EXPN.L gideon lens

Experian plc - Gideon Lens Decision Narrative

Verdict: PASS

Scorecard:

Gate	Result	Notes
Management	YELLOW	Strong execution; regulatory controls and acquisition returns remain unresolved
Moat	PASS	Embedded data workflows pass the 2046 durability test
P/E <= 15 on confident EPS at TTM + 5 calendar years	FAIL	Base cushion is -4.18% at 2,949 GBX
Compounder Score	Audited 55 / 100	Reject; evidence does not support dream-investment status
Business Quality Score	Audited 54 / 80	Durable franchise, but ROIIC and allocation evidence are capped
20% Return UW Score	Audited 1 / 20	Current price does not support the 20% hurdle

One-line thesis (or reason to pass): Experian is a durable data-network compounder, but a Management YELLOW, a failed five-year P/E-15 gate, and a 5.34% probability-weighted gross return make the current price a PASS.

Decision

Experian's operating case is credible, but the entry case is not. FY2026 is the complete TTM ending 31 March 2026, and the exact underwriting horizon is 31 March 2031. The four independently reviewed regional models consolidate to Base revenue of US$11.800bn, statutory operating income of US$3.141bn, and statutory diluted EPS of 188.374 GBX. At 15 times that EPS, value is 2,825.62 GBX, 4.18% below the sealed 2,949 GBX close from 21 August 2026. Under the exhaustive decision rule, any failed primary gate makes the ER2 verdict PASS.

Business quality is real but uneven. North America supplies roughly two-thirds of revenue and three-quarters of regional Benchmark EBIT; its bureau data, identity, fraud, Ascend decisioning and embedded enterprise workflows are difficult to replace. Latin America adds a layered Serasa consumer and enterprise network. UK and Ireland remains durable but faces open-data reform, while EMEA/APAC is a low-margin recovery rather than a proven wide-moat franchise. The Moat and 2046 tests therefore pass, but North American growth and statutory conversion dominate the thesis.

Management is YELLOW rather than PASS. Brian Cassin and Lloyd Pitchford delivered strong growth, improved ROCE and generally reliable guidance. Against that, the unresolved CFPB credit-dispute matter is a trust and controls issue; US$1.413bn of gross repurchases produced little five-year net share reduction; and US$10.339bn of goodwill and intangibles sits beside limited deal-level return disclosure. These are monitorable concerns, not a fraud or solvency claim, but they prevent the qualitative gate from clearing.

The audited 55/100 Compounder Score reinforces, rather than controls, the verdict. Business Quality is 54/80: moat, runway and cash conversion are credible, but acquisition-inclusive ROIIC is only about 7%-9%, organic ROIIC is undisclosed, and no 3/5-year ROIIC trend is measurable. Return Underwriting is 1/20 because Base earns 8.52%, probability-weighted gross return is 5.34%, and even Bull reaches only 18.09%.

Security return underwriting (mandatory even when the verdict is PASS):

Measure	Result	Notes
Primary valuation method	P/E	One audited method for all scenarios, weighting and net-SGD
Gross local-currency bear / base / bull IRR	-4.69% / 8.52% / 18.09%	Five-year annualized shareholder return in GBX
Probability-weighted gross local-currency IRR	5.34%	CAGR of 3,824.483 GBX expected wealth; weights 40%/50%/10%

Measure	Result	Notes
Return bridge	2,949 GBX -> scenario wealth	Terminal statutory EPS x 20x/22x/25x P/E plus distributions; no net-debt double count

Current reported P/E is 24.613x on 119.813 GBX TTM statutory EPS, but that denominator contains temporary breach-support economics of undisclosed size and profitability. It is therefore non-comparable to terminal statutory EPS, no normalized current P/E is published, and the raw current multiple is not used as an exit cap. The independently sealed exits are 20x Bear, 22x Base and 25x Bull, anchored to row-replayed historical statutory P/E and scenario quality/cycle evidence.

Current capital structure is US$328m cash excluding overdrafts, US$3m term deposits, US$5.565bn gross borrowings including US$133m leases, and US$5.179bn net debt. The P/E method already produces common-equity value, so none of those items is added or subtracted a second time. Scenario terminal net-debt diagnostics are US$6.0bn, US$4.5bn and US$3.0bn; component cash/debt schedules are unavailable and are not fabricated.

Bear-case operating and return bridge

Bear case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	US$8.445bn	US$9.968bn	3.37%	Regulatory cost, breach runoff and slower credit activity
Operating margin	24.22%	19.62%	-4.60 pp	Compliance, mix and statutory conversion pressure
Operating earnings	US$2.045bn	US$1.956bn	-0.89%	Statutory operating income after full bridge
Diluted share count	919.0m	889.433m	-0.65%	Modest net repurchases after issuance
EPS	119.813 GBX	103.287 GBX	-2.92%	Statutory diluted EPS attributable to owners
Valuation	24.613x reported/non-comparable	20.0x	-4.613x	Historical-floor stress; current multiple unused as cap
Share value	2,949 GBX	2,065.736 GBX	-6.87%	103.287 GBX x 20x P/E
Annual dividend	50.766 GBX	50.766 GBX	0.00%	FY2026 dividend frozen
Dividend yield	1.72%	2.46%	+0.74 pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	253.829 GBX	cumulative	Five equal source-anchored payments
Total ending value	2,949 GBX	2,319.565 GBX	-4.69% gross local IRR	Share value plus cumulative distributions

Base-case operating and return bridge

Base case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	US$8.445bn	US$11.800bn	6.92%	Reviewed regional growth and measured EMEA/APAC recovery
Operating margin	24.22%	26.62%	+2.40 pp	North America mix, scale and statutory conversion
Operating earnings	US$2.045bn	US$3.141bn	8.96%	Statutory operating income after full bridge
Diluted share count	919.0m	860.863m	-1.30%	Buybacks net of employee-plan issuance
EPS	119.813 GBX	188.374 GBX	9.47%	Statutory diluted EPS attributable to owners
Valuation	24.613x reported/non-comparable	22.0x	-2.613x	Low-end historical/quality anchor; no raw-current cap
Share value	2,949 GBX	4,144.238 GBX	7.04%	188.374 GBX x 22x P/E
Annual dividend	50.766 GBX	64.791 GBX	5.00%	Five-year 5% dividend growth path
Dividend yield	1.72%	1.56%	-0.16 pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value

Base case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Five-year dividends	-	294.538 GBX	cumulative	Source-anchored dividend path
Total ending value	2,949 GBX	4,438.776 GBX	8.52% gross local IRR	Share value plus cumulative distributions

Bull-case operating and return bridge

Bull case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	US$8.445bn	US$13.245bn	9.42%	Broad Ascend, fraud, vertical and consumer execution
Operating margin	24.22%	30.78%	+6.56 pp	Strong mix and simultaneous regional execution
Operating earnings	US$2.045bn	US$4.077bn	14.79%	Statutory operating income after full bridge
Diluted share count	919.0m	849.986m	-1.55%	Stronger net repurchases after issuance
EPS	119.813 GBX	258.042 GBX	16.58%	Statutory diluted EPS attributable to owners
Valuation	24.613x reported/non-comparable	25.0x	+0.387x	Quality-growth range below historical median
Share value	2,949 GBX	6,451.041 GBX	16.95%	258.042 GBX x 25x P/E
Annual dividend	50.766 GBX	74.591 GBX	8.00%	Five-year 8% dividend growth path
Dividend yield	1.72%	1.16%	-0.56 pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	321.648 GBX	cumulative	Source-anchored dividend path
Total ending value	2,949 GBX	6,772.689 GBX	18.09% gross local IRR	Share value plus cumulative distributions

CIO actionability (separate from ER2 underwriting):

Measure	Result	Notes
Status	WATCH	Quality is credible, but expected return and downside do not clear
Bear / Base / Bull net SGD IRR	-5.05% / 8.21% / 17.79%	Five-year annualized after diagnostic costs and reserves
Probability-weighted net SGD IRR	5.02%	CAGR of SGD66.106 expected wealth; weights 40%/50%/10%
10% mandate hurdle	FAIL	Base and probability-weighted cases are both below 10%
15% stretch hurdle	FAIL	Only Bull clears 15%
Downside and portfolio fit	WATCH / UNAVAILABLE	Bear loses capital; holdings and factor budget were not provided
Proposed sizing ceiling	none	Portfolio context unavailable; research has no sizing authority

The net-SGD diagnostic uses the same P/E method and a constant source-bound 1.743741813 SGD/GBP across all scenarios, plus explicit transaction and distribution reserves. It does not use return-correlated FX. Missing portfolio context constrains only fit and sizing; it does not make returns null.

