NTDU SI gideon lens

NTT DC REIT (NTDU.SI) - Final Gideon Lens Report

Assembled: 2026-07-02

Main Narrative

NTT DC REIT (NTDU.SI) - Gideon-Lens Equity Research

Date: 2026-07-02. Analyst: Codex. Current price: US$0.94. Market cap anchor: about US$972m from fresh FMP NTDU.SI quote. Fiscal year end: March 31. Reporting currency: USD.

VERDICT BLOCK

Verdict: PASS

Scorecard:

Gate	Result	Notes
Management	YELLOW	Competent start, but external-manager and sponsor-deal proof missing
Moat	YELLOW	Real asset scarcity; 2046 durability still unproven
P/E <= 15 on confident EPS at TTM + 5 calendar years	PASS	REIT-adapted P/DPU 15 cushion +9.9%
Compounder Score	Audited 42 / 100	Reject; evidence does not support dream-investment status
Business Quality Score	Audited 39 / 80	Asset quality real, per-unit compounding proof incomplete
20% Return UW Score	Audited 3 / 20	High-single-digit base IRR fails 20% hurdle

One-line thesis (or reason to pass): NTT DC REIT owns credible data-center infrastructure, but at US$0.94 the evidence supports a good-asset REIT monitor, not a Gideon BUY, because qualitative gates remain YELLOW and the 20% per-unit compounding case fails.

Kill / trigger criteria:

- BUY trigger: below roughly US$0.54 if the 20% IRR hurdle is required, or below roughly US$0.72 if a 30% cushion to the P/DPU 15 base value is enough for a REIT watchlist entry.
- PASS triggers: two reporting updates with occupancy below 94.0% or committed occupancy below 96.0%, plus NPI margin below 44.0%, without signed accretive remedies.
- Upgrade to BUY conditions: management fee alignment implemented, first sponsor acquisition proven DPU/NAV accretive after financing and fees, tenant concentration reduced, and DPU growth remains visible with no unit-dilution surprise.

Position sizing if bought: 0% today under Gideon; at a lower watchlist price, cap at 1.0% until management and sponsor-acquisition evidence mature.

Stage 0 - Time anchor

Today is 2026-07-02. NTT DC REIT's fiscal year ends March 31. The most recently reported period is FY25/26, ended 2026-03-31 and announced 2026-05-12. Because NTT DC REIT listed in July 2025 and FY25/26 includes properties from completion dates, there is no normal four-quarter listed-company TTM series. The official FY25/26/pro forma listed-history base is the controlling anchor to 2026-03-31, and the forward horizon is exactly five calendar years later: 2031-03-31.

Stage 1 - Disqualifier sweep

The disqualifier sweep is mixed rather than clean. ROIC is YELLOW because ordinary ROIC is not the right REIT metric and ROIIC is not observable from one listed period. Cash conversion is GREEN/YELLOW because FY25/26 DPU and distributable income were supported, but there is not yet a long record. Leverage is GREEN/YELLOW at 29.2% aggregate leverage and 4.2x ICR. End-markets are GREEN: data-center demand, cloud and AI remain supportive. Governance is YELLOW because related-party economics and sponsor dependence are material. AI disruption is GREEN as a demand driver, not a workflow replacement. Pricing power is YELLOW/GREEN because SG1 rent reversion and escalation are real,

but cycle-tested owner-specific power is not yet proven.

Management - summary

Management is YELLOW. The first public period was competent: FY25/26 distributable income and DPU beat IPO forecast, aggregate leverage stayed moderate, no near-term maturities are visible, SG1 was renewed with meaningful rent uplift, and disclosures were detailed enough to verify the core bridge. The problem is not obvious incompetence; it is insufficient proof. NTT DC REIT is externally managed and sponsor-dependent, with material related-party revenue, fees, sales commissions, reimbursements, property-management fees, and sponsor-linked leasing. A management PASS would require several public periods of capital allocation discipline, a fee framework aligned to per-unit value, and at least one sponsor acquisition that is demonstrably accretive after fees, financing and unit issuance. That evidence does not exist yet.

Moat - summary

The moat is YELLOW, and the 2046 test is YELLOW. The asset-level moat is real: scarce powered sites, high-trust operation, customer switching costs, high occupancy, escalators, SG1 reversion, and the NTT sponsor platform. But a data-center demand tailwind is not the same thing as a 20-year owner-specific compounding moat for minority unitholders. The listed vehicle must still prove that lease renewals, technical refresh capex, power pass-through, tenant concentration, and sponsor asset injections leave enough per-unit value. The 2046 business can be described credibly, but the proof that this REIT will compound through several renewal and acquisition cycles is still missing.

Stage 5 synthesis - headline numbers

The synthesis adapts the ER2 price gate to REIT economics. Segment NPI is the operating-income proxy, and distributable income per unit is the equity earnings measure. FY25/26 gross revenue was US$164.821m, NPI was US$74.925m, distributable income was US$57.516m, and DPU was 5.56 US cents. The base 2031 model reaches US$208.050m revenue, US$98.433m NPI, US$74.317m distributable income, and 6.89 US cents of DPU. At US$0.94, required DPU for a 15x P/DPU entry is 6.27 cents, so the adapted gate passes with a 9.9% cushion. The synthesis passed 11/11 tie-outs, but the pass is thin.

Case	Revenue	NPI	DPU	DPU x 15	Cushion vs US$0.94
Bear	US$179.375m	US$75.767m	5.09c	US$0.764	-18.7%
Base	US$208.050m	US$98.433m	6.89c	US$1.033	+9.9%
Bull	US$231.454m	US$115.380m	8.18c	US$1.227	+30.5%

This is enough for a valuation watch, not enough for BUY. The audited score estimates only high-single-digit base IRR, and the max buy price for a 20% five-year IRR is roughly US$0.54. Passing P/DPU 15 is not equivalent to meeting Gideon's 20% compounder hurdle.

Red team - summary

The strongest bear argument is that NTT DC REIT is a good-asset, mediocre-security setup at the current price. The 2031 base DPU of 6.89 cents is most exposed to lower distributable-income conversion and higher unit dilution. The red-team exit signal is concrete: two reporting updates with occupancy below 94.0% or committed occupancy below 96.0%, plus NPI margin below 44.0%, without signed accretive remedies. SG1 also needs monitoring before the 2029 MSA expiry; if renewal or replacement economics imply less than 3% net effective annual rent growth after incentives and power-cost sharing, the Singapore base case should move to bear.

Kill / trigger criteria

- Revisit for BUY below roughly US$0.54 if the Gideon 20% hurdle is mandatory.
- Revisit for watchlist accumulation below roughly US$0.72 if accepting a REIT-specific 30% cushion to base P/DPU 15 value.
- Kill the thesis if occupancy falls below 94.0% or committed occupancy below 96.0% for two updates and NPI margin falls below 44.0%.
- Downgrade further if sponsor acquisitions are funded with dilutive equity at tight yields or if related-party economics become less transparent.

- Upgrade only after fee alignment, acquisition discipline, and tenant concentration improve in public evidence.

Analyst flags

The biggest limitation is short public history: no normal four-quarter listed TTM, no five-year listed record, no calculated ROIIC, no acquisition-inclusive ROIIC, no property-level FY25/26 revenue, and limited tenant-level revenue disclosure. The synthesis is arithmetically sound, but it is built from one official listed-history base. That is acceptable for a monitor, not enough for a Gideon BUY.

The underwriting implication is deliberately conservative. The present asset base can probably support moderate DPU growth if occupancy, SG1 renewal economics, financing costs and manager-fee dilution behave normally, but the current price already capitalizes much of that outcome. A BUY would require either a lower entry price or new evidence that the sponsor pipeline can be acquired on terms that improve per-unit value after all fees and financing. Until that evidence appears, the right answer is to keep the name on file, not to force a position.

Appendix A - Company Primer

NTT DC REIT - Company Primer

Source Discipline And Listed-History Caveat

This primer treats NTT DC REIT as a REIT, not as a conventional operating company. The key measures are gross revenue, net property income, distributable income, distribution per unit, net asset value, leverage, interest coverage, occupancy, committed occupancy, WALE, lease escalation, and asset-level economics. Conventional EPS is present in the financial statements, but it is not the primary economic lens because depreciation, revaluation reserves, tax structuring, and distribution adjustments make REIT earnings per unit a poor standalone proxy for recurring cash yield.

All financial figures in this primer are sourced from `quant_foundation.md`, which reconciles the FY25/26 SGX/IR disclosures and FMP pulls. The official source pack in `raw\` is used only for qualitative context, portfolio description, lease model, sponsor background, and operating color. Where FMP and official sources differ, the quantitative foundation uses official SGX/IR statements as controlling. This matters because FMP recognizes `NTDU.SI` but does not provide product segmentation and records only the colocation and power services component as revenue, while the official REIT presentation includes other operating income in gross revenue.

The second framing point is history. NTT DC REIT is not a mature listed security with a long public record. It was constituted on 28 March 2025, VIE1 was acquired on 27 June 2025, the remaining initial portfolio was acquired on the 14 July 2025 listing date, and FY25/26 runs from constitution to 31 March 2026. The quantitative foundation therefore does not fabricate four normal listed quarters. The operating base for downstream work is FY25/26 to 31 March 2026, supplemented by the 9M and 2H disclosures where the REIT disclosed them. Any five-year underwriting has to start from a short actual history and the IPO/prospectus framework, not from a decade of listed same-store operating history.

Business Overview

NTT DC REIT is a Singapore-listed, USD-denominated, pure-play data-center real estate investment trust. It owns stabilized income-producing data-center properties used by enterprise, cloud, network, and digital-infrastructure customers. Its principal investment strategy is to hold data-center real estate globally, with the initial portfolio spread across the United States, Austria, and Singapore. The REIT is sponsored by NTT Limited, part of NTT Group, and the operating context is tied to NTT Global Data Centers, which gives the vehicle a sponsor-backed data-center platform rather than a standalone landlord identity.

For an investor new to data centers, the asset is not just a building. A data center combines power capacity, cooling, security, network connectivity, redundancy, and operational reliability in a physical location where customers place servers and related equipment. The REIT owns the real estate and data-center infrastructure and collects recurring revenue for colocation and power services, plus other operating income such as tenant fit-out revenue where tenants request customization. Customers buy capacity because they need resilient IT environments and cannot easily replicate power availability, carrier neutrality, technical redundancy, and operating procedures at scale.

The business has two customer modes. First, hyperscale-style demand uses larger blocks of contracted capacity and tends to be driven by cloud, platform, AI, and high-performance computing workloads. Second, colocation and enterprise demand can involve a broader customer base buying cabinets, suites, power density, connectivity, and related services. The official source pack describes the portfolio as having an optimal mix of hyperscale and colocation customer contracts. NTT DC REIT's reported revenue is not split into hyperscale versus colocation categories in the quantitative foundation; the controlling revenue components are colocation and power services, other operating income, and geography.

NTT DC REIT is also different from a normal office, retail, or industrial REIT because the lease economics are closely tied to power. Electricity can be both a major pass-through item and a source of volatility. The REIT's FY25/26 media release says it uses pass-through arrangements across most leases, has a fixed electricity contract at SG1, and includes provisions for rental adjustments if electricity costs rise materially. That gives the landlord some protection against power-cost shocks, but it also means revenue and property expenses have to be read together. A higher power-services revenue line is not automatically equivalent to higher margin; the NPI bridge is what matters.

Corporate And Sponsor Context

The sponsor relationship is central. NTT Limited is the sponsor and is part of NTT Group, a major global IT services and telecommunications group with a leading global data-center business. The official release states that NTT Global Data

Centers is the third-largest data-center provider globally excluding China and has a footprint of about 2,400 MW of IT power in operation and under construction across the Americas, EMEA, and Asia-Pacific. That sponsor connection gives NTT DC REIT a potential acquisition pipeline, technical operating support, and customer-channel advantages that a generic financial sponsor would not have.

The same connection also creates governance questions that downstream management and moat work should examine rather than gloss over. The REIT can benefit from NTT's platform, but related-party leases, property-management arrangements, sponsor asset sales, and fee alignment matter. The 9M update noted discussions with the sponsor on a potential management-fee structure change intended to improve alignment with unitholders. The FY25/26 financial-statement announcement says NTT DC REIT did not have a general mandate for interested-person transactions during the period under review. That is not, by itself, a governance verdict, but it is a reminder that the investment case depends on sponsor-backed growth being done at fair prices and on terms that do not transfer too much value away from minority unitholders.

Structurally, the REIT has a cross-border asset and tax architecture. The presentation materials describe U.S. REIT and taxable REIT subsidiary arrangements, Austria property-company arrangements, and Singapore property ownership through SG1. For a primer, the practical takeaway is that NTT DC REIT is not a single-country property landlord. It owns data centers in several tax, currency, regulatory, and power-market regimes while reporting in USD. The REIT investor's cash return depends on property NPI, financing cost, tax leakage, distribution adjustments, FX translation, and capital structure, not merely on occupancy.

Portfolio Snapshot

The portfolio comprises six disclosed data-center assets: CA1, CA2, and CA3 in Sacramento, California; VA2 in Ashburn, Northern Virginia; VIE1 in Vienna, Austria; and SG1 in Singapore. The official source pack describes the assets as carrier-neutral and Tier III or Tier III-equivalent. The FY25/26 QF records a portfolio value of US$1,670.2 million on an independent valuation basis at 31 March 2026, with carrying value of US$1,667.2 million including the relevant prepaid sales commission note. Design IT load is about 90.7 MW.

The portfolio is geographically diversified but still concentrated. FY25/26 official gross revenue was US$164.821 million: US$100.824 million from the United States, US$30.430 million from Austria, and US$33.567 million from Singapore. That means the United States was 61.2% of FY25/26 gross revenue, Austria 18.5%, and Singapore 20.4%. On NPI, the split was US$40.054 million from the United States, US$14.026 million from Austria, and US$20.845 million from Singapore, totaling US$74.925 million.

The six-asset physical footprint can be summarized as follows, using official source-pack operating descriptions for the asset data and QF for financial context:

Asset / market	Country / region	Role in portfolio	Qualitative read-through
CA1	United States / Sacramento	One of three Sacramento assets	Colocation-rich U.S. exposure with leasing and backfill relevance.
CA2	United States / Sacramento	Largest disclosed Sacramento IT-load asset	Scale asset within the California cluster; occupancy was very high in the 1H source pack.
CA3	United States / Sacramento	Third Sacramento asset	U.S. cluster exposure with committed backfill noted in the 9M update.
VA2	United States / Northern Virginia	Exposure to the largest U.S. data-center market	Higher hyperscale relevance given Northern Virginia market depth.
VIE1	Austria / Vienna	EMEA asset	Freehold Vienna data-center exposure with longer WALE in source-pack asset table.
SG1	Singapore	APAC asset	Leasehold land; anchor-tenant MSA with NTT Singapore; strong renewal economics but shorter disclosed WALE before renewal impact.

The official 1H asset table disclosed individual asset design IT load and customer counts. VA2 had 14.0 MW, CA1 12.6 MW, CA2 26.1 MW, CA3 14.0 MW, VIE1 15.4 MW, and SG1 8.6 MW, summing to the 90.7 MW design IT load used in the QF. The same table showed the portfolio as mostly freehold by purchase consideration, with SG1 on JTC leasehold land through August 2040 and a potential 30-year extension to 2070 subject to conditions. The QF uses the 31 March 2026 portfolio metrics as controlling: occupancy by IT load was 95.1%, committed occupancy was 98.5%, and WALE was 4.5 years.

Revenue Architecture

The official revenue architecture is simpler than a technology-company segment tree. FY25/26 gross revenue was US$164.821 million. Of that, US$155.106 million was revenue from colocation and power services and US$9.715 million was other operating income. The REIT does not disclose a product-level quarterly series; FMP product segmentation is empty; and the QF explicitly instructs downstream agents not to fabricate product history.

The more useful segment lens is geography:

FY25/26 geography	Gross revenue (US$m)	Share of gross revenue	NPI (US$m)	NPI margin
United States	100.824	61.2%	40.054	39.7%
Austria	30.430	18.5%	14.026	46.1%
Singapore	33.567	20.4%	20.845	62.1%
Total	164.821	100.0%	74.925	45.5%

The U.S. segment is the largest revenue pool and contains both Northern California and Northern Virginia exposure. Its FY25/26 gross revenue was US$100.824 million and NPI was US$40.054 million. The 39.7% NPI margin was the lowest of the three geographies. That does not automatically mean poor asset quality; U.S. power services, tenant fit-out activity, property taxes, operating costs, and customer mix can all affect the reported margin. It does mean downstream modeling should not apply Singapore-like margins to the U.S. base without an explicit lease and cost rationale.

Austria contributed US$30.430 million of gross revenue and US$14.026 million of NPI, a 46.1% NPI margin. The official materials frame Vienna as a market with supply barriers from land, power, and construction costs. VIE1 also appears in the official source pack as a freehold asset. The QF's segment table allocates US$4.053 million of finance expense to Austria and records segment liabilities that include US$157.466 million of loans and borrowings. For REIT analysis, this matters because property-level NPI is not the same as equity cash return after debt.

Singapore contributed US$33.567 million of gross revenue and US$20.845 million of NPI, a 62.1% NPI margin. SG1 is the smallest asset by design IT load but a meaningful contributor to NPI. The key lease event after FY25/26 was the renewed SG1 Master Services Agreement with NTT Singapore. The official release says the renewed MSA commenced on 1 April 2026, expires on 31 March 2029, provides for a 23% rental reversion, lifts rent from S$385 per kilowatt to S$474 per kilowatt, and includes fixed annual escalations of 5%. That renewal is important because it shifts SG1 from a short one-year arrangement to a three-year term and improves forward rental economics, though the reversion will be recorded in 1Q FY26/27 rather than FY25/26.

Unit Economics And NPI Conversion

The REIT's economic path is: contracted IT capacity and services become colocation and power services revenue; other tenant-related activity becomes other operating income; property expenses are deducted to arrive at NPI; trust-level costs, finance costs, taxes, and distribution adjustments determine distributable income; and distributable income divided by entitled units becomes DPU. That is the central bridge. EPS alone misses the point because data-center depreciation and revaluation accounting can obscure cash distribution capacity.

For FY25/26, US$164.821 million of gross revenue converted into US$74.925 million of NPI, a portfolio NPI margin of 45.5%. The cost stack was substantial: property operating expenses were US$89.896 million. Utilities were the largest disclosed property expense at US$49.005 million. Repair and maintenance was US$11.126 million, property management reimbursements US$10.505 million, other property expenses US$9.993 million, real estate taxes and insurance US$6.011 million, and property management fees US$3.256 million. This cost structure shows why data-center real estate is not a simple rent collection business. Power, maintenance, operating staffing, property services, and site reliability costs all matter.

The distribution bridge then adds back non-cash and REIT-specific items. FY25/26 profit attributable to unitholders was only US$3.134 million, but distributable income was US$57.516 million. The difference is explained by distribution adjustments such as depreciation of data-center properties, amortization items, manager fees payable in units, deferred taxes, unrealized FX gains, derivative fair-value movement, and other adjustments. This is why the primer treats DPU, distributable income, and NPI as primary. The reported FY25/26 DPU was 5.56 U.S. cents, based on US$57.516 million of income available for distribution and 1.033950746 billion units entitled for distribution.

The distribution policy is also REIT-specific. The official financial statement says NTT DC REIT intends semi-annual distributions. It plans to distribute 100% of annual distributable income for the period from constitution to 31 March 2027, and

thereafter at least 90% of annual distributable income for each financial year, with the actual level determined by the Manager's discretion. In other words, near-term retained cash is limited by policy, which supports yield but increases reliance on debt and equity markets for acquisitions and growth capital.

Lease, Tenant, And Power Model

The leasing model is a mix of capacity contracts, monthly base rent, power pass-throughs, fixed or CPI-linked escalations, and renewal spreads. At 31 March 2026, occupancy by IT load was 95.1% and committed occupancy was 98.5%. The difference means space had been leased but not yet fully commenced. That is economically important because committed occupancy can signal revenue not yet fully reflected in current NPI, while also reducing near-term vacancy risk if the tenants commence as expected.

WALE was 4.5 years at 31 March 2026. The official release states that less than 17% of leases were expiring in the financial year ending 31 March 2027, and 89.4% of leases by monthly base rent had fixed escalation clauses, with another 3.3% CPI-linked. Weighted average rental escalation by monthly base rent was 3.1%. For a REIT investor, this creates income visibility but not full inflation immunity. Fixed escalators protect contractual growth, while CPI-linked leases help with inflation exposure; however, operating costs and power procurement can still create margin volatility.

Power pass-throughs are central. NTT DC REIT's FY25/26 release says most leases include pass-through arrangements, SG1 has a fixed electricity contract, and leases include provisions for rental adjustments if electricity costs rise significantly. The practical implication is that power-price volatility may show up in both revenue and expense. Analysts should separate true rent growth, power-services pass-through growth, and tenant fit-out revenue when assessing underlying NPI growth.

Tenant concentration and related-party exposure require monitoring. SG1's anchor tenant is NTT Singapore, and the renewed SG1 MSA creates meaningful rent uplift but also related-party reliance. At SG1, NTT Singapore remains the anchor tenant with 2.7 MW of contracted capacity, while the Manager was pursuing backfill for 0.3 MW returned capacity. The U.S. source-pack asset table also referred to a customer reducing capacity at CA1, with alternative tenants being sought. Those examples are not necessarily thesis-breakers; they are normal data-center leasing events. They do, however, show that occupancy, customer churn, backfill timing, and related-party terms have to be tracked asset by asset.

Balance Sheet, NAV, And Capital Structure

At 31 March 2026, QF reports total assets of US$1,773.797 million, data-center properties of US$1,667.213 million, cash and cash equivalents of US$45.992 million, total liabilities of US$592.380 million, and net assets of US$1,181.417 million. NAV/NTA per unit was US$1.14 at the group level and US$0.94 at the trust level. The portfolio was independently valued at US$1,670.2 million, up from the US$1.5 billion IPO purchase consideration baseline cited in the official materials.

Gross borrowings were US$517.232 million and carrying loans and borrowings were US$512.140 million. Aggregate leverage was 29.17%, or 29.2% rounded. Interest coverage was 4.2x, the weighted average all-in interest rate was 4.01%, 70% of borrowings were fixed-rate, and 100% of total assets were unencumbered. The REIT also had US$60.000 million of unutilized facilities and no debt maturities due in the next two financial years.

This is a relatively conservative opening capital structure for a Singapore REIT, especially compared with regulatory leverage ceilings. But conservative does not mean risk-free. The portfolio is capital-intensive, interest rates directly affect DPU through finance costs, and acquisitions from the sponsor pipeline would likely require a combination of debt and equity. Because the distribution policy pays out most of distributable income, internal retained capital will not by itself fund major growth.

What The Primer Implies For Downstream ER2 Work

The first implication is that NTT DC REIT should be modeled from an FY25/26 official base, not from FMP's partial revenue line or from pre-IPO history. The QF's reconciliation line is clean, but it also warns that FMP product segmentation is empty and that the listed history is short. Downstream agents should not create quarterly history that the issuer did not disclose.

The second implication is that geography is the primary segment lens. U.S., Austria, and Singapore differ in margin, market structure, lease events, power exposure, and debt allocation. The U.S. segment is revenue-heavy but lower-margin; Singapore has higher reported NPI margin and a newly improved SG1 MSA; Austria sits between them and carries property-level finance expense in the QF table. A single blended growth assumption would hide important asset-level economics.

The third implication is that sponsor quality is a double-edged factor. NTT Group / NTT GDC support the platform, technical competence, and acquisition pipeline. The same sponsor relationship creates valuation, fee, and related-party-transaction

questions. The investment case should give credit for the sponsor only if future asset injections, lease renewals, and fee structures are minority-unitholder friendly.

The fourth implication is that DPU growth is the real equity story. FY25/26 DPU was 5.56 U.S. cents and exceeded IPO forecast, but the base period was short and included properties from completion dates. The next few reporting periods are unusually important because they will show how the portfolio performs after the initial listing period, after SG1's renewed MSA begins, and after committed occupancy converts into revenue.

Key Questions For The Main Analysis

Question	Why it matters	Evidence anchor
Can occupancy stay near the mid-to-high 90s?	Small occupancy changes can affect revenue and operating leverage.	95.1% occupancy and 98.5% committed occupancy at 31 March 2026.
Does SG1 renewal translate into clean DPU growth?	The 23% reversion and 5% annual escalators start after FY25/26.	Renewed MSA commenced 1 April 2026.
Are power costs truly passed through?	Power revenue without margin protection can flatter gross revenue.	FY25/26 utilities were US$49.005 million; pass-through arrangements cover most leases.
Is sponsor pipeline accretive?	Growth will likely require acquisitions and external capital.	NTT GDC is a large global platform; distribution policy limits retained cash.
Does leverage remain conservative?	DPU is sensitive to rates and refinancing spreads.	29.2% leverage, 4.2x ICR, 70% fixed-rate debt at 31 March 2026.
Is related-party governance strong enough?	Sponsor-backed REITs can shift value through leases, fees, or asset sales.	SG1 anchor tenant is NTT Singapore; fee-alignment discussion noted in 9M update.

Bottom-Line Orientation

NTT DC REIT is best understood as a newly listed, sponsor-backed data-center yield vehicle with high-quality digital-infrastructure exposure but limited listed history. The opening portfolio has six assets across three regions, about 90.7 MW of design IT load, high occupancy, meaningful committed occupancy, and a balance sheet that started with moderate leverage. FY25/26 gross revenue was US$164.821 million, NPI was US$74.925 million, distributable income was US$57.516 million, and DPU was 5.56 U.S. cents.

The upside case is that NTT DC REIT converts sponsor-backed data-center demand, fixed escalators, high occupancy, SG1 rental reversion, and disciplined acquisitions into durable DPU growth. The risk case is that the short operating history, power-cost complexity, customer churn, related-party reliance, FX/tax leakage, and external-capital dependence make the initial yield look cleaner than the through-cycle economics. Downstream ER2 work should therefore avoid EPS-only framing, keep the model anchored to NPI and DPU, and treat the first post-listing years as proof-of-underwriting periods rather than as a long validated track record.

Management Assessment

NTT DC REIT - Management Assessment

1. Who is running the REIT

NTT DC REIT is not an internally managed operating company. It is an externally managed Singapore REIT sponsored by NTT Limited, part of NTT Group, and managed by NTT DC REIT Manager Pte. Ltd. That structure changes the management assessment. The investable question is not whether a standalone CEO has spent five years compounding retained capital inside a conventional company. The question is whether the REIT manager, its board, the sponsor, and the trustee framework can protect minority unitholders while the REIT depends on NTT Group for asset sourcing, leasing channels, property services, related-party tenants, and potentially future acquisitions.

The only named executive in the official source pack is Yutaka Torigoe, Chief Executive Officer of the REIT Manager. He is the public-facing management voice in the FY25/26 media release. His message was that DPU above the IPO forecast marked a strong start, that the first year reflected focused execution and proactive asset management, and that the REIT remained committed to disciplined growth and long-term value creation. That is directionally the right framing for a new REIT: asset management, balance-sheet discipline, and acquisition discipline matter more than growth language. It is also still a short evidentiary record. NTT DC REIT completed VIE1 on 2025-06-27, listed and completed the remaining initial portfolio on 2025-07-14, and reported its first full-year result on 2026-05-12. The CEO has not yet had a public listed-cycle record long enough to judge underwriting through refinancing, a weak leasing market, an external acquisition cycle, or a dilutive equity raise.

The official source pack does not identify a CFO or equivalent finance head for the REIT Manager. It also does not provide a complete board skills matrix, board independence table, executive compensation table, or director ownership schedule. The FY25/26 financial-statement confirmation is signed by Shuichi Sasakura, Chairman, and Douglas Stuart Adams, Director, on behalf of the board of NTT DC REIT Manager Pte. Ltd. That gives two named board-level accountability points but not enough to assess board independence in the way a proxy statement would allow. For this management gate, the absence of a full board/independence disclosure in the available pack is not treated as proof of weak governance, but it is a material evidence gap. A PASS would require a clearer picture of independent director strength, related-party review procedures, and the board's willingness to say no to the sponsor.

The sponsor is central. The FY25/26 financial-statement announcement describes NTT Limited as a wholly owned subsidiary of NTT DATA, Inc.; NTT DATA, Inc. is in turn 55% held by NTT DATA Group Corporation and 45% held by NTT, Inc. The source pack describes NTT Global Data Centers as the third largest data-center provider globally excluding China, and the 9M materials state that NTT Limited provides data-center services through the NTT GDC platform with more than 2,300 MW capacity across 92 sites. That platform is a real advantage. It can provide technical capability, tenant relationships, future acquisition candidates, procurement knowledge, and operating credibility. It also means the REIT is exposed to sponsor economics. The sponsor can sit on multiple sides of the table: seller of assets, property manager or service provider, leasing channel, related-party tenant at SG1, and recipient of units or fees through the manager structure.

2. Tenure and track record

The tenure record is necessarily short. The listed REIT has one public fiscal period, FY25/26, covering the period from constitution and property completion dates to 2026-03-31. The data package explicitly warns not to fabricate a five-year listed-company history or four-quarter earnings-call cadence. This management assessment therefore uses official releases, presentations, financial statements, and the data-package sections on capital allocation and recent corporate actions. It does not invent eight quarters of earnings calls.

Within that short record, management has three observable decisions. First, the manager completed the initial portfolio acquisition sequence: VIE1 on 2025-06-27 and the remaining initial portfolio on 2025-07-14. The cash-flow statement shows US$1.233726 billion of acquisition outflow for data-center properties and related assets/liabilities, after consideration settled through sponsor units and post-completion adjustments. The initial purchase consideration was US$1.5 billion, and the FY25/26 media release later referenced an independent portfolio valuation of US$1.6702 billion as of 2026-03-31. That is positive at the starting line, but not a full acquisition track record. A post-IPO valuation uplift over less than a year is not the same as proven per-unit value creation after a series of third-party and sponsor acquisitions.

Second, the manager handled the SG1 Master Services Agreement renewal with NTT Singapore. The renewed MSA was completed on 2026-03-31, commenced on 2026-04-01, and extended a one-year arrangement into a three-year term to 2029-03-31. Rent increased from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, a 23% rental reversion, with fixed annual escalations of 5%. NTT Singapore remains SG1's anchor tenant with 2.7 MW of contracted capacity, while 0.3 MW of returned capacity needed backfill. This is a useful first test because it combines asset management, related-party negotiation, and disclosure. The economic result appears favorable, and the manager disclosed both the positive reversion and the returned-capacity backfill requirement. The unresolved issue is process: the available source pack does not show the independent review mechanics behind the related-party tenant negotiation. A good price with a related party is better than a bad price, but minority unitholders still need comfort that the process was robust.

Third, management has kept opening leverage conservative. At 2026-03-31, gross borrowings were about US$517 million, aggregate leverage was 29.2%, ICR was 4.2x, 70% of debt was fixed-rate, and there were no maturities due in the next two financial years. The data package notes debt maturities of US$157 million in FY28/29, US$230 million in FY29/30, and US$130 million in FY30/31, with extension options that should be treated as flexibility rather than permanent capital. This is a real positive. A new externally managed REIT can destroy minority value quickly by using cheap-looking debt and repeated equity issuance to chase sponsor pipeline growth. NTT DC REIT has not done that in its first period.

There is no observable failed decision yet, but that is because the listed history is short rather than because management has proven flawless execution. The customer termination/backfill item at CA1 and CA3 was disclosed in the 1H and 9M materials; the 9M update then said strong third-quarter leasing activity lifted committed occupancy to 97.3%, with revenue contribution starting from 4Q FY25/26. By FY25/26, occupancy was 95.1% and committed occupancy was 98.5%. The manager has shown early evidence of dealing with leasing friction, but the through-cycle evidence is not yet there.

3. Capital allocation behavior

The capital-allocation table in the data package is unusually simple because pre-listing years are not applicable. FY25/26 had US$17.495 million of additions to data-center properties, US$1.233726 billion of acquisition outflow, no disclosed buybacks, US$57.516 million of distributable income, and DPU of 5.56 US cents. The additions line equals about 10.6% of gross revenue, but conventional capex/revenue ratios are less informative here because the first listed year includes portfolio acquisition, fit-out activity, data-center property capex, and REIT distribution adjustments.

The positive evidence is that the first period beat IPO forecast at the key REIT cash metrics. Data-package Section 9 records FY25/26 DPU of 5.56 US cents, distributable income of US$57.516 million, gross revenue of US$164.821 million, and NPI of US$74.925 million. The FY25/26 financial-statement breakdown shows gross revenue above forecast, profit after tax above forecast, and total annual distribution of US$57.516 million. The manager did not respond to the first period by stretching leverage; aggregate leverage improved from 32.5% at 2025-12-31 to 29.2% at 2026-03-31, before the expected post-distribution step-up to 31.3%.

The caution is that future capital allocation will probably be external-growth heavy. The 1H presentation listed a potential acquisition of an asset in a Tier-1 data-center market from the sponsor as a key REIT-manager initiative. That is exactly where sponsor alignment matters. A sponsor-backed REIT can be an attractive vehicle when the sponsor sells high-quality assets at fair prices, supports leasing, and leaves room for minority unitholder returns. It can also become a fee and monetization channel if the REIT buys assets at tight yields, funds growth with dilutive equity, and rewards the manager for asset-base expansion. The first listed period does not answer that question. It only establishes that the manager started with a moderate balance sheet and one portfolio valuation uplift.

The distribution policy also constrains capital allocation. NTT DC REIT intends semi-annual distributions and plans to distribute 100% of annual distributable income from constitution to 2027-03-31, then at least 90% of annual distributable income thereafter, with the actual level determined by the manager. That is standard enough for a Singapore REIT, but it means retained capital will not fund major acquisitions. Growth will rely on debt, equity, sponsor arrangements, and capital markets access. A management PASS would need evidence that the manager will walk away from sponsor acquisitions when unit economics are poor. That evidence is not yet available.

