press release.pdf), [H1 2026 presentation](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/results/interim-presentations/2026-first-half-presentation.pdf), the [August 2026 investor overview](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/relx-overview-august-2026.pdf), the [May 2026 Risk Business Services seminar transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/risk-business-services-seminar-2026-transcript-qa.pdf), and official results transcripts. Prior annual reports were live-fetched to backfill FY2021–FY2022.

FMP status is **thin and taxonomy-inconsistent**. The annual product endpoint returned four rows; FY2023–FY2025 are the recent usable rows, but FY2023–FY2024 retain their contemporaneous format classification and are not the later print-separated restatement. The quarterly product endpoint returned an empty array. The geographic endpoint contains a basis switch: FY2021–FY2022 values correspond to geographic origin, while FY2023–FY2025 match geographic market. FMP does not provide RELX business-area adjusted operating profit. Official RELX tables therefore control business-area economics and category histories.

Search inventory completed in the live annual, interim, presentations, and transcripts: `business area analysis`, `revenue by segment`, `adjusted operating profit`, `revenue by format`, `revenue by type`, `revenue by geographical market`, `subscription`, `transactional`, `machine-to-machine`, `article submissions`, `articles published`, `Lexis+`, `Protégé`, `customer concentration`, `contributory databases`, `sanctions`, `digital transactions`, `capital expenditure`, `cash flow conversion`, `return on invested capital`, `net debt`, `acquisitions`, `share repurchases`, `outlook`, and `reporting changes`.

Dataset / table family	Official source searched	Search terms or table names	Years available	Included?	If excluded, why	Downstream relevance
Business-area revenue and adjusted operating profit	FY2025 annual report note 2; FY2022 annual report note 2; H1 2026 results	Analysis by business segment; adjusted operating profit	FY2021–FY2025 plus H1 2026; current taxonomy only FY2023 onward	Yes	FY2021–FY2022 current-taxonomy restatement is a true non-disclosure	Segment appendices and synthesis
Format and print-related revenue	FY2021, FY2022, FY2025 annual reports; live FMP product endpoint	Revenue by format; print and print-related	FY2021–FY2025 plus H1 mix	Yes	Current print-separated restatement only FY2023 onward	Taxonomy, secular mix, moat
Revenue type and geography	Annual reports note 2; H1 presentation	Subscription; transactional; geographical market	FY2021–FY2025 plus H1 2026 mix	Yes	H1 only gives percentages, not dollar tables	Recurrence, end-market resilience
Business-unit mix	FY2025 and H1 2026 presentations and transcripts	Business Services; Insurance; Primary Research; Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference; Law Firms & Corporate Legal	Current period approximate shares	Yes	Exact unit dollars are not disclosed	Segment drivers and forecast bounds

Dataset / table family	Official source searched	Search terms or table names	Years available	Included?	If excluded, why	Downstream relevance
Product adoption and workflow KPIs	Last four official result transcripts and presentations	Machine-to-machine; article submissions; articles published; AI-enabled tools	FY2024, H1 2025, FY2025, H1 2026	Yes	ARR, NRR, RPO, customer count, and per-product revenue are not disclosed	Growth durability and AI analysis
Risk Business Services operating scale and mix	May 2026 official investor seminar transcript; August 2026 investor overview	Customer concentration; contributory databases; sanctions; digital transactions; segment and geographic mix	Latest May/August 2026 snapshot; no comparable five-year series disclosed	Yes	Snapshot KPIs are not presented as a longitudinal series	Risk moat, concentration, and forecast bounds
Capital, cash flow, and balance sheet	Annual report five-year summary; statement notes; H1 2026 results	ROIC; capital expenditure; buybacks; net debt; acquisitions	FY2021–FY2025 plus H1 2026	Yes	None material	ROIC, allocation, valuation
Quarterly business-area dollars	FMP quarterly product endpoint; RELX trading updates and half-year reports	Quarter; quarterly revenue; segment revenue	None	No	True non-disclosure; RELX reports business-area dollars half-yearly and annually	Recency caveat

Material KPI history — format, recurrence, and geography

The physical-format series below uses each period's contemporaneous filing. FY2023–FY2024 differ from RELX's later current-taxonomy restatement because the 2025 reporting change moved all remaining **print and print-related activities**, including some electronic delivery, into a separate segment. This is a classification change, not a revenue residual.

KPI family, GBPm	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Latest interim / TTM	Source path
Electronic format, contemporaneous basis	6,230	7,112	7,625	7,824	8,070	H1 2026 mix 86%; dollars not disclosed by format	FY2021 and FY2022 annual notes; live FMP FY2023–FY2025; H1 presentation
Face-to-face format	500	912	1,060	1,189	1,121	H1 2026 mix 11%; dollars not disclosed by format	Same sources
Physical print format	514	529	476	421	399	H1 2026 residual about 3%; dollars not disclosed by format	Same sources
Subscriptions	4,214	4,655	4,976	5,025	5,190	H1 2026 mix 54%; dollars not disclosed by type	Annual report note 2; H1 presentation
Transactional and event revenue	3,030	3,898	4,185	4,409	4,400	H1 2026 mix 46%; includes long-term volumetric contracts	Annual report note 2; H1 presentation
North America by customer market	4,321	5,101	5,386	5,495	5,595	H1 2026 mix 59%	Annual report note 2; H1 presentation
Europe by customer market	1,472	1,800	1,908	2,025	2,000	H1 2026 mix 21%	Annual report note 2; H1 presentation
Rest of world by customer market	1,451	1,652	1,867	1,914	1,995	H1 2026 mix 20%	Annual report note 2; H1 presentation

Current print-separated restatement: FY2023 electronic £7,515m, face-to-face £1,060m, print and print-related £586m; FY2024 £7,728m, £1,189m, and £517m; FY2025 £8,070m, £1,121m, and £399m. Those values reconcile exactly to revenue but should not be spliced into the physical-print series above before the FY2023 restatement boundary.