Trade execution authorized: NO

Kill / trigger criteria:

- BUY trigger: price at or below 2,825.62 GBX only after Management upgrades to PASS; valuation alone cannot create BUY.

- PASS triggers: North America organic growth below 5.0% for two consecutive post-runoff quarterly updates; group organic growth below 5.0% with statutory margin contraction for two reporting periods; or net debt / Benchmark EBITDA above 2.5x without a funded deleveraging plan.
- Upgrade to BUY conditions: CFPB/control remediation is resolved, net share reduction is demonstrated after SBC, all three ER2 gates pass, and the P/E-15 cushion is positive.

Research sizing if actionable: None. Portfolio fit is unavailable, and this research package has no ranking, sizing, portfolio-mutation or trade authority.

Final conclusion

The red team originally identified material denominator, probability and FX objections. The repaired chain conservatively changed probabilities to 40%/50%/10%, marked current P/E non-comparable, resealed exits at 20x/22x/25x, and replaced scenario-correlated FX with one constant convention. The independent scorer, auditor and red-team recheck reproduced the repaired arithmetic; the final return objection is MATERIAL_RESOLVED. That strengthens confidence in the conclusion but does not improve it: Experian is a good franchise at a price that does not earn a Production ER2 recommendation today.

Appendix A - Company Primer

Experian plc - Company Primer

Security: Experian plc ordinary shares (`XLON:EXPN`; `EXPN.L`) **Financial anchor:** audited FY2026 and exact TTM ended 31 March 2026 **Forward horizon used by the ER2:** 31 March 2031, exactly five years after the TTM end **Status of later information:** the Q1 FY2027 trading update is a KPI overlay only; it does not contain a complete income statement and does not reset the TTM base **Scope:** reader-facing business orientation, not a valuation, recommendation, sizing decision, or trade instruction

1. Business overview

Experian is best understood as a data-and-decision infrastructure company, not merely as a credit-reporting bureau. Its core activity is to assemble difficult-to-replicate information about consumers, businesses, identities, vehicles, healthcare transactions and commercial audiences; resolve those records into usable identities; apply scores, analytics and software; and insert the resulting decision into a customer's operating workflow. A bank may use Experian to verify an applicant, assess credit risk, identify fraud, approve or decline a loan, price the exposure and manage the account. A hospital may use it to identify a patient, verify insurance eligibility and reduce claim denials. An auto lender or dealer may use it to understand a vehicle and borrower. A consumer may use Experian to monitor credit, protect identity, renegotiate debt or compare a card, loan, mortgage or insurance offer.[1][2]

The economic product is therefore not simply a database record. It is a trusted answer delivered at the point of action: identity, affordability, fraud, suitability or regulatory documentation. Its value rises with the breadth, recency and accuracy of the data, the quality and explainability of the model, and the difficulty of replacing an embedded integration.

Experian serves both organisations and individuals. Its Business-to-Business activities encompass Financial Services and three verticals - Automotive, Health and Marketing Services. Its Consumer Services activities provide consumer-facing credit, identity, financial-health and marketplace experiences. These are business activities, not the IFRS reportable segments. The audited operating segments are geographic: North America, Latin America, UK and Ireland, and EMEA and Asia Pacific. Every reader should keep that distinction in view because products such as bureau data, Ascend decisioning and Consumer Services appear in more than one region.[1][2]

Large institutions generally buy through direct sales, implementation teams and multi-year relationships. Delivery can be by API, batch file, transaction, recurring licence, hosted platform or professional services. Vertical clients combine contracts with usage fees. Consumers arrive through Experian apps, partners, marketplaces, breach-support relationships and AI interfaces. Free services establish reach; subscriptions, protection, referrals and originations produce revenue.[2]

2. Four-region revenue architecture

Experian generated TTM revenue of US$8,445 million. The four regions sum exactly to that amount. They also differ materially in scale, maturity and current profitability.[1]

FY2026 / exact TTM region	Revenue (US$m)	Share of Group revenue	Benchmark EBIT (US$m)	Benchmark EBIT margin
North America	5,587	66.2%	1,912	34.2%
Latin America	1,299	15.4%	399	30.7%
UK and Ireland	942	11.2%	220	23.4%
EMEA and Asia Pacific	617	7.3%	30	4.9%
Operating-segment sum	8,445	100.0%	2,561	30.3%
Central Activities	0	n/a	(164)	n/a
Total Group	8,445	100.0%	2,397	28.4%

Percentages are calculated from the QFR-cleared quantitative foundation and may not add to exactly 100.0% because of rounding. `Benchmark EBIT` is Experian's disclosed non-GAAP segment performance measure; it must not be confused with statutory operating profit. After Central Activities and the audited statutory adjustments, Group operating profit was US$2,045 million.[1]

North America

North America is the centre of gravity: roughly two-thirds of revenue and nearly three-quarters of operating-segment Benchmark EBIT. It combines the US consumer and commercial credit bureau, analytics and decisioning, fraud and identity, Consumer Services, and scaled vertical franchises in Health, Automotive and Marketing Services. The region benefits from a dense ecosystem of banks, specialty lenders, insurers, healthcare providers, auto participants and advertisers, plus a large consumer membership platform. Its 34.2% Benchmark EBIT margin illustrates the economics available when widely reused data and software are distributed across large transaction volumes and a mature client base.[1][2]

North America's strength is also a concentration risk. Changes in US credit-reporting rules, lender appetite, consumer disputes, privacy law or marketplace economics can be material to the Group. Origination checks and referrals are cyclical, while account management, collections, identity, fraud, decisioning software, Health and subscriptions provide partial offsets.[2][4]

Latin America

Latin America is principally a Brazil-led ecosystem under the Serasa Experian brand, supplemented by businesses in Colombia, Peru, Panama and other markets. It combines traditional bureau and decisioning products with a fast-growing consumer platform, identity and fraud, debt renegotiation, payments and credit-related services. Limpa Nome connects creditors and consumers to renegotiate overdue obligations. Serasa Pass aims to create a reusable, consent-based digital identity layer. The ClearSale acquisition added transaction-fraud data and capabilities, while idwall adds digital identity management. These activities can reinforce one another: consumer engagement creates permissioned signals, the bureau improves risk assessment, and fraud data expands the number of workflows that Experian can address.[2][4]

The region's 30.7% Benchmark EBIT margin is already close to North America's despite a different stage of development. Attractive structural drivers include formalisation of financial activity, FinTech formation, digital payments, financial inclusion and rising demand for identity verification. Risks are correspondingly distinct: Brazilian interest rates, delinquency, currency volatility, consumer litigation, central-bank oversight of payments and credit activities, and interpretation of the Brazilian data-protection regime all matter.[1][2]