4. Compensation and alignment

The available source pack does not provide individual CEO or director compensation, actual personal unit ownership, hedging policies, clawback terms, or long-term incentive scorecards. It does provide the manager fee mechanics in aggregate. The FY25/26 financial statement records manager base fee of US$5.955 million and manager performance fee of US$2.622 million, both payable in units. It also records 6,101,605 units to be issued for the base-fee component and 2,830,404 units for

the performance-fee component, for total issued and issuable units of 1,039,141,509 at 2026-03-31. The manager elected to receive 100% of base and performance fees in units for the post-listing periods referenced in the financial statements.

Fees paid in units are better than all-cash fees because they create some alignment with unit price and distribution sustainability. They are not sufficient for a PASS. Unit-paid fees still dilute minority unitholders, and the formula behind the performance fee matters. A fee based on asset value, NPI, or DPU optics can still encourage growth for growth's sake if it is not tied to per-unit returns, cost of capital, and long-term total return. The 9M business update stated that discussions with the sponsor on a potential management-fee structure change were in progress to enhance alignment with unitholders' interests, with implementation targeted by 1H FY26/27. That is a constructive disclosure, but it also implies the current structure may not yet be the final alignment answer.

The right monitoring condition is specific: by 1H FY26/27, the manager should disclose a fee framework that rewards per-unit outcomes and protects minorities during sponsor acquisitions. Unit issuance for fees should remain modest relative to DPU growth, and any performance fee should not be earned simply because the manager buys more assets or benefits from mark-to-market valuation uplift.

5. Disclosure quality and candor

There is no earnings-call transcript in the official source pack or live-source package used by the data package. The data package classifies this as true non-disclosure / not found and instructs downstream agents not to attribute call quotes. That matters. The standard management section asks for the last eight quarters of earnings calls because call behavior reveals whether management answers hard questions directly. NTT DC REIT cannot yet be scored on that dimension.

The official disclosure that does exist is reasonably clean for a new REIT. The financial-statement announcement separates gross revenue, revenue from colocation and power services, other operating income, property expenses, NPI, distributable income, DPU, leverage, fee units, and related-party transactions. It explicitly notes that the actual DPU and IPO-forecast DPU calculations exclude fee units not eligible for the distribution. The data package also flags that FMP revenue ties only the colocation/power component and omits other operating income; the official statement controls. That is more a data-provider limitation than a management issue, and the official bridge is adequate.

Candor is mixed but acceptable at this stage. Positives include disclosure of the SG1 rent uplift, the 0.3 MW returned capacity, the CA1/CA3 backfill issue, committed occupancy, fixed escalation mix, and debt maturity profile. Management did not merely say demand was strong; it gave rent reversion, occupancy, committed occupancy, WALE, fixed-rate debt, ICR, and leverage numbers. The 9M update also said discussions were ongoing around a management-fee structure change to improve alignment. That is a useful admission that alignment is a live issue.

The weakness is the absence of a public Q&A record and limited governance detail in the available pack. There is a short CEO quote, but not enough to judge how management handles skeptical questions about sponsor pricing, property-management fees, related-party leases, or external acquisitions. A PASS would require more direct answers over several reporting periods, ideally including hard numbers on acquisition yields, cap rates versus independent valuation, accretion after financing, and independent committee review.

6. Strategic coherence

The stated strategy is coherent. NTT DC REIT is established to invest in a diversified portfolio of stabilized income-producing real estate assets used primarily for data-center purposes, and assets necessary to support the digital economy. The manager describes the portfolio as six carrier-neutral Tier III-equivalent assets across the United States, Austria, and Singapore, with about 90.7 MW of design IT load, high occupancy, and an optimal mix of hyperscale and colocation customer contracts. The 1H presentation listed three practical initiatives: reduce concentration risk and improve portfolio quality, improve profitability through rental reversions, and source green power for customers.

That strategy matches the first-year actions. The manager renewed leases, achieved 8.5% rental reversion excluding SG1 and 13.7% including the SG1 MSA, shifted SG1 to a three-year term with a 23% rent uplift, improved committed occupancy, and kept leverage moderate. It also addressed power-cost volatility through pass-through arrangements, a fixed electricity contract at SG1, and rental-adjustment provisions for significant electricity-cost increases. These are the right issues for a data-center REIT manager to focus on.

The strategic risk is not incoherence; it is governance under dependence. The strategy depends on NTT Group's platform, sponsor pipeline, related-party tenants, and property-level operating support. That sponsor dependence can produce better sourcing and technical outcomes than a standalone financial buyer could achieve. But it also creates the core

minority-unitholder question: when the sponsor has a choice between maximizing the price of an asset sale, maximizing recurring service economics, or maximizing REIT unitholder returns, who wins?

7. Governance flags

The governance file is not clean enough for PASS, but it is not bad enough for FAIL on the current evidence. Significant related-party transactions in FY25/26 included US$17.143 million of revenue from colocation and power services from related parties, US$736,000 of other operating income from related parties, US$5.955 million of manager base fee payable in units, US$2.622 million of manager performance fee payable in units, US$3.256 million of property-management fees payable to related parties, US$2.956 million of sales commissions payable to related parties, US$10.505 million of property-management reimbursements payable to related parties, and US$224,000 of finance cost paid to related parties. These amounts are not incidental. They are load-bearing to the governance assessment.

The financial statement says the group carried out related-party transactions on terms agreed between the parties. That phrase is standard, but it is not the same as a full independent fairness demonstration. NTT DC REIT also did not obtain a general mandate from unitholders for Interested Person Transactions for the period under review. That is a useful minority protection because it limits blanket pre-approval, but it does not remove related-party risk. It means each future transaction process matters.

There are some helpful controls and disclosures. Perpetual (Asia) Limited is trustee and is described as being under a duty to take custody and hold the assets in trust for unitholders. The manager confirmed there was no person occupying a managerial position in the manager who was a relative of a director, CEO, or substantial unitholder of the manager or NTT DC REIT. The board confirmed that nothing had come to its attention that would render the FY25/26 condensed financial statements false or misleading in any material respect. Independent valuers supported the portfolio valuation.

Still, the structure creates recurring conflicts that require monitoring: sponsor asset sales, related-party leases, property-management fees, sales commissions, reimbursements, fee units, and tax-structure arrangements in the U.S. REIT subsidiaries. The 1H and 9M materials also reference preferred shares to be issued by NTT DC U.S. REIT to parties not related to the sponsor, with an anticipated coupon around 12% to 12.5%, to meet U.S. REIT requirements. This appears tax-structural rather than abusive on the evidence, but it adds complexity that makes transparent governance more important.

8. Peer comparison

The right peer set is sponsor-backed Singapore-listed REIT managers with data-center or industrial/logistics exposure, plus global data-center REIT platforms where management quality is judged by capital discipline and leasing execution. Keppel DC REIT is the closest Singapore data-center REIT reference point. Mapletree Industrial Trust is a broader industrial/data-center comparator. Digital Realty is a global data-center REIT comparator, though it is internally managed and much larger.

Against Keppel DC REIT and Mapletree Industrial Trust, NTT DC REIT is not yet comparable on public stewardship history. Those managers have multi-year acquisition, refinancing, DPU, and capital-market records. NTT DC REIT has a stronger visible sponsor operating platform in NTT GDC, but less listed-company evidence. Against Digital Realty, NTT DC REIT is far smaller, externally managed, and more dependent on sponsor alignment. Its opening leverage is conservative and its first-year leasing execution is credible, but the external-manager and related-party footprint make the governance burden heavier.

On five-year stewardship, NTT DC REIT cannot rank above proven peers yet because it does not have five public years. On sponsor capability, NTT Group is a high-quality platform. On minority-unitholder alignment, the evidence is still incomplete. The current manager earns provisional credit for disclosure and early execution, not a durable compounder-grade management score.

9. Verdict on the management gate

Management gate: YELLOW.

The case for YELLOW is that the first listed period shows competent execution: DPU and distributable income exceeded IPO forecast, leverage remained moderate at 29.2%, near-term maturities are absent, the SG1 related-party renewal achieved a meaningful rent uplift, and the manager disclosed relevant operating and related-party items rather than hiding behind generic demand language. The case against PASS is stronger: listed history is less than one full public cycle, the REIT is externally managed and sponsor-dependent, related-party transactions are material, no eight-quarter call record exists, full board independence and executive ownership evidence are not available in the source pack, and the pending fee-structure change

is not yet implemented. This is investable only with explicit monitoring conditions, not a management team we would underwrite for a decade without further proof.

Upgrade to PASS would require three things: first, the FY26/27 fee-structure update must clearly improve per-unit alignment and avoid rewarding asset-base expansion without accretion; second, the next sponsor acquisition must show independent valuation support, fair pricing, conservative financing, and DPU/NAV accretion after fees and equity issuance; third, management must build a public record of candid Q&A or equivalent disclosure on related-party leasing, property-management economics, and capital allocation tradeoffs. Downgrade to FAIL would be triggered by a sponsor acquisition at a tight yield funded with dilutive equity, persistent fee-unit dilution not matched by per-unit DPU growth, opaque related-party lease or service terms, or leverage pushed materially higher to support sponsor pipeline growth.

Moat and 2046 Test

NTT DC REIT - Moat and 2046 Durability

Company: NTT DC REIT Ticker: NTDU.SI Date: 2026-07-02 Workdir: C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\NTT DC REIT

1. Moat taxonomy applied

NTT DC REIT has a real but bounded moat. It is not a technology platform moat, not a patent moat, and not a brand moat in the consumer sense. The defendable profit pool is the right to collect rent and related data-center service revenue from scarce, power-connected, operating data-center assets in markets where customers value uptime, power availability, connectivity, physical security, and migration certainty. That moat is asset-specific and contract-specific. It belongs to VA2, CA1-3, VIE1, and SG1 only to the extent those facilities remain technically current, power-ready, well connected, leased to creditworthy customers, and backed by a sponsor platform that can keep tenants and source future assets at fair prices. A broad cloud, AI, and data-center demand tailwind is not itself a moat. The moat has to be observable in capacity scarcity, lease duration, switching costs, pricing evidence, and sponsor-owned sourcing advantages.

Network effects are weak at the REIT level. Customers do not join NTT DC REIT because other customers are there in the same way users join a software network. There can be localized interconnection value inside a facility or market cluster, especially in mature data-center markets where network carriers, cloud on-ramps, and enterprise ecosystems matter, but the available package does not disclose enough interconnection density, cross-connect revenue, carrier count, or ecosystem metrics to underwrite a true network effect. Northern Virginia and Singapore are latency- and connectivity-sensitive markets, and Vienna has regional enterprise relevance, but the evidence supports "strategic location and connected capacity" rather than a proprietary network.

Switching costs are the strongest internal moat component. Data-center customers face real friction when they move installed workloads: migration planning, downtime risk, equipment movement, re-certification, network redesign, procurement approvals, and operational risk. That supports retention and renewals, especially when the asset already provides reliable power, cooling, security, and operating discipline. The limitation is lease duration. Portfolio WALE was 4.5 years at 2026-03-31, with CA1-3 at 3.5 years, VA2 at 5.5 years, VIE1 at 5.2 years, and SG1 at 1.8 years after the year-end update. Switching costs therefore protect the next renewal cycle, but they do not lock the portfolio through a 20-year horizon. Large hyperscale and enterprise customers can multi-source, self-build, phase incremental workloads elsewhere, or use future expansion needs as bargaining leverage.

Scale economies are moderate. The REIT owns six assets with 90.7 MW of design IT load and a US$1.6702 billion independent valuation at 2026-03-31. That is meaningful for a newly listed Singapore REIT, but it is small relative to the largest global data-center platforms and hyperscale self-build programs. Scale is more compelling when viewed through the NTT sponsor platform. The primer says NTT Global Data Centers is a large global provider with roughly 2,400 MW of IT power in operation and under construction across the Americas, EMEA, and APAC. That platform can support operations, procurement, customer relationships, and a future acquisition pipeline. The REIT itself, however, does not own that full platform. Its scale moat depends on fair sponsor access, disciplined asset injections, and minority-unitholder-aligned pricing.

Brand and trust matter, but mostly through NTT rather than the listed REIT. Customers buy reliability. Poor data-center operators cannot discount their way back into mission-critical workloads after operational failure. NTT's reputation and operating experience are legitimate advantages for leasing, procurement, and customer confidence. This is a high-trust procurement moat rather than a consumer brand moat. It is useful because tenants care about counterparties that can run facilities safely over years. It is not enough by itself, because sophisticated customers can also buy from Equinix, Digital Realty, Global Switch, ST Telemedia, cloud self-build, or local alternatives depending on market and workload.

Regulatory and site barriers are meaningful but uneven. The portfolio benefits from scarce land, grid power, permitting friction, and long development timelines in several markets. The data package explicitly frames Vienna as constrained by land, power, and construction costs; Singapore as supply-constrained with pipeline pre-committed; and the U.S. assets as exposed to strong demand and power/land constraints. These are real barriers to new supply, but they are partly cyclical. If power becomes available, capital markets reopen, or competitors accept lower yields, supply can arrive. Capacity scarcity is therefore a moat only when tied to existing powered facilities, not when asserted as a permanent industry condition.

IP and patents are not a material moat. The REIT does not appear to own proprietary compute technology. Its intellectual capital is operating process, asset design, customer relationships, and sponsor know-how. Those are valuable but replicable by other experienced data-center operators. The right analytical category is physical infrastructure scarcity plus switching

costs, not IP.

2. Per-segment moat

The U.S. segment is the most important by revenue and the largest blended moat driver. It produced FY25/26 gross revenue of US$100.824 million, or 61.2% of group gross revenue, and NPI of US$40.054 million at a 39.7% NPI margin. The assets are VA2 in Northern Virginia and CA1-3 in Northern California. The moat is existing powered capacity in two difficult data-center markets, customer stickiness, sponsor channel, and operational reliability. Northern Virginia has deep cloud and network relevance; Northern California has tight vacancy and AI/HPC spillover according to the data package. The U.S. segment's moat is durable for five years if occupancy and committed occupancy convert into revenue, and plausible for ten years if the assets remain technically current. It is less proven over 20 years because customer concentration, power costs, capital intensity, and technical density requirements can all reset economics. The earliest negative signal would be a major tenant churn or renewal at weak economics, CA1-3 occupancy falling back below the mid-90s, or power/cooling capex rising faster than rent.

Austria is a single-asset moat around VIE1 in Vienna. FY25/26 gross revenue was US$30.430 million, NPI was US$14.026 million, and the NPI margin was 46.1%. VIE1 had 15.4 MW of design IT load, 77 customers, 92.0% occupancy at 2026-03-31, and 5.2 years of WALE. The moat is power-connected Vienna capacity, customer switching costs, a diversified customer count, and NTT operational credibility. The segment appendix correctly frames Vienna as a constrained but gradual-growth market, not a hypergrowth market. This moat is good for steady cash flow, not explosive compounding. It could last ten years if the asset stays technically relevant and power cost pass-through remains effective. The earliest warning signs would be VIE1 occupancy slipping below 90%, fixed escalators failing to cover operating-cost inflation, or customers demanding costly technical upgrades without rent compensation.

Singapore is the highest-margin segment but the least independently documented in current segment appendices. The Singapore appendix was still a placeholder when this W appendix was written, so this assessment uses the data package and primer. SG1 produced FY25/26 gross revenue of US$33.567 million, NPI of US$20.845 million, and a 62.1% NPI margin. At 2026-03-31, SG1 had 91.8% occupancy, 1.8 years of WALE, and a US$310.7 million valuation versus US$259.0 million purchase consideration. The key lease event is the renewed SG1 Master Services Agreement with NTT Singapore from 2026-04-01 to 2029-03-31, with rent rising from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, 5% fixed annual escalation, 2.7 MW contracted capacity, and 0.3 MW returned capacity to backfill. The moat is supply-constrained Singapore power capacity and related-party anchor tenancy, but that same anchor tenancy is also a governance and concentration risk. This segment has strong near-term pricing evidence, but the 2046 durability question is unresolved because the latest renewal is only three years and the asset depends on sponsor-related tenant economics.

The blended moat is weaker than the best segment suggests. Singapore's NPI margin and rental reversion look powerful, but the asset has short remaining lease visibility and related-party exposure. The U.S. provides most revenue, but its reported NPI margin is the lowest and the tenant book is concentrated. Austria has the cleanest customer count evidence but is a single property in a gradual-growth market. The equity should therefore be underwritten as a sponsor-backed, high-quality data-center REIT with moderate organic durability, not as a platform with self-reinforcing 20-year economics.

3. Margin persistence evidence

The margin evidence is promising but too short to support a PASS by itself. NTT DC REIT listed in July 2025, FY25/26 covers the period from constitution and property completion dates to 2026-03-31, and the data package explicitly warns against fabricating a five-year listed history. FY25/26 official gross revenue was US$164.821 million, NPI was US$74.925 million, and group NPI margin was 45.5%. The interim 2H FY25/26 margin was 45.4%, which is consistent with the full-period margin but not a full cycle.

Segment margins show real asset differentiation. The U.S. segment reported 39.7% NPI margin for FY25/26 and 40.0% in 2H FY25/26. Austria reported 46.1% for FY25/26 and 43.9% in 2H. Singapore reported 62.1% for FY25/26 and 63.0% in 2H. This pattern supports the view that SG1 is the highest-return asset, Austria is stable mid-40s property income, and the U.S. portfolio has more cost leakage from power, property expenses, tenant mix, and operating cost structure. The data is not long enough to prove through-cycle margin persistence under power-cost spikes, a data-center supply cycle, refinancing stress, or tenant churn.

The portfolio's contractual structure helps. At 2026-03-31, occupancy was 95.1%, committed occupancy was 98.5%, WALE was 4.5 years, 89.4% of MBR had fixed escalation, 3.3% was CPI-linked, and weighted average escalation was 3.1%. FY25/26 rental reversion was 8.5%, or 13.7% including the SG1 MSA renewal. That is observable pricing power, especially

the SG1 repricing. But fixed escalators also cap upside in tight markets and can lag inflation if energy, maintenance, labor, insurance, or property tax costs rise faster than rent. The margin evidence is therefore good enough for YELLOW, not enough for PASS.

4. AI disruption stress test

AI is a demand accelerator for this business, not a direct workflow disruptor. NTT DC REIT does not sell a workflow that a foundation model can replicate. It sells physical capacity, power, cooling, security, and uptime. In that sense the portfolio is closer to chokepoint infrastructure than an AI-replaceable service business. AI workloads can increase demand for power-ready data-center capacity, especially in markets with grid and land constraints.

The risk is not AI disintermediation. The risk is AI-driven technical obsolescence and capital intensity. AI and HPC workloads may require higher rack density, different cooling architectures, larger power blocks, and faster deployment cycles. Existing facilities that can support those needs become more valuable. Facilities that cannot may need major capex or face tenant migration toward purpose-built campuses. The data package does not disclose rack-density capability, remaining utility power, liquid-cooling readiness, or asset-level expansion capacity. Therefore this appendix gives credit for AI as demand support, but does not treat AI as a moat proof.

The most AI-protected segment is the U.S. portfolio, because Northern Virginia and Northern California are relevant to cloud, AI, and enterprise infrastructure demand, and because existing powered capacity is valuable when power queues are long. The most AI-exposed segment is any asset that cannot support future density requirements without material capex; the current package does not identify which asset has the largest density gap. SG1 may benefit from Singapore scarcity, but its 2046 case depends on repeated lease renewals and technical modernization beyond the current three-year MSA.

5. The 2046 test

Twenty years from today is 2046-07-02. A credible 2046 description is possible, but it requires careful wording. In 2046, NTT DC REIT should still be a Singapore-listed or successor listed vehicle owning data-center infrastructure leased to hyperscale, enterprise, network, AI, and sovereign or regional digital-infrastructure customers. Its assets should still monetize scarce power-connected sites in markets where customers need uptime, latency, data residency, hybrid-cloud architecture, and reliable operating partners. The original assets may not be the whole company. A durable 2046 NTT DC REIT likely includes a larger portfolio sourced from the NTT sponsor platform, several asset refurbishments, higher-density cooling upgrades, and a lease book refreshed through multiple cycles. The business still makes money if it owns power-ready, customer-embedded facilities and collects rent plus service revenue under leases with escalators and pass-through mechanisms.

The 2046 operating margin should be stable to modestly higher only if the REIT keeps assets technically current and acquisitions are made at attractive spreads. It should not be assumed to rise structurally just because data demand grows. Data centers are capital-intensive, and long-lived competitiveness requires spend on mechanical systems, electrical infrastructure, cooling, cyber/physical security, energy procurement, and customer fit-outs. A 2046 version with high margins is one where existing facilities were modernized, power procurement was controlled, tenants renewed because migration remained risky, and the sponsor pipeline added assets without overpaying. A 2046 version with lower margins is one where fixed escalators lag operating costs, tenants demand expensive upgrades, power scarcity raises input costs more than rent, and external acquisitions dilute unitholders.

The bear 2046 description is also plausible. NTT DC REIT could become a mature external-capital yield vehicle whose initial assets remain occupied but earn ordinary real-estate returns after several renewal cycles. Hyperscale customers may self-build more capacity; AI workloads may move to purpose-built mega-campuses with lower cost per MW; older facilities may need large capex; sponsor asset injections may arrive at full prices; and related-party leases may be fair but not especially accretive. In that world the portfolio survives but does not compound at Gideon quality. The bear case is not business failure. It is a lower-return, capital-intensive REIT outcome with moderate DPU growth and limited owner-specific pricing power.

This is why the 2046 test is YELLOW. I can describe who pays NTT DC REIT in 2046 and why the assets remain useful. I cannot, from the current evidence, prove that the listed REIT has owner-specific control over enough scarce capacity, customer lock-in, and sponsor pipeline economics to keep compounding at high returns for two decades. The public history is too short, the lease book is too short for 20-year proof, and the key sponsor relationship is both an advantage and a risk.

6. Competitive threat inventory

Threat	Mechanism	Segment(s) affected	Earliest observable signal	Plausibility
Hyperscale self-build and multi-sourcing	Large customers can build, shift incremental workloads, or play providers against each other	US, Singapore	Lower renewal spreads, tenant churn, lower committed occupancy	High
Power/cooling capex cycle	Higher-density workloads and grid constraints require expensive upgrades	All	Capex/revenue rises, NPI margin compresses, disclosure of density upgrades	High
Sponsor and related-party value transfer	Pipeline assets, SG1 lease terms, fees, or incentives may favor sponsor over minorities	Singapore, group	Related-party transactions at full prices, fee structure not improved, weak acquisition accretion	Medium-high
New supply after current scarcity	Competitors add power-ready capacity or accept lower yields	US, Austria, Singapore	Market vacancy rises, reversion falls, valuation cap rates widen	Medium
Fixed escalators lag cost inflation	Contracted rent growth cannot offset power, labor, insurance, tax, or maintenance inflation	All	NPI margin falls despite revenue growth	Medium-high

7. Pricing power verification

Pricing power is observable but not complete. The strongest evidence is SG1. The renewed SG1 MSA raised rent from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, a 23% uplift, with 5% fixed annual escalation, a three-year term, and 2.7 MW contracted capacity. That is real pricing power in a supply-constrained Singapore market. It also comes with related-party complexity because NTT Singapore is the anchor tenant, and the term only runs to 2029-03-31.

Portfolio-wide pricing evidence is also positive. FY25/26 rental reversion was 8.5%, or 13.7% including SG1. Fixed escalators cover 89.4% of MBR, CPI-linked escalation covers 3.3%, and weighted average escalation is 3.1%. Occupancy was high at 95.1%, and committed occupancy was 98.5%. These figures indicate a cash-flow floor and some ability to renew above prior rents.

The weak point is customer concentration. The top 10 customers excluding NTT Group represented 62.9% of total MBR, and the top 10 including NTT Group represented 75.4%. The top customer category represented 31.5% of MBR. That concentration can be normal for data centers, but it means pricing power must be proven at renewal, not assumed. Large customers have alternatives and negotiating leverage. The REIT's pricing power is therefore stronger against generic vacancy than against a concentrated top tenant with credible alternatives.

8. Moat verdict

Moat gate: YELLOW

NTT DC REIT has a real data-center infrastructure moat based on scarce power-connected sites, tenant switching costs, high occupancy, lease escalators, and NTT sponsor support. The evidence is not strong enough for PASS because the listed history is short, the lease book is not long enough to evidence 20-year lock-in, tenant concentration is high, SG1 is partly related-party dependent, and the sponsor pipeline can create as much governance risk as growth upside. The moat is tangible at the asset level, but not yet proven as a high-return owner-specific compounding moat.

2046 test: YELLOW

The 2046 business description is specific and plausible: a sponsor-backed data-center REIT owning power-ready, customer-embedded digital infrastructure across constrained markets. The unresolved durability question is whether the current listed vehicle can retain enough owner-specific scarcity and contractual lock-in after several lease cycles, technical upgrade cycles, and sponsor transactions. Upgrade to PASS would require several years of stable or rising NPI margins, continued high occupancy after renewals, tenant concentration reduction, clean related-party governance, and accretive sponsor asset injections. Downgrade to FAIL if renewals show weak reversion, capex consumes NPI growth, sponsor transactions dilute minorities, or major tenants shift workloads away from the portfolio.

Segment Appendix - United States

US - Segment Deep Dive

Company: NTT DC REIT Ticker: NTDU.SI Segment: US Prepared: 2026-07-02 Source hierarchy: `data_package.md` and `quant_foundation.md` control all NTT DC REIT historical company figures. No company historicals were re-fetched for this appendix.

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

The US segment is a geography, not a product line. The data package states that the current reportable segment structure is US, Austria and Singapore, because each geography is managed under different economic and regulatory conditions. For the US segment, the disclosed assets are VA2 in Northern Virginia and CA1, CA2 and CA3 in Northern California. The segment boundary has not been restated during the short listed history. The important boundary is the listing and acquisition completion boundary: NTT DC REIT was constituted on 2025-03-28, completed VIE1 on 2025-06-27, completed the remaining initial portfolio on 2025-07-14, and reports FY25/26 to 2026-03-31. Therefore FY25/26 is not a normal five-year listed-history endpoint. It includes property performance from respective completion dates, and prior FMP rows are not treated as listed REIT history unless independently tied to official pre-listing or prospectus disclosure. This appendix therefore uses FY25/26 as the TTM anchor, with explicit `[DATA GAP]` flags where the requested five-year or property-level revenue history is not disclosed.

The key REIT-specific mapping is also explicit. The official segment table does not provide U.S.-style operating income by geography. It gives gross revenue, property operating expenses, net property income, depreciation, finance expense where applicable, NPI after depreciation, segment assets, segment liabilities and capex. For this segment appendix, gross revenue is the top line and NPI is the operating-profit proxy. If a later synthesis needs "operating income" for segment economics, the right mapping for the US geography is NPI, not accounting net income and not NPI after depreciation. NPI is the REIT property-level cash earnings proxy before corporate costs, financing, tax and valuation movements.

The Stage 0 anchor from `quant_foundation.md` is FY ending March 31, most recently reported FY25/26 to 2026-03-31, and forward horizon TTM plus five calendar years to 2031-03-31. Because there is no normal four-quarter listed public history, the model compounds from the official FY25/26 base rather than fabricating quarterly TTM observations.

1. What this segment actually is

The US segment is NTT DC REIT's largest geography. It consists of four operating data-center properties: VA2 in Northern Virginia and CA1, CA2 and CA3 in Northern California. The data package describes the US segment as data center properties in Northern Virginia and Northern California, with FY25/26 gross revenue of US$100.824 million, 61.2% of group gross revenue, FY25/26 NPI of US$40.054 million and an NPI margin of 39.7% [data_package.md lines 73-80]. The geography is therefore the core earnings driver of the REIT by revenue, even though Singapore carries the highest NPI margin and Austria has its own financing nuance.

The customer offering is data-center real estate and operating infrastructure: space, power, cooling, connectivity and related colocation/power services under lease or service arrangements. The official product-dollar disclosure is narrow. Group revenue is disclosed as revenue from colocation and power services plus other operating income, but the data package states that there is no official product revenue by hyperscale, colocation, retail, wholesale, individual tenant, or individual asset for FY25/26. Customer mix is disclosed by monthly base rent, not by revenue dollars. The latest customer mix is 50.3% hyperscale and 49.7% colocation by MBR at 2026-03-31, while the latest escalation mix is 89.4% fixed escalation, 3.3% CPI-linked and 7.3% other or no escalation [data_package.md lines 311-318].

The go-to-market is partly sponsor-anchored and partly third-party enterprise/hyperscale. NTT is not just a passive property seller in this structure. It is the sponsor and an operating ecosystem around global data centers, connectivity and enterprise IT relationships. That matters because data-center demand is not just about finding any tenant; it is about selling power-ready capacity to customers that need reliability, latency, implementation support and counterparty credibility. The data package states that 1H named customer evidence included Tesla, Microsoft, Oracle, Agoda, IBM, Open Text, Cohesity and GlobalDots, while the latest FY25/26 deck anonymized most customer names and should be treated as the current concentration source [data_package.md lines 313-320, 342].

Pricing is driven by leased capacity, base rent escalation, power pass-through and renewal or backfill economics. The data package records portfolio fixed escalation of 89.4%, weighted average rental escalation of 3.1%, occupancy of 95.1%,

committed occupancy of 98.5% and WALE of 4.5 years at 2026-03-31 [data_package.md lines 221-226, 236-245]. The US segment should therefore be modeled as a high-occupancy contracted infrastructure portfolio with visible escalators, not a software-like growth product. Growth comes from escalators, occupancy/backfill, renewal spreads, selected power/service revenue, and external growth or expansions if funded, not from unit volume expansion without capital.

2. Current economics

The official US base is clear. FY25/26 gross revenue was US$100.824 million, property operating expenses were US$60.770 million, and NPI was US$40.054 million. NPI margin was 39.7%. Segment assets were US$1,098.124 million, segment liabilities were US$42.002 million, and segment capex was US$8.769 million [data_package.md lines 117-125 for revenue, NPI, margin, assets and capex; quant_foundation.md lines 71-76 for the full segment table including liabilities]. The US segment had no geography-specific finance expense in the official table, unlike Austria. The accounting line "NPI after depreciation" for the US was US$13.445 million after US$26.609 million of depreciation, but that is not the segment cash proxy used here [quant_foundation.md lines 71-76].

US historical base metric	FY25/26 value	Verification source
Gross revenue	US$100.824m	data_package.md lines 117-125; quant_foundation.md lines 71-76
NPI	US$40.054m	data_package.md lines 117-125; quant_foundation.md lines 71-76
NPI margin	39.7%	data_package.md lines 117-125; quant_foundation.md lines 71-76
Segment assets	US$1,098.124m	data_package.md lines 117-125; quant_foundation.md lines 71-76
Segment liabilities	US$42.002m	quant_foundation.md lines 71-76
Segment capex	US$8.769m	data_package.md lines 117-125; quant_foundation.md lines 71-76

The asset KPI base is more informative than a conventional product split. At 9M FY25/26, VA2 had 14.0 MW design IT load, 9 customers, 98.1% occupancy by IT load, US$7.8 million year-to-date base rent, 3.7-year WALE and US$200.0 million purchase consideration. CA1 had 12.6 MW, 119 customers, 90.3% occupancy, US$10.8 million year-to-date base rent, 3.8-year WALE and US$250.0 million purchase consideration. CA2 had 26.1 MW, 22 customers, 99.8% occupancy, US$15.1 million year-to-date base rent, 7.3-year WALE and US$308.0 million purchase consideration. CA3 had 14.0 MW, 30 customers, 89.7% occupancy, US$9.7 million year-to-date base rent, 5.6-year WALE and US$212.0 million purchase consideration [data_package.md lines 182-192].

The FY25/26 year-end update improves the read-through. VA2 occupancy stayed at 98.1%, WALE moved from 5.7 years at 2025-12-31 to 5.5 years at 2026-03-31, and valuation was US$250.0 million versus US$200.0 million purchase consideration. CA1-3 occupancy improved from 94.8% at 2025-12-31 to 95.7% at 2026-03-31, WALE moved from 3.7 years to 3.5 years, and valuation was US$818.0 million versus US$770.0 million purchase consideration [data_package.md lines 194-204]. Combining VA2 and CA1-3 gives US valuation of US$1,068.0 million against purchase consideration of US$970.0 million, broadly consistent with the official US segment assets of US$1,098.124 million once other segment assets and accounting presentation are included.

The economics are not yet mature listed-history economics. FY25/26 includes the acquisition/listing period, and the data package explicitly warns against extrapolating older FMP rows as public listed REIT history. The US segment's 2H FY25/26 gross revenue was US$70.968 million and 2H NPI was US$28.382 million, a 40.0% NPI margin [data_package.md lines 148-155]. That is close to the FY25/26 margin of 39.7% and suggests the initial period was not dramatically distorted by a one-off margin collapse, but 2H overlaps other interim disclosure and is not a clean quarterly run-rate.

The current capital intensity is high because data centers are property assets. FY25/26 US capex was US$8.769 million, equal to 8.7% of US gross revenue and 21.9% of US NPI. That capex is not necessarily normalized maintenance capex, but it demonstrates the structural point: the US segment cannot compound like a low-capital-intensity software segment. Even if rent growth is strong, sustaining asset quality, power infrastructure, redundancy and customer fit-out capacity requires ongoing capital.

3. Unit economics

The US segment's unit economics start with leased or serviceable IT load and customer contracts. Revenue is earned from colocation and power services at group level, plus other operating income where applicable. At the segment level, the official geography table does not split revenue into rent, power, service charge, fit-out or other operating components. The model therefore uses gross revenue at geography level and treats the asset KPIs as operating drivers rather than revenue lines.