Workflow and adoption KPI history

KPI family	Granularity	FY2024 call	H1 2025 call	FY2025 call	H1 2026 call	Source
Risk machine-to-machine revenue share	Risk	More than 90%	More than 90%	More than 90%	More than 90%	Official results transcripts dated 2025-02-13, 2025-07-24, 2026-02-12, 2026-07-23
STM article submissions growth	Primary Research	More than 20%	More than 20%	More than 20%	More than 20%	Same official transcripts
STM articles published growth	Primary Research	About 15%	10%	10%	7%	Same official transcripts
Legal AI-platform revenue or ARR	Legal	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Lexis+ and Protégé adoption described, but no dollars or ARR
Exhibitions digital revenue	Exhibitions	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Digital tools described qualitatively only

Latest Risk Business Services operating-scale KPIs

The May 2026 investor seminar is the most granular current official disclosure for Risk Business Services. It provides a point-in-time operating snapshot rather than a five-year comparable series; earlier values are therefore not backfilled or implied.

KPI	Latest official value	Period / basis	Forecast relevance	Live official source
Risk segment mix	Business Services nearly 45%; Insurance nearly 40%; Specialised Industry Data Services just over 10%; Government about 5%	May 2026 seminar; approximate shares of Risk revenue	Prevents the residual Risk businesses from being treated as immaterial	Risk Business Services seminar, slides 9–10
Business Services geographic mix	Nearly 30% outside the US	May 2026 snapshot	Non-US expansion is a stated growth runway	Same seminar
Business Services global-solution mix	More than 45% of revenue	May 2026 snapshot	Supports reuse of data and product capabilities across markets	Same seminar
Business Services customers	More than 18,000 customers in over 180 countries and territories	May 2026 snapshot	Breadth and diversification evidence	Same seminar
Customer concentration	Top 30 customers contribute less than 30% of Business Services revenue	May 2026 snapshot	Bounds single-customer concentration risk	Same seminar
Risk contributory databases	More than 25	May 2026 snapshot	Proprietary network-data depth	Same seminar
Sanctions processing	More than 1 trillion checks annually	May 2026 snapshot	Workflow criticality and scale	Same seminar
Digital transaction processing	About 145bn annually, including 81bn logins, 2bn new-account creations, and 28bn payments	May 2026 snapshot	Usage and fraud-intelligence scale; not revenue	Same seminar
Daily transaction observation	More than 400m transactions per day	May 2026 snapshot	Data feedback-loop scale; avoid converting to revenue	Same seminar

1. Reporting structure and taxonomy

RELX has four operating business areas plus a separately reported print and print-related line. Risk provides fraud, identity, compliance, insurance, government, and specialized-industry decision tools. Scientific, Technical & Medical, or STM, combines primary research and databases, analytics, reference, and workflow tools. Legal supplies legal research, drafting, analytics, and workflow systems. Exhibitions organizes industry events and related digital services. Print and print-related activities are managed for customer service and value as the long print transition winds down.

Current modeled line	FY2025 revenue, GBPm	Share of RELX revenue	FY2025 adjusted operating profit, GBPm	Margin	Primary-source basis
Risk	3,485	36.3%	1,305	37.4%	FY2025 annual report note 2
Scientific, Technical & Medical	2,714	28.3%	1,035	38.1%	FY2025 annual report note 2
Legal	1,806	18.8%	415	23.0%	FY2025 annual report note 2
Exhibitions	1,186	12.4%	410	34.6%	FY2025 annual report note 2
Print & print-related activities	399	4.2%	185	46.4%	FY2025 annual report note 2
Segment sum	9,590	100.0%	3,350	34.9%	Before £8m unallocated central costs

Taxonomy change: from 2025 RELX reports remaining print and print-related activities separately and moved a small commercial healthcare portfolio from STM to Risk. The FY2025 annual report restates FY2023 and FY2024 on the new basis. FY2021 and FY2022 remain on the old four-area basis with print embedded in Risk, STM, and Legal. Therefore FY2023–FY2025 and H1 2026 are cleanly comparable on the current taxonomy; FY2021–FY2022 are context only and cannot be treated as restated current-segment history.

Geographically, 2025 revenue was 58.3% North America, 20.9% Europe, and 20.8% rest of world. H1 2026 mix was 59%, 21%, and 20%, respectively. The business is globally diversified but economically North America-led, especially Risk at 78%

and Legal at 68% of H1 2026 revenue.

2. Consolidated historicals — five years

Official RELX reported figures control operating profit. FMP's FY2025 `operatingIncome` field is £2,983m because it excludes £44m of joint-venture and associate results that RELX includes in statutory operating profit; the official £3,027m is used. Revenue, pretax income, shareholder net income, and diluted shares otherwise tie the fresh FMP annual pull to the filing.