UK and Ireland

UK and Ireland is a mature credit-reference market with bureau data, analytics, Ascend decisioning, fraud and financial-crime products, and a consumer platform spanning credit scores, subscriptions and marketplaces. KYC360 expanded financial-crime compliance capabilities; Konfir, acquired after the FY2026 balance-sheet date, strengthens digital verification. Consumer engagement can support marketplace conversion, while direct integrations with banks and other regulated institutions make the B2B relationship more persistent than a stand-alone data sale.[2]

The region's 23.4% Benchmark EBIT margin is healthy but below the two largest regions. The market faces subdued credit conditions and significant regulatory oversight. The Financial Conduct Authority's credit-information reforms, Consumer Duty, data-dispute scrutiny and operational-resilience expectations can increase costs or change industry practices. The strategic task is to move clients from episodic bureau products toward higher-value, longer-duration platform and workflow relationships without sacrificing regulatory trust.[1][2]

EMEA and Asia Pacific

EMEA and Asia Pacific is the smallest and least profitable region. It includes a collection of bureau, decisioning, fraud and marketing operations across continental Europe, India, Southeast Asia, South Africa and Australia/New Zealand. The acquisition of illion enlarged the Australia/New Zealand position and provides a platform from which to cross-sell scores, attributes, identity/fraud and Ascend capabilities.[2]

The 4.9% Benchmark EBIT margin makes the region an execution test: acquisitions and platform investment must translate into durable revenue and margin. European privacy and AI regulation, Australian privacy reform and India's new privacy regime add complexity.[1][2]

3. Customer workflows and distribution

The cleanest way to understand distribution is to follow the customer's workflow rather than Experian's legal entities.

Workflow	Primary buyer or user	Experian contribution	Typical commercial model
Credit origination and account management	Banks, lenders, FinTechs, telecoms, utilities, insurers	Bureau data, scores, affordability, income, employment, cash-flow data, models and orchestration	Transactions, data contracts, batch services, licences, support and consulting

Workflow	Primary buyer or user	Experian contribution	Typical commercial model
Identity, fraud and compliance	Financial institutions, e-commerce, gaming, public sector and other digital businesses	Identity resolution, document/device/behavioural signals, fraud scores, KYC/AML workflows and case management	Transaction or usage fees, software licences and multi-year contracts
Healthcare revenue cycle	US hospitals, physician groups and revenue-cycle managers	Patient identity, eligibility, insurance discovery, claims and denial reduction	Multi-year subscription and volume-based software contracts
Automotive	Manufacturers, dealers, lenders, insurers and marketplaces	Vehicle history, ownership, valuation, credit, marketing and recovery data	Data licences, subscriptions and transaction fees
Marketing and audience activation	Brands, agencies, publishers and platforms	Identity graphs, audience enrichment, activation and measurement	Subscription and usage fees
Consumer financial journey	Individuals plus banks, lenders and insurers seeking customers	Credit monitoring, identity protection, guidance, debt negotiation and product comparison/origination	Free funnel, premium subscription, referral, performance and origination fees

Direct enterprise distribution matters because the product often requires integration, model validation, security review and regulatory governance. These are frictions at the start of a relationship but can become retention advantages after implementation. A client may begin with a bureau file and later add attributes, fraud checks, cash-flow analytics, decisioning modules and monitoring. Experian's objective is to deliver more of this stack through Ascend, converting separate products into modular capabilities inside a common cloud environment.[2]

Consumer distribution starts with a free score, identity or financial-health feature. Experian then uses eligibility, preferences and permissioned data to present offers, and partners pay when referrals or originations occur. Both sides must benefit: consumers need utility and control; partners need compliant, economical acquisition. Traffic cost, lender appetite, regulation and AI-controlled interfaces can weaken the model.

4. Unit economics and capital intensity

Experian does not disclose product-level gross margins, customer-acquisition cost, net revenue retention or contribution margins. Any precise SaaS-style unit-economic claim would therefore be invented. The disclosed regional margins and cash flow nevertheless reveal the broad shape of the model.

The bureau business has high fixed and quasi-fixed costs: contributor relationships, data ingestion and matching, historical databases, model development, regulatory compliance, dispute handling, cybersecurity and resilient infrastructure. Once those assets exist, an additional score, attribute or file lookup has relatively low marginal delivery cost. Scale improves economics, but the company must keep reinvesting because stale, inaccurate or inadequately governed data quickly loses value.

Decisioning software adds implementation, product-development, cloud and support costs. Early deployments can require consulting and integration effort; later usage can be attractive because licences, support and workflow modules recur, and a common platform allows one data asset to support multiple products. The economic advantage is strongest when Ascend replaces disconnected point tools and becomes the orchestration layer. It is weaker when a customer treats Experian as a replaceable data input or when implementation remains bespoke.

Identity and fraud is more transaction-sensitive. More digital activity creates more billable checks, but also requires low latency, continuous model monitoring, new signals and rapid response to adversaries. Network scale can improve detection because more interactions produce more patterns, yet this is an arms race: synthetic identities, deepfakes and automated attacks raise the cost of staying effective. Health and Automotive mix recurring contracts with usage fees and benefit from proprietary workflow-specific datasets. Marketing Services has scalable data economics but faces greater privacy and platform-policy risk.

Consumer Services bears acquisition, product, service and compliance costs before monetisation. Free members are not revenue by themselves. The relevant conversion chain is audience to engagement, engagement to a useful action, and action to subscription or partner-paid outcome. Organic traffic, trusted brand access and cross-use of Experian data can lower acquisition cost. Conversely, purchased traffic, weak lender demand or low conversion can compress contribution economics. Premium identity and monitoring subscriptions are recurring; marketplace revenue is more exposed to product demand and approval rates.

Capital intensity is frequently understated if one looks only at property, plant and equipment. TTM net operating cash flow was US$2,239 million. Total core capital expenditure was US$726 million, of which US$677 million was intangible investment and

only US$49 million was property, plant and equipment. Core free cash flow was therefore US$1,513 million. The 8.6% capex-to-revenue burden reflects databases and developed or purchased software: Experian is physically asset-light but not reinvestment-light. This capitalised investment must generate future products and efficiency; otherwise accounting capitalisation would flatter current operating expenses.[1]

Statutory and benchmark profitability also differ. Total Benchmark EBIT was US$2,397 million, while statutory operating profit was US$2,045 million. The largest reconciling item was US$271 million of acquisition-intangible amortisation and impairment, alongside exceptional items and acquisition/disposal expenses. Benchmark EBIT is useful for operating comparison, but the recurring strategic use of M&A means acquisition-related costs and amortisation cannot be treated as economically irrelevant by default.[1]

5. Products and platforms

Core bureau and verification data

The foundational products are consumer and commercial credit files, scores, attributes and monitoring. Experian adds trended credit behaviour, alternative data, income and employment verification, cash-flow information and speciality datasets such as Clarity's alternative-finance records. These products help clients identify applicants, assess ability and willingness to pay, set limits, manage portfolios and collect delinquent accounts. The bureau is a contributor network: lenders and other institutions provide data under legal and contractual frameworks, and the aggregated history becomes more useful than any one contributor's view.

The strategic direction is from a static credit history toward a broader, permissioned financial identity. Experian Boost lets consumers contribute positive account information; open-banking and cash-flow data can help lenders assess people with thin or non-traditional files. The upside is greater coverage and more predictive decisions. The risk is that open-data regimes also make raw information more portable, moving value from possession of records toward identity resolution, permission, accuracy, analytics and workflow execution.[2]

Decisioning and Ascend

Ascend is the main cloud platform for combining Experian data, analytics, model development, decisioning and workflow orchestration. Rather than selling separate bureau, fraud and analytic products to different client departments, Experian wants modular capabilities to operate in one environment across acquisition, underwriting, account management, collections and governance. Experian Assistant adds generative-AI tools that can explain model outcomes, support analysis and accelerate regulatory documentation while retaining human oversight for high-risk decisions.[2]

The economic promise is more data consumption, recurring software revenue, cross-sell and higher switching costs. The customer promise is faster implementation and a controlled route from model development to production. The chief execution risk is that the platform must actually simplify the client's architecture. If it becomes another complex layer, if third-party cloud or AI tools replicate orchestration, or if customers insist on model-agnostic open stacks, the platform advantage will be smaller.