The profit bridge is gross revenue minus property operating expenses to NPI. FY25/26 US gross revenue of US$100.824 million less US$60.770 million of property operating expenses produced US$40.054 million of NPI [data_package.md lines 117-125]. Property operating expenses were therefore 60.3% of gross revenue. That expense load is high compared with Singapore's segment margin but should not be assumed structurally broken without asset-level expense detail. U.S. data centers can carry meaningful utility, property tax, labor, maintenance and power-related costs. The data package also notes that 9M NPI was modestly below adjusted IPO forecast due to lower occupancy and softer power revenue, before year-end committed occupancy improved [data_package.md lines 228, 346].

Revenue growth has three layers. First, contracted escalation gives a mechanical base. The portfolio weighted average rental escalation was 3.1% and 89.4% of MBR had fixed escalation at FY25/26 [data_package.md lines 236-245, 311-318]. Second, occupancy and committed occupancy provide backfill upside. Portfolio occupancy was 95.1% and committed occupancy was 98.5% at year-end; CA1-3 was 95.7% occupied while VA2 was 98.1% [data_package.md lines 196-204, 221-226]. Third, renewal spreads and market tightness can add above-escalator growth when contracts roll. The data package's US market context says Sacramento vacancy was tight, AI/HPC spillover supported demand, and U.S. data-center demand remained strong while power and land constrained supply [data_package.md lines 247-253].

Margin movement depends on how much incremental revenue comes from escalation/backfill versus cost-heavy power revenue or tenant fit-out income. A pure escalator dollar should be high incremental margin because the asset, staffing and property platform already exist. Backfilled capacity can also be attractive if it uses existing power-ready infrastructure. By contrast, power-related revenue, repairs, property tax inflation, insurance and specialized labor costs can absorb much of the gross revenue uplift. Because official disclosure does not provide property-level margins, the base case only raises US NPI margin from 39.7% to 41.5% over five years. That is a controlled assumption: it gives credit for high occupancy, fixed escalators and operating leverage, but does not assume a structural convergence to Singapore's 62.1% margin.

What breaks the unit economics upward is scarce powered capacity. If Northern California and Northern Virginia customers continue to compete for ready capacity, renewals can include both fixed escalators and positive market reversion. If backfill at CA1 and CA3 uses existing shell/power infrastructure and sponsor leasing channels, incremental economics can improve. What breaks the unit economics downward is power cost volatility, customer churn, a large tenant renegotiation, or higher maintenance capital needs. The official disclosures show CA1 at only 90.3% occupancy and CA3 at 89.7% occupancy at 9M, even though the grouped CA1-3 year-end occupancy improved to 95.7% [data_package.md lines 184-202]. That evidence argues against modeling the segment as riskless.

4. Competitive dynamics

The US segment competes in two distinct markets: Northern Virginia and Northern California. Northern Virginia is the deepest data-center market in the world, with dense cloud, network and enterprise ecosystems. Competition is intense because large global operators, wholesale providers, hyperscale self-build programs and private infrastructure capital all target the market. The barrier is not lack of competitors; the barrier is the scarcity of power, land, interconnection, operating history and deliverable capacity. An owner with an operating asset and tenant relationships can have pricing power even in a competitive market if alternatives are delayed by power queues or permitting.

Northern California is different. The data package specifically cites Sacramento tight vacancy and AI/HPC spillover as supportive US context [data_package.md lines 247-253]. California can be operationally complex because power procurement, construction costs, environmental requirements and grid constraints can matter as much as raw demand. That can protect existing powered assets, but it can also raise opex and capex. For this REIT, the benefit is that CA1-3 are existing assets with disclosed occupancy, customer count, WALE and valuation. The risk is that high valuation marks depend on continuing market tightness and successful customer retention.

The sponsor relationship matters competitively. NTT's global data-center and enterprise relationships can lower leasing friction, provide operational credibility and support customer expansion paths. However, this is not the same as owning a closed ecosystem. Hyperscale customers are sophisticated buyers. They can use multiple providers, self-build where feasible, and negotiate hard on renewal. The latest customer concentration table is anonymized, but the top 10 excluding NTT Group were 62.9% of total MBR and the top 10 including NTT Group were 75.4% [data_package.md lines 311-320]. That concentration can be normal in data centers, but it also means the segment's bargaining power must be judged contract by

contract.

The main substitutes are other third-party data centers, hyperscale self-build, cloud region shifts and workload placement alternatives. AI/HPC demand can be a tailwind for powered capacity, but it can also change technical requirements: higher rack density, cooling load, power delivery and capital spend. Existing sites that can accommodate denser loads become more valuable; sites that cannot may face capex needs or tenant churn. The US segment disclosure does not provide rack-density, power-availability pipeline or expansion capacity by asset, so this appendix does not underwrite an AI growth step-change. It treats AI/HPC spillover as a demand support that helps occupancy and pricing rather than as a separate new revenue product.

The competitive conclusion is balanced. The US segment has real scarcity value because it is power-ready data-center real estate in strong markets. The assets are mostly occupied, the portfolio has fixed escalators, and the sponsor improves leasing credibility. But the segment does not have software-like pricing power. Customers are concentrated and sophisticated, and asset economics require capital. A prudent five-year model should show steady revenue compounding and modest margin improvement, not explosive hypergrowth.

5. Moat at the segment level

The US segment's moat is location, power availability, operating reliability and sponsor channel. It is not a patent moat, brand moat or pure network effect. Location matters because Northern Virginia and Northern California are established data-center markets where customers value latency, network access, cloud ecosystems and operational resilience. Power availability matters because new supply can be constrained by grid interconnection and land availability. Reliability matters because enterprise and hyperscale workloads cannot tolerate downtime. Sponsor channel matters because NTT can support customer relationships and operating execution.

The moat is strongest around existing occupied capacity. A tenant already installed in a mission-critical facility faces switching costs: migration planning, downtime risk, interconnection changes, operational validation and procurement complexity. These switching costs help renewals, but they are not absolute. A large tenant can gradually diversify, move incremental workloads elsewhere, or use future capacity needs as leverage. This is why the latest WALE and concentration disclosures matter. Portfolio WALE was 4.5 years and US grouped CA1-3 WALE was only 3.5 years at 2026-03-31, while VA2 WALE was 5.5 years [data_package.md lines 196-204, 221-226]. The lease book provides visibility but not a decade-long lock.

The moat is weaker around future growth. Competitors can build if power, land and capital are available. Hyperscalers can self-build. Private infrastructure funds can accept lower yields if they expect rental growth and valuation uplift. The US segment's current asset valuations already reflect scarcity value: VA2 valuation was US$250.0 million versus US$200.0 million purchase consideration, and CA1-3 valuation was US$818.0 million versus US$770.0 million [data_package.md lines 194-204]. That is favorable for NAV, but it reduces the margin of safety if future cap rates move or growth disappoints.

Over five years, the moat should be sufficient for stable occupancy and low-to-mid-single-digit organic revenue growth, with upside if renewal spreads stay positive and backfill works. Over 10 years, durability depends on whether NTT continues to invest in power, cooling and customer requirements. Data centers can become less competitive if they lack density, efficient cooling, sufficient utility capacity or renewable power options. The data package records management strategy language that included sourcing green power and improving profitability through reversion [data_package.md lines 236-245]. That is the right direction, but the appendix cannot verify asset-level power procurement economics from the current data package.

The segment moat verdict is investable but not exceptional. The US assets should have more durability than generic office or retail real estate because demand for data-center capacity is structurally supported and supply is constrained. But within the Gideon framework, this is not a 20-year high-ROIC compounder segment unless the sponsor can repeatedly add assets or expansions at attractive spreads. The organic US portfolio alone looks like a contracted infrastructure yield asset with moderate growth.

6. Historical growth rates - reproduced from data package, not re-derived

The data package does not provide a five-year annual listed-company segment series. It explicitly says the REIT was newly listed and that prior columns are not applicable for listed history. The official segment table gives FY25/26 and 2H FY25/26 by geography, while product or property revenue by hyperscale, colocation, individual tenant group or individual property is not disclosed. The table below therefore preserves the required contract without fabricating unavailable years.

Product / sub-segment	FY-3 rev	FY-2 rev	FY-1 rev	3-yr CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
US geography gross revenue	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$100.824m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful vs listed history	data_package.md lines 113-125
US geography NPI, used as operating-profit proxy	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$40.054m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful vs listed history	data_package.md lines 117-125
US property operating expenses	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$60.770m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful vs listed history	data_package.md lines 117-125
VA2 property revenue	[DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed]	[DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed]	[DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed]	Not available	Not available	data_package.md lines 167, 182-204, 339
CA1-3 property revenue	[DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed]	[DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed]	[DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed]	Not available	Not available	data_package.md lines 167, 182-204, 339

Internal arithmetic check: US FY25/26 gross revenue of US$100.824 million minus property operating expenses of US$60.770 million equals NPI of US$40.054 million. US NPI margin is US$40.054 million divided by US$100.824 million, or 39.7% after rounding. The 2H recency row also ties: US$28.382 million of 2H NPI divided by US$70.968 million of 2H gross revenue equals 40.0% [data_package.md lines 148-155]. No back-solved property revenue is used because the data package explicitly says property-level revenue is a true non-disclosure [data_package.md lines 332-342].

The asset KPI table is not a revenue history, but it is the right operating context for the US model.

Asset / group	Geography	2026-03-31 occupancy	2026-03-31 WALE	2026-03-31 valuation	Purchase consideration	Data package cite
VA2	US	98.1%	5.5 years	US$250.0m	US$200.0m	data_package.md lines 196-204
CA1-3	US	95.7%	3.5 years	US$818.0m	US$770.0m	data_package.md lines 196-204
US total from valuation rows	US	Mixed	Mixed	US$1,068.0m	US$970.0m	data_package.md lines 196-204

The 9M asset-level detail adds design IT load and customer count.

Asset	Design IT load	Customers	9M occupancy by IT load	9M YTD base rent	9M WALE	Data package cite
VA2	14.0 MW	9	98.1%	US$7.8m	3.7 years	data_package.md lines 182-192
CA1	12.6 MW	119	90.3%	US$10.8m	3.8 years	data_package.md lines 182-192
CA2	26.1 MW	22	99.8%	US$15.1m	7.3 years	data_package.md lines 182-192
CA3	14.0 MW	30	89.7%	US$9.7m	5.6 years	data_package.md lines 182-192

7. Management guidance - quoted from data package Section 6

There was no earnings-call transcript in the source pack, and the data package instructs downstream agents not to invent conference-call quotes [data_package.md lines 230-245, 332-342]. The relevant forward anchors are official release and presentation comments summarized in Section 6 of the data package.

First, management framed initial execution as ahead of IPO forecast. The data package cites the CEO quote "DPU above our IPO forecast" and says the first fiscal period should be read as execution ahead of IPO forecast, not as mature run-rate history [data_package.md lines 236-240]. For the US segment, this means the base year is credible enough to underwrite, but not long enough to extrapolate at a high CAGR without caution.

Second, the CEO language on "disciplined growth and long-term value creation" points to sponsor-backed but controlled expansion [data_package.md lines 236-240]. The model therefore does not assume a large unfunded US acquisition program inside the organic segment forecast. Any external acquisition pipeline belongs in synthesis or capital allocation, not in this US organic segment line unless separately instructed.

Third, the official results release said gross revenue and NPI exceeded IPO forecast, helped by colocation/power services and tenant fit-out revenue [data_package.md lines 236-245]. The interpretation in the data package is important: tenant fit-out and other operating income contributed to outperformance, so recurring NPI should not simply capitalize all other operating income. For the US model, this argues for a moderate base growth rate and only modest margin improvement.

Fourth, the portfolio WALE and escalation evidence is directly relevant. The data package records portfolio WALE of 4.5 years, 89.4% fixed escalation and weighted average rental escalation of 3.1% [data_package.md lines 236-245]. This supports a baseline growth floor but also indicates that much of the rent book is fixed rather than fully market-linked.

Fifth, the 9M update said strong 3Q leasing led to committed backfill and that a sponsor leasing incentive was expected to help [data_package.md lines 236-245]. This matters for the US segment because CA1 and CA3 had lower occupancy at 9M than VA2 and CA2, and CA1-3 year-end occupancy improved to 95.7%. The base case assumes the backfill benefit is mostly captured through high occupancy and modest revenue growth, not a one-time step-change.

Sixth, management strategy language included reducing concentration risk, improving profitability through reversion and sourcing green power [data_package.md lines 236-245]. This is the key qualitative constraint on the model. A bull case can give credit for better reversion and power procurement, while a bear case should penalize concentration and cost inflation.

8. Forward growth assumptions - explicit, per product, justified

The official product line for this appendix is the US geography, because property and product revenue splits are not disclosed. The base case uses a 4.75% gross revenue CAGR from FY25/26/TTM to 2031-03-31. That is above the 3.1% portfolio weighted average rental escalation because it includes modest occupancy/backfill, renewal reversion and tight US market support, but it is below a high-growth data-center development assumption because no asset expansion pipeline or property-level revenue growth series is disclosed. The bear case uses 1.50% CAGR, reflecting weak renewal spreads, higher churn/friction and cost pass-through issues. The bull case uses 7.00% CAGR, reflecting sustained scarcity, high committed occupancy, positive reversion and better monetization of Northern California and Northern Virginia demand.

Base case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
US geography gross revenue	Not meaningful - newly listed	Not meaningful	No explicit US guide; portfolio fixed escalation 3.1%, committed occupancy 98.5%	4.75%	Uses FY25/26 gross revenue base, escalation floor, high occupancy and US demand context without assuming undisclosed expansion.

Bear case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
US geography gross revenue	Not meaningful - newly listed	Not meaningful	No explicit US guide; backfill and reversion remain execution-dependent	1.50%	Assumes fixed escalators are offset by churn, weaker power revenue, tenant concentration pressure and cost-heavy renewals.

Bull case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
US geography gross revenue	Not meaningful - newly listed	Not meaningful	No explicit US guide; tight US capacity and committed occupancy support	7.00%	Assumes scarcity in Northern California and Northern Virginia sustains renewal spreads, backfill completes cleanly and sponsor channel helps retention.

The year-by-year path below makes the deceleration/compounding shape explicit. Because there is no disclosed US historical YoY series, the case paths are not calibrated to a disclosed prior CAGR. They are anchored to rent escalation, committed occupancy, US market context and REIT capital intensity. Values are model output, not historical disclosure.

Year ending	Bear revenue	Base revenue	Bull revenue
2026-03-31 base	US$100.824m	US$100.824m	US$100.824m
2027-03-31	US$102.336m	US$105.613m	US$107.882m
2028-03-31	US$103.871m	US$110.630m	US$115.434m
2029-03-31	US$105.429m	US$115.885m	US$123.514m
2030-03-31	US$107.010m	US$121.390m	US$132.160m
2031-03-31	US$108.615m	US$127.156m	US$141.411m

The base case requires only US$26.332 million of five-year incremental gross revenue. That is a controlled underwriting burden for a segment with US$1.098 billion of assets and year-end occupancy above 95%. The bull case requires US$40.587 million of incremental revenue, which likely needs more than contractual escalation; it needs strong renewals, backfill, power/service monetization or modest expansion. The bear case requires only US$7.791 million of incremental revenue, effectively assuming that most contractual growth is lost to churn, mix or revenue leakage.

9. Forward operating margin assumptions - explicit and justified

For this REIT segment, "operating margin" means NPI margin. The current US NPI margin is 39.7%, calculated as US$40.054 million of NPI divided by US$100.824 million of gross revenue [data_package.md lines 117-125]. It is lower than the group margin of 45.5% and lower than Singapore's 62.1%, but close to the US 2H FY25/26 NPI margin of 40.0% [data_package.md lines 148-155]. The base case moves the margin to 41.5% by 2031-03-31. The 180 bp uplift is above the 100 bp threshold and is justified by scale leverage on fixed property costs, higher occupancy/backfill and rent escalation on an existing asset base. It is not a convergence to Singapore.

Case	Current NPI margin	TTM+5y NPI margin	Change	Mechanism
Bear	39.7%	36.5%	-320 bps	Tenant churn, power and property-cost inflation, unfavorable mix and renewal pressure reduce property-level conversion.
Base	39.7%	41.5%	+180 bps	Fixed escalators, backfill and modest operating leverage lift conversion while power and maintenance costs limit upside.
Bull	39.7%	44.0%	+430 bps	Strong renewal spreads, high utilization, favorable power/service mix and sponsor leasing support higher incremental margins.

The bear margin is deliberately below the current base because the segment has concentration risk and cost exposure. The data package says top 10 customers excluding NTT Group were 62.9% of MBR and top 10 including NTT Group were 75.4% [data_package.md lines 311-320]. A concentrated tenant book can be stable, but it also means one large renegotiation, churn event or fit-out issue can move margin. The bear case also reflects the risk that power revenue growth can be lower-margin if utility or procurement costs rise faster than recoveries.

The base margin does not require heroic assumptions. It assumes year-end committed occupancy begins to contribute, CA1-3 stays above 95% occupied, VA2 remains highly occupied and the 3.1% weighted average escalation flows through with some fixed-cost leverage. It also assumes that the segment's US property operating expenses continue to absorb a large share of gross revenue. That prevents the model from overstating the NPI impact of gross revenue growth.

The bull margin requires several things to go right at once. It assumes tight US capacity lets NTT DC REIT renew at better effective rates, backfill lower-occupancy capacity without material incentive leakage, manage power procurement and hold operating costs. It is plausible in a strong market, but not the base case, because the data package does not disclose asset-level revenue or margin and because CA1-3 WALE was only 3.5 years at year-end [data_package.md lines 196-204].

10. Segment rollup - built bottoms-up

Because the data package does not disclose US property revenue, the bottom-up rollup uses the only disclosed economic line: US geography gross revenue. The segment row is therefore a one-line rollup rather than a fabricated VA2/CA1/CA2/CA3 product model. This is intentional and data-package compliant.

Case	Product / sub-segment	TTM+5y revenue	TTM+5y NPI margin	TTM+5y NPI	Arithmetic check
Bear	US geography	US$108.615m	36.5%	US$39.644m	108.615 x 36.5% = 39.644
Base	US geography	US$127.156m	41.5%	US$52.770m	127.156 x 41.5% = 52.770
Bull	US geography	US$141.411m	44.0%	US$62.221m	141.411 x 44.0% = 62.221

All three cases tie arithmetically to sections 8 and 9. Bear revenue is US$100.824 million compounded at 1.50% for five years, producing US$108.615 million. Base revenue is US$100.824 million compounded at 4.75% for five years, producing

US$127.156 million. Bull revenue is US$100.824 million compounded at 7.00% for five years, producing US$141.411 million. NPI is then revenue times the case NPI margin. There is no separate product revenue sum because the data package says product and property revenue are not disclosed.

The probability weights used for synthesis should be treated as scenario weights, not a forecast distribution from a long historical sample. This segment lacks a five-year listed history, so the weights are qualitative: 25% bear, 55% base and 20% bull. The base case gets the highest weight because high occupancy, contracted escalation and sponsor support are visible. The bear case gets a meaningful weight because customer concentration, short public history and power-cost exposure are real. The bull case is possible, but it requires sustained scarcity and successful renewal economics beyond what the data package proves.

11. Key risks and wildcards

Bear risk: customer concentration. The top 10 customers excluding NTT Group represented 62.9% of total MBR and top 10 including NTT Group represented 75.4% at FY25/26 [data_package.md lines 311-320]. If one major US tenant churns or negotiates a lower effective rate, the segment can lose both occupancy and NPI conversion.

Bear risk: power and property operating costs. The FY25/26 US property operating expense ratio was 60.3% of gross revenue. If power procurement, property tax, insurance, labor or maintenance costs rise faster than contractual recoveries, NPI margin can fall even while gross revenue rises.

Bear/base risk: limited disclosure. There is no property-level revenue, property-level NPI, hyperscale versus colocation revenue, or normal four-quarter TTM. This limits precision and makes the US segment model more dependent on geography-level revenue, occupancy and WALE. The appendix flags this rather than filling gaps.

Base wildcard: committed occupancy. Portfolio committed occupancy was 98.5% at 2026-03-31, while CA1-3 occupancy improved to 95.7% and VA2 remained 98.1% [data_package.md lines 196-204, 221-226]. If committed backfill converts into billings with normal margins, base revenue and margin can outperform without requiring new assets.

Bull wildcard: AI/HPC demand and scarce powered capacity. The data package notes tight Sacramento vacancy, AI/HPC spillover and constrained US supply from power and land [data_package.md lines 247-253]. If that demand persists and NTT DC REIT has the technical capacity to support higher-density workloads, renewal spreads and valuations can exceed the base case.

Bull/base wildcard: sponsor channel. NTT's customer relationships can help leasing and retention. The 9M update indicated sponsor leasing incentive support for committed backfill [data_package.md lines 236-245]. That can reduce vacancy duration, but it can also mask the true market-clearing rent if incentives are material.

Bear wildcard: valuation and cap rates. US valuation rows show VA2 and CA1-3 above purchase consideration [data_package.md lines 196-204]. Higher interest rates or lower data-center cap-rate enthusiasm could reduce valuation even if NPI grows. That does not directly change NPI, but it matters for NAV, leverage and acquisition capacity.

Summary table

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Segment TTM+5y Op Margin	Segment TTM+5y Op Income	Probability
Bear	US$108.615m	36.5% NPI margin	US$39.644m NPI	25%
Base	US$127.156m	41.5% NPI margin	US$52.770m NPI	55%
Bull	US$141.411m	44.0% NPI margin	US$62.221m NPI	20%

For REIT-specific synthesis, read the "Op Margin" and "Op Income" columns above as NPI margin and NPI. The US segment's conventional operating income is not separately disclosed in a U.S. industrial-segment format. NPI is the correct geography-level economic proxy in the official segment table, while NPI after depreciation is an accounting bridge and not the property-level cash earnings proxy used for this segment model.

Data gaps inserted

- [DATA GAP: property revenue not disclosed] for VA2 and CA1-3 historical revenue.
- [DATA GAP: no five-year listed-company US revenue history] because NTDU.SI listed in July 2025 and FY25/26 is the official listed-history anchor.

- [DATA GAP: no US revenue split by hyperscale versus colocation] because the data package discloses contract mix by MBR, not revenue dollars.
- [DATA GAP: no property-level NPI margin] because the official segment table reports US geography NPI, not VA2/CA1/CA2/CA3 NPI.

Segment Appendix - Singapore

Singapore - Segment Deep Dive

Company: NTT DC REIT Ticker: NTDU.SI Segment: Singapore Prepared: 2026-07-02 Source hierarchy: `data_package.md` is the source of truth for company historicals; `quant_foundation.md` is used only to confirm QF arithmetic and the REIT-specific mapping from operating income to NPI.

0. Segment boundary + taxonomy note

Singapore is a geography segment, not a conventional product segment. The data package states that NTT DC REIT's reportable segments are US, Austria and Singapore because each geography is managed under different economic and regulatory conditions. For Singapore, the disclosed operating asset is SG1, a Singapore data center. The taxonomy has not been restated during the short listed history. The important boundary is the listing and acquisition-completion boundary: NTT DC REIT was constituted on 2025-03-28, completed VIE1 on 2025-06-27, completed the remaining initial portfolio on 2025-07-14, and reports FY25/26 to 2026-03-31. FY25/26 is therefore the official listed-history and TTM anchor. Pre-listing FMP rows are not treated as listed REIT history because the data package explicitly warns that FMP has older context rows that are not controlling unless tied to prospectus or official pro-forma disclosure.

For this REIT segment, "operating income" in the forward tables means net property income, or NPI. QF states that segment operating income is not disclosed in a U.S. 10-K format and that the REIT-relevant operating profit metric is NPI. The official Singapore segment table provides gross revenue, property operating expenses, NPI, depreciation, finance expense allocation, NPI after depreciation, segment assets, segment liabilities and capex. For synthesis, gross revenue and NPI are the correct economic proxy because NPI is the property-level cash profit before trust-level financing, management fees and distribution adjustments. Where the required ER2 template asks for operating margin or operating income, this appendix reports NPI margin and NPI, and makes that mapping explicit.

The TTM anchor is FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31, the most recent completed fiscal period in the data package. The TTM+5y horizon is 2031-03-31. All forward CAGRs in this appendix compound from FY25/26 Singapore gross revenue of US$33.567 million to that 2031-03-31 endpoint. This is not a six-year fiscal-year forecast, not a calendar-2026-to-2031 forecast, and not an extrapolation from FMP pre-IPO rows.

1. What this segment actually is

Singapore consists of SG1, an operating data center in Singapore owned through NTT DC REIT's initial portfolio. The economics are those of a data-center landlord and operator rather than a software company. Customers contract for powered data-center capacity and related colocation and power services. The REIT earns gross revenue from those services plus other operating income, then pays property operating expenses such as utilities, facility operations, repairs, property tax and other site-level costs. The segment's recurring cash engine is the difference between gross revenue and property operating expenses, which the REIT reports as NPI.

SG1 is not disclosed as separate products by hyperscale, enterprise colocation, retail colocation, power revenue, cross-connects or fit-out revenue. The data package explicitly says property tables disclose IT load, customer count, occupancy, MBR and WALE, but do not disclose gross revenue by property in the FY25/26 financial statement announcement. Because Singapore has only one disclosed asset, the geography-level revenue and NPI are also the segment-level economic view. However, the data package still does not provide a clean product split inside SG1. The only dollar-disclosed base for this appendix is Singapore geography gross revenue and NPI.

The operating unit is best understood through the asset KPIs. SG1 had 8.6 MW of design IT load at the 9M snapshot, 28 customers, 93.5% occupancy by IT load at 2025-12-31, year-to-date base rent of US$15.7 million and a 0.9-year WALE at that 9M date. The FY25/26 results deck then updated SG1 to 91.8% occupancy and 1.8 years WALE at 2026-03-31, with a US$310.7 million valuation versus US$259.0 million purchase consideration. Those data points matter more than an ordinary revenue-product table because SG1's economics turn on capacity, occupancy, lease rollover, rent per kW, energy pass-through and operating expense control.

The pricing model is capacity and rent based. The most important specific disclosure is the SG1 MSA renewal. The data package states that the renewed SG1 MSA moved rent from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, involved 2.7 MW of contracted capacity, returned 0.3 MW to be backfilled, and included a three-year term to 2029-03-31 with 5% fixed annual escalations. The rent step-up is about 23.1% before the fixed escalators. This is the cleanest direct evidence of Singapore segment pricing

power in the package. It is also not a five-year full-building lease: the term is three years, and the returned capacity must be leased again to avoid a utilization drag.

The go-to-market is sponsor-assisted asset management rather than broad enterprise sales. NTT DC REIT has a sponsor ecosystem through NTT, and the data package includes management strategy language about reducing concentration risk, improving profitability through reversion, and sourcing green power. For SG1, that matters because the tenant base is not a long-tail retail colocation book where hundreds of small customers determine churn. One major MSA renewal can move the revenue run-rate, WALE and committed occupancy. The segment's opportunity is therefore concentrated and real, but so is the renewal risk.

2. Current economics (FY25/26 and TTM)

Singapore generated FY25/26 gross revenue of US$33.567 million, equal to 20.4% of NTT DC REIT's US$164.821 million group gross revenue. It generated NPI of US$20.845 million, or a 62.1% NPI margin. Property operating expenses were US$12.722 million. This is the highest reported NPI margin among the three geographies in FY25/26: the US segment reported 39.7% and Austria reported 46.1%. The data package warns against over-interpreting Austria due to its segment finance structure, but Singapore's high NPI margin is still economically important because it contributes 27.8% of group NPI on only 20.4% of gross revenue.

The balance-sheet footprint is also material. Singapore segment assets were US$342.315 million, segment liabilities were US$24.584 million, and segment capex was US$4.100 million in FY25/26. QF adds that depreciation was US$15.805 million, finance expense allocated to Singapore was zero, and NPI after depreciation was US$5.040 million. That after-depreciation figure is not the primary REIT metric, but it shows the accounting burden of the asset base. The property-level return proxy is FY25/26 Singapore NPI divided by segment assets: US$20.845 million / US$342.315 million = 6.1% before trust-level debt and fees. On the FY25/26 valuation of US$310.7 million, the NPI yield is 6.7%. Both are meaningfully higher than the group property-level NPI yield of 4.5% cited in the data package, although the group denominator includes property carrying value and the Singapore numerator reflects a short, listing-year period with specific lease events.

The recency picture is stronger than the annual table alone. Singapore 2H FY25/26 gross revenue was US$23.664 million and NPI was US$14.899 million, for a 63.0% NPI margin. The 2H margin is 90 bps above the FY25/26 Singapore margin, suggesting that the property was not deteriorating as the year ended. However, 2H is not a standalone quarter series because the REIT listed mid-year and property contributions began on completion dates. The data package is explicit that downstream models should not construct fake quarters. The safe conclusion is that Singapore's most recent disclosed half-period carried a slightly better NPI margin than the FY25/26 segment average, while the full FY25/26 year remains the official TTM base.

SG1's asset KPIs are mixed but attractive. The 9M table shows 8.6 MW of design IT load, 28 customers, 93.5% occupancy, US$15.7 million of year-to-date base rent and 0.9-year WALE. The FY25/26 deck then shows 91.8% occupancy and 1.8 years WALE. Occupancy fell from the 9M SG1 snapshot to year-end, while WALE increased after the MSA renewal. That combination is exactly what a renewal-and-backfill story looks like: the property secured longer contracted revenue on part of the base, but some capacity was returned and still needs to be absorbed. The data package also states that portfolio committed occupancy reached 98.5% at FY25/26, but it does not disclose SG1-only committed occupancy. This appendix therefore does not assume that SG1 itself is 98.5% committed.

Current economics are thus a high-margin, supply-constrained Singapore asset with a short lease profile, one major renewal already completed, and some near-term backfill execution still embedded in the forecast. The MSA renewal is a positive signal, but it should not be extrapolated mechanically to the whole segment. A 23% reversion on 2.7 MW is powerful, yet 2.7 MW is roughly 31% of SG1's 8.6 MW design load, and 0.3 MW came back for backfill. The forward model needs to reflect both the repricing benefit and the returned-capacity friction.

3. Unit economics

SG1's unit economics begin with power-ready capacity and contracted rent per kW. Revenue rises when occupied IT load increases, when rent per kW steps up at renewal, when fixed escalators compound contracted rent, and when ancillary or fit-out income is earned. Revenue falls or underperforms when capacity is returned, when power revenue softens, when customers delay deployments, or when replacement tenants require incentive packages. Because the data package does not disclose SG1 revenue by tenant or product, the model uses one SG1 gross revenue line and ties the forward logic to disclosed capacity, occupancy and renewal data.

At the property level, the conversion from gross revenue to NPI is unusually strong. FY25/26 Singapore NPI margin was 62.1%, and 2H FY25/26 was 63.0%. That implies property operating expenses consumed US$12.722 million, or 37.9% of Singapore gross revenue. The property operating expense base is not purely fixed: energy, facility operations and service costs scale with utilization and power draw. But a meaningful share of the cost structure should have operating leverage because staffing, site operations, security, maintenance and landlord overhead do not move one-for-one with rent per kW. This is why a rent reversion can be high quality for NPI if it does not require a proportional increase in power or maintenance expense.

The SG1 MSA renewal is the most important unit-economic proof point. Rent per kW increased from S$385 to S$474, or 23.1%. The three-year term carries 5% fixed annual escalation. If those figures apply monthly, the initial rent step-up on 2.7 MW equals S$89/kW/month times 2,700 kW times 12 months, or roughly S$2.9 million of annualized gross rent before the fixed annual escalators. This appendix does not book that calculation as a historical dollar figure because the data package does not say how the rent is recognized, what services are bundled, or how much is passed through as power. The calculation is used only as a reasonableness check: the renewal is large enough to move a US$33.567 million segment, but not large enough by itself to double it.

NPI margin can move up or down for three reasons. First, rent reversion and escalators can raise gross revenue without equivalent expense growth, pushing NPI margin higher. Second, occupancy and backfill can either help or hurt. Backfilling the returned 0.3 MW at attractive rents supports margin; a prolonged vacancy would lower revenue while many site costs remain in place. Third, power and operating costs can dilute the headline rent uplift. Singapore is a constrained data-center market, but constraints do not only benefit landlords. They can also increase power procurement complexity, cooling costs, grid-connection burden and compliance requirements. A landlord with fixed escalators can lag a sudden cost shock if leases do not pass costs through cleanly.

Capex is not trivial. Singapore segment capex was US$4.100 million in FY25/26, equal to 12.2% of Singapore gross revenue and 19.7% of Singapore NPI. Some capex may be completion, fit-out or non-recurring for a newly listed portfolio, but the asset is still capital intensive. A data-center REIT can report attractive NPI while requiring periodic power, cooling, security and tenant-specific upgrades. The segment-level forecast therefore does not treat the entire NPI margin as free cash flow margin. Synthesis should use NPI as property profit, then apply trust-level cash costs, capex, debt and distribution logic separately.

Depreciation is also substantial. QF reports Singapore depreciation of US$15.805 million and NPI after depreciation of US$5.040 million. This is not the preferred cash metric for a REIT, but it is useful as a guardrail against excessive capital-light assumptions. If the segment grows because rents rise on the existing shell and power capacity, incremental returns can be attractive. If it grows because the property needs major expansion or mechanical/electrical replacement, NPI may not translate into equally high distributable cash. The base case assumes the MSA renewal, fixed escalators and modest backfill create operating leverage, but not a permanently rising margin line without reinvestment.

4. Competitive dynamics

Singapore is one of the more supply-constrained data-center markets in Asia-Pacific. The data package's industry context states that the FY25/26 media release and CBRE global data-center trends describe Singapore as a tight market with pipeline pre-committed. This matters because SG1's pricing power is not just an asset-level phenomenon. It is supported by market structure: limited land, power constraints, sustainability requirements, customer latency needs, and high switching friction for workloads already installed in a facility.