Metric	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Source
Revenue, £bn	7.244	8.553	9.161	9.434	9.590	Live FMP income statement; official five-year summary
Statutory operating profit, £bn	1.884	2.323	2.682	2.861	3.027	Official five-year summary controls
Statutory operating margin	26.0%	27.2%	29.3%	30.3%	31.6%	Calculated
Net income attributable to shareholders, £bn	1.471	1.634	1.781	1.934	2.065	Live FMP; official five-year summary
Diluted EPS, £ per ordinary share	0.758	0.847	0.936	1.031	1.120	Official annual-report EPS notes; shareholder net income divided by diluted weighted-average shares
Diluted weighted-average shares, millions	1,939.4	1,929.3	1,902.8	1,876.7	1,843.5	Live FMP annual income statement
Core capex, £bn	0.339	0.439	0.477	0.484	0.525	Official additions to PPE plus internally developed intangibles
Simple statutory FCF after core capex, £bn	1.677	1.962	1.980	2.124	2.311	Official CFO less core capex
Simple statutory ROIC	16.7%	18.4%	20.9%	22.1%	23.5%	Calculated as described below

ROIC calculation: NOPAT equals official statutory operating profit multiplied by one minus the contemporaneous statutory tax rate, where tax rate equals FMP income-tax expense divided by pretax income. Invested capital equals FMP total shareholder equity plus total debt less cash and short-term investments. The denominator is the average of current and prior year-end invested capital. For FY2025: tax rate = £672m ÷ £2,750m = 24.44%; NOPAT = £3,027m × 75.56% = £2,287m; average invested capital = £9,729m; ROIC = 23.51%. This transparent statutory calculation is not the issuer's adjusted ROIC, which was 11.9%, 12.5%, 14.0%, 14.8%, and 15.4% in FY2021–FY2025 under RELX's broader average-invested-capital definition.

3. Business-area historicals

The exact common profit basis is **Adjusted operating profit**, the issuer's key segmental profit measure. It is not statutory segment operating income. FY2021–FY2022 figures below are old-taxonomy context; the current five-line taxonomy begins with the FY2023 restatement.

Risk, GBPm	FY2021 old basis	FY2022 old basis	FY2023 restated	FY2024 restated	FY2025	Source
Revenue	2,474	2,909	3,224	3,336	3,485	FY2022 and FY2025 annual report note 2
YoY growth	n/c	17.6%	n/c taxonomy boundary	3.5%	4.5%	Calculated reported currency
Adjusted operating profit	915	1,078	1,170	1,233	1,305	Same sources
Margin on adjusted operating profit	37.0%	37.1%	36.3%	37.0%	37.4%	Calculated

Scientific, Technical & Medical, GBPm	FY2021 old basis	FY2022 old basis	FY2023 restated	FY2024 restated	FY2025	Source
Revenue	2,649	2,909	2,581	2,624	2,714	FY2022 and FY2025 annual report note 2
YoY growth	n/c	9.8%	n/c taxonomy boundary	1.7%	3.4%	Calculated reported currency

Scientific, Technical & Medical, GBPm	FY2021 old basis	FY2022 old basis	FY2023 restated	FY2024 restated	FY2025	Source
Adjusted operating profit	1,001	1,100	940	981	1,035	Same sources
Margin on adjusted operating profit	37.8%	37.8%	36.4%	37.4%	38.1%	Calculated

Legal, GBPm	FY2021 old basis	FY2022 old basis	FY2023 restated	FY2024 restated	FY2025	Source
Revenue	1,587	1,782	1,655	1,718	1,806	FY2022 and FY2025 annual report note 2
YoY growth	n/c	12.3%	n/c taxonomy boundary	3.8%	5.1%	Calculated reported currency
Adjusted operating profit	326	372	360	381	415	Same sources
Margin on adjusted operating profit	20.5%	20.9%	21.8%	22.2%	23.0%	Calculated

Exhibitions, GBPm	FY2021 old basis	FY2022 old basis	FY2023 restated	FY2024 restated	FY2025	Source
Revenue	534	953	1,115	1,239	1,186	FY2022 and FY2025 annual report note 2
YoY growth	n/c	78.5%	n/c taxonomy boundary	11.1%	-4.3%	Reported currency; cycling matters
Adjusted operating profit	10	162	319	398	410	Same sources
Margin on adjusted operating profit	1.9%	17.0%	28.6%	32.1%	34.6%	Calculated

Print & print-related activities, GBPm	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023 restated	FY2024 restated	FY2025	Source
Revenue	Not separately reported	Not separately reported	586	517	399	FY2025 annual report note 2
YoY growth	n/a	n/a	n/c boundary	-11.8%	-22.8%	Calculated
Adjusted operating profit	Not separately reported	Not separately reported	253	217	185	FY2025 annual report note 2
Margin on adjusted operating profit	n/a	n/a	43.2%	42.0%	46.4%	Calculated

3a. Historical statutory-profit bridge and forecast-driver ledger

The QFR-sealed packet at `C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\RELX PLC\statutory_bridge.json` has SHA-256 `662e8442070eea961b6fdf19bc25b065e1a9f7a82e98e3b41ec87c3ad31b6814`. It was rehashed before this package was written and matches the same seal in `quant_foundation_review.md`. Every label, value, sign, classification, source ID, currency, and scale below is reproduced from that packet. Currency is GBP and scale is millions.