Identity, fraud and financial crime

Experian's identity-and-fraud stack resolves identities and combines credit, device, behavioural, transaction, email and other signals to distinguish genuine customers from fraud. Use cases include onboarding, account takeover, first-party fraud, payment fraud, age or identity checks, anti-money-laundering processes, sanctions and case management. Acquired capabilities are an important part of this stack: AtData strengthens email and digital identity intelligence; ClearSale adds Brazilian transaction-fraud data; KYC360 adds financial-crime compliance; idwall adds Brazilian digital identity management.[2][4]

Serasa Pass illustrates the intended endpoint: a consumer verifies once, consents to share required attributes and reuses that identity across participating services, while Experian supplies risk and trust signals through an API. This could reduce checkout and onboarding friction and create a high-frequency network. It also raises the standard for consent, security and error remediation because a compromised or incorrect reusable identity can propagate harm across multiple workflows.

Consumer Services

Consumer Services spans free credit access and monitoring, paid identity and credit subscriptions, marketplaces for financial products and insurance, partner solutions, debt renegotiation and AI guidance. Experian reported more than 215 million free members globally. Experian Boost allows permissioned positive account data to augment a US credit profile. Limpa Nome

helps Brazilian consumers renegotiate debts. EVA is evolving from a credit explainer toward a financial co-pilot that can combine credit and permissioned banking data, identify actions and eventually help execute them. Own Up adds a digital mortgage marketplace, while consumer insurance distribution extends beyond traditional cards and loans.[2]

The attraction is continuous engagement rather than an occasional credit-report interaction. Membership is not the same as monetisable loyalty: consumers can multi-home, and the app or AI agent that owns the interface may capture the economics.

Verticals

Automotive links vehicle identity, history, value, ownership, credit and marketing. AutoCheck is the visible consumer-facing vehicle-history product, but the deeper value is participation across dealers, lenders, insurers and marketplaces. Health focuses on the US provider revenue cycle. Patient Access Curator combines identity, coverage and eligibility into an automated front-end workflow intended to reduce denials and administrative cost. Marketing Services supplies identity resolution, audience enrichment and measurement as advertising moves toward privacy-safe first-party data. These verticals diversify Experian away from pure consumer lending, but each brings specialised competitors and its own regulation.[2]

6. Competitive structure and proprietary-data advantage

Competition is layered. Equifax and TransUnion are the closest global credit-bureau peers. FICO competes in scores and decisioning; LexisNexis Risk Solutions and specialists compete in identity and fraud. S&P Global Mobility competes in automotive information. Waystar, Optum's Change Healthcare and FinThrive compete in healthcare workflows. LiveRamp and Acxiom compete in marketing identity. Credit Karma, NerdWallet, ClearScore, LendingTree, Gen Digital and the other bureaus compete for consumer attention and monetisation.[2]

Experian's strongest advantage is not one algorithm. It is the combination of contributor relationships, historical depth, record linkage, regulated permissions, data quality, brand trust, model expertise and integration into high-consequence workflows. More data can improve answers; better answers attract use cases; more workflows generate signals; and a common platform distributes the assets at low marginal cost.

The barriers are real but conditional. Regulation, open banking, multi-vendor models, cloud software and foundation models can reduce exclusivity or commoditise analytics. Data remain advantaged only if lawful, current, differentiated and outcome-improving; workflow embedding persists only with high service quality and innovation. The moat requires continuing database, software, security and compliance investment.

7. Regulation, privacy, data quality and cyber

Regulation is both barrier and risk. Complex rules make it difficult for a new entrant to assemble credit and identity data and sell decisions into regulated institutions. The same rules can impose litigation, remediation, fines, operating constraints and reputational damage on an incumbent. Experian identifies legislative/regulatory change and compliance, data loss/misuse, resiliency and business conduct as principal risks.[2]

In the United States, the Fair Credit Reporting Act governs core credit-reporting practices. Experian is defending a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau lawsuit concerning credit-profile dispute resolution. State privacy laws are proliferating, and the California Delete Act can affect non-credit-reporting businesses such as parts of Marketing Services. Class actions can amplify exposure where alleged misconduct affects many consumers. In the UK, the FCA's Credit Information Market Study remedies, Consumer Duty, data disputes and operational resilience are relevant. Brazil adds the LGPD, the National Data Protection Authority, Central Bank oversight of payments and credit activities, and substantial consumer litigation. GDPR interpretations, EU AI and cyber rules, Australian privacy reform and India's privacy law expand the compliance perimeter.[2]

Data quality is not a back-office detail. A false match, missing update or mishandled dispute can change a person's access to credit and produce regulatory or litigation consequences. Experian describes source due diligence, validation, integrity monitoring, dispute analysis, correction and privacy-by-design controls. Responsible AI adds requirements for explainability, human oversight and bias management. As decisions become faster and more automated, a small defect can propagate more quickly.

Cyber risk is existential to trust. Experian stores sensitive consumer and client information, operates always-on decision services and inherits risk from partners, suppliers and acquired companies. A breach or prolonged outage could cause direct consumer harm, lost contracts, litigation, enforcement and reputational damage. The company describes layered prevention, detection and response, a global Cyber Fusion Centre, external audits, third-party assurance, resilience-by-design, secondary providers and acquisition-security reviews. These controls reduce risk but cannot eliminate it; the attack surface grows with

cloud migration, APIs, consumer accounts, third parties and AI-enabled adversaries.[2]

8. Credit-cycle exposure

Experian is exposed to the credit cycle through volume and mix rather than through large direct loan losses. Lender inquiries, mortgage activity, card marketing, loan originations and marketplace conversions can weaken when rates rise or underwriting tightens. Consumer engagement can remain high while monetisation falls because fewer offers are available or approval rates decline. Brazil adds delinquency, interest-rate and currency sensitivity. The UK can experience subdued lender and consumer activity.[2]

There are offsets. Fraud, identity, collections, portfolio monitoring, affordability and risk-management demand can rise when conditions deteriorate. Subscriptions, multi-year software, Health, Automotive data and recurring bureau activity diversify the exposure. Experian has reported long-duration organic growth through prior dislocations, but that history should not be converted into a claim of immunity. North America's scale means a broad US credit contraction or major rule change would still matter. The right monitoring framework separates applications and originations from recurring contracts, fraud/collections, consumer engagement and partner conversion rather than treating all revenue as equally cyclical.

9. M&A and capital allocation

Experian uses acquisitions to obtain differentiated data, enter adjacent workflows and accelerate regional scale. FY2026 examples include ClearSale, AtData and KYC360. After year-end it completed Own Up and Konfir, and the Q1 FY2027 update reported completion of idwall. The industrial logic is consistent: transaction fraud, digital identity, compliance, mortgage distribution and verification can plug into existing bureau, decisioning or consumer ecosystems.[2][4]

Strategic adjacency must not excuse serial acquisition. Integration must preserve security, data rights and service; cross-sell must be observable; and purchase price must be justified after amortisation and integration costs. The low EMEA and Asia Pacific margin makes illion a visible test.