The direct competitors are other Singapore data-center owners and operators serving enterprise, cloud, network, financial services and digital platform customers. These include global data-center specialists, carrier-neutral colocation operators, cloud-adjacent landlords, regional data-center platforms and sponsor-backed assets. The exact competitor list is less important than the supply-demand balance. In a loose market, a 1.8-year WALE and 91.8% occupancy would be a warning that a large part of the asset could reprice down or require concessions. In a constrained market, that same lease profile can be an asset because near-term expiries can be repriced at higher market rents.

SG1 appears to sit between those two interpretations. The MSA renewal proves at least one important tenant accepted materially higher rent. The data package explicitly calls the reversion 23% and notes 5% fixed annual escalation. However, the renewal also returned 0.3 MW for backfill, and SG1 occupancy at 2026-03-31 was 91.8%, below its 2025-12-31 93.5% level and below the portfolio's 95.1% occupancy. That means market tightness is not equivalent to zero leasing risk. The property still needs execution to keep revenue fully utilized.

Pricing power is strongest where customers have latency, resilience, data-sovereignty, interconnection or migration-cost reasons to remain in Singapore. Existing deployments are hard to move. Customers may also face scarcity of alternative high-quality powered capacity. The landlord's ability to raise price is therefore most credible on renewals where customer switching cost is high and where competing capacity is scarce or pre-committed. That is consistent with the SG1 MSA renewal evidence.

Pricing power is weaker if customers can shift growth to Johor, Batam, other regional campuses, cloud-region alternatives or sponsor-owned assets outside the listed REIT. The Singapore market is constrained, but regional substitution is a real pressure valve. Some workloads need Singapore; others need Southeast Asian capacity at acceptable latency and reliability. If customers can take incremental demand to lower-cost regional markets, SG1 may remain valuable but not enjoy unlimited rent growth. This is especially important after the three-year MSA term: a tenant that accepted a 2026 repricing may use the next renewal to negotiate regional alternatives.

The sponsor relationship is a competitive advantage and a potential channel conflict. NTT's platform can support leasing relationships, operational credibility and technical capability. It can also create a pipeline of assets or customer introductions. But a listed REIT owns a defined asset base and depends on external growth and asset management decisions. Sponsor-backed scale helps underwriting only if it translates into fair acquisitions, tenant stability and disciplined capital allocation for unitholders. For the Singapore segment specifically, the sponsor ecosystem likely helps operational reliability and leasing credibility, but the asset's near-term numbers still depend on SG1's own renewal and occupancy outcomes.

5. Moat at the segment level

SG1's moat is real but asset-specific. It is not a global network moat like a hyperscale cloud platform, nor a software switching-cost moat that scales with code. It is a property-level moat built on scarce powered capacity in Singapore, customer migration friction, operational reliability, sponsor credibility and the regulatory/power constraints that limit new supply. The FY25/26 SG1 valuation of US$310.7 million versus US$259.0 million purchase consideration is a market-value signal that the asset became more valuable in the listed period. The data package cautions that valuation marks are not recurring revenue growth rates, but they do support the idea that scarce Singapore data-center assets are valued highly.

The strongest moat evidence is the MSA renewal. A 23% rent reversion on 2.7 MW with 5% fixed annual escalators is hard to reconcile with a commodity asset. If tenants had abundant equivalent alternatives, a major customer would be unlikely to accept that step-up. The renewal also extended SG1 WALE from 0.9 years at 9M to 1.8 years at FY25/26, showing that the asset did not enter FY26/27 with the same near-term cliff.

The moat is not complete because SG1 has short WALE, only one geography, no disclosed tenant-by-tenant lease ladder and a material customer-concentration backdrop at group level. The data package states that, excluding NTT Group, the top 10 represented 62.9% of MBR at FY25/26 and the top customer category represented 31.5% of MBR in the FY25/26 deck. It does not give SG1-only concentration. In a data center, concentration can be acceptable if tenants are creditworthy and sticky. But it also means a single renewal, return of capacity or deployment shift can move segment economics.

The durability over five years depends on three tests. First, does the MSA reversion flow through to revenue and NPI without offsetting vacancies or cost pressure? Second, does the 0.3 MW returned capacity get backfilled at rents close to or above the renewed MSA rent? Third, does Singapore remain sufficiently constrained that the 2029 renewal cycle can preserve at least inflation-plus pricing? The base case assumes yes to the first, partial yes to the second, and moderate yes to the third. The bear case assumes the backfill is slower and the 2029 cycle normalizes. The bull case assumes Singapore scarcity remains acute and SG1 uses the near-term rollover profile to raise rent per kW across more of the property.

On a 5-to-10-year basis, SG1's moat should support above-group property margins, but not high-teens revenue growth without expansion or repeated major reversion. The asset is nearly occupied, design IT load is fixed at 8.6 MW in the data package, and the largest disclosed MSA term only runs three years. That means the economic moat is more yield and repricing protection than a long runway of physical volume growth. The segment is valuable because it can generate high NPI on a scarce asset, not because it can compound like a software platform.

6. Historical growth rates - reproduced from data package, not re-derived

The data package gives one official listed-history period for Singapore plus 2H FY25/26 recency. It does not give a five-year annual segment series because NTT DC REIT is newly listed. The table below preserves the ER2 historical format but marks unavailable pre-listing years as data gaps instead of using FMP pre-IPO rows. The "FY-1" column is FY25/26, which is also the TTM base. Every dollar figure below comes from the data package or QF.

Product / sub-segment	FY-3 rev	FY-2 rev	FY-1 rev	3-yr CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
Singapore / SG1 gross revenue	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	US$33.567m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package.md lines 138-146 and 150-154; quant_foundation.md lines 60-75
Singapore / SG1 property operating expenses	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	US$12.722m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package.md lines 138-146; quant_foundation.md lines 60-75
Singapore / SG1 NPI	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	US$20.845m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package.md lines 138-146 and 150-154; quant_foundation.md lines 60-75
Singapore / SG1 NPI margin	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	62.1%	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package.md lines 138-146 and 150-154; quant_foundation.md lines 71-75
Singapore / SG1 segment assets	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	US$342.315m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package.md lines 138-146; quant_foundation.md lines 71-75
Singapore / SG1 segment liabilities	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	US$24.584m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	quant_foundation.md lines 71-75; data_package.md line 346 confirms segment liabilities are supported
Singapore / SG1 segment capex	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	[DATA GAP: not applicable before listed history]	US$4.100m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package.md lines 138-146; quant_foundation.md lines 71-75
SG1 property revenue by tenant or product	[DATA GAP: property-level product revenue not disclosed]	[DATA GAP: property-level product revenue not disclosed]	[DATA GAP: property-level product revenue not disclosed]	Not available	Not available	data_package.md lines 157-169 and 332-342
SG1 MSA rent per kW	[DATA GAP: no three-year listed series]	S$385/kW prior rent reference	S$474/kW renewed rent	Not meaningful	23.1% reversion on renewed MSA	data_package.md lines 173-180, 238-245 and 327-330
SG1 occupancy by IT load	[DATA GAP: no three-year listed series]	93.5% at 2025-12-31	91.8% at 2026-03-31	Not meaningful	Down 170 bps from 9M snapshot	data_package.md lines 184-201
SG1 WALE	[DATA GAP: no three-year listed series]	0.9 years at 2025-12-31	1.8 years at 2026-03-31	Not meaningful	Up 0.9 years from 9M snapshot	data_package.md lines 184-201

Arithmetic tie-out: FY25/26 Singapore gross revenue of US$33.567 million less property operating expenses of US$12.722 million equals NPI of US$20.845 million. NPI margin is US$20.845 million divided by US$33.567 million, or 62.1% after rounding. The 2H FY25/26 Singapore tie-out is US$23.664 million of gross revenue and US$14.899 million of NPI, or 63.0% NPI margin. No three-year revenue CAGR can be calculated because the data package intentionally excludes pre-listing FMP history from official listed REIT history. [DATA GAP: no listed three-year Singapore revenue, NPI, product revenue, tenant revenue or YoY series exists in the data package.]

The MSA rent-per-kW row is included because it is the best disclosed operating signal for Singapore, but it is not a substitute for revenue history. The data package gives the old and new rent per kW, capacity and term. It does not provide historical MSA revenue recognized in FY25/26, power pass-through terms, tenant identity, or whether the rent is monthly, annualized, all-in, or base-rent-only. The correct analytical use is therefore directional: the renewal supports stronger FY26/27 revenue and NPI, but the FY25/26 revenue base remains the only official gross-revenue anchor.

7. Management guidance - quoted from data package Section 6

The data package does not provide an earnings-call transcript and flags that no transcript was found. The relevant management and official guidance therefore comes from SGX releases, presentations and business updates already extracted in the data package. The following items are the complete Singapore-relevant guidance set used in this appendix.

- data_package.md lines 240-241: "Gross revenue and NPI exceeded IPO forecast, helped by colocation/power services and tenant fit-out revenue." Interpretation: FY25/26 outperformance is positive, but part of the beat came from tenant fit-out and other operating income, which should not be blindly capitalized as recurring same-store rent.

- data_package.md line 241: "SG1 MSA renewal delivered 23% rent reversion and 5% fixed annual escalation." Interpretation: this is the core Singapore repricing anchor. It supports above-portfolio revenue growth in FY26/27 and beyond, but it applies to a specific 2.7 MW renewal with a three-year term and 0.3 MW returned to backfill.

- data_package.md line 242: "Portfolio WALE 4.5 years; 89.4% fixed escalation; weighted average rental escalation 3.1%." Interpretation: the portfolio has contractual growth, but fixed escalators cap upside if market rents accelerate faster than lease terms. For SG1, the 5% escalator on the renewed MSA is better than the portfolio weighted average, while SG1's 1.8-year WALE is shorter than the portfolio.

- data_package.md line 244: "Strong 3Q leasing led to committed backfill; sponsor leasing incentive expected to help." Interpretation: 9M occupancy weakness was not ignored by management; there was committed leasing activity expected to contribute from 4Q FY25/26. The package does not disclose SG1-only committed occupancy, so the appendix treats this as supportive but not conclusive for SG1.

- data_package.md line 245: "Strategy included reducing concentration risk, improving profitability through reversion, and sourcing green power." Interpretation: the forward model should not just assume passive rent collection. Management is explicitly pointing to reversion, concentration reduction and power procurement as value drivers. For Singapore, those are exactly the relevant levers.

- data_package.md line 253: "Supply-constrained market with pipeline pre-committed; CBRE noted Singapore as one of APAC's tightest markets." Interpretation: market tightness supports SG1 reversion and backfill assumptions. It does not remove tenant concentration or regional substitution risk.

- data_package.md lines 173-180 and 327-330: "SG1 MSA renewed, with rent rising from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, 5% fixed annual escalations, a three-year term to 2029-03-31, 2.7MW contracted capacity, and 0.3MW returned capacity to backfill." Interpretation: the base model gives SG1 explicit credit for a three-year contractual uplift, then normalizes growth after 2029 because the renewal itself does not cover the full five-year horizon and because the returned capacity still needs leasing execution.

[DATA GAP: no SG1-only committed occupancy, tenant-by-tenant lease expiry table, MSA tenant identity, power pass-through formula, or earnings-call commentary is available in the data package.]

8. Forward growth assumptions - explicit, per product, justified

The one modeled line is Singapore / SG1 gross revenue. This is not because SG1 lacks multiple customers or revenue components. It is because the data package does not disclose Singapore product revenue by hyperscale, colocation, power, fit-out, tenant or customer category. The model therefore compounds the FY25/26 Singapore gross revenue base of US$33.567 million. The base case uses a 5.5% CAGR for TTM to TTM+5y. That is above the portfolio 3.1% weighted average rental escalation because the SG1 MSA renewal has a 23% reversion and 5% annual escalators, Singapore is supply constrained, and SG1 has some remaining occupancy and backfill upside. It is below the one-time 23% reversion because that reversion applies to a 2.7 MW lease, not the entire asset, and because the three-year term ends before the 2031 endpoint.

Base case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Singapore / SG1 gross revenue	Not meaningful due to listing boundary	Not meaningful; FY25/26 is official base	SG1 MSA: 23% rent reversion, 5% fixed annual escalation, 2.7 MW contracted, 0.3 MW returned	5.5%	Reversion and 5% escalators lift the near-term run-rate, while 91.8% occupancy and backfill create modest volume upside; CAGR is moderated because the MSA term is three years and property load is finite.

Bull case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Singapore / SG1 gross revenue	Not meaningful due to listing boundary	Not meaningful; FY25/26 is official base	Same SG1 MSA renewal plus Singapore supply-constrained market context	8.0%	Assumes returned capacity is backfilled quickly, more of SG1 reprices at attractive rent per kW before 2031, and tight Singapore supply keeps renewal spreads above fixed escalator levels.

Bear case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Singapore / SG1 gross revenue	Not meaningful due to listing boundary	Not meaningful; FY25/26 is official base	Same SG1 MSA renewal, but 0.3 MW returned capacity needs backfill	2.5%	Assumes MSA uplift is partly offset by returned capacity, slower backfill, power-cost friction, and less favorable 2029 renewal dynamics as customers test regional alternatives.

The year-by-year base path implied by 5.5% is deliberately smoother than the lease event. In reality, the MSA should create a front-loaded FY26/27 uplift and then 5% fixed escalation through 2029-03-31, followed by a new renewal or market reset. Because the data package does not provide SG1 quarterly revenue or MSA revenue share, this appendix uses a single five-year CAGR rather than fabricating annual steps. A reasonableness check shows the base case takes revenue from US$33.567 million to US$43.871 million by 2031-03-31. That is a US$10.304 million increase over five years. A 2.7 MW renewal with a roughly 23% rent step-up can plausibly contribute a few million dollars of annualized gross rent, while fixed escalators and backfill can cover the rest. The base case therefore credits the lease event without assuming every SG1 customer gets the same immediate uplift.

The bull case requires more than the disclosed MSA. An 8.0% CAGR takes Singapore revenue to US$49.321 million, or US$15.754 million above FY25/26. To get there, SG1 would need quick backfill of the 0.3 MW, sustained occupancy recovery toward the mid-to-high 90s, meaningful repricing across additional leases, and either continued Singapore scarcity or a tenant need for SG1-specific capacity. This is possible in a tight market but not the central case because SG1's FY25/26 WALE is only 1.8 years and the asset's design IT load is fixed at 8.6 MW in the data package.

The bear case is not a collapse case. A 2.5% CAGR still gives credit for some fixed escalation and the already-signed renewal. It underwrites the risk that the MSA uplift is not fully reflected in cash revenue, that returned capacity takes longer to backfill, or that customers use the 2029 maturity to push some growth to lower-cost regional markets. It also recognizes that fixed escalators can lag operating cost inflation. The bear revenue endpoint is US$37.978 million, up only US$4.411 million from FY25/26.

9. Forward operating margin assumptions - explicit and justified

The current Singapore NPI margin is 62.1% for FY25/26 and 63.0% for 2H FY25/26. The forecast uses NPI margin as the operating margin proxy. This is a REIT-specific mapping: NPI is gross revenue less property operating expenses, and it is the disclosed segment profit measure in the official geographic table. QF also provides NPI after depreciation, but that is not the right cash operating proxy for segment rollup. Finance expense, trust expenses, management fees, tax and distribution adjustments belong in the group synthesis rather than the Singapore segment NPI margin.

Product	Current NPI margin	Bear TTM+5y NPI margin	Base TTM+5y NPI margin	Bull TTM+5y NPI margin	Justification
Singapore / SG1	62.1%	58.0%	64.0%	66.5%	Bear assumes slower backfill and power/operating cost drag; base assumes rent reversion and escalators flow through with modest operating leverage; bull assumes high occupancy and scarcity-driven repricing over a mostly fixed site-cost base.

The base margin rises 190 bps from 62.1% to 64.0%. That is a meaningful move, so it needs a mechanism. The mechanism is rent-per-kW growth on existing capacity. A 23% rent reversion on 2.7 MW and 5% fixed annual escalators should raise revenue faster than many site operating costs. The 2H FY25/26 margin of 63.0% already shows a slightly stronger recent margin than the full-year base. If returned capacity is backfilled and the renewed MSA flows through, a 64.0% horizon margin

is plausible. It is not set higher because power, cooling, maintenance and asset-management execution costs remain real, and because the asset may need reinvestment.

The bull margin of 66.5% assumes a very favorable operating leverage outcome. It requires high occupancy, limited incremental operating expense per dollar of rent increase, good power procurement, and no material tenant incentives that dilute rent reversion. The bull case also assumes the next renewal cycle after the three-year MSA does not force concessions. A 66.5% margin is below software-like economics but high for property NPI, so it is reserved for the case where Singapore scarcity remains acute and SG1's rent reset broadens beyond the disclosed MSA.

The bear margin of 58.0% assumes the opposite. SG1 still benefits from a signed renewal, but operating costs, power procurement, returned capacity and tenant incentives dilute the headline rent uplift. The margin decline is 410 bps from current. That is harsh but not punitive given the short WALE, the unknown SG1-only committed occupancy, and the lack of tenant-by-tenant lease disclosure. In the bear case, Singapore remains a good asset but no longer deserves the current premium NPI margin.

10. Segment rollup - built bottoms-up, arithmetic must tie

Because Singapore has one disclosed asset and no product-level revenue split, the rollup is a single-line asset model. The TTM base is FY25/26 Singapore gross revenue of US$33.567 million and NPI of US$20.845 million. TTM+5y revenue is calculated as `33.567 x (1 + CAGR)^5`. NPI is calculated as TTM+5y revenue multiplied by the case-specific NPI margin. All figures are in US$m.

Case	Product	TTM base revenue	Revenue CAGR	TTM+5y revenue	TTM+5y NPI margin	TTM+5y NPI
Bear	Singapore / SG1	33.567	2.5%	37.978	58.0%	22.027
Base	Singapore / SG1	33.567	5.5%	43.871	64.0%	28.077
Bull	Singapore / SG1	33.567	8.0%	49.321	66.5%	32.798

Rollup check: Bear revenue is US$33.567 million compounded at 2.5% for five years, or US$37.978 million; US$37.978 million multiplied by 58.0% equals US$22.027 million of NPI. Base revenue is US$33.567 million compounded at 5.5% for five years, or US$43.871 million; US$43.871 million multiplied by 64.0% equals US$28.077 million of NPI. Bull revenue is US$33.567 million compounded at 8.0% for five years, or US$49.321 million; US$49.321 million multiplied by 66.5% equals US$32.798 million of NPI. Because SG1 is the only disclosed Singapore asset and no product revenue split is disclosed, the product sum equals the segment total in every case. The rollup reconciles exactly by construction.

These NPI outputs should be used as segment operating profit proxies in synthesis. They should not be confused with distributable income. Group-level synthesis still needs to deduct trust-level expenses, finance costs, taxes, management fees, non-controlling impacts if any, and capex or distribution adjustments. The Singapore segment can be highly profitable at the property level while consolidated DPU still depends on leverage, refinancing, acquisition financing and unit count.

11. Key risks and wildcards

Bear risk - returned capacity and occupancy: the MSA renewal returned 0.3 MW for backfill. In a tight market, that should be leasable, but the data package does not provide SG1-only committed occupancy. If backfill takes longer or requires incentives, revenue growth and NPI margin both undershoot.

Bear risk - 2029 renewal cliff: the renewed MSA runs only to 2029-03-31, two years before the 2031-03-31 model endpoint. A tenant can accept a 2026 reset and still push back hard at the next renewal, especially if regional capacity becomes a credible alternative.

Bear risk - power and operating costs: fixed escalators are valuable, but they can lag a cost shock. SG1's NPI margin is high because revenue converts well today. If power, cooling, repair, insurance, compliance or sustainability costs rise faster than rents, the segment can grow revenue while losing margin.

Base risk - disclosure opacity: the data package does not disclose Singapore revenue by tenant, product, hyperscale versus colocation, power service, fit-out, or MSA. That forces a one-line model. The direction is well supported; the exact sensitivity is less precise than it would be with a lease-by-lease schedule.

Base risk - sponsor dependence: NTT sponsorship may help leasing, but the listed REIT still needs fair asset management and unitholder-oriented capital allocation. The Singapore segment is not immune to group-level acquisition, funding or related-party governance risks.

Bull wildcard - scarcity persists: if Singapore remains one of APAC's tightest markets and pipeline is pre-committed, SG1 may continue to reprice faster than the portfolio's 3.1% weighted average escalation. In that case, the 8.0% bull revenue CAGR could prove conservative if more leases roll at large spreads.

Bull wildcard - occupancy recovers: SG1 occupancy was 91.8% at FY25/26 versus portfolio occupancy of 95.1% and committed occupancy of 98.5%. If SG1-specific occupancy moves back toward the mid-to-high 90s while rent per kW rises, the combination is powerful for NPI.

Wild card - asset value and external growth: SG1's FY25/26 valuation was US$310.7 million versus US$259.0 million purchase consideration, a 20.0% uplift according to the data package. A higher valuation supports NAV and financing capacity, but it also lowers forward acquisition yields if Singapore assets become more expensive. That is good for existing asset value and potentially bad for reinvestment returns.

Summary table

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Segment TTM+5y Op Margin	Segment TTM+5y Op Income	Probability
Bear	US$37.978m	58.0% NPI margin	US$22.027m NPI	25%
Base	US$43.871m	64.0% NPI margin	US$28.077m NPI	55%
Bull	US$49.321m	66.5% NPI margin	US$32.798m NPI	20%

Data gaps inserted

- [DATA GAP: no listed three-year Singapore revenue, NPI, product revenue, tenant revenue or YoY series exists in the data package.]
- [DATA GAP: property-level product revenue not disclosed] for SG1 by hyperscale, colocation, power, tenant, fit-out or customer category.
- [DATA GAP: no SG1-only committed occupancy, tenant-by-tenant lease expiry table, MSA tenant identity, power pass-through formula, or earnings-call commentary is available in the data package.]
- [DATA GAP: no historical MSA revenue recognized in FY25/26, power pass-through terms, tenant identity, or whether the rent is monthly, annualized, all-in, or base-rent-only.]

Segment Appendix - Austria

Austria - Segment Deep Dive

Company: NTT DC REIT Ticker: NTDU.SI Segment: Austria Segment economic proxy: gross revenue and net property income, with NPI used as the REIT-specific operating-income proxy TTM anchor: FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31 Forward horizon: TTM + 5 calendar years, ending 2031-03-31

0. Segment boundary + taxonomy note

Austria is a reportable geography, not a product segment. The current reporting structure is geography: US, Austria and Singapore. The data package states that this is the correct taxonomy because each geography is separately managed due to different economic and regulatory environments. There is no segment restatement to reconcile. The controlling boundary is the listing and acquisition completion boundary: NTT DC REIT was constituted on 2025-03-28, VIE1 completed on 2025-06-27, the rest of the initial portfolio completed on 2025-07-14, and FY25/26 ended on 2026-03-31. Austria therefore means VIE1 in Vienna. FY25/26 is the official listed-history anchor, and prior FMP or pre-listing rows are not treated as listed REIT history unless tied to official prospectus or pro-forma disclosure. The appendix models gross revenue and NPI rather than conventional operating income because the official segment table does not provide U.S.-style operating income. Where a segment operating-profit measure is required, NPI is used and the mapping is explicit.

1. What this segment actually is

Austria is the VIE1 data center in Vienna. In economic terms this is a single data-center property that sells contracted colocation and related power services to enterprise, hyperscale and other data-center customers. The revenue engine is not a software subscription or a high-turnover merchant sale. It is an infrastructure lease and service stream. Customers contract for space, power capacity, cooling, physical security, connectivity and operating resilience. Gross revenue is the cash-like property top line, while property operating expenses include the costs needed to operate the facility and deliver those services. NPI is the REIT-level property income before depreciation, finance expense and trust-level items. For Austria, the data package gives FY25/26 gross revenue of US$30.430 million, property operating expenses of US$16.404 million and NPI of US$14.026 million, which produces a 46.1% NPI margin.

The property-level KPI set makes VIE1 underwrite more like a high-spec infrastructure asset than an ordinary office or logistics building. At 9M FY25/26, the data package shows VIE1 with 15.4 MW of design IT load, 77 customers, 91.5% occupancy by IT load, year-to-date base rent of US$13.0 million, 6.3 years of WALE and purchase consideration of US$271.0 million. The latest FY25/26 results presentation then updates the property highlights: VIE1 occupancy moved from 91.5% at 2025-12-31 to 92.0% at 2026-03-31, WALE moved from 6.3 years to 5.2 years, and valuation was US$291.5 million against US$271.0 million purchase consideration. That valuation increase is a mark of asset value, not recurring revenue growth. It is nevertheless relevant because it indicates independent market support for the asset despite only a short listed operating history.

The pricing model is a combination of contracted capacity economics and lease escalators. The company does not disclose Austria revenue split by hyperscale, colocation, customer vertical or tenant. At the group level, the FY25/26 deck disclosed monthly base rent of US$12.7 million, 50.3% hyperscale and 49.7% colocation by contract mix, and escalation mix of 89.4% fixed escalation, 3.3% CPI-linked and 7.3% other or no escalation. Those are portfolio metrics, not VIE1-only metrics, but they help frame the Austria forecast because the same REIT contract architecture governs the property. The data package also flags that Vienna has barriers from land, power and construction costs, vacancy around 8%, and gradual rental growth. That combination supports a steady growth model rather than a hypergrowth model.

Go-to-market is not a broad enterprise sales motion run by VIE1 as a separate operating company. The asset is managed inside NTT DC REIT and benefits from the sponsor ecosystem, operating know-how, customer relationships and the REIT manager's asset-management process. The practical commercial task is to keep occupancy high, reprice expiring capacity where market conditions allow, improve power-cost recovery and operating efficiency, and maintain the asset's reliability so churn stays low. Because VIE1 already has 77 customers and more than 90% occupancy by IT load, the next five years are more about yield management, escalation, backfill and selective capacity monetization than about filling an empty shell.

2. Current economics (FY25/26 and TTM)

FY25/26 is the current economic anchor. The quant foundation states that there is no normal four-quarter public history because the REIT listed on 2025-07-14 and properties contributed from completion dates. It instructs downstream work to use official FY25/26 and pro-forma or run-rate disclosures where disclosed as the controlling anchor, with anchor date 2026-03-31 and forward horizon 2031-03-31. The Austria row in the quant foundation gives FY25/26 official base revenue of US$30.430 million and official base NPI of US$14.026 million. That is 18.5% of group gross revenue and 18.7% of group NPI. The segment is large enough to matter to the combined REIT but not large enough to dictate the group alone.

The reported FY25/26 NPI margin is 46.1%. That margin is below Singapore's 62.1% and above the U.S. segment's 39.7%. It is also slightly above the group NPI margin of 45.5%. The comparison is useful but should not be over-read. Geography margins reflect different property ages, power cost arrangements, tax and utility pass-through structures, customer mix, occupancy, depreciation and finance allocation. The data package notes that Austria carries asset-specific finance expense in the segment note because Austria segment liabilities include loans and borrowings of US$157.466 million. The quant foundation's P2 table gives Austria depreciation of US$7.581 million, finance expenses allocated of US$4.053 million and NPI after depreciation of US$2.392 million. For segment forecasting here, I do not treat that after-depreciation figure as the recurring operating-income proxy. NPI is the correct property operating proxy because it is the metric used by REIT investors and because depreciation and debt structure are synthesis-level concerns.

Capital intensity is visible even in the short history. Austria segment assets were US$320.310 million, segment liabilities were US$181.257 million and segment capex was US$4.626 million in FY25/26, all from the data package's Austria segment historical table. The simple capex-to-gross-revenue ratio is 15.2% for the first reported period, but that first year includes listing and property-completion effects and should not be naively normalized. It is safer to treat FY25/26 capex as evidence that the asset needs ongoing reinvestment, fit-out, maintenance and power/cooling resilience spend, not as a steady-state annual run rate. Data centers are capital-intensive infrastructure assets. They can produce visible rent streams, but they also require recurring investment in mechanical and electrical systems, redundancy, compliance and customer-specific fit-out. If capex is deferred, near-term NPI may look better while future churn or downtime risk rises.

The most important operational KPI is occupancy. VIE1 was 91.5% occupied by IT load at 9M FY25/26 and 92.0% at 2026-03-31. That leaves some incremental occupancy headroom but not enough to drive explosive revenue growth without repricing or expansion. WALE was 5.2 years at 2026-03-31, still long enough to provide visibility but down from 6.3 years at 2025-12-31. High WALE is a double-edged feature. It protects near-term cash flow in a weak market but slows the speed at which market rent growth can flow through when supply is tight. For Austria, with Vienna described as a market of barriers and gradual rental growth, the base case should not assume a sudden repricing wave. It should assume contracted escalators, modest occupancy improvement, selective renewal uplift and a stable margin envelope.

3. Unit economics

VIE1's unit economics start with committed data-center service revenue and power-related revenue. The customer pays for usable IT capacity, associated power, cooling, operational support, connectivity and facility access under contracted arrangements. The REIT recognizes gross revenue, incurs property operating expenses, and reports NPI. The conversion from gross revenue to NPI is the most useful measure of property-level economics. In FY25/26, US$30.430 million of Austria gross revenue less US$16.404 million of property operating expenses produced US$14.026 million of NPI. That is a 46.1% NPI margin. The margin says roughly half the property top line converts to property income before depreciation, finance and trust-level items.

The largest variable in a data-center asset is power and related facility operation. Energy cost, power pass-through design, cooling efficiency, utilization, maintenance, staffing, property tax, insurance and customer-specific service levels determine how much of gross revenue becomes NPI. A property with strong power-cost recovery can preserve margin even if utility prices rise. A property with weaker pass-through can suffer margin compression despite stable occupancy. The data package does not disclose VIE1-only power pass-through terms or customer-by-customer contract economics, so this appendix does not assign product-level margins to hyperscale versus colocation. It uses the official geography-level margin and models modest changes from that anchor.

Occupancy is the first operating lever. At 92.0% occupancy, VIE1 has about 8 percentage points of physical IT-load vacancy before committed occupancy effects. Filling that capacity would add revenue with high contribution margin if incremental power and service costs are covered by customer pricing. However, the property is already largely leased, so the base-case upside from occupancy should be measured in basis points and low single-digit revenue increments, not a doubling of the property. The second lever is contractual escalation. At the portfolio level, 89.4% of MBR had fixed escalation and weighted average rental escalation was 3.1%. If Austria follows the portfolio pattern, a meaningful part of forward growth is visible but

capped: fixed escalators provide a floor but can lag market rent in a supply-constrained market.

The third lever is renewal and reversion. The group achieved 8.5% rental reversion in FY25/26 and 13.7% including the SG1 MSA renewal, but the SG1 detail is Singapore-specific and should not be copied into Austria. The relevant Austria market context in the data package is more measured: Vienna has land, power and construction-cost barriers, vacancy around 8%, and gradual rental growth. That supports positive reversion, but not a Singapore-style step-change embedded into every renewal. The fourth lever is operating efficiency. Better utilization of fixed facility staffing, cooling, maintenance and monitoring costs can lift NPI margin when revenue grows. The counterweight is the capital and operating cost required to maintain redundancy and reliability. Margin expansion is plausible, but it should be slow.

The economics can break down through three channels. First, power cost or availability can impair both revenue growth and margin. If energy inflation is not fully passed through, NPI margin falls. If power availability constrains customer expansion, revenue growth slows even in a demand-rich market. Second, customer concentration or tenant churn can hit occupancy. The data package gives portfolio top-10 concentration but not VIE1-specific tenant concentration, which is a gap for underwriting the single-property segment. Third, refinancing and debt allocation can affect distributable income. Austria has segment liabilities and finance expense allocation. This appendix deliberately keeps the property model at gross revenue and NPI, then flags debt and financing as synthesis-level issues.

4. Competitive dynamics

Vienna is not Northern Virginia and it is not Singapore. It is a European data-center market with meaningful barriers but a more gradual demand and rent-growth profile. The data package's Austria market line says Vienna has barriers from land, power and construction costs, vacancy around 8%, and gradual rental growth. This is the right lens. The market is not empty and is not supply-free, but the constraints on land, grid power and build cost limit the ease with which new entrants can add equivalent capacity. For VIE1, that makes the competitive setting structurally supportive but not bulletproof.

Direct competitors are other Vienna and Central European data-center operators, including global colocation platforms, carrier-neutral facilities, cloud-adjacent capacity providers and local or regional operators. The customer choice set is broader than one property. A tenant can compare VIE1 against other Vienna assets, nearby Central European campuses, self-build options if scale permits, and cloud-region architecture choices that may reduce the need for owned or colocated hardware. The moat is therefore not "no substitutes." It is that data-center migration is operationally painful, power-ready capacity is scarce, reliability matters, and existing customer installations are sticky once live.

Pricing power depends on three conditions. First, the market must need capacity faster than new supply can be added. The data package's vacancy around 8% is tight enough to support rent but not so tight that every renewal is captive. Second, the asset must remain technically competitive. Customers care about uptime, redundancy, power density, network access, sustainability credentials and operational discipline. A data center can lose pricing power if it becomes underpowered, inefficient or operationally unreliable. Third, contracts must allow reversion. Long WALE protects cash flow, but if leases have fixed escalators and long remaining duration, market tightness will flow through slowly.

The sponsor relationship matters. NTT is a credible data-center operator and customer ecosystem participant. A small standalone REIT with a single Vienna asset would have less operating knowledge and less commercial reach. The sponsor can help with customer relationships, technical operations, procurement and future pipeline. However, sponsor alignment is not the same as guaranteed growth. The REIT owns and earns from its assets; the sponsor may develop or sell assets subject to pricing and governance. Austria's five-year forecast should therefore include sponsor-aided stability and leasing competence, but should not assume large external acquisitions inside the Austria segment unless specifically disclosed. The segment as defined today is VIE1, not a Europe growth platform with automatic asset drops.