FY2025 ended 31 December 2025

Bridge line	Classification	Value	Source ID	Running subtotal
Risk	segment profit	1,305	relx_fy2025_official	1,305
Scientific, Technical & Medical	segment profit	1,035	relx_fy2025_official	2,340
Legal	segment profit	415	relx_fy2025_official	2,755
Exhibitions	segment profit	410	relx_fy2025_official	3,165
Print & print-related activities	segment profit	185	relx_fy2025_official	3,350
Sum of reportable segment profit	segment profit	3,350	relx_fy2025_official	3,350
Unallocated central costs	corporate_unallocated	-8	relx_fy2025_official	3,342
Consolidated segment profit metric	subtotal	3,342	relx_fy2025_official	3,342
Amortisation of acquired intangible assets	operating	-248	relx_fy2025_official	3,094
Acquisition and disposal related items	operating	-54	relx_fy2025_official	3,040
Reclassification of tax in joint ventures and associates	operating	-14	relx_fy2025_official	3,026

Bridge line	Classification	Value	Source ID	Running subtotal
Reclassification of net finance income in joint ventures and associates	operating	1	relx_fy2025_official	3,027
Statutory operating income	statutory subtotal	3,027	relx_fy2025_official	3,027
Net finance costs	interest	-286	relx_fy2025_official	2,741
Disposals and other non-operating items	other_non_operating	9	relx_fy2025_official	2,750
Pretax income	statutory subtotal	2,750	relx_fy2025_official	2,750
Current tax	tax	-726	relx_fy2025_official	2,024
Deferred tax	tax	54	relx_fy2025_official	2,078
Non-controlling interests	noncontrolling_interests	-13	relx_fy2025_official	2,065
Net income	statutory subtotal	2,065	relx_fy2025_official	2,065

TTM ended 30 June 2026, calculated as FY2025 − H1 2025 + H1 2026

Bridge line	Classification	Value	Source ID	Running subtotal
Risk	segment profit	1,342	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	1,342
Scientific, Technical & Medical	segment profit	1,063	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,405
Legal	segment profit	435	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,840
Exhibitions	segment profit	402	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,242
Print & print-related activities	segment profit	179	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,421
Sum of reportable segment profit	segment profit	3,421	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,421
Unallocated central costs (TTM)	corporate_unallocated	-4	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,417
Consolidated segment profit metric	subtotal	3,417	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,417
Amortisation of acquired intangible assets (TTM)	operating	-243	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,174
Acquisition and disposal related items (TTM)	operating	-37	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,137
Reclassification of tax in joint ventures and associates (TTM)	operating	-15	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,122
Reclassification of net finance income or costs in joint ventures and associates (TTM)	operating	0	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,122
Statutory operating income	statutory subtotal	3,122	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	3,122
Net finance costs (TTM)	interest	-181	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,941
Disposals and other non-operating items (TTM)	other_non_operating	49	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,990
Pretax income	statutory subtotal	2,990	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,990
Current tax (TTM)	tax	-734	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,256
Deferred tax (TTM)	tax	18	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,274
Non-controlling interests (TTM)	noncontrolling_interests	-12	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,262
Net income	statutory subtotal	2,262	relx_ttm_reconciliation_schedule	2,262

Forecast-driver ledger

These are forecast instructions, not new historical classifications. The five reportable businesses are assigned to separate forecasts on the exact **Adjusted operating profit** basis; the remaining rows preserve every corporate, operating, below-line, tax, and attribution line separately so downstream models cannot plug adjusted operating profit directly into statutory earnings.

Historical bridge line	FY value	TTM value	Forecast treatment	Driver and source	Bear / base / bull rule
Reportable-segment Adjusted operating profit	3,350	3,421	Five separately modeled segment forecasts on the issuer-disclosed basis	Section 3 and sealed bridge	Segment-specific bear / base / bull revenue and adjusted-margin cases; no statutory-operating-income relabeling
Consolidated segment profit metric	3,342	3,417	Mechanical sum of the five segment forecasts and unallocated central costs	Sealed bridge arithmetic	No independent growth rate or balancing plug
Unallocated central costs	-8	-4	Fixed nominal amount, refreshed annually	FY2025 annual and H1 2026 segment notes	Bear -£10m; base -£5m; bull £0m
Amortisation of acquired intangible assets	-248	-243	Independent acquired-intangible amortisation schedule	Annual note 14 and H1 reconciliation	Bear hold £243m; base decline 5% yearly absent acquisitions; bull decline 10% yearly
Acquisition and disposal related items	-54	-37	Independently forecast operating expense	Annual and H1 APM reconciliations	Bear -£55m; base -£35m; bull -£20m, never zero without cessation evidence
Reclassification of tax in joint ventures and associates	-14	-15	Percentage of adjusted segment profit	Historical ratio about 0.4%	Bear -0.6%; base -0.45%; bull -0.3% of adjusted segment profit
Reclassification of JV and associate net finance income or costs	1	0	Fixed near-zero amount	Historical FY and TTM values	Bear -£5m; base £0m; bull £5m
Net finance costs	-286	-181	Gross-debt and interest-rate schedule	H1 gross debt £8,906m; average interest rate 3.6%	Bear 4.5% average cost; base 3.8%; bull 3.3%, with debt path explicit
Disposals and other non-operating items	9	49	Separately forecast non-recurring line	FY and TTM statutory bridge	Bear -£25m; base £0m; bull £25m; no recurring gain in base
Current tax	-726	-734	Formula-derived current-tax component after total statutory tax is set from pretax income and the separately forecast deferred-tax line is applied	Statutory effective rate and disclosed adjusted rate	Total tax: bear 25.5%; base 24.5%; bull 23.5% of pretax income; current tax equals total tax less the deferred-tax amount, so tax is counted once
Deferred tax	54	18	Separate deferred-tax bridge	FY2025 annual and H1 2026 tax notes	Bear £0m; base £20m credit; bull £35m credit, updated for acquisition amortisation
Non-controlling interests	-13	-12	Fixed amount or percentage of post-tax profit	FY and TTM ownership line	Bear -£20m; base -£12m; bull -£8m

`STATUTORY_BRIDGE_STATUS: VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING`

4. Product and sub-segment historical disclosures

RELX does not disclose revenue dollars for Risk’s Business Services or Insurance, STM’s Primary Research or databases/tools, Legal’s customer groups, or Exhibitions’ exhibitor and visitor categories. It discloses approximate current shares and directional growth. Dollar-disclosed history is available for the reportable business areas and RELX-wide format categories only.