The foundation shows both reinvestment and shareholder returns. FY2026 cash share purchases were US$727 million and dividends paid were US$592 million. Diluted weighted-average shares declined from 922 million to 919 million, a modest 0.3%, while share-based compensation was US$138 million. Gross borrowings were US$5,565 million, net debt was US$5,179 million and net debt to Benchmark EBITDA was 1.7 times. The company therefore has financial flexibility, but buybacks, dividends, M&A and internally developed data/software all compete for cash. Repurchases create value only when the shares are bought below intrinsic value and should be judged net of employee dilution and leverage.[1]

10. Growth drivers

The first driver is expansion of the core data envelope. Cash-flow, rental, utility, employment, income, email, transaction, device and permissioned consumer data can improve coverage and prediction beyond traditional credit files. This supports both financial inclusion and higher-value risk products.

Second is the shift from data sale to embedded platform. Ascend can deepen relationships by combining analytics, decisioning, fraud and governance in recurring workflows. Cross-selling an installed customer is potentially more efficient than winning a new institution, but the platform must demonstrate faster deployment and measurable client outcomes.

Third is identity and fraud. Digital commerce, synthetic identity, account takeover, AI-generated content and regulatory pressure increase demand for verified identity and explainable risk controls. Experian's bureau, email, device, behavioural and transaction data create multiple routes into this market.

Fourth is vertical digitisation. US healthcare administration remains fragmented and costly; Patient Access Curator and claims tools address high-value friction. Automotive can monetise a vehicle across history, financing, valuation, sale and recovery. Marketing's opportunity is privacy-safe identity and measurement as third-party cookies and platform identifiers weaken.

Fifth is consumer engagement. More useful free tools can enlarge the permissioned-data base; better personalisation can increase subscription and marketplace conversion; broader offers in insurance, mortgages, debt and savings can increase revenue per engaged member. Latin America has additional runway from financial inclusion and the expansion of the Serasa ecosystem.

Sixth is AI, but its role should be framed precisely. AI can increase product velocity, automate model governance, improve fraud detection, personalise consumer guidance and reduce internal cost. It can also make generic models and interfaces cheaper. Experian wins if AI raises the value of verified proprietary data and trusted execution faster than it commoditises

analytics or redirects customer traffic to third-party agents.

11. Key risks and the disruption / 2046 setup

The most important near- and medium-term risks are: a material cyber or resiliency incident; regulatory restrictions on data use or credit reporting; costly disputes and class actions; deterioration in data accuracy or consumer trust; a US credit or marketplace slowdown; failure to convert Ascend adoption into profitable recurring revenue; M&A integration or overpayment; continued weak profitability in EMEA and Asia Pacific; and capitalised software or database spending that does not earn an adequate return. Concentration in North America and the gap between benchmark and statutory profit increase the importance of disciplined monitoring.[1][2]

The 2046 question is not whether credit reports will still exist in their present form. They probably will not. Static bureau files are likely to evolve toward real-time, permissioned and multi-source financial identities. Decisions may be initiated by autonomous consumer or enterprise agents. Open-data frameworks could make raw records more portable. Foundation models could generate analytics cheaply, and embedded-finance platforms could control distribution.

Experian can remain important if it becomes the trusted verification and execution layer underneath those agents: resolving identity, proving data provenance and consent, supplying scarce historical and behavioural signals, producing explainable decisions, and operating inside regulated workflows with very high availability. Its current combination of bureau networks, direct consumer relationships, fraud signals, vertical data and decisioning software provides a plausible route. Ascend, Serasa Pass and EVA are early expressions of that architecture.[2]

In the adverse 2046 case, portability and deletion expand, banks directly access open data, cloud or AI vendors own orchestration, consumer agents capture referrals, and privacy-preserving techniques reduce dependence on bureau history. Experian could become a regulated commodity input while value migrates to the interface and execution layer.

The durable test is therefore behavioural and economic, not rhetorical. Over time, investors should look for greater use of differentiated data, growing recurring software and workflow penetration, strong retention, demonstrably better fraud and credit outcomes, disciplined capex, sustained statutory cash conversion, and evidence that consumer engagement converts without excessive acquisition cost. If growth increasingly requires acquisition, if data becomes less exclusive, if clients modularise Experian out of the workflow, or if compliance costs rise faster than the value delivered, the 20-year compounding thesis weakens.

12. Source notes and analytical boundaries

- **QFR-cleared quantitative foundation (controlling for every financial figure):** `C:/Users/Admin/OneDrive/GPT/ER 2.0/Experian plc/quant_foundation.md`, prepared and independently verified for run `pulse-cio-20260824T000124+0800`. It is based on the audited FY2026 Annual Report and results announcement, includes the exact TTM construction, and contains the sealed statutory bridge. All revenue, profit, margin, cash-flow, capex, debt, share and capital-return figures in this primer come from that file.
- **Experian FY2026 Annual Report (primary qualitative source):** [Experian Annual Report 2026](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf), especially pages 6-29 (business model, markets, strategy and product architecture), 33-35 (regional review), 48-52 (data, privacy and security), 70-78 (principal risks), and 213-214 (acquisitions). Live source bytes were retrieved and archived during this run.
- **Experian FY2026 results announcement (primary cross-reference):** [FY2026 results announcement](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-FY26-FY-results-announcement.pdf). Quantitative claims are not taken independently from this document; they enter only through the cleared foundation.
- **Experian Q1 FY2027 trading update (KPI overlay only):** [Trading update, first quarter FY2027](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--first-quarter-fy27), dated 16 July 2026. It was used only to confirm current qualitative product and acquisition developments. It does not contain a complete financial statement and was not used to reset the 31 March 2026 TTM anchor.

No third-party market-share estimate, reconstructed quote, remembered financial value or local data-warehouse number is used. Statements about future competitive structure and 2046 are explicitly analytical inferences from the current business model and disclosed risks, not company guidance.

Appendix M - Management Assessment

Experian plc — Management Assessment

Assessment date: 24 August 2026 **Historical cut-off / TTM:** 31 March 2026 **Forecast horizon:** 31 March 2031
Management gate: YELLOW

This is a research assessment, not trading or portfolio advice. Historical financial figures are taken from the DR-verified `data_package.md`; live governance, remuneration, leadership and disclosure evidence was independently checked against Experian's FY2026 annual report, AGM materials, company disclosures and recent results materials. “Benchmark EBIT” is Experian's defined alternative performance measure and is not statutory operating profit.

Executive assessment

Experian has an unusually durable executive pair for a large data company. Brian Cassin has been CEO since July 2014 after two years as CFO, while Lloyd Pitchford has been CFO since October 2014. The record under them is strong: FY2022–FY2026 revenue rose from $6.288 billion to $8.445 billion, statutory operating profit from $1.416 billion to $2.045 billion, and post-tax ROCE from 15.7% to 17.2%. Organic growth and margin guidance was met or exceeded in the two completed annual cycles reviewed, and management has allocated substantial capital without allowing leverage to become excessive.

The gate is nevertheless **YELLOW**, not a courtesy downgrade from PASS. In January 2025 the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau sued Experian Information Solutions over alleged failures in the reinvestigation and correction of disputed credit-file information—processes central to Experian's trust proposition. When asked on the Q3 FY2025 call, Cassin called the case meritless, said he was “not worried about it at all,” and declined further discussion. That response was more dismissive than the gravity of a core-data-control allegation warranted. The CFPB's second amended complaint remains an allegation, not an adjudicated finding, but the court denied Experian's motion to dismiss in October 2025 and discovery was ongoing at the assessment date. Strong execution, ownership and capital discipline therefore coexist with a material unresolved governance test.

Dimension	Assessment	Decision implication
Leadership continuity	Strong	Long CEO/CFO tenure reduces execution hand-off risk, but concentrates accountability for current controls.
Operating record	Strong	Revenue, statutory profit and ROCE advanced through mixed credit environments.
Capital allocation	Good, not exceptional	Balanced reinvestment, M&A, dividends and repurchases; deal-level return evidence remains incomplete.
Incentive alignment	Mixed-positive	Large actual shareholdings and multi-year metrics help; CEO pay escalation and achievable-looking targets weaken the signal.
Disclosure quality	Good with one important exception	Guidance and financial Q&A are generally quantitative; the CFPB response was inadequate.
Governance	Adequate	Majority-independent board and clean audit, but chair/SID external workload and regulatory overhang merit monitoring.