Substitution risk is real but manageable. Some workloads can migrate to public cloud, some enterprise workloads can consolidate, and some hyperscale customers may prefer owned campuses where they have sufficient scale. On the other hand, latency, data sovereignty, hybrid-cloud architecture, enterprise resilience and regional demand support continued colocation and data-center demand. AI and high-performance computing may increase power-density needs, but VIE1-specific suitability for high-density AI loads is not disclosed in the data package. The base case should therefore avoid an AI-driven rent acceleration assumption. The bull case can include stronger utilization and renewal pricing from a tighter Vienna market, but the bear case must include the possibility that tenants choose alternate sites or require costly upgrades that dilute NPI.

5. Moat at the segment level

The Austria moat is an asset-level moat built on power-connected real estate, customer stickiness, operational credibility, long lease duration and sponsor support. It is not a network-effect moat in the software sense and it is not a regulatory monopoly. VIE1's first protection is physical scarcity. A well-located, power-ready data center with 15.4 MW of design IT load cannot be replicated quickly if land, grid connection and construction costs are barriers. The data package's market context supports this scarcity point for Vienna, but with a measured tone: vacancy is around 8%, and rental growth is gradual.

The second protection is customer switching cost. With 77 customers at 9M FY25/26, VIE1 is diversified at the property level relative to a single-tenant facility. Once equipment is installed and workloads are connected, moving is expensive and operationally risky. This stickiness supports occupancy and renewal probability. The counterpoint is that customer count alone does not eliminate concentration risk because revenue and MBR can be skewed to large tenants. The data package does not disclose VIE1-specific MBR concentration. That means the moat cannot be assessed as fully de-risked. The portfolio top-10 concentration is material, and a single-property segment is inherently exposed to tenant mix.

The third protection is operating reliability. Data centers are not commodity sheds. Customers buy uptime, redundancy, power quality, security and technical response. NTT's operating experience and sponsor ecosystem should help. This is a credible moat component because poor operators lose trust and cannot simply discount their way back into mission-critical workloads. Still, reliability is a "must keep earning it" moat. If maintenance or capex is underfunded, the moat erodes. VIE1's FY25/26 capex of US$4.626 million is a reminder that the property requires investment.

The fourth protection is lease structure. WALE of 5.2 years at 2026-03-31 gives visible cash flow. Portfolio fixed escalation of 89.4% of MBR and weighted average escalation of 3.1% support predictable revenue growth. The weakness is that fixed escalation also limits upside in a hot market and may lag inflation. In Austria's base case, that is a feature, not a flaw: the segment should grow steadily, with low volatility, but it should not be modeled like an asset-light compounding platform.

On a 5 to 10 year view, the segment moat is moderate and durable if the asset remains technically current. It protects occupancy and a mid-40s NPI margin better than it protects high growth. The biggest moat test is whether VIE1 can maintain pricing and utilization when customers renew or expand, while avoiding major upgrade capex that consumes property income. A strong moat case is not "Austria grows rapidly." It is "Austria keeps earning high occupancy, modest escalator-driven growth, and stable to slightly better NPI conversion because power-ready Vienna capacity has value."

6. Historical growth rates - reproduced from data package, not re-derived

The data package explicitly states that NTT DC REIT does not have five fiscal years of listed REIT financial statements and that FY25/26 is the official listed-history anchor. The Austria segment table gives FY25/26 and 2H FY25/26 by geography. It does not give a five-year annual segment series. Therefore the historical table preserves the required structure but does not fabricate pre-listing Austria revenue. The "product" line is VIE1 / Austria because property-level revenue is not separately disclosed inside the geography, and Austria is a single-property geography in the current package.

Product / sub-segment	FY-3 rev	FY-2 rev	FY-1 rev	3-yr CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
VIE1 / Austria gross revenue	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$30.430m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package Section 1 Austria row; Section 3 Austria Gross revenue row; QF P2 Austria row
VIE1 / Austria NPI	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$14.026m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package Section 3 Austria NPI row; QF P2 Austria row
VIE1 / Austria NPI margin	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	46.1%	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package Section 3 Austria NPI margin row; QF P2 Austria row
VIE1 / Austria 2H recency check	Not applicable	Not applicable	2H FY25/26 gross revenue US$20.670m; NPI US$9.075m	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	data_package Section 3 interim segment table

Arithmetic tie-out: FY25/26 Austria gross revenue US$30.430m less property operating expenses US$16.404m equals NPI US$14.026m. NPI margin is US$14.026m divided by US$30.430m, or 46.1% after rounding. No historical YoY arithmetic check is possible because pre-listing FY-3 and FY-2 listed-history revenue are not disclosed. The absence of a YoY check is a data limitation, not an analytical choice. [DATA GAP: no listed three-year Austria revenue, NPI, or YoY history exists in the data package.]

The 2H recency row is not a quarterly series. It overlaps the FY25/26 period and should not be annualized without a prospectus or run-rate framework. It is useful directionally because 2H Austria NPI margin was 43.9%, below the full-year Austria margin of 46.1%, but the period mix includes completion timing, early listed history and possible timing of expenses. I

therefore do not use the 2H margin as a new base. I use FY25/26 as the TTM anchor and treat the 2H result as a caution against aggressive margin expansion.

7. Management guidance - quoted from data package Section 6

The data package found no earnings-call transcript and instructs downstream agents not to invent call speakers or quotes. It uses official releases and presentations. The following guidance points are relevant to Austria either directly or through portfolio-wide assumptions.

- FY25/26 media release dated 2026-05-12, Yutaka Torigoe, CEO of the REIT Manager: "DPU above our IPO forecast." Interpretation: the first listed period came in ahead of IPO expectations at the portfolio level, but this should not be converted into a long Austria-specific growth rate because the data package does not disclose Austria-specific forecast variance.
- FY25/26 media release lines 49-52, Yutaka Torigoe: "disciplined growth and long-term value creation." Interpretation: growth is sponsor-backed and disciplined, not an instruction to assume unconstrained external acquisitions in Austria.
- FY25/26 media release lines 70-83: gross revenue and NPI exceeded IPO forecast, helped by colocation and power services and tenant fit-out revenue. Interpretation: part of outperformance came from potentially non-recurring or timing-sensitive tenant fit-out revenue, so base-case revenue should not capitalize every dollar of other operating income as a recurring escalator stream.
- FY25/26 media release lines 127-134: portfolio WALE was 4.5 years, 89.4% of MBR had fixed escalation, and weighted average rental escalation was 3.1%. Interpretation: this is the key growth anchor for Austria because it supports visible low-single-digit contractual uplift.
- FY25/26 media release lines 88-96: there were no maturities due in the next two financial years, 70% fixed-rate debt, and ICR of 4.2x. Interpretation: near-term financial stress should not force asset-level underinvestment, but Austria has allocated debt and refinancing risk later in the horizon.
- 9M update lines 196-212: strong 3Q leasing led to committed backfill and sponsor leasing incentive was expected to help. Interpretation: portfolio leasing momentum supports occupancy stabilization, though it is not VIE1-specific.
- 1H presentation lines 834-842: strategy included reducing concentration risk, improving profitability through reversion, and sourcing green power. Interpretation: Austria margin and retention depend on active asset management, not purely passive escalators.
- Austria market context in data_package Section 6: Vienna has barriers from land, power and construction costs, vacancy around 8%, and gradual rental growth. Interpretation: the base case should be steady; bull case can assume a tighter market, but hypergrowth is unsupported.

[DATA GAP: no VIE1-specific management quote, earnings-call transcript, tenant-by-tenant lease expiry table, or Austria-only renewal guidance is available in the data package.]

8. Forward growth assumptions - explicit, per product, justified

The one modeled product line is VIE1 / Austria gross revenue. This is not because the property has only one customer or one service, but because the data package does not disclose Austria revenue by hyperscale, colocation, tenant or service component. The model compounds from FY25/26 gross revenue of US$30.430 million to the TTM+5y endpoint. Base case uses 4.0% revenue CAGR. That is slightly above the portfolio 3.1% weighted average rental escalation because VIE1 has some occupancy headroom, Vienna barriers support gradual rental growth, and active asset management can produce some reversion. It is not materially above mid-single digits because occupancy is already 92.0%, WALE is 5.2 years, and Vienna market language is gradual rather than explosive.

Base case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
VIE1 / Austria gross revenue	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	No Austria-only guide; portfolio fixed escalation 3.1%	4.0%	Uses fixed escalation plus modest occupancy and reversion; Vienna barriers support gradual growth, not hypergrowth.

Bull case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
VIE1 / Austria gross revenue	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	No Austria-only guide; portfolio fixed escalation 3.1%	6.0%	Assumes occupancy moves closer to full utilization, power-ready capacity tightens, and renewal pricing exceeds fixed escalators without major churn.

Bear case:

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
VIE1 / Austria gross revenue	Not meaningful	Not meaningful	No Austria-only guide; portfolio fixed escalation 3.1%	1.5%	Assumes slower backfill, fixed escalators partly offset by concessions or power-cost pressure, and Vienna vacancy remains enough to cap reversion.

The implied five-year revenue outcomes are US$32.782 million in bear, US$37.023 million in base and US$40.722 million in bull. Those figures are intentionally not wide enough to make Austria the swing factor in the whole REIT. The segment is a mature, mostly occupied, contracted infrastructure asset. A five-year revenue range of about US$32.8 million to US$40.7 million captures the plausible envelope from sluggish renewal economics to strong but still credible utilization and reversion.

The base case can be decomposed qualitatively into about 3.1% contractual escalation plus roughly 0.9 percentage points from occupancy improvement, reversion and ancillary income mix. I do not model tenant fit-out revenue as a recurring high-growth line because management commentary says tenant fit-out helped FY25/26 outperformance and the package warns that recurring NPI should not capitalize all other operating income. The bear case is below the escalation headline because escalation can be diluted by vacancy, concessions, lower power revenue or customer churn. The bull case is above the escalation headline because it assumes VIE1's remaining vacant capacity is monetized and the Vienna supply environment tightens enough to produce stronger reversion.

9. Forward operating margin assumptions - explicit and justified

For this REIT segment, operating margin means NPI margin. The official segment table does not disclose conventional segment operating income. The quant foundation says the REIT-relevant operating profit metric is NPI, and the data package instructs downstream modeling to prioritize gross revenue, NPI, distributable income, DPU, occupancy, WALE, leverage and REIT KPIs. I therefore use FY25/26 NPI margin of 46.1% as the current operating margin proxy. Depreciation, finance expense and tax are not ignored; they are just not the segment operating-income metric in this appendix. Austria had depreciation of US$7.581 million, allocated finance expense of US$4.053 million and NPI after depreciation of US$2.392 million in the quant foundation. Those items matter for synthesis, but they are not the best measure of property operating performance.

Product	Current NPI margin	Bear TTM+5y NPI margin	Base TTM+5y NPI margin	Bull TTM+5y NPI margin	Justification
VIE1 / Austria	46.1%	43.0%	47.5%	50.0%	Bear assumes power and maintenance cost pressure plus concessions; base assumes modest scale leverage; bull assumes high utilization and efficient pass-through.

The bear margin is 310 basis points below the current margin. That is a material change and needs a specific mechanism. The mechanism is not random conservatism. It is the combination of higher utility and facility operating costs, less favorable customer renewal economics, and required maintenance or green-power sourcing costs that are not fully passed through. Because VIE1's 2H FY25/26 margin was 43.9%, a 43.0% bear end-state is within observed short-period recency rather than an extreme stress case. It assumes the property remains occupied and valuable, but the NPI conversion weakens.

The base margin is 140 basis points above the current margin. The mechanism is operating leverage and better occupancy, not aggressive cost cuts. A data center has fixed and semi-fixed operating costs. If occupancy rises from 92.0% toward a higher level and contractual escalators flow through, incremental revenue can carry above-average contribution margin. However, I cap base margin expansion because power, cooling, maintenance and reliability costs do not scale like software.

VIE1 must keep investing to remain competitive. A mid-to-high 40s NPI margin is credible; a sudden jump to the Singapore segment's margin would not be.

The bull margin is 390 basis points above current. That requires a tighter market, stronger renewal pricing, higher utilization, clean pass-through of power costs and no major maintenance surprise. It is achievable if Vienna's land and power constraints become more valuable and VIE1's customer base remains sticky. It is not the probability-weighted case because the data package describes gradual rental growth and because VIE1 is a single asset with limited disclosed tenant concentration detail.

10. Segment rollup - built bottoms-up, arithmetic must tie

Because Austria is VIE1 in the current reportable taxonomy and no sub-property revenue split is disclosed, the rollup is one line. Revenue equals VIE1 / Austria revenue. NPI equals revenue multiplied by the modeled NPI margin. The arithmetic ties exactly to the product-level assumptions in Sections 8 and 9.

Case	Product	TTM base revenue	Revenue CAGR	TTM+5y revenue	TTM+5y NPI margin	TTM+5y NPI
Bear	VIE1 / Austria	US$30.430m	1.5%	US$32.782m	43.0%	US$14.096m
Base	VIE1 / Austria	US$30.430m	4.0%	US$37.023m	47.5%	US$17.586m
Bull	VIE1 / Austria	US$30.430m	6.0%	US$40.722m	50.0%	US$20.361m

Rollup check: Bear NPI is US$32.782 million multiplied by 43.0%, or US$14.096 million. Base NPI is US$37.023 million multiplied by 47.5%, or US$17.586 million. Bull NPI is US$40.722 million multiplied by 50.0%, or US$20.361 million. These are the same numbers in the ending summary table. Because there is only one disclosed product/property line, no further segment-to-product reconciliation is needed. The limitation is disclosure, not arithmetic. [DATA GAP: no Austria revenue split by tenant, hyperscale, colocation, power, fit-out, or other operating income is available in the data package.]

11. Key risks and wildcards

Bear risk - power cost and power availability. A data-center property can have strong demand and still disappoint if utility costs rise faster than pass-through or if grid constraints prevent expansion. Austria's land and power barriers support pricing, but they also make operations more complex. If customers resist pass-through or require concessions, gross revenue can grow slowly while NPI margin compresses.

Bear risk - single-property exposure. Austria is VIE1. A property-specific outage, customer loss, regulatory cost, major equipment issue or local market change has no offset inside the Austria segment. The group has other geographies, but this appendix is deliberately scoped to Austria only. The single-asset nature argues against overconfidence in a narrow base-to-bull spread.

Bear and base risk - tenant concentration. The portfolio top 10 customers were 62.9% of total MBR excluding NTT Group and 75.4% including NTT Group at FY25/26, but VIE1-specific MBR concentration is not disclosed. Customer count of 77 helps, but revenue can still be concentrated. This risk affects both margin and occupancy at renewal.

Base risk - fixed escalators cap upside. Portfolio fixed escalation is a stabilizer, not only a growth driver. If market rent rises faster than fixed escalators, VIE1 may lag market pricing until renewal windows. This is why the base case uses 4.0% instead of a higher data-center demand growth rate.

Bull wildcard - tighter Vienna supply. If Vienna vacancy falls below the cited around-8% level and power-ready capacity becomes scarce, VIE1 could earn stronger renewal pricing and fill residual vacancy. That is the core bull mechanism and the main path to 6.0% revenue CAGR and 50.0% NPI margin.

Bull wildcard - sponsor execution and green power. Management strategy includes reducing concentration risk, improving profitability through reversion and sourcing green power. If the sponsor and REIT manager execute well, green power access and operating credibility could support customer retention and pricing. The benefit should be modeled as improved retention and margin, not as a guaranteed step-change in revenue.

Summary table

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Segment TTM+5y Op Margin	Segment TTM+5y Op Income	Probability
Bear	US$32.782m	43.0%	US$14.096m	25%
Base	US$37.023m	47.5%	US$17.586m	55%

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Segment TTM+5y Op Margin	Segment TTM+5y Op Income	Probability
Bull	US$40.722m	50.0%	US$20.361m	20%

Note: Op margin and op income in this summary mean REIT segment NPI margin and NPI. This mapping is intentional because the official segment table and quant foundation identify NPI as the REIT-relevant operating profit metric. Conventional segment operating income is not disclosed for Austria. The summary probabilities are segment-scenario probabilities for synthesis, not standalone investment probabilities.

Data gaps inserted

- [DATA GAP: no listed three-year Austria revenue, NPI, or YoY history exists in the data package.]
- [DATA GAP: no VIE1-specific management quote, earnings-call transcript, tenant-by-tenant lease expiry table, or Austria-only renewal guidance is available in the data package.]
- [DATA GAP: no Austria revenue split by tenant, hyperscale, colocation, power, fit-out, or other operating income is available in the data package.]

Stage 5 Synthesis and Valuation

NTT DC REIT - Synthesis (Combined Earnings Model)

Date prepared: 2026-07-02 Ticker: NTDU.SI Current price: US$0.94 TTM end: 2026-03-31 Horizon date: 2031-03-31

1. Anchors

This synthesis uses the ER2 Stage 5 framework, adapted for a listed Singapore REIT. The framework's ordinary language asks for revenue, operating income, net income, EPS, and a P/E 15 test. For NTT DC REIT, the controlling operating metric is not conventional operating income and the controlling equity earnings metric is not IFRS net profit. The data package and quant foundation identify gross revenue, net property income, distributable income, DPU, leverage, interest cover, occupancy, WALE, rent reversion, manager-fee units, and distribution units as the material REIT economics. I therefore use NPI as the segment operating income proxy, then bridge to distributable income and DPU per unit. The ER2 price gate is preserved by mapping DPU x 15 to the current unit price, clearly labeled as a P/DPU 15 equivalent.

The official listed-history boundary matters. NTT DC REIT listed in July 2025 and FY25/26 includes properties from their respective completion dates. There is no true four-quarter listed REIT history and no normal five-year public company series. The correct anchor is the official FY25/26 listed-history and pro forma base to 2026-03-31, not pre-listing FMP rows. FMP recognized NTDU.SI but omitted official other operating income and did not supply REIT KPI lines. The official SGX financial statement announcement, media release, investor presentations, quant foundation, and reviewed data package control the model.

Anchor	Value	Source or use
Today	2026-07-02	Orchestrator anchor
Fiscal year end	March 31	Data package and quant foundation
TTM anchor	2026-03-31	FY25/26 official listed-history anchor
TTM quarters	No true four-quarter listed REIT history	Use FY25/26 and pro forma official base
Horizon date	2031-03-31	TTM end plus exactly 5.0 calendar years
Compounding span	5.0 years	Do not stretch to six fiscal years
Current price	US$0.94	Orchestrator input
TTM gross revenue	US$164.821m	Data package
TTM NPI	US$74.925m	Data package
TTM distributable income	US$57.516m	Data package
TTM DPU	5.56 US cents	Data package
Units entitled for distribution	1,033.950746m	Data package
Issued and issuable units	1,039.141509m	Quant foundation

The IFRS net profit record is shown but not used as the primary valuation gate. FY25/26 profit after tax attributable to unitholders was US$3.134 million and diluted EPU was 0.30 US cents. At US$0.94 per unit, that accounting EPU would imply a very high conventional P/E, but that is not the right REIT cash earnings test because net profit includes depreciation, revaluation and deferred tax effects while DPU is the cash distribution measure. The gate below is therefore P/DPU less than or equal to 15 on the TTM+5y base case.

2. Segment-level forward assumptions

The segment appendices use geography as the reportable taxonomy: US, Austria, and Singapore. That matches the data package, which states that the current segment structure is geography because each geography is separately managed under different economic and regulatory conditions. Each segment appendix also concludes that property-level and product-level revenue are not disclosed. The model therefore does not invent VA2, CA1, CA2, CA3, VIE1, SG1 tenant or product revenue splits. It uses the single official geography line for each segment and treats NPI as the property operating income proxy.

Segment	TTM revenue	Bear TTM+5y revenue	Base TTM+5y revenue	Bull TTM+5y revenue	Bear NPI margin	Base NPI margin	Bull NPI margin	Source
US	US$100.824m	US$108.615m	US$127.156m	US$141.411m	36.5%	41.5%	44.0%	appendix_B_us.md sections 8-10
Austria	US$30.430m	US$32.782m	US$37.023m	US$40.722m	43.0%	47.5%	50.0%	appendix_B_austria.md sections 8-10
Singapore	US$33.567m	US$37.978m	US$43.871m	US$49.321m	58.0%	64.0%	66.5%	appendix_B_singapore.md sections 8-10
Total	US$164.821m	US$179.375m	US$208.050m	US$231.454m	42.2%	47.3%	49.9%	Segment sums

The US segment is the largest revenue contributor and the main swing factor in absolute dollars. Its base case uses a 4.75% five-year revenue CAGR and modest NPI margin improvement from 39.7% to 41.5%. Austria is a smaller single-property segment with a base 4.0% revenue CAGR and margin improvement from 46.1% to 47.5%. Singapore is the highest-margin property, with a base 5.5% revenue CAGR and margin improvement from 62.1% to 64.0%, driven by the SG1 MSA renewal, fixed escalation, and backfill opportunity. The combined base case is not a hypergrowth data-center model. It is a contracted rent, occupancy, reversion, and property operating leverage model.

3. Combined revenue build

The consolidated revenue build is a direct sum of the three reviewed segment appendices. No corporate eliminations are added because the official FY25/26 geography revenue table already ties to the group gross revenue line, and the data package does not identify a recurring intersegment elimination that should be carried forward. If future reporting introduces a corporate or elimination line, this synthesis should be updated rather than silently forcing the old taxonomy.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
US revenue	US$108.615m	US$127.156m	US$141.411m
Austria revenue	US$32.782m	US$37.023m	US$40.722m
Singapore revenue	US$37.978m	US$43.871m	US$49.321m
Sum of segment TTM+5y revenue	US$179.375m	US$208.050m	US$231.454m
Corporate eliminations	US$0.000m	US$0.000m	US$0.000m
Combined TTM+5y gross revenue	US$179.375m	US$208.050m	US$231.454m
Implied TTM to TTM+5y CAGR	1.71%	4.77%	7.03%

The base case revenue endpoint is US$208.050 million, up US$43.229 million from the official FY25/26 base. That requires a 4.77% combined five-year CAGR. This is above the portfolio's 3.1% weighted average escalation because the model gives credit for committed occupancy, SG1 reversion, some renewal economics, and operating execution. It is not an aggressive development pipeline case. The bull case reaches US$231.454 million, or a 7.03% combined CAGR, and requires sustained scarcity pricing and clean backfill across the portfolio. The bear case still grows revenue modestly because the portfolio has fixed escalators, but it assumes churn, weak power revenue, concessions, or operating friction absorb most of the visible rent escalator benefit.

4. Combined NPI build

This section is the REIT-specific replacement for the ordinary operating income build. NPI is gross revenue less property operating expenses. It is the disclosed segment profit metric and the best property-level cash operating proxy. Depreciation, finance expense, trust expenses, taxes, valuation movements, and distribution adjustments are not ignored; they are handled in the group distributable income bridge. The segment appendices do not use NPI after depreciation as operating income because that would mix property cash economics with accounting depreciation in a way that is not comparable across REIT assets.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
US NPI	US$39.644m	US$52.770m	US$62.221m
Austria NPI	US$14.096m	US$17.586m	US$20.361m
Singapore NPI	US$22.027m	US$28.077m	US$32.798m
Sum of segment TTM+5y NPI	US$75.767m	US$98.433m	US$115.380m

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
Unallocated corporate expense	Included in DI bridge	Included in DI bridge	Included in DI bridge
Combined TTM+5y NPI	US$75.767m	US$98.433m	US$115.380m
Implied NPI margin	42.24%	47.31%	49.85%

The base case NPI endpoint is US$98.433 million, up US$23.508 million from the official FY25/26 NPI base of US$74.925 million. The combined NPI margin rises from 45.45% to 47.31%. The uplift is driven by mix and operating leverage: Singapore grows faster than the group and keeps a high margin; US margin improves from a low starting point; Austria improves modestly. This is plausible but not free. Data centers require ongoing power, cooling, maintenance, security, customer fit-out, and technical upgrade spend. The model therefore does not treat every incremental rent dollar as distributable income.

The bear case is important because the NPI endpoint of US$75.767 million is only slightly above the FY25/26 base. That is not business failure. It is a scenario in which revenue rises but NPI conversion weakens because property operating costs, energy, incentives, vacancy, or customer concentration offset the rent escalator. The bull case NPI of US$115.380 million requires margin to approach 50%, which is possible only if high occupancy, rent reversion, and power-service economics flow through without a large cost shock.

5. Distributable income and DPU build

For a REIT, the equity earnings measure used in the valuation gate is distributable income per unit. This bridge starts with combined NPI and applies a distributable income conversion ratio. The FY25/26 conversion was 76.8%, calculated as US$57.516 million of distributable income divided by US$74.925 million of NPI. That conversion includes trust-level expenses, finance costs, taxes, manager fees, and distribution adjustments. I do not use FY25/26 IFRS net profit of US$3.134 million as the valuation base because that would let fair-value and accounting depreciation effects dominate a cash distribution vehicle.

The forward conversion assumptions are conservative relative to the TTM conversion. Bear uses 72.5% because refinancing, power, fee, and maintenance drag can absorb NPI growth. Base uses 75.5%, slightly below TTM, because manager-fee units and rising finance cost over the maturity ladder should not be ignored. Bull uses 76.5%, roughly in line with TTM, because operating leverage and high occupancy can preserve conversion if debt and fee discipline hold. These are not tax-rate assumptions in the ordinary corporate sense; they are REIT cash conversion assumptions.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
Combined TTM+5y NPI	US$75.767m	US$98.433m	US$115.380m
Distributable income conversion	72.5%	75.5%	76.5%
Distributable income	US$54.931m	US$74.317m	US$88.266m
Ending units for DPU	1,078.611m	1,078.611m	1,078.611m
DPU at TTM+5y	5.09 US cents	6.89 US cents	8.18 US cents
Reported FY25/26 IFRS net profit	US$3.134m	US$3.134m	US$3.134m
Reported FY25/26 diluted EPU	0.30 US cents	0.30 US cents	0.30 US cents

The base case DPU is 6.89 US cents. This is the number that matters for the ER2 gate adaptation. It is only 24% above the FY25/26 DPU of 5.56 US cents over five years, despite a 31% NPI increase, because the model allows ongoing unit issuance for manager fees and does not assume conversion expands. The resulting DPU CAGR from 5.56 cents to 6.89 cents is about 4.4% over five years. That is compatible with a stable, high-quality data-center REIT. It is not enough to prove a 20% Gideon compounder unless the current price is low enough.

6. Unit count path

The ordinary ER2 share-count section asks for buybacks and SBC. That is not the right structure for NTT DC REIT. There are no modeled buybacks and no conventional SBC path in the source package. The relevant unit-count issue is manager fees paid in units. The management appendix states that FY25/26 manager base fee of US$5.955 million and performance fee of US$2.622 million were payable in units, with 6.101605 million units for the base-fee component and 2.830404 million units for the performance-fee component. That is 8.932009 million fee units in total for the year. The data package and quant foundation separately show 1,033.950746 million units entitled for distribution and 1,039.141509 million issued and issuable units at 2026-03-31.

The base unit path uses the distribution-entitled units as the DPU starting denominator and adds 8.932009 million fee units per year for five years. It does not model acquisition equity issuance because no specific acquisition, price, financing mix, or accretion economics are in the reviewed source files. That is conservative in one way and incomplete in another: it captures ongoing fee dilution, but it does not assume sponsor acquisitions create accretion or dilution. Any future acquisition should be modeled as a separate event.

Year ending	Starting units	Buyback units	SBC-like issuance	Manager fee units	Ending units
2026-03-31 base	1,033.951m	0.000m	0.000m	0.000m	1,033.951m
2027-03-31	1,033.951m	0.000m	0.000m	8.932m	1,042.883m
2028-03-31	1,042.883m	0.000m	0.000m	8.932m	1,051.815m
2029-03-31	1,051.815m	0.000m	0.000m	8.932m	1,060.747m
2030-03-31	1,060.747m	0.000m	0.000m	8.932m	1,069.679m
2031-03-31	1,069.679m	0.000m	0.000m	8.932m	1,078.611m

This path raises units by 44.660 million, or 4.3%, over five years. If the fee framework changes in FY26/27 as management has indicated, the path may be wrong. That is a monitoring item, not a reason to omit dilution today. The gate should not give credit for a fee redesign until it is implemented and its per-unit economics are known.

7. P/DPU 15 test

The ER2 valuation gate is preserved by asking whether base case DPU x 15 exceeds the current unit price. Required DPU at US$0.94 and a P/DPU of 15 is US$0.062667 per unit, or 6.27 US cents. The base case clears that requirement, but not with a large margin of safety.

Case	DPU at TTM+5y	DPU x 15	Current price	Cushion	Pass
Bear	US$0.0509	US$0.764	US$0.940	-18.7%	No
Base	US$0.0689	US$1.033	US$0.940	9.9%	Yes
Bull	US$0.0818	US$1.227	US$0.940	30.6%	Yes

P/DPU 15 gate: PASS, with a thin 9.9% base-case cushion. The base case current-price multiple is 13.6x TTM+5y DPU. This is not a deep bargain. The gate passes because a plausible five-year DPU is above the required 6.27 cents, not because the REIT has proven a high-return compounder profile. Management and moat both remain YELLOW in their appendices, and the listed history is short. If the main narrative applies a higher qualitative hurdle for a BUY verdict, the synthesis alone should not override that caution.

8. Reflexivity check

The model compounds from a base that must tie to official reported data. It does. The three FY25/26 segment revenues sum to the official gross revenue line: US$100.824 million plus US$30.430 million plus US$33.567 million equals US$164.821 million. The three FY25/26 segment NPIs also sum to the official NPI line: US$40.054 million plus US$14.026 million plus US$20.845 million equals US$74.925 million. The data package and quant foundation already verified the DPU bridge: US$57.516 million of distributable income divided by 1.033950746 billion distribution units equals 5.56 US cents after rounding.

The latest completed FY and the TTM anchor are the same official FY25/26/pro forma listed-history base. That is not ideal for a mature-company analysis, but it is the correct fact pattern for a newly listed REIT. The forward model therefore inherits a disclosure limitation, not an arithmetic flaw. The limitation is visible: no pre-listing annual public REIT series, no normal four-quarter public TTM series, no property-level revenue, and no tenant-level revenue. The synthesis should be read as a controlled five-year underwriting from the best official anchor, not as a statistically validated time-series forecast.

9. In-progress FY and recency reconciliation

There is no clean in-progress FY treatment in this synthesis. The Stage 0 anchor is FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31, and the horizon is exactly five calendar years after that date. The recent trend evidence is 1H FY25/26, 9M FY25/26, 2H FY25/26, and FY25/26, but those periods overlap and do not form four independent public quarters. The correct use of recency is qualitative and arithmetic: the first forward-year base case should not step materially above the latest run-rate without a specific reason.

The first forward year implied by the base segment CAGRs is US$172.674 million of gross revenue. That is 4.8% above the FY25/26 official gross revenue base of US$164.821 million. It is within the 10% recency tolerance and is supported by the SG1 renewal, portfolio committed occupancy of 98.5%, fixed escalation, and year-end leasing recovery after a weaker 9M NPI observation. The model does not begin with a 15% or 20% step-up. That matters because a newly listed REIT could otherwise appear cheap simply by capitalizing a front-loaded lease event across the whole portfolio.

Recency item	Value	Comment
FY25/26 gross revenue	US$164.821m	Official base
Base first-forward-year revenue	US$172.674m	Segment CAGR path
Difference from base	4.8%	Within 10% tolerance
FY25/26 NPI	US$74.925m	Official base
Base TTM+5y NPI	US$98.433m	Five-year endpoint
Portfolio committed occupancy	98.5%	Supports moderate growth

10. Sensitivity

The sensitivity table varies one input at a time and holds the rest of the base case constant. Because this is a REIT model, the final column is DPU rather than EPS. The most important variables are US revenue growth, unit dilution, and the NPI-to-distributable-income conversion ratio. Singapore margin matters less than intuition might suggest because Singapore is a high-margin asset but only about 21% of base horizon revenue. US is the largest segment, so a 200 bp change in US revenue CAGR has a visible impact on DPU.

Variable tested	Downside case	Base DPU	Upside case	Interpretation
US revenue CAGR plus or minus 200 bps	6.55 cents	6.89 cents	7.26 cents	Largest segment drives absolute DPU sensitivity
Singapore NPI margin plus or minus 200 bps	6.83 cents	6.89 cents	6.95 cents	High margin but smaller revenue base
Ending units plus or minus 5%	6.56 cents	6.89 cents	7.25 cents	Fee units and equity issuance matter
DI conversion plus or minus 300 bps	6.62 cents	6.89 cents	7.16 cents	Finance costs, trust expenses, tax and fees matter

The DPU gate is most fragile when unit issuance and cash conversion move the wrong way at the same time. A 5% higher unit count alone would reduce base DPU to 6.56 cents, still above the required 6.27 cents but with only a small cushion. A 300 bp lower DI conversion would reduce base DPU to 6.62 cents. If both happened together, the base case would be close to the line. That is why sponsor acquisitions, manager fee structure, refinancing, and debt discipline are not side issues. They directly determine whether NPI growth becomes per-unit DPU growth.

11. Combined earnings summary

The probability weights are 25% bear, 55% base, and 20% bull. The base case gets the highest weight because current occupancy, committed occupancy, fixed escalation, and the SG1 renewal support steady growth. The bear case receives a meaningful weight because the REIT is newly listed, externally managed, sponsor-dependent, tenant-concentrated, and exposed to power and refinancing costs. The bull case is credible but lower probability because it requires sustained scarcity pricing, clean backfill, margin expansion, and no governance or capital markets disappointment.