Segment	Product or sub-segment	What it is	Dollar disclosure?	Disclosed history and source
RELX-wide	Electronic delivery	Digital information, analytics, tools, and electronic reference	Yes, format basis	FY2023 £7,625m; FY2024 £7,824m; FY2025 £8,070m on contemporaneous format basis
RELX-wide	Face-to-face	Exhibitions and limited in-person delivery	Yes, format basis	FY2023 £1,060m; FY2024 £1,189m; FY2025 £1,121m
RELX-wide	Physical print	Print-format revenue	Yes, format basis	FY2023 £476m; FY2024 £421m; FY2025 £399m

Segment	Product or sub-segment	What it is	Dollar disclosure?	Disclosed history and source
Risk	Business Services	Financial crime, identity, fraud, payments, and compliance tools	No	More than 40% in the H1 2026 transcript and nearly 45% in the May 2026 seminar; exact dollars not disclosed
Risk	Insurance	Contributory databases and insurance decision tools	No	Around 40% in H1 2026 and nearly 40% in the May 2026 seminar; exact dollars not disclosed
Risk	Specialized Industry Data Services and Government	Commodity, aviation, government analytics, and decision tools	No	Just over 10% and about 5%, respectively, in the May 2026 seminar; exact dollars not disclosed
STM	Primary Research	Journals, article workflow, and research dissemination	No	A little over half of divisional revenue; submissions and publication growth disclosed
STM	Databases, Tools & Electronic Reference	Scopus, ScienceDirect, clinical, education, and research workflow tools	No	Around 40% of divisional revenue; exact dollars not disclosed
Legal	Law Firms & Corporate Legal	Legal research, drafting, analytics, and agentic workflow	No	Around 70% of divisional revenue; exact dollars not disclosed
Legal	Government & Academic; News & Business	Public-sector, academic, and news information products	No	Residual mix; exact dollars not disclosed
Exhibitions	Exhibitor revenue	Stand, sponsorship, and related event revenue	No dollars	73% of H1 2026 segment revenue; percentage only
Exhibitions	Visitors and other	Visitor and related revenue	No dollars	27% of H1 2026 segment revenue; percentage only

Segment or KPI	FY2024	H1 2025	FY2025	H1 2026	Disclosure method and source
Risk Business Services	Strong growth	Driven by Financial Crime Compliance and digital Fraud & Identity	Strong growth and strong new sales	Strong growth and strong new sales	Official transcript paraphrases; no numerical subsegment growth
Risk Insurance	Positive market factors and solution extension	Strong new sales and solution extension	Innovation and contributory-database adoption	Strong growth from adoption and new sales	Official transcript paraphrases; no numerical subsegment growth
STM article submissions	More than 20% growth	More than 20% growth	More than 20% growth	More than 20% growth	Official results transcripts
STM articles published	About 15% growth	10% growth	10% growth	7% growth	Official results transcripts
Legal AI platforms	Lexis+ AI progress; Protégé positively received	Adoption progressing	Double-digit Law Firms & Corporate Legal growth	Double-digit Law Firms & Corporate Legal growth	Official transcripts; product dollars not disclosed
Exhibitions digital initiatives	Good progress	Good progress	Good progress	Good progress	Official presentations; digital revenue not disclosed

No back-solved product dollars are used. Approximate segment shares are not multiplied into segment revenue because the source percentages are rounded and management does not label the resulting values as disclosed revenue.

5. Most recent trend — four disclosed result periods

RELX's FY ends 31 December. Most recently completed fiscal period at the cutoff is H1 2026, covering 1 January–30 June 2026, reported 23 July 2026 via the [official H1 release](https://www.relx.com/media/press-releases/year-2026/first-half-2026). RELX does not disclose quarterly business-area dollars, so the table uses the latest four formal annual or half-year result periods rather than fabricating four quarters.

Segment	Period	Revenue, GBPm	Underlying revenue growth	Adjusted operating profit, GBPm	Margin	Underlying adjusted OP growth	Source
Risk	FY2024 boundary	3,336 restated	8% old taxonomy	1,233 restated	37.0% restated	9% old taxonomy	FY2024 release for growth; FY2025 restatement for dollars
Risk	H1 2025	1,748	8%	660	37.8%	9%	H1 2025 presentation
Risk	FY2025	3,485	8%	1,305	37.4%	10%	FY2025 presentation
Risk	H1 2026	1,810	8%	697	38.5%	10%	H1 2026 presentation