1. Leadership roster, tenure and relevant background

The [FY2026 annual report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf) and current board pages establish the following leadership picture. Adam Crozier joined the board on 12 May 2026 and became chair after the 22 July 2026 AGM, replacing Mike Rogers. The post-AGM board comprises an independent chair, two executive directors and five independent non-executive directors.

Leader	Role and start	Relevant evidence	Assessment
Adam Crozier	Chair from 22 July 2026; director from 12 May 2026	Former ITV, Royal Mail and Saatchi & Saatchi CEO; also chairs BT Group and Kantar	High-calibre operator, but a demanding external portfolio creates a bandwidth issue to monitor.

Leader	Role and start	Relevant evidence	Assessment
Brian Cassin	CEO from 16 July 2014; director/CFO from 30 April 2012	Former Greenhill managing director; prior Baring Brothers and London Stock Exchange roles	Deep institutional and transaction experience; accountable for the full FY2022–FY2026 record and current regulatory posture.
Lloyd Pitchford	CFO from 1 October 2014	Former Intertek CFO; earlier BG Group and Mobil; audit chair at London Stock Exchange Group	Long partnership with Cassin, credible financial-control background and visible command of guidance drivers.
Alison Brittain	Senior independent director from 21 July 2022; director from 1 September 2020	Former Whitbread CEO and Lloyds Banking Group executive; chairs Premier League and Dunelm and is a British Airways NED	Strong consumer/financial-services experience, but multiple substantive outside roles deserve workload scrutiny.
Regional and functional leaders	Jeff Softley (North America), Valdemir Bertolo (Latin America), Malin Holmberg (UK & Ireland), Mariana Pinheiro (EMEA/APAC), Alex Lintner (technology/software/innovation)	Named in FY2026 senior-management disclosure	Operating bench is identifiable, but appointment dates and granular succession depth were not fully disclosed in the controlling source set.

Experian discloses relevant biographies and the division of board responsibilities, but succession visibility below the CEO/CFO level is only moderate. The two executives' combined tenure is a strength until it becomes key-person dependence. Crozier's appointment is therefore strategically important: a genuinely independent chair should test acquisition discipline, incentive calibration and consumer-data controls rather than merely preserve a successful formula.

2. Track record and consequential decisions

Three decisions are most useful in judging management rather than merely observing the cycle.

Decision	Evidence and outcome	Attribution
Maintain high organic investment in data, cloud, product and consumer distribution	Capital expenditure totaled $3.152 billion in FY2022–FY2026, 8.1%–9.5% of annual revenue. Management says more than 85% of main business units have migrated to the cloud and expects capex intensity to trend toward 7%. Revenue rose 34% across the period and ROCE increased 150 basis points.	Positive. Returns improved while investment stayed elevated; the eventual capex normalization still must be delivered.
Build Latin America and repair EMEA/APAC profitability	Latin America revenue rose from $791 million to $1.299 billion and Benchmark EBIT from $223 million to $399 million; margin improved from 28.2% to 30.7%. EMEA/APAC Benchmark EBIT margin recovered from 0.4% in FY2025 to 4.9% in FY2026.	Positive, especially in Latin America. EMEA/APAC remains low margin and needs several years of proof.
Accelerate targeted M&A while returning capital	Cash acquisitions totaled $3.357 billion over five years, including illion, Audigent, NeuroID, ClearSale, AtData and KYC360. Post-tax ROCE reached 17.2%, but FY2026 goodwill plus intangibles were $10.339 billion against $5.545 billion of equity.	Mixed-positive. Strategic logic is coherent and aggregate returns are healthy, but asset intensity and limited deal-level ROI disclosure create real downside if integrations disappoint.

The strongest point is that growth did not come with collapsing returns: post-tax ROCE rose from 15.7% to 17.2%, while each main region except still-subscale EMEA/APAC delivered healthy Benchmark EBIT margins. Statutory operating profit also increased, so the conclusion does not depend solely on management's Benchmark presentation. The weakest point is that management discusses integration progress and synergies more readily than it publishes acquired-asset revenue, cash return or impairment scorecards. ClearSale, AtData and KYC360 are too recent to judge, and illion's integration benefits are visible only indirectly in regional results.

3. Capital allocation and shareholder alignment

FY ended March	Capex ($bn)	Capex / revenue	Cash acquisitions ($bn)	Dividends ($bn)	Gross repurchases ($bn)
2022	0.508	8.1%	0.736	0.446	0.173
2023	0.627	9.5%	0.309	0.483	0.194
2024	0.640	9.0%	0.462	0.510	0.120
2025	0.651	8.7%	1.158	0.548	0.199
2026	0.726	8.6%	0.692	0.592	0.727
Five-year total	**3.152**	—	**3.357**	**2.579**	**1.413**

This is balanced allocation rather than financial engineering. Net debt was $5.179 billion at FY2026 and leverage 1.7 times, up from $4.684 billion but still within a reasonable range for recurring, cash-generative data assets. The board announced a further repurchase programme of up to $1 billion in May 2026.

Repurchase optics require care. Of FY2026's $725 million executed purchases, approximately $216 million offset shares delivered under employee plans; only $509 million was net repurchase. FY2025 repurchases were used entirely for employee-plan deliveries. Diluted weighted-average shares were 921 million in FY2022 and 919 million in FY2026, so $1.413 billion of gross five-year repurchases produced only modest cumulative share-count contraction. Management did display some price sensitivity—the disclosed average purchase price fell from 3,583 pence in FY2025 to 2,876 pence in FY2026 as spending increased—but has not published a valuation threshold or expected-return framework.

M&A has been strategically adjacent rather than empire-building in unrelated sectors: credit data, identity, fraud, verification and consumer marketplaces. FY2026 acquisition fair values included ClearSale at $374 million, AtData at $225 million and KYC360 at $114 million. However, $429 million of FY2026 acquired value was goodwill, and negative tangible book value increases the penalty for poor integration. Future underwriting should therefore focus on acquired organic growth, realized synergies and ROCE after acquisition amortization—not announcement narratives.

4. Compensation, ownership and incentive quality

The [FY2026 remuneration report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf) ties annual bonus to 80% Benchmark EBIT and 20% revenue. Half of bonus must enter the three-year Co-investment Plan; both executives voluntarily invested 100% for FY2026. CIP vesting is split between adjusted Benchmark EPS and cumulative Benchmark operating cash flow. The Performance Share Plan uses adjusted Benchmark EPS, adjusted ROCE and relative TSR, followed by a two-year holding period. Malus and clawback can apply for five years after grant for matters including misstatement, misconduct and reputational loss.

Item	CEO Brian Cassin	CFO Lloyd Pitchford	Assessment
FY2026 salary	£1.350m	£0.770m	CEO salary rose 26.2%, far above the 3% UK employee review budget; CFO rose 2.7%.
FY2026 total remuneration	£8.090m	£4.809m	High absolute outcomes; annual bonus was 192% of salary for each.
Beneficial shares at 31 March 2026	1,098,387	625,892	Actual ownership, including already-purchased CIP shares, was reported at about 21 times salary for each—strong alignment.
Normal PSP opportunity	Increased to 300% of salary	200% of salary	CEO increase from 200% adds leverage to already high pay; exceptional CEO maximum is 600%.
Shareholding guideline	Increased to 400% of salary	300% of salary	Materially exceeded by both executives.