Case	Revenue	NPI	NPI margin	Distributable income	DPU	Probability	DPU x 15	Vs. US$0.94
Bear	US$179.375m	US$75.767m	42.2%	US$54.931m	5.09 cents	25%	US$0.764	-18.7%
Base	US$208.050m	US$98.433m	47.3%	US$74.317m	6.89 cents	55%	US$1.033	9.9%
Bull	US$231.454m	US$115.380m	49.9%	US$88.266m	8.18 cents	20%	US$1.227	30.6%
Probability-weighted	US$205.969m	US$96.841m	47.0%	US$72.491m	6.72 cents	100%	US$1.008	7.3%

The headline base case is therefore: TTM+5y revenue of US$208.050 million, NPI of US$98.433 million, distributable income of US$74.317 million, DPU of 6.89 US cents, and required DPU of 6.27 US cents for P/DPU 15 at the current US$0.94 price. The base cushion is 9.9%. The probability-weighted DPU is 6.72 cents, or a 7.3% cushion. Both are positive, but neither is

wide enough to ignore the YELLOW management and moat gates.

Tie-out checks

- Reported-financial tie-out: PASS. FY25/26 segment gross revenue sums exactly to US$164.821 million and segment NPI sums exactly to US$74.925 million. Because FY25/26 is also the official TTM/pro forma listed-history anchor, the latest completed FY and TTM checks tie to the same official base.

- DI divided by units equals DPU: PASS. TTM US$57.516 million divided by 1.033950746 billion units equals 5.56 US cents after rounding. Bear US$54.931 million divided by 1.078611 billion units equals 5.09 cents. Base US$74.317 million divided by 1.078611 billion units equals 6.89 cents. Bull US$88.266 million divided by 1.078611 billion units equals 8.18 cents.

- Segment sum tie-out at horizon: PASS. Horizon revenue equals the sum of US, Austria, and Singapore in every case. Bear is US$179.375 million, base is US$208.050 million, and bull is US$231.454 million. Corporate eliminations are zero because no forward elimination line is disclosed.

- Product-to-segment rollup: PASS with disclosure limitation. Each segment appendix uses one disclosed geography or property line because product and property revenue splits are not disclosed. The product sum therefore equals the segment total in each case by construction. This is a data limitation, not an arithmetic gap.

- Weighted margin check: PASS. Each segment has one modeled line, so the segment margin equals that line's NPI margin. The combined margin is the weighted result of segment NPI divided by segment revenue: 42.2% in bear, 47.3% in base, and 49.9% in bull.

- Unit count path: PASS. The path begins with 1,033.950746 million distribution-entitled units, adds 8.932009 million manager-fee units per year for five years, and ends at 1,078.611 million units. No buyback or SBC-like program is modeled because none applies to this REIT in the reviewed source pack.

- Growth plausibility: PASS with young-listing caveat. There is no listed three-year CAGR, so the check cannot use a normal historical ceiling. Segment base CAGRs of 4.75%, 4.0%, and 5.5% are justified by fixed escalation, occupancy, SG1 reversion, and market scarcity, and do not assume a hidden development pipeline.

- Historical arithmetic: PASS. The segment appendices calculate TTM revenue multiplied by one plus CAGR to the fifth power for exactly five years. The resulting endpoints match the provided reviewed segment figures within rounding: US$127.156 million for US base, US$37.023 million for Austria base, and US$43.871 million for Singapore base.

- Recency anchor: PASS. The base first-forward-year revenue is US$172.674 million, or 4.8% above the official FY25/26 base of US$164.821 million. That is within the 10% tolerance and is supported by disclosed leasing and committed occupancy.

- Capital allocation and cash conversion consistency: PASS. The DI conversion ratios are anchored to FY25/26 DI/NPI of 76.8% and are held at or below that level in bear and base. Debt maturity, fee units, and trust-level cash costs are recognized through conversion and unit dilution rather than ignored.

- Markdown table verification: PASS. Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11 use pipe tables with blank lines before and after, a header row, a delimiter row, consistent cell counts, no multi-line cells, and no literal pipe characters inside cells.

Key findings for the main narrative

The synthesis passes the adapted ER2 price gate, but it is not a high-margin pass. Base case DPU of 6.89 US cents gives a P/DPU 15 value of US$1.033, only 9.9% above the current US$0.94 unit price. A conventional corporate EPS model would be misleading here because FY25/26 IFRS EPU was only 0.30 US cents while cash DPU was 5.56 US cents. The main report

should therefore state the gate as P/DPU less than or equal to 15 equivalent, not ordinary P/E.

The operating forecast is plausible because it is not heroic. Combined revenue grows at 4.77% and NPI at 5.62% annually from the official base to 2031-03-31. The model gives credit for the SG1 renewal, high occupancy, committed occupancy, fixed escalation, and modest margin improvement, while keeping DI conversion below the TTM level and adding manager-fee unit dilution. The most important risks are not the arithmetic. They are governance, sponsor economics, future fee structure, refinancing, tenant concentration, and whether data-center technical capex consumes more NPI growth than the model allows.

Compounder Score

NTT DC REIT - Compounder Score

Date prepared: 2026-07-02 Ticker: NTDU.SI Current price: US$0.94 Currency: USD TTM end: 2026-03-31 Horizon date: 2031-03-31

1. Executive Verdict

NTT DC REIT earns a diagnostic Compounder Score of 46/100, made up of Business Quality of 42/80 and Valuation / 20% Return Underwriting of 4/20. The score-implied classification is Reject under the compounder rubric. That does not mechanically override the ER2 verdict gates, but it does say the current evidence does not support a Gideon-style 20% annualized compounder case at US$0.94.

The score is capped for four reasons. First, this is a newly listed REIT with one public fiscal period, not a business with a multi-cycle public track record. The quant foundation and data package both warn that FY25/26 is the official listed-history anchor and that pre-listing FMP rows should not be treated as ordinary listed-company history. Second, standard ROIC and ROIIC are not the right primary metrics. The more relevant return proxy is property-level NPI yield, which was 4.5% on group data-center property carrying value in FY25/26, with Singapore stronger at about 6.7% on valuation but the US segment materially lower. Third, reinvestment is not internally funded in the way a retained-earnings compounder reinvests. Major growth will require acquisitions, debt, equity, sponsor arrangements, or development capital. Fourth, the base-case price gate passes on P/DPU 15 but does not come close to a 20% return case.

The evidence supports a real asset-level data-center infrastructure business. Portfolio occupancy was 95.1%, committed occupancy was 98.5%, WALE was 4.5 years, weighted average rental escalation was 3.1%, and FY25/26 rental reversion was 8.5%, or 13.7% including the SG1 MSA renewal. Aggregate leverage was moderate at 29.2%, ICR was 4.2x, and there were no debt maturities due in the next two financial years. The sponsor platform is a real advantage. NTT Global Data Centers brings technical credibility, customer relationships, and possible pipeline access that a small standalone REIT would not have.

The evidence does not support a high-confidence compounder score. Management is YELLOW, moat is YELLOW, and the 2046 test is YELLOW. Related-party exposure is material, the external-manager structure matters, tenant concentration is high, FY25/26 top 10 customers represented 75.4% of MBR including NTT Group, and SG1's major MSA renewal only runs to 2029-03-31. The base-case synthesis produces 2031 DPU of 6.89 US cents and a P/DPU 15 value of US$1.033, only 9.9% above the current unit price. Including interim distributions, that is roughly a high-single-digit annualized return, not a 20% underwriting case.

2. Data Source Map

Evidence area	Source used	Treatment
Price and market cap	Quant foundation FMP status and orchestrator current price	Current price US$0.94; market cap US$971.914m from fresh FMP quote file noted in QF
Income and NPI	Quant foundation and data package	Official SGX FY25/26 gross revenue US$164.821m, NPI US$74.925m
Distributable income and DPU	Quant foundation, data package, synthesis	FY25/26 DI US$57.516m and DPU 5.56 US cents; base 2031 DPU 6.89 cents
Balance sheet and leverage	Quant foundation and data package	Gross borrowings US$517.232m, cash US$45.992m, leverage 29.2%, ICR 4.2x
Segment economics	Appendix B US, Austria, Singapore	Geography-level revenue and NPI; no product or property revenue split invented
Management	Appendix management	Management gate YELLOW; external manager, sponsor dependence, fee structure pending
Moat and durability	Appendix moat	Moat gate YELLOW and 2046 test YELLOW
Valuation model	Appendix synthesis	P/DPU 15 adaptation; base-case P/DPU pass with thin 9.9% cushion
Data gaps	QF, data package, segment appendices	No normal four-quarter listed TTM, no five-year listed history, limited tenant/property revenue detail

3. Key Financial and Quality Metrics

Metric	Value	Formula / source	Scoring implication
FY25/26 gross revenue	US$164.821m	Official SGX / QF	Official listed-history base
FY25/26 NPI	US$74.925m	Official SGX / QF	REIT operating profit proxy
FY25/26 distributable income	US$57.516m	Official SGX / QF	Cash distribution base
FY25/26 DPU	5.56 US cents	Official SGX / QF	Current P/DPU about 16.9x
Group NPI yield on property carrying value	4.5%	74.925 / 1,667.213	Modest property return proxy
Singapore NPI yield on valuation	6.7%	20.845 / 310.7	Best asset-level evidence but only one segment
DI / NPI conversion	76.8%	57.516 / 74.925	Good cash conversion for REIT context
CFO / DI	103.5%	59.504 / 57.516	Supports cash quality
Aggregate leverage	29.2%	Official FY25/26	Conservative opening leverage
Debt / EBITDA	5.8x	Data package FY25/26 deck	REIT leverage is real despite low aggregate leverage
Interest coverage ratio	4.2x	Official FY25/26	Adequate but not stress-proof
Top 10 customers incl. NTT Group	75.4% of MBR	FY25/26 presentation via data package	Material concentration risk
Portfolio occupancy	95.1%	FY25/26 release	Strong operating base
Portfolio committed occupancy	98.5%	FY25/26 release	Positive near-term backfill signal
WALE	4.5 years	FY25/26 release	Good five-year visibility, not 20-year proof
Base 2031 DPU	6.89 US cents	Synthesis	P/DPU 15 value US$1.033
Base P/DPU 15 cushion	9.9%	1.033 / 0.94 - 1	Positive but thin
Estimated base shareholder IRR	About 7% to 8%	Exit at 15x DPU plus distributions	Does not clear 20%

Standard ROIC is less meaningful here because this is a REIT, net income includes non-cash property and tax effects, and the company has only one listed reporting period. I therefore score incremental returns using NPI yield on property value, DI conversion, DPU growth, leverage, funding need, and acquisition discipline. The resulting score is deliberately lower than the asset quality might feel in a narrative data-center demand discussion.

4. Rubric Scorecard

Category	Score	Max	Evidence
Incremental returns on capital	9	25	Group NPI yield 4.5%, Singapore stronger, ROIIC unproven, DI conversion good
Reinvestment runway	12	20	Strong data-center demand and sponsor pipeline, but organic capacity is finite and external growth needs capital
Durability of moat	8	15	Real asset scarcity and switching costs, but moat and 2046 are YELLOW
Accounting and financial quality	7	10	Official disclosures tie, cash conversion good, but short history and disclosure gaps limit confidence
Capital allocation discipline	6	10	Opening leverage is prudent; acquisition discipline and fee alignment are unproven
Price and 20% return underwriting	4	20	P/DPU 15 gate passes, but 20% IRR does not clear at current price
Total	46	100	Reject under compounder rubric

Incremental returns on capital: 9/25

The strongest positive is cash conversion. FY25/26 distributable income was 76.8% of NPI, and CFO was slightly above DI. That supports the view that NPI is not merely an accounting number. The negative is that the property return proxy is not high.

Group NPI divided by data-center properties was 4.5%. Even if Singapore's NPI yield is materially better, the REIT as a whole does not show the kind of high incremental return that would earn a high score under a compounder framework.

ROIIC cannot be calculated credibly from public listed history. There is no normal five-year listed-company series, no clean acquisition ROI series, and no asset-drop track record after listing. The initial portfolio valuation uplift is positive but not a proven acquisition-inclusive ROIIC record. The score gives partial credit for good cash conversion and strong asset demand, but it withholds high-return credit until the REIT proves that acquisitions, lease renewals, and development capex create per-unit DPU growth above the cost of capital.

Reinvestment runway: 12/20

The runway is real but not fully owned by the REIT. Data-center demand, AI/HPC workloads, cloud growth, power scarcity, and Singapore/U.S. market tightness all support the asset class. The NTT sponsor platform adds pipeline and operating credibility. The segment models also show plausible base-case growth: US revenue CAGR 4.75%, Austria 4.0%, and Singapore 5.5% from the FY25/26 base to 2031.

The cap is that organic reinvestment is limited by owned capacity, lease rolls, power availability, and physical asset needs. Major growth likely comes from sponsor acquisitions or development capital. That can be value creating if acquired at attractive yields with conservative financing. It can also dilute minorities if assets are dropped into the REIT at tight cap rates with fee leakage and equity issuance. A REIT that must repeatedly access external capital cannot be scored like a capital-light compounder.

Durability of moat: 8/15

The moat is tangible. Existing powered data centers in constrained markets are hard to replicate quickly. Customers face migration risk, downtime risk, network redesign, procurement friction, and operational risk when they move workloads. Portfolio occupancy and committed occupancy support the switching-cost argument, and SG1's 23% rent reversion is direct pricing evidence.

The moat is not yet a PASS. The moat appendix marks Moat gate YELLOW and 2046 test YELLOW. Lease duration is useful for the next cycle but not enough for a 20-year proof. SG1 has a 2029 renewal cliff before the 2031 model endpoint. Customer concentration is material. The sponsor relationship is both advantage and risk. The asset-level moat is real; the listed vehicle's right to compound that moat for minority unitholders through multiple acquisition and renewal cycles remains unproven.

Accounting and financial quality: 7/10

The source chain is clean enough for a medium confidence score. The quant foundation reconciled official SGX figures and identified FMP's limitation: FMP matched colocation/power revenue but omitted other operating income and did not provide REIT KPI lines. The official bridge ties gross revenue, NPI, distributable income, DPU, balance sheet, units, leverage, and segment totals. CFO also supports distributable income.

The score is not higher because important economic details are missing. There is no normal four-quarter public TTM, no five-year listed history, no property-level revenue, no tenant-level revenue, limited FY25/26 tenant names, no earnings-call transcript, and no complete lease-by-lease maturity schedule. Those gaps do not imply bad accounting, but they do reduce precision and make the score less robust.

Capital allocation discipline: 6/10

Opening balance-sheet discipline is good. Leverage was 29.2%, ICR was 4.2x, 70% of debt was fixed, unencumbered assets were 100%, and no maturities are due in the next two financial years. Management also completed the initial portfolio and achieved early DPU above IPO forecast.

The score is capped because this is an externally managed, sponsor-dependent REIT with material related-party transactions. The management appendix is YELLOW. Manager fees were payable in units, which is better than pure cash fees but still dilutive. A fee-structure change was under discussion rather than already proven. Future sponsor acquisitions are the key capital-allocation test, and that test has not yet occurred as a public listed REIT.

5. ROIIC and Reinvestment Analysis

For NTT DC REIT, the correct ROIIC question is not whether EBIT/NOPAT on a software-style invested-capital denominator is above 30%. The question is whether incremental property investment, capex, acquisitions, debt, and unit issuance produce per-unit DPU growth above the REIT's cost of capital.

The current evidence is insufficient to calculate a reliable three-year or five-year ROIIC. FY25/26 includes the constitution, VIE1 completion, listing, and remaining initial portfolio completion. There is no listed public baseline three years ago. There is no sequence of disclosed acquisitions where purchase yield, financing cost, fee leakage, and DPU accretion can be compared after the fact. There is no property-level revenue table that would let us isolate asset-by-asset incremental returns.

What can be scored is the starting return profile. Group NPI yield was 4.5% on data-center property carrying value. Singapore was stronger at about 6.7% on FY25/26 valuation and had a 62.1% NPI margin. The US segment had only a 39.7% NPI margin and higher property expense burden. Austria was stable but single-asset and gradual-growth. Those metrics are acceptable for a REIT, but they are not high enough to earn a high compounder score.

The reinvestment risk is that growth will look good at the NPI line but less good per unit. The synthesis already models manager-fee unit dilution of 8.932m units per year for five years, raising ending units to 1.078611bn. It does not model acquisition equity issuance because no specific transaction is available. That is conservative for the score because it gives no credit for unproven acquisition accretion. It also highlights the core diligence item: future growth must be judged after financing, fees, and unit dilution, not by asset count or NPI alone.

6. Runway Analysis

The runway is the best part of the case. Digital infrastructure demand is favorable, and data-center capacity in Northern Virginia, Northern California, Vienna, and Singapore has real scarcity characteristics. The FY25/26 metrics show the portfolio is already largely occupied, with committed occupancy above physical occupancy. Contracted escalation gives a base of growth, and the SG1 MSA renewal shows that scarcity can translate into rent per kW.

The base-case synthesis is appropriately moderate. Combined revenue grows from US$164.821m to US$208.050m over five years, a 4.77% CAGR. Combined NPI grows from US$74.925m to US$98.433m, and base DPU grows from 5.56 cents to 6.89 cents. That is a plausible REIT runway.

It is not a 20% reinvestment runway. The company cannot simply redeploy retained cash at high incremental returns because it distributes most cash income. It must maintain assets, fund capex, refinance debt, issue fee units, and probably use debt/equity for meaningful acquisitions. The NTT sponsor pipeline can help, but it must be bought at fair prices. In a hot data-center market, the same scarcity that supports existing asset values can make new acquisitions expensive.

7. Moat Analysis

The moat score gives credit for physical scarcity, switching costs, high occupancy, rent escalators, and the NTT platform. The strongest direct pricing evidence is SG1's rent moving from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, plus 5% fixed annual escalations for a three-year term. The portfolio also had 8.5% rental reversion, or 13.7% including SG1, and a high fixed-escalation mix.

The cap is durability. A high-quality data-center asset can still be a mediocre stock if tenants have bargaining power, technical capex rises, sponsor transactions are priced aggressively, or acquisition funding dilutes per-unit value. The top 10 customer concentration is high. SG1's renewal runs to 2029, two years before the valuation horizon. The available package does not disclose rack-density readiness, liquid-cooling capability, asset-level expansion capacity, or tenant-level renewal economics. AI is a demand support, not a proven moat by itself.

8. Accounting and Capital Allocation Analysis

The accounting evidence is adequate. Official SGX disclosures control the model, and the quant foundation reconciles the major financial lines. The main adjustment is analytical rather than forensic: IFRS net profit and diluted EPU are not the right valuation base. FY25/26 diluted EPU was only 0.30 US cents, while DPU was 5.56 US cents. For a REIT, distributable income and DPU are the better cash owner metrics, as long as capex, debt, fees, and unit issuance are not ignored.

Capital allocation is still the unresolved piece. The REIT has not yet had to prove that it will reject a sponsor asset that is attractive to the sponsor but unattractive to minority unitholders. Related-party revenue, property management fees, sales commissions, reimbursements, manager fees, and sponsor-related leasing are all material. The management appendix's upgrade condition is exactly right: a clearer fee framework, independent valuation support, conservative financing, and real DPU/NAV accretion after fees and equity issuance.

9. 20% Return Underwriting

The 20% return case does not clear. The base synthesis gives 2031 DPU of 6.89 US cents. Applying 15x DPU gives a terminal value of US$1.033. If an investor receives roughly five years of distributions along the way, total undiscounted value

might reach roughly US$1.34 per unit. From US$0.94, that is a high-single-digit annualized return, not 20%.

The bear case is clearly inadequate. Bear DPU of 5.09 cents at 15x is US$0.764, below today's price before dividends. The bull case is better but still not a clean 20% case. Bull DPU of 8.18 cents at 15x is US$1.227; with distributions, that still falls far short of the roughly US$2.34 to US$2.49 total value needed over five years for a 20% annualized return from US$0.94.

Case	2031 DPU	Exit P/DPU	Terminal value	Estimated dividends	Approx. total value	Approx. IRR
Bear	5.09 cents	15.0x	US$0.764	US$0.27	US$1.03	2%
Base	6.89 cents	15.0x	US$1.033	US$0.31	US$1.34	7% to 8%
Bull	8.18 cents	15.0x	US$1.227	US$0.34	US$1.57	10% to 11%

The estimated max buy price for a 20% five-year IRR under the base case is about US$0.54, using US$1.34 of approximate total value discounted at 20% for five years. This is rough, but the direction is clear. The current price may pass the ER2 P/DPU 15 adaptation, but it does not provide a 20% compounder entry point.

10. Hard Veto Checklist

Veto item	Status	Evidence
ROIIC below cost of capital or unproven	Watch	ROIIC is not calculable from listed history; NPI yields are modest
Reported returns are accounting artifact	Watch	NPI is cash-relevant, but property value marks and short history limit confidence
Growth requires external financing	Watch	Major acquisitions need debt/equity/sponsor capital
Share/unit count rises without per-unit proof	Watch	Fee-unit issuance modeled; future acquisition equity not yet tested
Large acquisitions without disclosed returns	Watch	Initial portfolio only; next sponsor acquisition is key test
FCF consistently lags earnings	Pass	CFO supports DI; REIT capex still matters
Concentration/leverage/regulation can impair equity	Watch	Tenant concentration and refinancing risk are material
20% case requires multiple expansion	Fail	Current price does not clear 20% under 15x DPU exit
Flawless execution required	Watch	Thin P/DPU cushion leaves limited room for dilution or lower DI conversion
Moat cannot be explained	Pass	Physical scarcity plus switching costs, but YELLOW durability
Governance/accounting trust issue	Watch	Related-party and external-manager risks require monitoring
Balance sheet could wipe out equity	Pass / Watch	Opening leverage moderate, but REIT debt/refinancing remains relevant

11. Final Decision

Score-implied classification: Reject under the diagnostic compounder rubric.

This is not a claim that the REIT is broken. The evidence supports a plausible, investable infrastructure vehicle at the right price and with explicit monitoring. It does not support a current-price, 20% annualized compounder underwriting. The base-case P/DPU test passes, but the margin of safety is thin and the expected return is much closer to a stable REIT yield-plus-growth outcome than a Gideon compounder.

Compounder Score note: 46/100; promising data-center REIT assets, but one listed period, sponsor dependence, YELLOW management/moat, and modest property returns cap the score.

Business Quality Score note: 42/80; real infrastructure quality and cash conversion, but ROIIC is unproven, organic runway is finite, tenant concentration is high, and capital allocation is not yet proven through acquisitions.

20% Return UW Score note: 4/20; base P/DPU 15 value clears the current price by only 9.9%, and estimated base IRR is high single digits rather than 20%.

12. Machine-Readable JSON

The machine-readable score is saved separately in `compounder_score.json`.

Scoring Audit

NTT DC REIT - Scoring Audit

Date: 2026-07-02 Ticker: NTDU.SI Currency: USD Current price: US$0.94 TTM anchor: 2026-03-31 Horizon date: 2031-03-31

1. Original vs Audited Scores

Item	Original	Audited	Notes
Business Quality Score / 80	42	39	Directionally fair, but still reduced for missing ROIIC, unproven acquisition economics, short public history, and YELLOW management/moat gates.
Valuation / 20% Return UW Score / 20	4	3	The P/DPU 15 gate clears with a thin 9.9% cushion, but base IRR is only high single digits and the 20% case does not clear.
Total Score / 100	46	42	Reject remains the right score-implied classification.
Classification	Reject	Reject	Score is below 70, hard vetoes remain, and current-price 20% underwriting is not plausible.

The original scorer was not making an aggressive buy case. The original report correctly identified the REIT as a promising data-center asset vehicle that fails the diagnostic compounder test. It also correctly treated the ordinary corporate P/E framework as a poor fit and used REIT-adapted metrics: NPI, distributable income, DPU, units, leverage, occupancy, WALE, rent reversion, and P/DPU. The audit does not overturn the conclusion.

The score is still modestly too generous. A newly listed REIT with one public period, no normal four-quarter listed TTM, no five-year listed record, no calculable 3-year or 5-year ROIIC, no acquisition-inclusive ROIIC, and management/moat/2046 all marked YELLOW should not retain much residual credit for incremental-return proof. The business has useful assets, but the listed security has not yet proven the Gideon-style right to compound per-unit value at high rates.

2. Score Reductions and Reasons

Incremental returns on capital are reduced from 9/25 to 7/25. Standard ROIC is not the right primary metric for a REIT, and the original scorer was correct to use property-level proxies. However, the data package gives group NPI yield on data-center property carrying value of about 4.5%, with Singapore stronger at about 6.7% on valuation. Those are useful property-yield facts, not proof of high incremental returns. The CS rubric says ROIIC receives zero if there is insufficient evidence. Here ROIIC is explicitly not calculable from listed history. Acquisition-inclusive ROIIC is also missing because there is no post-listing acquisition sequence with purchase yield, financing cost, fee leakage, and DPU accretion.

Reinvestment runway is reduced from 12/20 to 11/20. The data-center demand backdrop, NTT sponsor platform, high occupancy, committed occupancy of 98.5%, and SG1 rent reset support a real runway. The cap is structural: the REIT distributes most cash income, has finite organic capacity in the current asset base, and material growth likely requires acquisitions, debt, equity, and sponsor transactions. That is not the same reinvestment engine as a retained-earnings compounder.

Durability of moat remains 8/15. This is already below the 60% qualitative cap and is consistent with the moat appendix. The assets have scarcity, switching costs, escalators, and sponsor operating support. But the moat gate and 2046 test are YELLOW, tenant concentration is high, SG1 has a 2029 renewal checkpoint before the 2031 model endpoint, and technical capex readiness is not fully disclosed.

Accounting and financial quality remains 7/10. Official SGX sources tie the key numbers, QF reconciled 8/8 checks, and FMP limitations were handled correctly. Cash conversion from NPI to DI is visible for FY25/26 and CFO supports DI, but the score cannot go higher because multi-year FCF conversion does not exist and property-level/tenant-level revenue is not disclosed.

Capital allocation is reduced from 6/10 to 5/10. Opening leverage of 29.2%, ICR of 4.2x, 70% fixed-rate debt, and no near-term maturities are positives. The reduction is for the external-manager model, material related-party transactions, pending fee-structure change, no public acquisition discipline record, and no evidence yet that the manager will reject a

sponsor asset if unit economics are poor.

Valuation / 20% underwriting is reduced from 4/20 to 3/20. The synthesis gives 2031 base DPU of 6.89 US cents and a 15x P/DPU value of US$1.033, only 9.9% above US$0.94. Including interim distributions, the original score estimates base IRR at 7% to 8%, bear at 2%, and bull at 10% to 11%. The base case is below 10%, so 6A should be zero. The REIT deserves limited credit for cash distributions and for passing a P/DPU 15 adaptation, but it does not underwrite anywhere near 20% annualized returns.

3. Unsupported Claims

The audit found no unsupported claim that changes the overall conclusion, because the original scorer already rejected the 20% case. The unsupported or insufficiently proven items are instead items that limit the score: high ROIIC, acquisition-inclusive compounding, sponsor-pipeline accretion, 20-year durability, tenant-level stickiness, and per-unit value creation through future acquisitions.

The evidence does not support treating the NTT sponsor pipeline as a realized reinvestment engine. Sponsor access is an option, not a return. It becomes value creating only if assets are acquired at fair yields, financed conservatively, and accretive after manager fees, property-management fees, sales commissions, reimbursements, taxes, and unit issuance.

The evidence also does not support a 20% annualized shareholder return claim at the current price. The synthesis supports a P/DPU 15 cushion, not a compounder hurdle pass.

4. Calculation Errors

No major arithmetic error was found in the original score. The DPU bridge, P/DPU test, and high-level IRR framing are directionally consistent with the synthesis. FY25/26 DI of US$57.516 million divided by 1.033950746 billion distribution units ties to 5.56 US cents of DPU. Base 2031 DPU of 6.89 US cents times 15 equals US$1.033. US$1.033 divided by US$0.94 minus one gives the stated 9.9% cushion.

The issue is not arithmetic. The issue is scoring calibration. The formal CS rubric gives zero credit to ROIIC where evidence is insufficient. The REIT-adapted score can use NPI yield and DPU growth as proxies, but it should not translate those proxies into much incremental-return credit when the public history is one listed fiscal period.

5. Missing Data

The most important missing evidence is a normal listed-company history. There is no true four-quarter public TTM, no five-year listed series, no 3-year or 5-year ROIIC, no acquisition-inclusive ROIIC, no property-level revenue by asset, no tenant-level revenue, no full lease-by-lease maturity schedule, no earnings-call transcript, no full board skills/independence matrix in the reviewed pack, and no post-listing acquisition record.

These gaps are not fatal to a REIT monitor thesis. They are fatal to a high-confidence compounder score. The right score must reflect that the assets may be good while the listed vehicle's compounding proof is still incomplete.

6. Hard-Veto and Threshold Test Audit

The hard vetoes remain valid. The current price does not support a 20% annualized return under the base case. The base case does not clear 20%, the bear case is not acceptable for a 20% hurdle, ROIIC plus runway does not clear the threshold, and the total score is far below 80. Management YELLOW, moat YELLOW, and 2046 YELLOW also prevent any high-quality override.

The classification must remain Reject. Watchlist would be too charitable under the diagnostic rubric because there is a hard veto and the 20% case is not plausible at US$0.94. The REIT could become a watchlist candidate at a lower price or after several years of clean acquisition and renewal evidence, but that is not the current file.

7. Final 20% Hurdle Pass/Fail

Fail. The 20% hurdle does not clear. The base-case total value estimate is roughly US$1.34 per unit over five years, implying about 7% to 8% annualized from US$0.94. The original max buy price estimate of roughly US$0.54 for a 20% five-year IRR is directionally reasonable. The current unit price may be acceptable for a lower-return REIT investor, but it is not a Gideon 20% compounder entry.

8. Dream Business / Dream Investment Classification

Neither. NTT DC REIT owns useful data-center infrastructure and may become an attractive yield-plus-growth REIT at the right price. It is not yet a dream business because owner-specific 20-year compounding durability is unproven. It is not a dream investment because the current price underwrites only high-single-digit base IRR with a thin P/DPU 15 cushion.

9. Stage 7 Scorecard Notes

Compounder Score note: 42/100; promising data-center REIT assets, but one listed period, missing ROIIC, sponsor dependence, YELLOW gates, and current-price return math keep the score in Reject.

Business Quality Score note: 39/80; asset quality is real, but per-unit compounding proof is incomplete because ROIIC, acquisition returns, tenant-level economics, and long-cycle governance evidence are missing.

20% Return UW Score note: 3/20; base P/DPU 15 value is only 9.9% above price and base IRR is high single digits, so the 20% hurdle fails.

10. Auditor JSON

See `compounder_score_audit.json`.

Red Team Review

NTT DC REIT - Red Team Appendix

Company: NTT DC REIT Ticker: NTDU.SI Stage: RT red team Horizon attacked: 2031-03-31, five calendar years after the FY25/26 anchor

1. Most Fragile Assumption

The most fragile assumption is not the headline demand for data-center capacity. Demand is the part of this file that is easiest to believe. The fragile assumption is that property-level NPI growth will translate into per-unit DPU growth while NTT DC REIT remains externally managed, sponsor-dependent, tenant-concentrated, and capital intensive. In the Stage 5 synthesis, the base case reaches 2031 revenue of US$208.050 million, NPI of US$98.433 million, distributable income of US$74.317 million, and DPU of 6.89 US cents. That DPU is only 9.9% above the DPU required for the P/DPU 15 gate at the current US$0.94 price. The model therefore does not have room for a normal REIT set of execution frictions.

The specific line I would attack first is the combined distributable-income-to-NPI conversion and unit denominator. Stage 5 uses a 75.5% base conversion ratio, only modestly below the FY25/26 conversion of 76.8%, and it models 8.932 million annual fee units for five years, ending at 1,078.611 million units. That is already an attempt at caution, but it may still be too clean. The REIT's future growth almost certainly cannot come only from fixed escalation and existing occupancy. The sponsor pipeline is central to the story. Once acquisitions enter the model, unit issuance, fees, debt cost, acquisition yield, property-management economics, capex, and minority-unitholder alignment become the actual per-unit return engine. Stage 5 deliberately excludes acquisition equity issuance because no specific acquisition terms are disclosed. That is analytically honest, but it also means the base DPU is a same-portfolio underwriting that may not represent the real listed-vehicle path.

The sensitivity in Stage 5 already shows why the gate is fragile. A 5% higher unit count alone reduces base DPU from 6.89 cents to 6.56 cents. A 300 bp lower distributable-income conversion reduces it to 6.62 cents. If both happen at once, the result is close to the required 6.27 cents. That combined downside is not exotic. It is exactly what can happen in an externally managed REIT that pays fees in units, raises capital for sponsor assets, absorbs higher financing costs, and spends more on power, cooling, technical refresh, tenant fit-out, and sustainability. The most dangerous version of the bear case is therefore not "data-center demand collapses." It is "the properties are good, but minority unitholders do not get enough per-unit growth after the external-manager structure has taken its share."

2. Most-Likely-To-Be-Optimistic Stage 5 Number

The Stage 5 number most likely to prove optimistic is base 2031 DPU of 6.89 US cents. The bull 8.18 cent DPU is obviously the optimistic scenario, but the investment decision depends on the base case clearing the adapted gate. That base DPU rests on three assumptions that are individually defensible and collectively thin: combined revenue grows at 4.77% annually, combined NPI margin rises from 45.45% to 47.31%, and distributable-income conversion holds at 75.5% despite finance costs, fee units, capex pressure, and external-growth complexity.

The biggest challenge is Singapore. The Singapore appendix models SG1 revenue at a 5.5% base CAGR and NPI margin rising from 62.1% to 64.0%. The support is the SG1 MSA renewal: rent rises from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, the contract includes 5% annual escalation, and 2.7 MW is contracted. The red-team problem is that the same facts also contain the break. The MSA runs only to 2029-03-31, two years before the 2031 model endpoint; 0.3 MW was returned for backfill; SG1 occupancy was 91.8% at 2026-03-31, below the portfolio's 95.1%; and there is no SG1-only committed occupancy, tenant identity, power pass-through formula, lease-by-lease maturity schedule, or product revenue split. A three-year related-party lease reset is a strong near-term cash-flow catalyst. It is not a five-year proof that 64% NPI margin and 5.5% revenue CAGR hold through the next renewal cycle.