Segment	Period	Revenue, GBPm	Underlying revenue growth	Adjusted operating profit, GBPm	Margin	Underlying adjusted OP growth	Source
Scientific, Technical & Medical	FY2024 boundary	2,624 restated	4% old taxonomy	981 restated	37.4% restated	5% old taxonomy	FY2024 release for growth; FY2025 restatement for dollars
Scientific, Technical & Medical	H1 2025	1,323	5%	491	37.1%	7%	H1 2025 presentation
Scientific, Technical & Medical	FY2025	2,714	5%	1,035	38.1%	7%	FY2025 presentation
Scientific, Technical & Medical	H1 2026	1,370	6%	519	37.9%	8%	H1 2026 presentation
Legal	FY2024 boundary	1,718 restated	7% old taxonomy	381 restated	22.2% restated	9% old taxonomy	FY2024 release for growth; FY2025 restatement for dollars
Legal	H1 2025	900	9%	188	20.9%	11%	H1 2025 presentation
Legal	FY2025	1,806	9%	415	23.0%	12%	FY2025 presentation
Legal	H1 2026	959	10%	208	21.7%	13%	H1 2026 presentation
Exhibitions	FY2024 boundary	1,239 restated	11% old taxonomy	398 restated	32.1% restated	31% old taxonomy	FY2024 official release for growth; FY2025 restatement for dollars
Exhibitions	H1 2025	581	8%	234	40.3%	9%	H1 2025 presentation
Exhibitions	FY2025	1,186	8%	410	34.6%	9%	FY2025 presentation
Exhibitions	H1 2026	575	6%	226	39.3%	2%	H1 2026 presentation
Print & print-related	FY2024 restated	517	Excluded from underlying growth	217	42.0%	Excluded	FY2025 restatement
Print & print-related	H1 2025	189	Excluded	84 derived from official combined line	44.4%	Excluded	H1 2026 note and central-cost footnote
Print & print-related	FY2025	399	Excluded	185	46.4%	Excluded	FY2025 annual report
Print & print-related	H1 2026	157	Excluded	78 derived from official combined line	49.7%	Excluded	H1 2026 note and central-cost footnote

The FY2024 boundary rows deliberately pair FY2025-restated current-taxonomy dollars with the underlying growth rates RELX published contemporaneously on its old four-area taxonomy. RELX did not restate those underlying growth rates; they are directional context only and must not be used as current-taxonomy forecast inputs. The recency pattern from H1 2025 onward is strong in Risk, accelerating in STM and Legal, and uneven in Exhibitions because event timing, cycling, and Middle East travel disruption moved activity across periods. H1 2026 print profit is not guessed: the official combined print-and-unallocated adjusted profit is £77m and unallocated central costs are £1m, producing £78m print adjusted operating profit.

6. Management commentary on forward growth

The table uses source-verified paraphrases to avoid presenting transcript wording as invented quotation. One short exact excerpt is retained for the required live quote check: CEO Erik Engstrom said, **“we continue to see positive momentum across the group”** in the [official 23 July 2026 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2026-transcript.pdf). The phrase was found verbatim in a fresh live download dated 2026-07-23; the rows below remain labelled as paraphrases rather than quotations.

Risk

Call date and period	Speaker	Source-verified commentary	Topic	Modeling implication
2025-02-13, FY2024	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Risk growth remained broad-based, with more than 90% of revenue from machine-to-machine interactions	Embedded workflow	High switching costs and recurring machine usage support durable growth
2025-07-24, H1 2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Full-year guidance called for continued strong underlying revenue growth and adjusted profit growth slightly faster than revenue	Growth and margin	Base case can assume modest operating leverage, not a step-change

Call date and period	Speaker	Source-verified commentary	Topic	Modeling implication
2026-02-12, FY2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Business Services and Insurance each represented about 40% of divisional revenue and both had strong new sales	Mix and breadth	Avoid concentrating the forecast on one Risk vertical
2026-07-23, H1 2026	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Full-year outlook called for continued strong underlying revenue growth with adjusted profit growth exceeding it	Outlook	Supports high-single-digit growth with measured margin expansion

Scientific, Technical & Medical

Call date and period	Speaker	Source-verified commentary	Topic	Modeling implication
2025-02-13, FY2024	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Analytics and product development offset a faster decline in remaining print; submissions rose more than 20%	Mix transition	Separate volume growth from monetization and publication-capacity constraints
2025-07-24, H1 2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	New-product introductions were increasing, while renewals and new sales were ahead of the prior year	Product cadence	Supports gradual acceleration, not immediate double-digit growth
2026-02-12, FY2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Primary Research was a little over half of revenue and databases, tools, and reference around 40%; outlook improved to good-to-strong growth	Mix and outlook	Model the two engines separately and retain research-integrity risk
2026-07-23, H1 2026	Erik Engstrom, CEO	The step-up to strong growth was supported by new products and strong sales; adjusted profit was expected to outgrow revenue	Acceleration	H1 supports a higher base rate, but submissions above 20% outpace 7% publication growth

Legal

Call date and period	Speaker	Source-verified commentary	Topic	Modeling implication
2025-02-13, FY2024	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Legal growth improved as business mix shifted toward higher-value analytics; Lexis+ AI and Protégé adoption progressed	AI monetization	Forecast adoption through core platform pricing and usage, not a separate invented product revenue
2025-07-24, H1 2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Growth stepped up and adjusted profit grew faster than revenue as costs were held below revenue growth	Margin	Supports gradual margin expansion with continued product investment
2026-02-12, FY2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Law Firms & Corporate Legal, about 70% of revenue, grew double digits with adoption of the integrated AI-enabled platform	Core franchise	Higher growth is broad enough to influence group Legal, but no ARR is disclosed
2026-07-23, H1 2026	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Legal reached 10% underlying revenue growth and 13% adjusted profit growth, with strong renewals and new sales	Momentum	Current trajectory is strongest in the group; bear case must test AI competition and pricing