The 2026 policy set FY2027 maximum vesting at 10% adjusted Benchmark EPS CAGR, $7.8 billion cumulative Benchmark operating cash flow and 16% average adjusted ROCE, plus FTSE 100 TSR outperformance. A 16% maximum ROCE hurdle looks lenient against FY2026's reported 17.2%; the committee may argue that acquisition accounting and investment depress future outcomes, but a maximum target below the latest result does not obviously demand exceptional value creation. The newly enlarged CEO PSP opportunity magnifies this concern.

Equity-settled share-based compensation has not grown faster than the business:

FY ended March	Equity-settled expense ($m)	Revenue ($m)	Expense / revenue
2022	149	6,288	2.37%
2023	129	6,619	1.95%
2024	132	7,097	1.86%
2025	127	7,523	1.69%
2026	138	8,445	1.63%

The declining ratio is favorable, though gross buybacks conceal employee-plan dilution. June 2026 dealing notices show both executives sold only the portion of vested shares needed for tax and social-security liabilities and retained the balance; both also invested their full bonuses in shares. No discretionary monetization was identified in the reviewed twelve-month RNS set.

This is a strong behavioral alignment signal, although it does not neutralize pay-design concerns.

Shareholders approved the FY2026 remuneration report with 94.01% support and the new policy with 90.58% at the [2026 AGM](https://www.experianplc.com/investors/shareholders/agm). The 9.42% policy dissent is not a revolt, but it is meaningful enough that the committee should explain why a larger CEO opportunity and below-current maximum ROCE threshold are necessary.

5. Candor, guidance and analyst-question handling

Eight recent reporting periods were reviewed using seven full official transcripts and the official Q3 FY2026 release. The archived Q3 FY2026 transcript failed on two identical retrieval attempts, so no language or answer is attributed to that unavailable file.

Period	Guidance action / outcome	Candor signal
H1 FY2025	Reiterated 6%–8% organic growth; raised margin expectation to upper end of 30–50 bps	Quantified regional and consumer drivers.
Q3 FY2025	Reiterated growth and upper-end margin	Direct on breach normalization and marketplace scale; poor response on CFPB litigation.
FY2025	Delivered 7% organic growth and about 70 bps constant-currency margin expansion	Met growth midpoint and exceeded margin range.
Q1 FY2026	Reiterated 6%–8% organic and 9%–11% total growth	Explained contribution and mortgage dynamics numerically.
H1 FY2026	Raised organic expectation to about 8% and total to about 11%	Upgrade was timely; margin guidance held.
Q3 FY2026	Official release maintained expectations	Release identified UK softness rather than obscuring it.
FY2026	Delivered 8% organic growth and upper-range margin outcome	Directly addressed LLM distribution risk, while acknowledging traffic from LLMs remained a small mix.
Q1 FY2027	Reported 7% organic growth and left FY2027 6%–8% guidance unchanged	No premature upgrade after one quarter.

There was no completed-year miss in this sample. Guidance was generally realistic rather than aggressively promotional: FY2025 landed inside the range and ahead on margin; FY2026 was raised at the half-year and delivered at the top of the organic range. Management gives useful voluntary metrics—consumer membership, marketplace run-rate, verification records, mortgage price/volume, regional organic growth and Ascend adoption. It is less forthcoming on acquired-business revenue and margin, consumer sub-business margins, product-level profitability and distribution dependence.

A simple prepared-remarks scan found at least one descriptor such as “headwind,” “soft,” “challenging” or “cautious” in seven of the eight periods, with Q3 FY2026 assessed from the release. This does not by itself indicate obfuscation: management usually paired the words with a driver or number. The pattern does show habitual hedging, and investors should prioritize the accompanying metrics.

On AI disruption, Cassin said LLM-originated traffic had grown significantly but remained a small share, while organic website traffic was strong. He described LLMs as an additional distribution platform rather than denying channel risk. That was a credible, falsifiable answer. By contrast, the CFPB exchange failed the same standard. The [CFPB docket](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/experian-information-solutions-inc/) alleges failures to reinvestigate disputes, remove unverifiable information, prevent reinsertion and maintain reasonable accuracy procedures. Those allegations reach the operating core. A robust answer would have separated legal defenses from operational assurance, described board oversight and provided measurable remediation or audit evidence.

6. Strategy clarity and internal consistency

Management's strategy is coherent: combine proprietary, permissioned data with decisioning software, analytics and direct-to-consumer distribution; extend those assets into fraud, verification, health, insurance and new AI channels; and deepen embedding in client workflows. The operating choices line up with the narrative. Capex supports cloud and product development; acquisitions expand data or distribution; consumer membership broadens first-party engagement; Ascend and fraud tools increase recurring workflow integration.

The FY2026 calls also show management engaging with plausible disintermediation. Experian has launched consumer capabilities on ChatGPT and other platforms and treats AI interfaces as distribution while retaining its regulated data and execution role. The thesis is sensible, but evidence is early: management disclosed that LLM traffic remained small and did not quantify economics, referral dependence or cannibalization. By FY2028, investors should expect channel-level conversion economics rather than only partnership counts.

The principal strategic tension is between “trusted data” positioning and the CFPB case. Accuracy and dispute resolution are not back-office details for a credit bureau; they are conditions of the moat. The strategy therefore requires management to prove process quality with the same numerical discipline it applies to organic growth.

7. Governance, board oversight and red flags

Issue	Evidence	Assessment
Board independence	Post-AGM board: independent chair, five independent NEDs and two executives	Appropriate formal majority; no dual-class structure identified.
Chair transition	Crozier became chair in July 2026 after joining in May	Fresh oversight is useful, but the handover was short and effectiveness is unproven.
External commitments	Crozier also chairs BT and Kantar; Brittain chairs Premier League and Dunelm and is a BA NED	**YELLOW flag** for bandwidth, particularly during regulatory and integration demands.
Audit and controls	KPMG issued an unmodified opinion; company reported no material weakness	Positive, but financial-control assurance is not the same as consumer-file process assurance.
Related parties	$15m services from associates on normal market terms, nil owed; $3m to Experian Medical Plan; no other material balances	No material conflict identified.
Regulatory posture	CFPB litigation over core US credit-file processes remains in discovery	**YELLOW flag**; allegation is unresolved, but management's initial public posture was too dismissive.
Shareholder voice	80.80% proxy participation; directors generally received strong support; remuneration policy support 90.58%	No governance revolt, but pay dissent deserves engagement.

The annual report describes delegated authority thresholds and board-level review for larger acquisitions and capital expenditures. That is good architecture. The more important test is whether the board obtains operational control evidence beneath legal reporting. The audit committee should disclose, at least in aggregate, dispute-resolution timeliness, repeat/reinsertion rates, independent testing coverage and material exceptions. Without that, investors cannot distinguish an aggressive regulator from an operational weakness.

8. Peer calibration

Peer leader	Comparable record	Relative judgment
Mark Begor, Equifax	CEO since 2018; company highlights large cloud/security investment and extensive bolt-on M&A after the 2017 breach	Experian appears better balanced on leverage and current ROCE, while Equifax's post-breach control transformation offers a relevant disclosure benchmark.
Chris Cartwright, TransUnion	CEO since 2019; recent priorities include deleveraging below 2.5 times, bolt-on M&A and repurchases	Experian's 1.7-times leverage and stronger aggregate return trajectory indicate better recent stewardship.
Will Lansing, FICO	Record revenue/free cash flow and aggressive repurchases, including debt-funded accelerated buybacks	FICO has delivered stronger pure per-share capital return, but with more leverage and greater product concentration; Experian's approach is more balanced.

Peer evidence supports a favorable but not dominant ranking. Cassin and Pitchford compare well on balanced growth, leverage and ROCE. They do not clearly lead on per-share value creation because net share reduction has been modest, and Equifax's experience illustrates the governance premium attached to transparent process remediation after a data-control failure. Overall, Experian management ranks **upper tier among relevant data/credit peers for execution and stewardship**, but not best-in-class until the regulatory/control question is resolved with evidence.