The US segment is the next pressure point. The base case uses 4.75% revenue CAGR and margin expansion from 39.7% to 41.5%. That is not wild, but it assumes high occupancy, fixed escalators, backfill, and some operating leverage without property-level revenue or tenant-level economics. The segment produced US$100.824 million of FY25/26 revenue, 61.2% of group revenue, and therefore carries the group model. A 200 bp lower US revenue CAGR takes base DPU down to 6.55 cents. That still clears the gate, but it leaves almost no cushion if unit count or conversion moves against the REIT at the same time.

External industry evidence cuts both ways. CBRE's 2026 global data-center work describes AI demand and power constraints as central market forces and notes emerging markets such as Johor and Batam gaining traction as scalable land and power

alternatives. JLL's 2026 outlook says global construction cost per MW rose from US$7.7 million in 2020 to US$10.7 million in 2025 and forecasts US$11.3 million per MW in 2026. Cushman & Wakefield's 2026 market comparison says power availability, delivery timelines, grid stability, cooling technologies, and AI infrastructure requirements are reshaping site selection. These datapoints support scarcity for existing powered assets, but they also support the red-team cost case: the same power and density constraints that make assets valuable can force capital spend, pressure utilities, increase development replacement cost, and shift incremental demand to cheaper regional markets.

Sources: [CBRE Global Data Center Trends 2026](https://www.cbre.com/insights/reports/global-data-center-trends-2026), [JLL 2026 Global Data Center Outlook](https://www.jll.com/en-us/insights/market-outlook/data-center-outlook), [Cushman & Wakefield Global Data Center Market Comparison](https://www.cushmanwakefield.com/en/insights/global-data-center-market-comparison).

3. Strongest Bear Case, Stated Hard

The strongest bear case is that NTT DC REIT is a good-asset, mediocre-security setup at the current price. The assets are real. The sponsor is real. The data-center demand backdrop is real. But the listed vehicle has one public fiscal period, no long DPU record, no acquisition-inclusive ROIIC proof, no tenant-level revenue disclosure, a concentrated customer book, and an external-manager structure that can turn asset growth into unit growth only if sponsor transactions are priced and financed for minority unitholders.

The short seller's version is simple: the market is capitalizing a data-center scarcity story, but the REIT's own base case only produces 6.89 cents of DPU in 2031 and a P/DPU 15 value of US$1.033. That is 9.9% above today's price before considering whether 15x is the right exit multiple, whether acquisitions dilute, whether SG1 renews cleanly in 2029, and whether power/cooling capex eats the NPI bridge. The audited score already says base IRR is only 7% to 8%, not 20%. If the bear is right, the public unit will not collapse because the properties are worthless; it will derate because the asset story never becomes a Gideon-quality per-unit compounding story.

The mechanism shows up in three places. First, tenant concentration gives large customers renewal leverage. The top 10 customers excluding NTT Group represented 62.9% of total MBR, and the top 10 including NTT Group represented 75.4%. Second, SG1's lease visibility ends before the model horizon. The 2026 renewal runs to 2029-03-31, not 2031-03-31. Third, data-center operating and technical costs are rising with power scarcity and AI density requirements. If those costs are not fully passed through, revenue can grow while DPU disappoints.

4. Cross-Examination Of Management Commentary

Management and official release language gives the bull case its scaffolding, but it also exposes the overpromise risk. The first statement is that FY25/26 DPU came in above IPO forecast. That is positive execution, but the data package also says gross revenue and NPI outperformance was helped by colocation/power services and tenant fit-out revenue. Tenant fit-out and other operating income should not be capitalized as if every dollar is recurring rent. The first sign this interpretation is wrong would be FY26/27 gross revenue growing while NPI margin stalls or slips because the FY25/26 beat included lower-quality or timing-sensitive revenue.

The second statement is the strategy language around "disciplined growth and long-term value creation." The red-team translation is: prove it with acquisitions. A sponsor-backed REIT can create value through pipeline access, but only if acquisition yields exceed the all-in cost of capital after fees, taxes, property-management charges, financing, and unit issuance. There is no post-listing acquisition sequence yet that proves the manager will reject a sponsor deal if the economics are poor. The first sign this breaks would be a sponsor acquisition funded with equity or hybrid capital that is presented as DPU-accretive on year-one math but lacks transparent purchase yield, maintenance capex, tenant concentration, and fee leakage disclosure.

The third statement is the SG1 MSA renewal: 23% rent reversion, 5% fixed escalation, a three-year term, 2.7 MW contracted, and 0.3 MW returned. The optimistic reading is that this validates Singapore pricing power. The skeptical reading is that the best disclosed lease event still leaves a 2029 renewal checkpoint and backfill risk before the 2031 endpoint. The first warning sign would be SG1 occupancy failing to recover above 95% or the next renewal being described with concessions, incentives, power-cost sharing, or lower net effective reversion.

5. Stage 5 Tie-Out Reverification

I do not find an arithmetic break in Stage 5. The reported segment revenue and NPI figures tie to the data package, the DPU bridge ties, the unit count path is explicit, and the P/DPU 15 test is correctly adapted to a REIT. The problem is underwriting

margin, not spreadsheet math.

The recency anchor is acceptable but weak. The REIT listed in July 2025, FY25/26 is the listed-history anchor, and there is no normal four-quarter public TTM. Stage 5 correctly refuses to fabricate a quarterly series, but that means the model is closer to a controlled underwriting than a statistically validated forecast. This matters because the same short history is being asked to carry valuation, moat, management, and scoring conclusions.

The unit-count path is also explicit but incomplete by design. It models 8.932 million fee units per year and no acquisition issuance. That is a reasonable same-portfolio case. It is not a complete listed-vehicle case if sponsor acquisitions are part of the growth runway. The absence of acquisition issuance makes the base DPU cleaner than the likely real-world path, unless future acquisitions are genuinely accretive after all costs.

6. Score-Derived 20% Return Claim Most Likely Wrong

There is no credible 20% current-price return claim to defend. The audited scoring file gives NTT DC REIT a 42/100 total score, 39/80 business-quality score, and 3/20 valuation-underwriting score. It classifies the security as Reject and says the base case supports only high-single-digit IRR. The red team agrees.

The claim most likely to be wrong, if anyone tries to resurrect it, is that passing the adapted P/DPU 15 gate is equivalent to clearing the Gideon 20% hurdle. It is not. The P/DPU 15 gate says the base DPU x 15 value is US$1.033 against a US$0.94 price. Including interim distributions, the scoring audit estimates roughly 7% to 8% annualized base return. That may be acceptable for a yield-plus-growth REIT investor. It is not a 20% compounder entry. The assumption that would break a 20% claim first is not exit multiple; it is NOPAT/DPU per-unit compounding after unit issuance and external acquisitions. The current file does not prove that engine.

7. Forced-Exit Signal

The forced-exit signal should be quantitative and near-term: exit if, over any two consecutive reporting updates before 2029-03-31, portfolio occupancy falls below 94.0% or committed occupancy falls below 96.0%, while NPI margin falls below 44.0% and management does not disclose a signed, net-effective accretive backfill or renewal plan. This combination would invalidate the thesis because the base case depends on high occupancy, fixed escalators, positive reversion, and stable-to-rising NPI conversion. A single metric can be noisy; the combination of lower utilization and lower margin would show that demand, pricing, or pass-through is not converting into DPU.

There is also an SG1-specific exit trigger: if the 2029 MSA renewal or replacement economics are not disclosed before expiry, or if disclosed renewal/backfill terms imply less than 3% net effective annual rent growth from the 2026 reset after incentives and power-cost sharing, downgrade the Singapore base case to bear. SG1 is only about one-fifth of base horizon revenue, but it is a much larger share of the confidence story because it supplies the clearest pricing-power proof.

8. Conviction After Red Team

The thesis does not survive as a BUY or Gideon compounder at the current price. It can survive as a monitor or lower-return REIT candidate if the user is underwriting yield, sponsor-backed asset quality, and moderate DPU growth. The core break is not the data-center demand backdrop. The core break is that the present evidence does not prove 20% per-unit compounding, and the valuation cushion is too thin to absorb normal REIT frictions.

The synthesis should therefore be rewritten around a PASS or strict watchlist frame: high-quality data-center assets, credible near-term operating support, but insufficient listed history, unresolved external-manager and sponsor-deal risk, tenant concentration, SG1 2029 renewal risk, capex/power pass-through uncertainty, and base-case return below the hurdle. The right investment question is not "are these assets useful?" They are. The right question is "does NTDU.SI at US$0.94 give Gideon enough per-unit compounding proof and margin of safety?" It does not.

Key Findings

- The strongest bear argument is good assets but weak current-price per-unit underwriting: 6.89 cents of base 2031 DPU gives only a 9.9% P/DPU 15 cushion.
- The Stage 5 base DPU is most exposed to simultaneous unit dilution and lower distributable-income conversion.
- The audited score already rejects the 20% case; the red team agrees that P/DPU 15 pass is not a 20% return pass.
- SG1 is the most dangerous comfort point because the 2026 MSA expires in 2029, before the 2031 model endpoint.

- Tenant concentration, external-manager incentives, acquisition financing, power costs, and technical capex are not side risks; they directly decide whether NPI becomes DPU.
- Forced exit: occupancy below 94.0% or committed occupancy below 96.0% for two reporting updates plus NPI margin below 44.0% without signed accretive remedies.

Data Package

NTT DC REIT - Data Package

PATH_RECEIVED: C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\NTT DC REIT\data_package.md

Company: NTT DC REIT Ticker: NTDU.SI Date prepared: 2026-07-02 Fiscal year: March 31 Most recent period anchor: FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31, announced 2026-05-12 Primary source rule: official SGX and NTT DC REIT IR disclosures control; FMP is comparison only where it is complete enough to compare.

0a. Industry classification and disclosure inventory

NTT DC REIT is a Singapore-listed data center REIT. The economic unit is not a conventional product segment with ordinary revenue and operating-income history. The material underwriting data are gross revenue, net property income, distributable income, DPU, occupancy by IT load, committed occupancy, WALE, rental reversion, design IT load, property value, customer concentration, escalation mix, leverage, debt maturity, fixed-rate debt, and interest cover. The official reporting regime is SGX local-exchange announcements and investor presentations. Because the issuer listed only on 2025-07-14 and FY25/26 includes property contributions from completion dates rather than a normal five-year listed-company history, any five-year table must explicitly separate official listed history from pre-listing, prospectus, or FMP pro-forma rows.

FMP recognized `NTDU.SI`, returned quote/profile/ordinary annual statements, and returned empty annual and quarterly revenue-product-segmentation arrays in fresh D pulls dated 2026-07-02. FMP's ordinary income statement captured revenue from colocation and power services of US$155.106 million for FY25/26, but the official REIT gross revenue was US$164.821 million because official gross revenue also included US$9.715 million of other operating income. Therefore FMP is useful for a comparison log but incomplete for REIT gross revenue, NPI, DPU, tenant and asset KPIs. The controlling sources checked in this run were the FY25/26 SGX financial statement announcement, FY25/26 SGX results media release, FY25/26 SGX results presentation, 9M FY25/26 business update, 1H FY25/26 investor presentation, QF/QFR artifacts, live SGX/IR search results, live FMP pulls saved under the local raw folder, and public data-center market sources from CBRE and JLL for industry context only.

Source inventory used in this package:

Source family	Exact source checked	Local or live reference	Controlling use
FY25/26 financial statement announcement	SGX announcement dated 2026-05-12	`raw\nttdcreit_fy25-26_fs_announcement_2026-05-12.txt`; SGX URL `https://links.sgx.com/1.0.0/corporate-announcements/TKVC2GLR5JBL9TYG/888501_FS%20Announcement.pdf`	Consolidated income, distribution statement, balance sheet, cash flow, geographic segment table, unit count, NAV/NTA, debt notes
FY25/26 results media release	SGX media release dated 2026-05-12	`raw\nttdcreit_fy25-26_results_media_release_2026-05-12.txt`; SGX URL `https://links.sgx.com/1.0.0/corporate-announcements/TKVC2GLR5JBL9TYG/888502_FY25-26%20Results%20MR.pdf`	Headline FY25/26 performance, management quote, leasing, occupancy, WALE, rental reversion, debt, valuation, industry outlook
FY25/26 results presentation	SGX presentation dated 2026-05-12	Live SGX URL `https://links.sgx.com/1.0.0/corporate-announcements/TKVC2GLR5JBL9TYG/888503_FY%2025-26%20Results.pdf`	Year-end portfolio overview, asset highlights, tenant concentration, property valuation table, capital-management and debt maturity charts
9M FY25/26 business update	IR update dated 2026-02-10	`raw\nttdcreit_9m_fy25-26_business_update_2026-02-10.txt`; IR URL `https://ir.nttdcreit.com/newsroom/20260210_182545_NTDU_NM95KKDU46GMA29I.1.pdf`	Interim context, property KPI detail, customer mix, debt maturity, 9M revenue/NPI/DI
1H FY25/26 investor presentation	Investor deck dated 2025-11-12	`raw\nttdcreit_1h_fy25-26_investor_presentation_2025-11-12.txt`	Earlier property KPI snapshot, tenant mix, named customer table, debt profile, strategy language
FMP comparison pulls	Fresh D files dated 2026-07-02	`raw\d_20260702_fmp_*.json`	Quote/profile/statements/ratios/key metrics/product endpoint status; not controlling for official REIT KPIs
Market context	CBRE and JLL 2026 data-center outlook pages	CBRE global data-center trends 2026, CBRE U.S. data-center outlook 2026, JLL 2026 data-center outlook	Industry tailwind context only; not used for NTT DC REIT historicals

Search inventory and table names checked:

Search term or table name	Sources checked	Result
Gross revenue, revenue from colocation and power services, other operating income	FY25/26 FS announcement, FY25/26 media release, FMP income statement	Official line items found; FMP matched colocation/power only and omitted other operating income
Net property income, property operating expenses, geographic segment	FY25/26 FS announcement segment note and statement table	Official geographic table found for US, Austria and Singapore
DPU, distributable income, units entitled for distribution	FY25/26 FS announcement distribution statement and EPU/DPU section	Official DPU and units found
Occupancy, committed occupancy, WALE, rent reversion, escalation	FY25/26 media release, FY25/26 presentation, 9M update, 1H presentation	Official portfolio and asset KPI tables found
Design IT load, customer count, MBR, property value	FY25/26 presentation, 9M update and 1H presentation property summary tables; FY25/26 media release for valuation	Official asset-level data found, including year-end grouped asset highlights and valuation table
Debt maturity, aggregate leverage, fixed-rate debt, ICR, all-in rate	FY25/26 FS announcement, FY25/26 media release, FY25/26 presentation, 9M update, 1H presentation	Official capital management data found, including year-end maturity buckets and no-maturity-near-term statement
Tenant concentration and credit	FY25/26 presentation, 9M update and 1H presentation customer tables	Official customer concentration found; latest FY25/26 deck anonymizes most customers but gives top-10 and MBR concentration
FMP product segmentation	Fresh FMP product segmentation annual and quarter endpoints	Empty arrays; classify as FMP unavailable, not official non-disclosure by itself

Completeness matrix:

Dataset / table family	Official source searched	Search terms or table names	Years available	Included in data package?	If excluded, why	Downstream relevance
Segment economics	FY25/26 FS announcement	Geographic segment, gross revenue, property operating expenses, NPI, segment assets, liabilities, capex	FY25/26 and 2H FY25/26	Yes	Not excluded	Segment appendices and synthesis should use geography as reportable segments
Industry KPIs	Media release, FY25/26 presentation, 9M update, 1H presentation	Occupancy, committed occupancy, design IT load, WALE, rent reversion, MBR, customer mix	IPO baseline, 1H, 9M, FY25/26 depending on KPI	Yes	Not excluded	Moat, management, real-estate underwriting
Capital and balance sheet	FS announcement, media release and presentations	Aggregate leverage, ICR, fixed rate, debt maturity, debt currency profile, unencumbered assets	1H, 9M, FY25/26	Yes	Not excluded	Synthesis leverage and refinancing risk
Product history	FS announcement and FMP product segmentation	Revenue from colocation and power, other operating income, revenue-product-segmentation	FY25/26 only officially; FMP product arrays empty	Partial	No granular product dollars beyond official components	Prevents fabricated product split
Recent trend	1H presentation, 9M update, FY25/26 release	Gross revenue, NPI, DI, DPU, occupancy, committed occupancy, rental reversion	1H, 9M, FY25/26	Yes	No normal quarterly public series because REIT was newly listed	Recency anchor and gap flags

Material KPI historical-series table:

KPI family	Granularity	FY-5	FY-4	FY-3	FY-2	FY-1	Latest interim / TTM	Source path
Gross revenue	Group	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$164.821m	9M FY25/26 US$106.021m; 2H FY25/26 US$115.302m	FY25/26 FS lines 139 and 193-197; 9M lines 329-336
NPI	Group	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$74.925m	9M FY25/26 US$47.105m; 2H FY25/26 US$52.356m	FY25/26 FS lines 139-145 and 193-207; 9M lines 329-344
Distributable income / DPU	Group	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	DI US$57.516m; DPU 5.56 US cents	9M DI US$36.290m; 1H DPU 1.69 US cents	FY25/26 FS lines 278-283 and 1221-1234; 9M lines 329-344

KPI family	Granularity	FY-5	FY-4	FY-3	FY-2	FY-1	Latest interim / TTM	Source path
Occupancy	Portfolio by IT load	IPO disclosure 94.3% baseline	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	95.1%	1H 95.1%; 9M 94.6%; committed 98.5% at FY	Media release lines 109-130; FY presentation lines 218-237; 1H lines 404-419 and 1444-1473; 9M lines 192-216
WALE	Portfolio by MBR	IPO disclosure 4.8 years	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	4.5 years	1H 4.4 years; 9M 4.4 years	Media release lines 127-130; FY presentation lines 115-147 and 291-310; 1H lines 192-215; 9M lines 248-269
Leverage / ICR / fixed debt	Group	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	29.2% leverage, 4.2x ICR, 70% fixed	1H 32.5% leverage, 4.1x ICR; 9M 32.5% leverage, 4.0x ICR	Media release lines 88-96; FY presentation lines 396-441; 1H lines 755-786; 9M lines 403-433
Asset value / design IT load	Portfolio and assets	IPO purchase consideration US$1.5bn	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Valuation US$1.6702bn; design IT load 90.7 MW	1H purchase consideration US$1.5bn; 9M table 90.7 MW	Media release lines 136-138 and 185-194; FY presentation lines 115-147 and 369-392; 9M lines 1018-1049

1. Reporting structure and taxonomy

The current reportable segment structure is geography: US, Austria and Singapore. The FY25/26 FS announcement states that segment reporting is by geography because the operations of each geography are separately managed due to different economic and regulatory environments. This is the correct taxonomy for downstream segment appendices. The product taxonomy is narrower: official statements disclose revenue from colocation and power services, other operating income, and property operating expenses. They do not disclose product-level revenue by hyperscale, colocation, retail, wholesale, customer vertical, or asset in the FY25/26 financial statement announcement. Investor presentations do disclose property-level design IT load, occupancy, customer count, MBR and WALE, which are REIT KPIs rather than product revenue.

Reporting has not changed during the short listed history. The listed entity was constituted on 2025-03-28, completed VIE1 on 2025-06-27, completed the remaining initial portfolio on 2025-07-14, and reports FY25/26 to 2026-03-31. The correct boundary is not a segment restatement; it is a listing and acquisition completion boundary. FY25/26 includes financial performance of properties from their respective completion dates. Pre-FY25/26 FMP rows appear to represent pre-listing or portfolio-context data and should not be treated as listed REIT history unless tied to the prospectus or official pre-listing pro forma disclosure.

FY25/26 reportable segments:

Segment / geography	Description	FY25/26 gross revenue	Share of FY25/26 gross revenue	FY25/26 NPI	NPI margin	Source
US	Data center properties in Northern Virginia and Northern California	US$100.824m	61.2%	US$40.054m	39.7%	FY25/26 FS lines 1049-1098
Austria	VIE1 data center in Vienna	US$30.430m	18.5%	US$14.026m	46.1%	FY25/26 FS lines 1049-1098
Singapore	SG1 data center in Singapore	US$33.567m	20.4%	US$20.845m	62.1%	FY25/26 FS lines 1049-1098
Total	Six-asset initial portfolio	US$164.821m	100.0%	US$74.925m	45.5%	FY25/26 FS lines 139-145 and 1094-1098

Geographic exposure is therefore material and primary. On revenue, the US is the largest exposure. On NPI margin, Singapore has the highest margin in FY25/26. Austria carries asset-specific finance expense in the segment note, because the segment liabilities for Austria include loans and borrowings of US$157.466 million. Downstream segment work should not interpret the Austria margin without that financing structure note.

2. Consolidated historicals

This section follows the required five-column table contract but does not fabricate five-year listed history. NTT DC REIT does not have five fiscal years of listed REIT financial statements. FY25/26 is the official listed-history anchor. Prior columns are marked as not applicable for listed history. FMP has older annual rows, but those are not controlling official listed REIT history and are excluded from the consolidated historical base unless a later subagent explicitly ties them to prospectus pro forma sources.

Metric	FY-5	FY-4	FY-3	FY-2	FY-1 FY25/26	Source
Gross revenue	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable - not listed	US$164.821m	Official FY25/26 FS lines 139 and 193-197
Revenue from colocation and power services	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$155.106m	Official FY25/26 FS line 195; fresh FMP income statement ties this component
Other operating income	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$9.715m	Official FY25/26 FS line 196
Property operating expenses	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$89.896m	Official FY25/26 FS lines 199-205
Net property income	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$74.925m	Official FY25/26 FS line 207
Profit before tax	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$0.978m	Official FY25/26 FS lines 1114-1116; fresh FMP income statement ties
Profit after tax attributable to unitholders	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$3.134m	Official FY25/26 FS lines 1114-1116 and 1221-1229
Diluted EPU	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	0.30 US cents	Official FY25/26 FS lines 1221-1229
Weighted average units	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	1,032.113m	Official FY25/26 FS line 1228
Capex in data center properties	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$17.495m	Official FY25/26 FS line 1129 and lines 733-768
Net cash generated from operating activities	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$59.504m	Official FY25/26 FS lines 557-559
Distributable income	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$57.516m	Official FY25/26 FS lines 278-283 and 1221-1234
DPU	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	5.56 US cents	Official FY25/26 FS line 283 and 1234
ROIC / NPI on invested property base	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	4.5% NPI / data-center properties	Calculation using NPI US$74.925m and data-center properties US$1,667.213m

ROIC note: a conventional NOPAT/invested-capital ROIC is not the best primary REIT metric for this listed history because net income includes large non-cash revaluation movements, the REIT was newly listed, and distributable income is the cash-relevant measure. For comparability, a property-level return proxy is FY25/26 NPI divided by period-end data-center property carrying value: US$74.925 million / US$1,667.213 million = 4.5%. A conventional FMP ROIC is lower and not controlling because FMP's ordinary statement format is not designed for REIT NPI and distributable-income economics. Tax rate is not normalized because FY25/26 income tax credit of US$2.156 million includes deferred tax effects and is not a clean cash tax rate.

Self-verification on load-bearing numbers:

Check	Live or official source used in this run	Result	Treatment
Most recent period headline performance	Live SGX FY25/26 media release PDF loaded on 2026-07-02; local official media release lines 70-83	Gross revenue US$164.8m, NPI US$74.9m, DI US$57.5m, DPU 5.56 US cents confirmed	Official controls
Management commentary	Official FY25/26 media release lines 49-52	Short CEO quote verified; no earnings-call transcript found in source pack	Use official release language; no fake call quote
FMP annual revenue	Fresh D FMP income statement saved as `raw\d_20260702_fmp_income_annual_NTDU_SI.json`	FMP revenue US$155.106m ties colocation/power services but is 5.9% below official gross revenue	FMP fails full gross-revenue tie; official gross revenue controls

3. Segment historicals

The official segment table gives FY25/26 and 2H FY25/26 by geography. It does not give a five-year annual segment series because the REIT is newly listed. Therefore each segment table preserves the required columns but marks unavailable prior years as not applicable.

US segment	FY-5	FY-4	FY-3	FY-2	FY-1 FY25/26	Source
Gross revenue	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$100.824m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
YoY %	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not meaningful vs listed history	Listing boundary
Property operating expenses	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$60.770m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
NPI	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$40.054m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
NPI margin	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	39.7%	Calculation
Segment assets	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$1,098.124m	FY25/26 FS lines 1118-1126
Segment capex	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$8.769m	FY25/26 FS lines 1128-1132

Austria segment	FY-5	FY-4	FY-3	FY-2	FY-1 FY25/26	Source
Gross revenue	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$30.430m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
YoY %	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not meaningful vs listed history	Listing boundary
Property operating expenses	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$16.404m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
NPI	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$14.026m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
NPI margin	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	46.1%	Calculation
Segment assets	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$320.310m	FY25/26 FS lines 1118-1126
Segment liabilities	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$181.257m	FY25/26 FS lines 1124-1132
Segment capex	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$4.626m	FY25/26 FS lines 1128-1132

Singapore segment	FY-5	FY-4	FY-3	FY-2	FY-1 FY25/26	Source
Gross revenue	Not applicable - not listed	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$33.567m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
YoY %	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not meaningful vs listed history	Listing boundary
Property operating expenses	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$12.722m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
NPI	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$20.845m	FY25/26 FS lines 1091-1098
NPI margin	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	62.1%	Calculation
Segment assets	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$342.315m	FY25/26 FS lines 1118-1126
Segment capex	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	US$4.100m	FY25/26 FS lines 1128-1132

Interim segment table for recency:

Segment / geography	2H FY25/26 gross revenue	2H FY25/26 NPI	2H FY25/26 NPI margin	Source
US	US$70.968m	US$28.382m	40.0%	FY25/26 FS lines 1057-1067
Austria	US$20.670m	US$9.075m	43.9%	FY25/26 FS lines 1057-1067
Singapore	US$23.664m	US$14.899m	63.0%	FY25/26 FS lines 1057-1067
Total	US$115.302m	US$52.356m	45.4%	FY25/26 FS lines 1057-1067

4. Product / sub-segment historicals

The official product-dollar disclosure is limited. Product segmentation by hyperscale/colocation is disclosed as contract mix by MBR or customer type in presentations, not as revenue dollars. Asset tables disclose IT load, customer count, occupancy, MBR and WALE; they do not disclose gross revenue by property in FY25/26 FS. No product revenue is back-solved in this package.

Segment	Product / revenue component	What it is	Dollar disclosure?	Last disclosed revenue and source
Group	Revenue from colocation and power services	Contracted data-center service and power revenue	Yes	FY25/26 US$155.106m; FY25/26 FS line 195
Group	Other operating income	Tenant fit-out and other operating income	Yes	FY25/26 US$9.715m; FY25/26 FS line 196
Group	Hyperscale contracts	Customer contract type, not product revenue	No revenue dollars	9M MBR mix: hyperscale 50.8%, colocation 49.2%; 9M lines 664-668
Group	Colocation contracts	Customer contract type, not product revenue	No revenue dollars	9M MBR mix: hyperscale 50.8%, colocation 49.2%; 9M lines 664-668
US	VA2, CA1, CA2, CA3 assets	Property-level data-center assets	No gross revenue dollars by asset in FY25/26 FS	Property KPIs disclosed in 1H and 9M presentations
Austria	VIE1	Property-level data-center asset	No gross revenue dollars by asset in FY25/26 FS	Geography-level revenue and NPI disclosed; property KPIs disclosed
Singapore	SG1	Property-level data-center asset	No gross revenue dollars by asset in FY25/26 FS	Geography-level revenue and NPI disclosed; property KPIs disclosed

Products or KPIs with only non-dollar, mix, or operating disclosure:

Segment	Product / KPI	Disclosure method	Last 4 available observations	Source
Group	Occupancy by IT load	Percent of design IT load	IPO baseline 94.3%; 1H 95.1%; 9M 94.6%; FY25/26 95.1%	Media release lines 109-130; 1H lines 404-419; 9M lines 192-216
Group	Committed occupancy	Percent including committed leases not yet commenced	9M 97.3%; FY25/26 98.5%	9M lines 192-216; media release lines 109-130
Group	WALE	Years weighted by MBR	1H 4.4; 9M 4.4; FY25/26 4.5	1H lines 192-215; 9M lines 248-269; media release lines 127-130
Group	Rental reversion	Percent on renewed leases	1H 5.1%; 9M 9.2%; FY25/26 8.5%; 13.7% including SG1 MSA	1H lines 128-141; 9M lines 192-216; media release lines 100-107
Singapore	SG1 MSA	Rent per kW and capacity	Renewal from S$385/kW to S$474/kW; 2.7MW contracted; 0.3MW returned capacity to backfill	Media release lines 106-110
Group	Escalation mix	MBR-weighted escalation profile	FY25/26 fixed escalation 89.4%; CPI-linked 3.3%; average escalation 3.1%	Media release lines 127-130

Asset KPI snapshot from 9M FY25/26:

Asset	Geography	Design IT load	Customers	Occupancy by IT load	Year-to-date base rent	WALE	Purchase consideration	Source
VA2	US	14.0 MW	9	98.1%	US$7.8m	3.7 years	US$200.0m	9M lines 1018-1049
CA1	US	12.6 MW	119	90.3%	US$10.8m	3.8 years	US$250.0m	9M lines 1018-1049
CA2	US	26.1 MW	22	99.8%	US$15.1m	7.3 years	US$308.0m	9M lines 1018-1049
CA3	US	14.0 MW	30	89.7%	US$9.7m	5.6 years	US$212.0m	9M lines 1018-1049
VIE1	Austria	15.4 MW	77	91.5%	US$13.0m	6.3 years	US$271.0m	9M lines 1018-1049
SG1	Singapore	8.6 MW	28	93.5%	US$15.7m	0.9 years	US$259.0m	9M lines 1018-1049

Asset	Geography	Design IT load	Customers	Occupancy by IT load	Year-to-date base rent	WALE	Purchase consideration	Source
Total / average	Portfolio	90.7 MW	262	94.6%	US$72.1m	4.4 years	US$1,500.0m	9M lines 1018-1049

Latest FY25/26 asset highlights and valuation from the live SGX results presentation:

Asset / group	Geography	2025-12-31 occupancy	2026-03-31 occupancy	2025-12-31 WALE	2026-03-31 WALE	2026-03-31 valuation	Purchase consideration	Source
VA2	US	98.1%	98.1%	5.7 years	5.5 years	US$250.0m	US$200.0m	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 259-290 and 369-392
CA1-3	US	94.8%	95.7%	3.7 years	3.5 years	US$818.0m	US$770.0m	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 259-290 and 369-392
VIE1	Austria	91.5%	92.0%	6.3 years	5.2 years	US$291.5m	US$271.0m	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 259-290 and 369-392
SG1	Singapore	93.5%	91.8%	0.9 years	1.8 years	US$310.7m	US$259.0m	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 259-290 and 369-392
Total / average	Portfolio	94.6%	95.1%	4.4 years	4.5 years	US$1,670.2m	US$1,500.0m	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 115-147, 218-237 and 369-392

The FY25/26 results deck updates the 9M table by showing year-end occupancy and WALE for VA2, CA1-3, VIE1 and SG1, but it still does not disclose property-level gross revenue or NPI. The asset-level valuation table is useful for NAV and geographic asset exposure: VA2 increased 25.0% versus purchase consideration, CA1-3 increased 6.2% in aggregate, VIE1 increased 7.6%, SG1 increased 20.0%, and total portfolio valuation increased 11.3%. These are valuation marks, not recurring revenue growth rates.

5. Most recent trend

Company FY ends March 31. Most recently completed fiscal period at time of writing: FY25/26, covering the period from constitution and property completion dates to 2026-03-31, reported on 2026-05-12 via SGX FY25/26 financial statement announcement and media release.

The REIT does not have a clean four-quarter public listed history. The proper recent trend is 1H FY25/26, 9M FY25/26, 2H FY25/26, and FY25/26, with explicit overlap. 2H overlaps the 9M update and should not be used as a standalone quarter. The most recent official anchor for downstream modeling is FY25/26.

Period	Gross revenue	NPI	Distributable income	DPU	Source
1H FY25/26	US$49.519m	US$22.569m	US$17.433m	1.69 US cents	1H presentation lines 275-298
9M FY25/26	US$106.021m	US$47.105m	US$36.290m	Not disclosed in update	9M update lines 329-344
2H FY25/26	US$115.302m	US$52.356m	US$40.083m	3.87 US cents	FY25/26 FS lines 139-145 and 278-283
FY25/26	US$164.821m	US$74.925m	US$57.516m	5.56 US cents	FY25/26 FS lines 139-145 and 278-283

Portfolio trend:

Date / period	Occupancy	Committed occupancy	WALE	Rental reversion	Debt / leverage	Source
IPO disclosure / 2024-12-31 baseline	94.3%	Not disclosed here	4.8 years	Not applicable	Not applicable	1H lines 404-419; QF source register
2025-09-30	95.1%	Not separately shown	4.4 years	5.1%	32.5% leverage, 4.1x ICR, 70% fixed	1H lines 128-141 and 755-786
2025-12-31	94.6%	97.3%	4.4 years	9.2%	32.5% leverage, 4.0x ICR, 70% fixed	9M lines 192-216 and 403-433
2026-03-31	95.1%	98.5%	4.5 years	8.5%; 13.7% including SG1 MSA	29.2% leverage, 4.2x ICR, 70% fixed	Media release lines 88-138

The operating trend is mixed but investable-quality for a data-center REIT: FY25/26 exceeded IPO forecast at gross revenue, NPI, distributable income and DPU, but the 9M update showed NPI modestly below adjusted IPO forecast due to lower occupancy and softer power revenue. The year-end update then showed stronger leasing and committed occupancy, with the SG1 MSA renewal setting up FY26/27 impact. The limitation is that there is no long multi-year public listed series; downstream models should use official FY25/26 and the prospectus forecast framework rather than extrapolating stale FMP pre-listing rows.