Exhibitions

Call date and period	Speaker	Source-verified commentary	Topic	Modeling implication
2025-02-13, FY2024	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Event-portfolio growth improved and digital initiatives progressed; management expected strong growth and higher margin	Post-pandemic normalization	Do not extrapolate recovery arithmetic without cycling adjustments

Call date and period	Speaker	Source-verified commentary	Topic	Modeling implication
2025-07-24, H1 2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Growth above pre-pandemic levels was established and margins were significantly above the earlier base	Structural profitability	Use current margin as a normalized anchor, not 2021–2022 recovery margins
2026-02-12, FY2025	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Strong ongoing growth and digital initiatives supported further margin improvement expectations	Outlook	Base case can carry mid-to-high-single-digit underlying growth
2026-07-23, H1 2026	Erik Engstrom, CEO	Event timing and travel disruption slowed first-half profit; Middle East uncertainty remained for the full year	Timing and geopolitics	Explicitly model event cycling and geographic disruption rather than smoothing every half-year

Print and group strategy

Management's 2025 and 2026 commentary treats the long print transition as largely complete: remaining print is managed separately for service and value, with outsourcing, joint ventures, and targeted disposals reducing operational distraction. At group level, management repeatedly links growth to the mix shift toward higher-value analytics and decision tools, new-product cadence, and cost growth below revenue growth. The evidence supports operating leverage but not an assumption that AI eliminates development cost.

No group-wide capital-markets-day transcript more recent than these formal calls was identified in the checked results archive and investor-presentation index. The segment-specific May 2026 Risk Business Services seminar was separately live-fetched and its material operating-scale KPIs are included in Section 0a. This is classified as **not fetched / omitted if another qualifying group-wide event exists outside those checked indexes**, rather than as a confirmed company non-disclosure; media summaries were not used to fill the gap.

7. Capital allocation history

Core capex equals additions to PPE plus internally developed intangible assets. FCF equals statutory operating cash flow less core capex and differs slightly from RELX's adjusted free-cash-flow definition. Acquisition values are cash spent; FY2025 total consideration was £270m and cash spent was £260m.

Year	Capex, £bn	Capex / revenue	Internally developed-intangible amortisation, £bn	Amortisation / revenue	Buybacks, £bn	Dividends paid, £bn	Cash acquisitions, £bn	Source
FY2021	0.339	4.7%	0.295	4.1%	0.001	0.920	0.064	Live FMP statements; FY2021 annual report
FY2022	0.439	5.1%	0.309	3.6%	0.500	0.983	0.390	Live FMP statements; FY2022 annual report
FY2023	0.477	5.2%	0.330	3.6%	0.800	1.059	0.112	Live FMP statements; FY2024 annual report
FY2024	0.484	5.1%	0.364	3.9%	1.000	1.121	0.170	Official cash flow and capex note; FMP capex field captures only £20m PPE and is not used
FY2025	0.525	5.5%	0.352	3.7%	1.500	1.181	0.260	FY2025 annual report; live FMP statements

The fourth and fifth columns are amortisation charges on internally developed intangible assets already included in adjusted operating profit; they are not a separately disclosed R&D expense or a second cash-investment line. Cash investment in internally developed assets is included once in capex (FY2025: £504m of the £525m total).

H1 2026 capex was £292m, including £280m capitalized development cost; management completed £1.75bn of the £2.25bn 2026 buyback by 30 June, another £100m after 1 July, and expected the remaining £400m before year-end. That pace reduces diluted shares but raised net debt to £8.733bn and net debt/EBITDA to 2.3×.

8. Balance sheet snapshot — 30 June 2026

Item	GBPbn	Source
Cash and equivalents	0.220	H1 2026 balance sheet and net-debt note
Short-term investments	0.000	No separately disclosed short-term investment balance
Bank and bond borrowings	8.787	H1 2026 net-debt note
Lease liabilities	0.119	H1 2026 net-debt note
Total gross debt	8.906	H1 2026 net-debt note
Official net debt	8.733	Includes cash and hedging derivatives
Net debt / adjusted EBITDA	2.3×	Latest issuer-disclosed ratio
Goodwill	8.101	H1 2026 condensed balance sheet
Intangible assets	3.112	H1 2026 condensed balance sheet
Goodwill plus intangibles	11.213	Calculated
Shareholders' equity	1.238	H1 2026 condensed balance sheet
Tangible book value	-9.975	Shareholders' equity less goodwill and intangibles

The negative tangible book value reflects the acquired and internally developed intangible base and aggressive buybacks, so book value is not a clean stand-alone valuation anchor. Liquidity must be judged with cash generation, debt maturities, fixed-rate share, and covenant headroom. At H1 2026, gross borrowings had a 3.7-year weighted-average remaining life and 54% were fixed rate after derivatives.