6. Management commentary on forward growth

No earnings-call transcript was found in the official source pack or live search results used for this D package. This package therefore does not invent call speakers or conference-call quotes. It uses the official FY25/26 media release, 9M business update and 1H investor presentation as management/event materials. Verbatim quoted text is intentionally short; longer commentary is paraphrased and cited.

Management and event commentary:

Source	Speaker / source type	Short quote or paraphrase	Topic	Modeling interpretation
FY25/26 media release dated 2026-05-12	Yutaka Torigoe, CEO of the REIT Manager	"DPU above our IPO forecast"	Initial listed execution	Management frames the first fiscal period as execution ahead of the IPO forecast, not as a mature run-rate history
FY25/26 media release lines 49-52	Yutaka Torigoe, CEO	"disciplined growth and long-term value creation"	Acquisition and growth posture	Growth should be modeled as disciplined sponsor-backed external growth, not unlimited debt-funded expansion
FY25/26 media release lines 70-83	Official results release	Gross revenue and NPI exceeded IPO forecast, helped by colocation/power services and tenant fit-out revenue	Revenue quality	Tenant fit-out and other operating income contributed to outperformance; recurring NPI base should not simply capitalize all other operating income
FY25/26 media release lines 100-110	Official results release	SG1 MSA renewal delivered 23% rent reversion and 5% fixed annual escalation	Singapore repricing	SG1 is a near-term positive lease reversion driver but the renewal term is three years and part of capacity is being backfilled
FY25/26 media release lines 127-134	Official results release	Portfolio WALE 4.5 years; 89.4% fixed escalation; weighted average rental escalation 3.1%	Cash-flow visibility	Lease escalators reduce inflation pass-through risk, but fixed escalators can lag market pricing in tight capacity periods
FY25/26 media release lines 88-96	Official results release	No maturities due in next two financial years; 70% fixed-rate debt; 4.2x ICR	Balance sheet	Refinancing risk is manageable near term; leverage improved to 29.2% pre-distribution and 31.3% expected post distribution
9M update lines 196-212	Official business update	Strong 3Q leasing led to committed backfill; sponsor leasing incentive expected to help	Leasing pipeline	9M lower occupancy was not a static problem; committed contracts were expected to contribute from 4Q FY25/26
1H presentation lines 834-842	Official investor presentation	Strategy included reducing concentration risk, improving profitability through reversion, and sourcing green power	Asset management	The underwriting case depends on active leasing and sponsor channel execution rather than passive yield alone

Industry and market context used only for qualitative backdrop:

Market	Source	Context included	Use in model
US	FY25/26 media release lines 146-152; CBRE U.S. data-center outlook 2026	Sacramento tight vacancy and AI/HPC spillover; U.S. demand remains strong while power and land constrain supply	Supports rent growth and high occupancy, but property-level customer renewals still control
Austria	FY25/26 media release lines 154-158	Vienna has barriers from land, power and construction costs; vacancy around 8%; gradual rental growth	Supports stable growth rather than hypergrowth assumptions

Market	Source	Context included	Use in model
Singapore	FY25/26 media release lines 160-162; CBRE global trends 2026	Supply-constrained market with pipeline pre-committed; CBRE noted Singapore as one of APAC's tightest markets	Supports SG1 pricing and reversion, but SG1 WALE was short at 9M and renewal terms matter

7. Capital allocation history

The listed history is one fiscal period. The table marks pre-listing years as not applicable and separates acquisition/investing cash flows from recurring maintenance capex. FMP free cash flow is not a clean REIT distributable-cash proxy because FY25/26 includes acquisition of the initial portfolio and data-center property capex.

Year	Capex / acquisitions	Capex / revenue	R&D	Buybacks	Dividends / distributions	M&A / acquisitions	Source
FY-5	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not listed
FY-4	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not listed
FY-3	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not listed
FY-2	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not listed
FY25/26	US$17.495m additions to data-center properties; US$1,233.726m acquisition outflow	10.6% of gross revenue for additions only	Not applicable	None disclosed	FY25/26 DPU 5.56 US cents; DI US$57.516m	Initial portfolio acquisition and VIE1 completion	FY25/26 FS lines 557-566, 1128-1132, 1221-1234

Cash-flow and capital-allocation details:

FY25/26 cash-flow / allocation line	Value	Source
Net cash generated from operating activities	US$59.504m	FY25/26 FS lines 557-559
Acquisition of data center properties and related assets/liabilities	US$1,233.726m outflow	FY25/26 FS lines 561-566
Additions of capital expenditures in data center properties	US$17.495m outflow	FY25/26 FS lines 561-566 and 1128-1129
Net cash used in investing activities	US$1,250.905m outflow	FY25/26 FS line 566
Proceeds from issuance of units	US$772.657m	FY25/26 FS lines 568-577
Proceeds from loans and borrowings	US$536.781m	FY25/26 FS lines 568-577
Repayment of loans and borrowings	US$11.673m outflow	FY25/26 FS lines 568-577
Financing costs paid on loans and borrowings	US$13.735m outflow	FY25/26 FS lines 568-577

8. Balance sheet snapshot

Balance sheet data are as of 2026-03-31 unless otherwise noted. The official FS controls; FMP ties many ordinary balance-sheet fields but is secondary.

Item	Value	Source
Data center properties	US$1,667.213m	FY25/26 FS lines 733-768
Independent portfolio valuation	US$1,670.2m	FY25/26 media release lines 136-138
Cash and cash equivalents	US$45.992m	FY25/26 FS lines 317-322
Restricted cash	US$7.000m	FY25/26 FS lines 308-315
Total assets	US$1,773.797m	FY25/26 FS lines 317-322
Loans and borrowings carrying value	US$512.140m	FY25/26 FS lines 789-797
Gross borrowings / total debt	US$517m / US$517.232m	FY25/26 FS lines 789-826; media release lines 88-96
Net debt using carrying loans less cash	US$466.148m	Calculation
Aggregate leverage	29.2% rounded; 29.17% in FS/QF	Media release lines 88-96; QF P6
Interest coverage ratio	4.2x	Media release lines 88-96
Weighted average all-in interest rate	4.01%	Media release lines 88-96
Fixed-rate debt	70%	FY25/26 FS lines 825-826; media release lines 94-96

Item	Value	Source
Unutilised facilities	US$60m	FY25/26 FS lines 822-826
Debt maturities	No maturities due in next two financial years	Media release lines 88-96
Debt maturity profile	US$157m FY28/29; US$230m FY29/30; US$130m FY30/31	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 420-430
Debt currency profile	EUR 45%, USD 30%, SGD 25%	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 413-419
Debt / EBITDA ratio	5.8x	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation line 412
Headroom to 40.0% leverage	US$320m	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 409-411
Goodwill and intangibles	US$0	FMP balance sheet; FY25/26 NAV/NTA same because no intangible assets
NAV/NTA per unit	US$1.14 group; US$0.94 trust	FY25/26 FS lines 1243-1258

Debt maturity and liquidity note: the latest media release says no maturities due in the next two financial years, and the live FY25/26 results presentation gives the year-end maturity ladder. The current base case should therefore use no FY26/27 or FY27/28 debt maturity, followed by US$157 million in FY28/29, US$230 million in FY29/30 and US$130 million in FY30/31. The facilities also have two 12-month extension options, but those extensions should be treated as liquidity flexibility, not automatic permanent capital.

Tenant and concentration snapshot:

Metric	Value	Source
Top 10 customers excluding NTT Group	62.9% of total MBR at 2026-03-31	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 315-368
Top 10 customers including NTT Group	75.4% of total MBR at 2026-03-31	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 315-368
Monthly base rent	US$12.7m at 2026-03-31	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 315-368
Contract mix	50.3% hyperscale / 49.7% colocation at 2026-03-31	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 311-314
Escalation mix	89.4% fixed escalation, 3.3% CPI linked, 7.3% other/no escalation at 2026-03-31	Live SGX FY25/26 presentation lines 358-368
Named customer evidence	Tesla, Microsoft, Oracle, Agoda, IBM, Open Text, Cohesity and GlobalDots appeared in 1H cleaned table	1H lines 647-660

The concentration profile is material. Even excluding NTT Group, the top 10 represented 62.9% of MBR at FY25/26, and the top customer category represented 31.5% of MBR in the FY25/26 deck. This is not necessarily unusual for a data-center REIT with large enterprise and hyperscale tenants, but downstream moat and red-team work should treat tenant concentration as a primary risk, especially when lease terms and power availability interact.

9. Recent corporate actions

- 2025-06-27: completion of VIE1 acquisition, per FY25/26 FS lines 81-82 and 9M notes.
- 2025-07-14: listing date and completion of remaining initial portfolio acquisition, per FY25/26 FS lines 81-85.
- 2025-09-30: one customer termination at CA1 took effect for 638 kW from a larger VA2/CA1 customer capacity package; alternate tenants were being sought, per property table notes in 1H and 9M presentations.
- 2025-11-12: 1H FY25/26 investor presentation disclosed occupancy improvement to 95.1%, 5.1% rental reversion, 32.5% aggregate leverage and 4.1x ICR.
- 2026-02-10: 9M FY25/26 business update disclosed gross revenue US$106.021 million, NPI US$47.105 million, DI US$36.290 million, committed occupancy 97.3%, total debt US$523 million and 70% fixed-rate debt.
- 2026-03-31: SG1 MSA renewed, with rent rising from S$385/kW to S$474/kW, 5% fixed annual escalations, a three-year term to 2029-03-31, and 2.7MW contracted capacity.
- 2026-05-12: FY25/26 results announced, including DPU 5.56 US cents, aggregate leverage 29.2%, 4.2x ICR, 95.1% occupancy, 98.5% committed occupancy and portfolio valuation US$1.6702 billion.

10. Open data gaps

Gap	Classification	Sources and search terms checked	Treatment for downstream agents
Five-year listed-company financial history	Not applicable	FY25/26 FS, 9M update, 1H presentation, QF/QFR	Do not fabricate. Use FY25/26 official base and interim context only
Normal four-quarter TTM	Not applicable	QF P4, official 1H/9M/2H/FY disclosures	Do not construct fake quarters. FY25/26 to 2026-03-31 is the anchor
Product revenue by hyperscale/colocation	True non-disclosure	FY25/26 FS search: hyperscale, colocation, segment, revenue; FMP product segmentation empty	Use MBR mix and customer mix only; no product revenue dollars
Revenue by property / asset	True non-disclosure in FY25/26 FS and FY25/26 results deck	Property tables provide valuation, base rent, occupancy, IT load or WALE, not FY revenue by property	Use geography revenue and property KPIs separately
Earnings-call transcript	True non-disclosure / not found in this run	Source pack and live search did not produce an earnings-call transcript	Do not attribute call quotes. Use official releases and presentations only
FMP gross revenue	Estimated / incomplete comparison	Fresh FMP income statement, official FS	FMP revenue equals colocation/power only; official gross revenue controls
Tenant names at FY25/26	Mostly true non-disclosure in FY25/26 anonymized table	FY deck anonymizes most top customers; 1H cleaned table has named customer evidence	Use anonymized FY25/26 concentration as latest; use 1H names only as historical context

Downstream handoff notes

The segment list for Wave 2 should be US, Austria and Singapore. The data package supports geography-level FY25/26 gross revenue, NPI, NPI margin, segment assets, segment liabilities and capex. It also supports property-level IT load, occupancy, customer count, base rent and WALE from 9M and 1H materials, plus FY25/26 grouped asset highlights and property valuations from the live SGX results presentation, but not FY25/26 property revenue. The proper base for synthesis is FY25/26 gross revenue US$164.821 million, NPI US$74.925 million, distributable income US$57.516 million and DPU 5.56 US cents. The proper recency modifier is stronger year-end leasing and committed occupancy after a 9M period where NPI was slightly below adjusted IPO forecast.

Product disclosure status is limited: official dollar-disclosed historicals exist for revenue from colocation and power services and other operating income. No dollar-disclosed revenue exists for hyperscale, colocation, individual tenant groups or individual properties in the available FY25/26 official sources. Customer mix is disclosed by MBR and customer concentration, not by revenue dollars. The industry checklist is now complete enough for DR to verify REIT-specific KPIs: NPI/NOI proxy, occupancy, WALE, rent reversion, DPU/distributable income, leverage, debt maturity, fixed-rate debt, tenant concentration, design IT load, valuation, and property/geographic tables are all inventoried.

Quant Foundation

NTT DC REIT - Quantitative Foundation

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Stage 0 Anchor

Item	Anchor
Today	2026-07-02
Fiscal year convention	FY ends March 31; latest full-year period FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31
Most recently reported period	FY25/26 financial results for 28 March 2025 date of constitution to 31 March 2026, announced 12 May 2026; 9M FY25/26 business update to 31 December 2025 also available
TTM anchor	No normal four-quarter public history because IPO/listing was 14 July 2025 and properties contributed from completion dates. Use official FY25/26 and pro forma/run-rate disclosures where disclosed as controlling anchor; anchor date 2026-03-31
Forward horizon	TTM anchor + 5 calendar years = 2031-03-31

Source Register

Source	Local file / live source	Status	Controls
FY25/26 FS announcement	`raw\nttdcreit_fy25-26_fs_announcement_2026-05-12.pdf/.txt`; SGX live URL `https://links.sgx.com/1.0.0/corporate-announcements/TKVC2GLR5JBL9TYG/888501_FS%20Announcement.pdf`	Available; local text parsed; live SGX source located	Consolidated statement, distribution statement, balance sheet, cash flow, segment analysis, units, NAV/NTA
FY25/26 results media release	`raw\nttdcreit_fy25-26_results_media_release_2026-05-12.pdf/.txt`; SGX live URL `https://links.sgx.com/1.0.0/corporate-announcements/TKVC2GLR5JBL9TYG/888502_FY25-26%20Results%20MR.pdf`	Available; local text parsed; live SGX source located	Summary financials, debt, leverage, ICR, occupancy, WALE, valuation, design IT load
FY25/26 results deck	SGX live URL `https://links.sgx.com/1.0.0/corporate-announcements/TKVC2GLR5JBL9TYG/888503_FY%2025-26%20Results.pdf`	Live SGX source located	Cross-check source only
9M FY25/26 business update	`raw\nttdcreit_9m_fy25-26_business_update_2026-02-10.pdf/.txt`; IR live URL `https://ir.nttdcreit.com/newsroom/20260210_182545_NTDU_NM95KKDU46GMA29I.1.pdf`	Available; local text parsed; live IR source located	Interim context only, not a fabricated quarterly series
Duplicate 9M update	`raw\nttdcreit_2026-02-10_9m_fy25-26_business_update.pdf/.txt`	Duplicate of 9M business update	Not used separately
FMP raw pulls	`raw\fmp_*.json`; warehouse copy under `C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\Cowork\Investing\data warehouse\fmp\NTT_DC_REIT`	Pulled live 2026-07-02 using local FMP helper	Comparison/discrepancy log only where official source differs

P0 - Official-Source Override Log

NTT DC REIT is a Singapore-listed REIT, listed on 14 July 2025, with USD units and local-exchange reporting. Official SGX/IR disclosures control if FMP is absent, stale, or differs. FMP did recognize `NTDU.SI` but did not provide product segmentation and appears to carry pre-IPO/pro-forma history not suitable as listed four-quarter history.

Period	Statement type	Official source URL/file	FMP endpoint	Line item	Official value	FMP value	Delta	Controlling source	Status
FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31	FY financial results	FS announcement lines 193-219; media release lines 30-39	`income-statement NTDU.SI period=annual`	Gross revenue	164.821 US$m	155.106 US$m	+9.715 US$m	Official	FMP captured revenue from colocation/power but omitted other operating income; official gross revenue controls
FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31	FY financial results	FS announcement lines 195-197	`income-statement NTDU.SI period=annual`	Revenue from colocation/power	155.106 US$m	155.106 US$m	0.000 US$m	Official / FMP tie	FMP line matches one official revenue component, not full gross revenue
FY25/26 ended 2026-03-31	FY financial results	FS announcement lines 207, 281-283	FMP income statement	NPI / distributable income / DPU	NPI 74.925 US$m; DI 57.516 US$m; DPU 5.56 US cents	Not provided as REIT KPIs	n/a	Official	FMP statement format lacks REIT KPI bridge
2026-03-31	Balance sheet	FS announcement lines 309-352	`balance-sheet-statement NTDU.SI period=annual`	Total assets / debt / cash / equity	Assets 1,773.797 US$m; loans 512.140 US$m carrying; cash 45.992 US$m; equity 1,181.417 US$m	Same for these fields	0.000 US$m on matched fields	Official	FMP balance sheet usable as secondary tie for matched fields
2026-03-31	Product segmentation	No official product-level revenue beyond colocation/power and other operating income; geographic segment analysis disclosed	`revenue-product-segmentation NTDU.SI period=quarter/annual`	Product revenue	Not disclosed beyond official revenue components	Empty arrays	n/a	Official	Do not fabricate product history
2026-03-31	10-K style detailed report	Local SGX annual announcement	`financial-reports-form-10-k-json NTDU.SI year=2026/2025/2024 period=FY`	Segment tables	Official geographic segment table available	FMP API "No Data"	n/a	Official	Local-exchange issuer; SGX announcement controls

Symbol Availability and FMP Status

Symbol tested	Quote/profile	Statements	Revenue product segmentation	10-K JSON style endpoint	Conclusion
NTDU.SI	Non-empty quote/profile; price 0.94 USD-equivalent quote, market cap 971.914 US$m in FMP quote file	Non-empty annual income, balance sheet, cash flow, key metrics, ratios	Empty arrays for quarter and annual	No Data for 2026/2025/2024 FY	Best available FMP symbol; use as comparison only
NTDU	Empty arrays	Empty arrays	Empty arrays	Not used after empty symbol checks	Not available
NTTD.SI	Empty arrays	Empty arrays	Empty arrays	Not used after empty symbol checks	Not available
NTTD	Empty arrays	Empty arrays	Empty arrays	Not used after empty symbol checks	Not available

P1 - Product Or Segment Revenue With Source Labels

Official disclosure provides revenue components and geographic segments; it does not provide a product-level history. The product segmentation endpoint was empty, so no product-level quarterly history is fabricated.

Period	Revenue component	Value (US$m)	Source label	Source
FY25/26	Revenue from colocation and power services	155.106	official / FMP tie	FS announcement lines 195-197; FMP income statement revenue
FY25/26	Other operating income	9.715	official	FS announcement lines 195-197

Period	Revenue component	Value (US$m)	Source label	Source
FY25/26	Gross revenue	164.821	official	FS announcement lines 197, 139; media release line 30
FY25/26	FMP product segmentation, annual	n/a	FMP unavailable	`raw\fmp_NTDU_SI_revenue_product_segmentation_annual.json` empty array
FY25/26	FMP product segmentation, quarter	n/a	FMP unavailable	`raw\fmp_NTDU_SI_revenue_product_segmentation_quarter.json` empty array

Period	Geography	Gross revenue (US$m)	Property operating expenses (US$m)	NPI (US$m)	Source label	Source
FY25/26	US	100.824	60.770	40.054	official	FS announcement lines 1094-1098
FY25/26	Austria	30.430	16.404	14.026	official	FS announcement lines 1094-1098
FY25/26	Singapore	33.567	12.722	20.845	official	FS announcement lines 1094-1098
FY25/26	Total	164.821	89.896	74.925	official	FS announcement lines 1094-1098

P2 - Segment Revenue And Operating / Profit Metrics From Primary Sources

Primary segment is geography: US, Austria, Singapore. Segment operating income is not disclosed in a U.S. 10-K format. The REIT-relevant operating profit metric is NPI; the official table also discloses NPI after depreciation and property-level finance expense where applicable.

Period	Geography	Gross revenue (US$m)	NPI (US$m)	NPI margin	Depreciation (US$m)	Finance expenses allocated (US$m)	NPI after depreciation (US$m)	Segment assets (US$m)	Segment liabilities (US$m)	Capex (US$m)
FY25/26	US	100.824	40.054	39.7%	26.609	0.000	13.445	1,098.124	42.002	8.769
FY25/26	Austria	30.430	14.026	46.1%	7.581	4.053	2.392	320.310	181.257	4.626
FY25/26	Singapore	33.567	20.845	62.1%	15.805	0.000	5.040	342.315	24.584	4.100
FY25/26	Total	164.821	74.925	45.5%	49.995	4.053	20.877	1,760.749	247.843	17.495

Period	Portfolio KPI	Value	Source
2026-03-31	Portfolio value	1,670.2 US$m independent valuation; carrying value 1,667.2 US$m including prepaid sales commission note	Media release lines 136-138 and footnote line 174; FS announcement lines 733-768
2026-03-31	Design IT load	Approx. 90.7 MW	Media release lines 190-194
2026-03-31	Portfolio occupancy by IT load	95.1%	Media release lines 112-113
2026-03-31	Committed occupancy	98.5%	Media release lines 112-119
2026-03-31	WALE	4.5 years	Media release lines 112-129
2026-03-31	Rental reversion	8.5%; 13.7% including renewed SG1 MSA	Media release lines 100-107
2026-03-31	Escalation mix	89.4% fixed escalation by MBR; 3.3% CPI-linked; weighted average rental escalation 3.1%	Media release lines 127-130
2025-12-31	9M occupancy / WALE context	Occupancy 94.6%; committed occupancy 97.3%; WALE 4.4 years	9M update lines 193-216 and 240-269

P3 - Consolidated Statements, FMP-Vs-Official Tie-Outs, And Unit/Currency Checks

Currency is USD. Units are Singapore-listed USD units. FY25/26 covers period from constitution to 2026-03-31 and includes properties from their respective completion dates; it is not a normal four-quarter listed history.

Period	Line item	Official value (US$m unless noted)	FMP value	Status
FY25/26	Revenue from colocation and power services	155.106	155.106	Tie

Period	Line item	Official value (US$m unless noted)	FMP value	Status
FY25/26	Other operating income	9.715	Not separately provided	Official controls
FY25/26	Gross revenue	164.821	155.106	Official controls
FY25/26	Property operating expenses	89.896	Not REIT-formatted	Official controls
FY25/26	Net property income	74.925	Not REIT-formatted	Official controls
FY25/26	Finance expenses	15.189	15.189	Tie
FY25/26	Profit before tax	0.978	0.978	Tie
FY25/26	Profit attributable to unitholders	3.134	3.134	Tie
FY25/26	Net cash generated from operating activities	59.504	59.504	Tie
2026-03-31	Data center properties	1,667.213	1,667.213	Tie
2026-03-31	Cash and cash equivalents	45.992	45.992	Tie
2026-03-31	Total assets	1,773.797	1,773.797	Tie
2026-03-31	Loans and borrowings, carrying value	512.140	512.140 long-term debt	Tie
2026-03-31	Gross borrowings	517.232	n/a	Official controls
2026-03-31	Total liabilities	592.380	592.380	Tie
2026-03-31	Net assets / equity	1,181.417	1,181.417	Tie

Unit metric	Value	Source
Issued units as at 2026-03-31	1,030,209,500	FS announcement line 1178
Issued and issuable units as at 2026-03-31	1,039,141,509	FS announcement lines 1155-1158
Weighted average units in issue and issuable for FY25/26 EPU	1,032,113,399	FS announcement line 1228
Units entitled for distribution	1,033,950,746	FS announcement line 1233
FY25/26 DPU	5.56 US cents	FS announcement lines 1231-1234
NAV/NTA per unit	1.14 US$ group; 0.94 US$ trust	FS announcement lines 1248-1251

P4 - TTM Construction From Controlling Official Periods

There is no normal listed-company TTM made from four public quarters. The controlling anchor is FY25/26 to 2026-03-31, supplemented by 9M business update context and 2H/FY breakdowns only where officially disclosed.

Period	Gross revenue (US$m)	NPI (US$m)	Distributable income (US$m)	DPU (US cents)	Comment
9M FY25/26 to 2025-12-31	106.021	47.105	36.290	n/a	Interim business update; includes property performance from completion dates
2H FY25/26 to 2026-03-31	115.302	52.356	40.083	3.87	Official 2H line; overlaps with 9M and not a standalone quarter series
FY25/26 to 2026-03-31	164.821	74.925	57.516	5.56	Controlling base for downstream modeling

Geography	FY25/26 official base revenue (US$m)	FY25/26 official base NPI (US$m)	Base share of gross revenue	Use in downstream work
US	100.824	40.054	61.2%	Model as US data-center assets; no product-level split
Austria	30.430	14.026	18.5%	Model as VIE1 / Austria geography; note finance expense allocation
Singapore	33.567	20.845	20.4%	Model as SG1; include 2026 renewal context separately
Total	164.821	74.925	100.0%	Ties to official gross revenue and NPI

P5 - Reconciliation Checklist

Check	Test	Result	Status
0	Mandatory FMP quarterly and annual product segmentation endpoint status	Both endpoints called for `NTDU.SI`; both returned empty arrays. Official component/geographic segment disclosures replace unavailable FMP product tables.	PASS
1	Official gross revenue tie	155.106 colocation/power + 9.715 other operating income = 164.821 gross revenue.	PASS
2	NPI tie	164.821 gross revenue - 89.896 property operating expenses = 74.925 NPI.	PASS
3	Geographic gross revenue tie	100.824 US + 30.430 Austria + 33.567 Singapore = 164.821 total.	PASS
4	Geographic NPI tie	40.054 US + 14.026 Austria + 20.845 Singapore = 74.925 total.	PASS
5	Distributable income and DPU tie	57.516 US$m / 1.033950746bn distribution units = 5.56 US cents per unit after rounding.	PASS
6	Balance sheet tie	1,773.797 assets - 592.380 liabilities = 1,181.417 net assets.	PASS
7	NAV / NTA and TTM provenance	1,181.417 US$m / 1.039142bn issued-and-issuable units = 1.14 US$ NAV/NTA after rounding; TTM is explicitly official FY25/26/pro forma base, not fabricated four-quarter history.	PASS
8	Capital structure / REIT KPI tie	Gross borrowings 517.232 US$m, carrying loans 512.140 US$m, cash 45.992 US$m, aggregate leverage 29.17%, ICR 4.2x, 70% fixed-rate debt tie to official notes/media release.	PASS

P6 - Cash Flow, Balance Sheet, Unit Count, And Liquidity Data

Period	Cash flow line item	Value (US$m)	Source
FY25/26	Net cash generated from operating activities	59.504	FS announcement lines 539-559
FY25/26	Acquisition of data center properties and related assets/liabilities	1,233.726 outflow	FS announcement lines 561-566
FY25/26	Additions of capital expenditures in data center properties	17.495 outflow	FS announcement lines 561-565
FY25/26	Net cash used in investing activities	1,250.905 outflow	FS announcement lines 561-566
FY25/26	Proceeds from issuance of units	772.657	FS announcement lines 568-577
FY25/26	Proceeds from loans and borrowings	536.781	FS announcement lines 568-577
FY25/26	Repayment of loans and borrowings	11.673 outflow	FS announcement lines 568-577
FY25/26	Financing costs paid on loans and borrowings	13.735 outflow	FS announcement lines 568-577
FY25/26	Cash and cash equivalents at end of period	45.992	FS announcement line 584

2026-03-31 balance sheet / liquidity item	Value	Source
Data center properties	1,667.213 US$m	FS announcement line 309 and lines 733-768
Total assets	1,773.797 US$m	FS announcement line 322
Cash and cash equivalents	45.992 US$m	FS announcement line 319
Restricted cash	7.000 US$m	FS announcement line 313
Loans and borrowings, carrying value	512.140 US$m	FS announcement lines 330-332 and 791-797
Gross borrowings / total debt	517.232 US$m / about 517 US$m	FS announcement lines 791-797; media release lines 88-90

2026-03-31 balance sheet / liquidity item	Value	Source
Unutilised facilities	60.000 US$m	FS announcement lines 825-826
Aggregate leverage	29.17% / 29.2% rounded	FS announcement lines 825-829; media release lines 88-91
Interest coverage ratio	4.2x	FS announcement lines 831-845; media release line 94
Weighted average all-in interest rate	4.01%	FS announcement lines 825-829; media release line 94
Fixed-rate debt	70%	FS announcement lines 825-827; media release lines 94-96
Unencumbered assets	100% of total assets	Media release lines 94-96
Debt maturities	No maturities due in next two financial years	Media release lines 88-90

Blockers / Caveats For Downstream Agents

Item	Treatment
No listed four-quarter history	Do not create quarterly history beyond official 9M, 2H, and FY figures. Use FY25/26 official/pro forma base and flag listed-history limitation.
FMP product segmentation unavailable	Do not fabricate product revenue. Use official revenue components and geographic segment tables.
FMP pre-IPO/pro-forma history	FMP includes older fiscal rows for the portfolio/symbol context, but NTDU.SI listed only on 2025-07-14; do not treat those as public listed REIT history unless independently tied to prospectus/pro forma disclosures.
REIT metric priority	Downstream modeling should prioritize gross revenue, NPI, distributable income, DPU, occupancy, WALE, leverage, ICR, asset value, and units over conventional EPS/operating-income screens.

RECONCILIATION: 8/8 checks PASSED

Quant Foundation Review

NTT DC REIT - Quantitative Foundation Review

PATH_RECEIVED: C:\Users\Admin\OneDrive\GPT\ER 2.0\NTT DC REIT\quant_foundation.md

QF Integrity

Item	Result	Evidence
File exists / non-empty	PASS	`quant_foundation.md` is 17,588 bytes.
Well-formed gate line	PASS	Contains `RECONCILIATION: 8/8 checks PASSED`.
Null/truncation scan	PASS	No null-byte matches found; file reaches P6 and final reconciliation.

QFR Checks A-H

Check	Test	Independent evidence	Gap / result	Status
A	FMP annual product endpoint	Fresh `qfr_20260702_NTDU_SI_revenue_product_segmentation_param_period_annual.json` returned empty list; alternate `NTDU`, `NTTD.SI`, `NTTD` annual product endpoints also empty.	No FMP product table exists; QF disclosed empty endpoint and used official components/geography only.	PASS
B	FMP quarterly product endpoint	Fresh `qfr_20260702_NTDU_SI_revenue_product_segmentation_param_period_quarter.json` returned empty list.	No quarterly product rollup possible; QF did not fabricate product history.	PASS
C	Latest official FY/interim tie-out	SGX FY25/26 FS text: colocation/power 155.106, other operating income 9.715, gross revenue 164.821, NPI 74.925, distributable income 57.516, DPU 5.56 US cents, distribution units 1.033950746bn.	All requested FY25/26 QF claims tie to official FS/media-release lines; DPU math 57.516 / 1.033950746 = 5.563 cents rounds to 5.56.	PASS
D	Annual filing / segment extraction	Local SGX FY25/26 FS announcement controls; geographic table shows US 100.824 / Austria 30.430 / Singapore 33.567 gross revenue and US 40.054 / Austria 14.026 / Singapore 20.845 NPI.	Geographic revenue sum = 164.821; NPI sum = 74.925.	PASS
E	TTM construction	NTT DC REIT listed in July 2025 and reports FY25/26 plus 9M/2H updates, not four normal listed quarters. 9M update ties gross revenue 106.021, NPI 47.105, occupancy 94.6%, committed occupancy 97.3%, WALE 4.4 years.	QF correctly uses FY25/26 official base to 2026-03-31 and does not mix stale FMP rows into a fake four-quarter TTM.	PASS
F	Consolidated statements	Fresh FMP annual statements for `NTDU.SI` tie official values where available: revenue 155.106, net income 3.134, CFO 59.504, total assets 1,773.797, cash 45.992, long-term debt 512.140 US$m. Official FS adds REIT-only lines omitted by FMP.	Max FMP-vs-official gap is 9.715 US$m on gross revenue because FMP omits other operating income; official override is visible and correct.	PASS

Check	Test	Independent evidence	Gap / result	Status
G	Product/segment provenance	Official disclosure supports revenue components and geographic segment tables; product segmentation endpoints are empty; 10-K-style JSON fresh pulls for 2026/2025/2024 return `No Data`.	Segment/product taxonomy completeness: 3/3 official geographies covered; 2/2 official revenue components covered; 0 fabricated product categories.	PASS
H	Final gate integrity	QF source register logs SGX/IR files, FMP symbol tests, FMP product-empty status, and 10-K JSON No Data; official operating and REIT KPI claims tie arithmetically.	No hidden mismatch found; official-source override is appropriate for Singapore local-exchange REIT.	PASS

Requested Claim Tie-Outs

Claim	QFR result	Source / arithmetic
Gross revenue 164.821; colocation/power 155.106; other operating income 9.715	PASS	SGX FY25/26 FS: 155.106 + 9.715 = 164.821 US$m.
NPI 74.925; distributable income 57.516; DPU 5.56; units 1.033950746bn	PASS	SGX FS distribution table; DPU recomputes to 5.56 US cents after rounding.
Geographic revenue US 100.824 / Austria 30.430 / Singapore 33.567	PASS	SGX segment table; sum = 164.821 US$m.
Aggregate leverage 29.17 / 29.2%; occupancy 95.1%; committed occupancy 98.5%; WALE 4.5 years	PASS	SGX FS leverage note and FY25/26 media release portfolio metrics.
FMP `NTDU.SI` quote/profile/statements exist; product segmentation empty; 10-K JSON No Data	PASS	Fresh QFR FMP pulls dated 2026-07-02 confirm same status.

Final Verdict

QUANT FOUNDATION VERIFIED - CLEARED FOR WAVE 1