9. Recent corporate actions — last 12 months

- **2026 buyback:** RELX authorized £2.25bn for 2026. It completed £1.75bn in H1, another £100m after 1 July, and planned to deploy the remaining £400m by year-end. Source: H1 2026 results, 23 July 2026.
- **H1 2026 portfolio development:** two acquisitions closed for total consideration of £103m and one small disposal completed. The source does not name material acquired businesses, and none is modeled separately.
- **FY2025 portfolio development:** five acquisitions closed for total consideration of £270m and two small disposals. Acquired businesses contributed only £12m revenue and no adjusted operating profit during RELX ownership in 2025.
- **Print restructuring:** the FY2025 report separated print and print-related activities, outsourced or partnered parts of the footprint, and reported a step-down to £399m revenue. This is a reporting and operating-perimeter change, not an unexplained segment loss.
- **Capital structure:** H1 2026 net debt increased £1.532bn from year-end, chiefly reflecting the accelerated buyback. Net debt/EBITDA increased from 2.0× at FY2025 to 2.3×.
- **Management:** no CEO or CFO transition was announced in the live annual, H1, results, or financial-calendar sources checked. Erik Engstrom remained CEO and Nick Luff CFO.
- **Guidance:** the April 2026 trading update and July 2026 H1 release reaffirmed another year of strong underlying revenue and adjusted operating profit growth, plus strong constant-currency adjusted EPS growth.
- **Regulatory and legal:** no large settlement or financial restatement was disclosed in the results set. Principal risks remain data/privacy regulation, intellectual property and research-integrity issues, cybersecurity, AI competition, and event/geopolitical disruption.

10. Open data gaps and evidence status

Gap or metric	Classification	Sources and search terms checked	Treatment
Current-taxonomy business-area history for FY2021–FY2022	True non-disclosure	FY2021, FY2022, and FY2025 annual reports; business area analysis; print and print-related; restated	Old-basis figures retained as context; no invented restatement

Gap or metric	Classification	Sources and search terms checked	Treatment
Quarterly business-area revenue and profit	True non-disclosure	Live FMP quarterly product endpoint returned `[]`; RELX trading updates, annual and H1 results checked	Section 5 uses four disclosed annual or half-year periods and labels the limitation
Product or subsegment revenue dollars	True non-disclosure	Last four transcripts and presentations; Business Services, Insurance, Primary Research, databases, Law Firms & Corporate Legal searched	Approximate shares and qualitative growth only; no back-solved dollars
Product ARR, NRR, RPO, customer count, seats, or AI-product revenue	True non-disclosure	Annual report, H1 report, presentations, transcripts; ARR, NRR, RPO, adoption, Lexis+, Protégé searched	Do not use SaaS-style metrics in downstream models
Latest H1 format, type, and geography dollars	True non-disclosure	H1 2026 release and presentation	Percentages included; no dollar multiplication of rounded mix
FMP FY2024 capex	Provider classification gap	Fresh FMP cash-flow statement versus official FY2024 cash-flow and capex notes	Official £484m core capex controls; FMP £20m is PPE only
FMP FY2023–FY2024 format values versus current restatement	Taxonomy difference	Fresh FMP product endpoint and FY2025 annual note 2	Both series disclosed separately; no false tie claim
FMP FY2021–FY2022 geography	Provider taxonomy gap	Fresh FMP geographic endpoint and official geography-by-market tables	Official customer-market geography controls
Most recent group-wide investor day	Not fetched / omitted if a qualifying event exists outside the checked indexes	RELX results archive and investor-presentation index checked	Formal annual and half-year calls control forward commentary
Named H1 2026 acquisitions	True non-disclosure in retrieved sources	H1 2026 portfolio-development and acquisition searches	Aggregate £103m consideration only
Risk Business Services KPI history before May 2026	True non-disclosure as a comparable series	May 2026 seminar transcript; August 2026 investor overview; customer concentration, contributory databases, sanctions, transactions	Latest operating-scale snapshot included in Section 0a; no historical backfill invented

Load-bearing live-source checks

- **Largest segment recency:** the live H1 2026 presentation states Risk underlying revenue growth of 8% and adjusted operating profit growth of 10%; this matches Section 5.
- **Management quote:** the freshly downloaded [official H1 2026 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2026-transcript.pdf) is dated 23 July 2026 and contains the short excerpt “we continue to see positive momentum across the group.”
- **Latest full-year revenue:** the fresh FMP `/stable/income-statement?symbol=RELX&period=annual` pull reports FY2025 revenue of £9.590bn, exactly matching the annual report.

Source register

- [RELX Annual Report 2025](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2025-annual-report.pdf), especially business overview, note 2, cash-flow statement, five-year summary, and alternative-performance-measure reconciliations.
- [RELX Annual Report 2024](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2024-annual-report.pdf), especially FY2023–FY2024 capex and cash-flow disclosures.
- [RELX Annual Report 2022](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2022-annual-report.pdf), note 2 for FY2021–FY2022 old-taxonomy segment, format, type, and geography data.
- [RELX Annual Report 2021](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/reports/annual-reports/relx-2021-annual-report.pdf), note 2 for FY2021 category detail.
- [RELX H1 2026 results](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/press-releases/2026/first-half-results-2026-pressrelease.pdf) and [presentation](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/results/interim-presentations/2026-first-half-presentation.pdf).
- [RELX August 2026 investor overview](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/relx-overview-august-2026.pdf) and

[Risk Business Services investor seminar transcript, 13 May 2026](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/risk-business-services-seminar-2026-transcript-qa.pdf).

- [Official H1 2026 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2026-transcript.pdf), [FY2025 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2025-transcript.pdf), [H1 2025 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/first-half-results-2025-transcript.pdf), and [FY2024 transcript](https://www.relx.com/~/media/Files/R/RELX-Group/documents/investors/transcripts/results-2024-transcript.pdf).
- Fresh FMP stable endpoints archived under the D-stage raw folder: annual and interim income, cash flow, balance sheet, ratios, key metrics, product segmentation, and geographic segmentation. FMP data is used only where it is definitionally consistent or explicitly reconciled to RELX.