9. Management gate and monitoring conditions

Final gate: YELLOW. The positive case is substantial: durable executives, strong ownership, sensible strategy, realistic guidance, improving returns and balanced capital allocation. The non-compensating concern is not a vague ESG deduction. It

is an unresolved allegation about the accuracy and correction processes underlying a credit bureau's licence to operate, coupled with a CEO response that did not demonstrate the desired control-mindedness. Pay escalation, an undemanding-looking maximum ROCE target and limited acquired-asset ROI reporting reinforce—but do not independently cause—the YELLOW.

Upgrade to PASS if: (1) the CFPB matter resolves without a material adverse finding, or Experian publishes credible remediation and independent assurance with measurable dispute-process KPIs; (2) FY2027–FY2028 integration preserves post-tax ROCE at or above roughly 16% and net leverage at or below 2.0 times; and (3) repurchases produce durable net share reduction after employee-plan deliveries.

Downgrade to FAIL if: (1) allegations are substantiated or similar consumer-data-control failures recur; (2) goodwill impairment or deal underperformance shows that acquisition returns were overstated; (3) post-tax ROCE falls below roughly 14.5% while leverage rises; or (4) executive opportunity and realized pay remain elevated despite weak per-share outcomes.

The near-term decision focus is therefore not whether this team can operate Experian—it has demonstrated that it can—but whether its governance response to a core trust challenge becomes as measurable and disciplined as its financial execution.

Principal live sources

- [Experian FY2026 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf)
- [Experian 2026 AGM results and materials](https://www.experianplc.com/investors/shareholders/agm)
- [Experian board and senior management](https://www.experianplc.com/about-us/board-and-senior-management)
- [Experian directors' interests and share dealing disclosures](https://www.experianplc.com/investors/sustainability/corporate-governance/directors-interest)
- [CFPB v. Experian Information Solutions docket](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/experian-information-solutions-inc/)
- Official Experian results presentations, releases and transcripts for H1 FY2025 through Q1 FY2027, cross-checked to the FY2026 annual report and the sealed historical data package.

Appendix W - Moat and 2046 Durability

Experian plc — Moat and 2046 Durability

Assessment date: 24 August 2026 **Financial anchor:** TTM/year ended 31 March 2026 **2046 test date:** 24 August 2046

This assessment uses the DR-verified `data_package.md` for all segment and margin facts. It uses the primer only for orientation and supplements the verified package with current issuer, regulator and competitor primary sources. The independently reviewed competitive/moat sections for all four regions—North America, Latin America, UK/Ireland and EMEA/Asia Pacific—were read before finalisation and are consistent with the conclusions below.

1. Moat taxonomy applied

Moat source	Strength	Where it exists	Evidence and boundary
Data network effects	Strong	Credit bureau, verification, identity/fraud; strongest in North America and Brazil	Contributors create longitudinal histories that no new model can recreate quickly; over 90% of group revenue is linked to proprietary data. The network is oligopolistic, not winner-take-all.
Switching costs	Strong	Large financial institutions, Ascend, Health and Automotive workflows	North American strategic-account renewals were 100% in FY2026, average contract term exceeded four years, and values rose double digits. Multi-bureau procurement limits absolute lock-in.
Scale economies	Strong	Data ingestion, matching, security, compliance, cloud and model governance	Fixed investment is spread across data on more than 1.5 billion consumers and 175 million businesses, over 2,300 Ascend client solutions, and more than 215 million free consumer members.
Brand	Moderate	Consumer Services, Serasa, regulated enterprise procurement	Trust supports consent and enterprise selection, but consumers can multi-home and a breach or data-quality failure can reverse the benefit quickly.
Regulatory barrier	Moderate/strong	Credit reporting, identity, fraud, financial crime and Health	Regulation raises compliance and audit costs for entrants, but it also exposes incumbents to remedies, deletion rights, litigation and restrictions on data use. It is a barrier and a liability, not a free licence.
IP/patents	Weak	Models, matching and product implementation	Algorithms and software matter, but the defensible asset is the lawful data/provenance/workflow combination rather than a patent estate. Foundation models make generic analytics cheaper.
High-trust procurement	Strong	Banks, insurers, healthcare providers and large platforms	Accuracy, uptime, explainability and regulatory documentation are essential in high-consequence decisions. Procurement is lengthy, although sophisticated clients deliberately retain multiple vendors.

Data network effects. Experian's core bureau is a contributor network: lenders and other institutions supply records, Experian standardises and links them, and customers buy a broader and deeper history than any contributor holds alone. More coverage improves matching and prediction; better outcomes support more use cases and reinforce the incentive to furnish. This is a real network effect, but not a pure marketplace flywheel. The CFPB identifies Experian, Equifax and TransUnion as the three nationwide US reporting companies, confirming an entrenched oligopoly rather than a single unavoidable network ([CFPB](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/consumer-tools/credit-reports-and-scores/consumer-reporting-companies/)). Regional bureaus and speciality datasets can still win individual use cases.

Switching costs. The strongest costs arise after Experian data, models, decision rules, case-management logic and governance artefacts are integrated into a client's production stack. Replacing a vendor requires data remapping, model validation, parallel testing, regulatory documentation and operational-risk approval; errors can alter real credit or fraud

outcomes. The FY2026 North American cohort is unusually concrete evidence: all top strategic accounts due for renewal renewed, average duration expanded by nearly 10% to more than four years, and contract values increased by double digits. All ten largest strategic clients were live on Ascend by Q1 FY2027. These facts support switching costs; they do not prove exclusivity, because banks often use several bureaus and can keep Experian as one input while shifting marginal workloads elsewhere ([FY2026 results](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-FY26-FY-results-announcement.pdf); [Q1 FY2027 transcript](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-q1-fy27-trading-update-transcript.pdf)).

Scale economies. The cost base includes data acquisition, identity resolution, dispute handling, privacy, security, resilient infrastructure, cloud migration and local regulatory expertise. Those investments are expensive before revenue arrives and cheap at the margin once the platform is built. Experian says proprietary data is associated with over 90% of revenue and covers more than 1.5 billion consumers and 175 million businesses. It also operates a direct distribution base of over 215 million free members. Scale therefore exists on both the enterprise-data and consumer sides. It is not unique: Equifax's Work Number ended 2025 with 209 million active and 813 million total employment records, materially ahead of Experian's 66 million active verification records. That comparison shows why scale is a barrier while also identifying a domain in which a rival has the better asset ([Experian Annual Report 2026](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf); [Equifax 2025 10-K](https://investor.equifax.com/sec-filings/all-sec-filings/content/0000033185-26-000010/efx-20251231.htm)).

Brand. Experian and Serasa are trusted consumer and enterprise brands, useful when asking people to share banking data, monitor identity or act on a marketplace recommendation. Yet Consumer Services has low natural exclusivity: a person can use Experian, Credit Karma, a bank app and an AI assistant simultaneously. Brand is therefore an acquisition and consent advantage, not a sufficient moat by itself. For enterprise clients, the more valuable brand attribute is operational trust: a known record of compliant, accurate delivery lowers procurement risk.

Regulation. Credit-reporting, privacy, financial-crime and healthcare rules make lawful data collection and explainable production decisions difficult for entrants. However, regulation can standardise data access and weaken differentiation. The FCA's 2026 proposed remedies include mandatory reporting and a framework intended to make information more consistent and comprehensive across designated UK credit-reference agencies. That can enlarge the overall pool but narrow data-quality gaps ([FCA CP26/7](https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/consultation-papers/cp26-7-credit-information-market-study-proposed-approach-implementing-fca-remedies)). The CFPB's ongoing lawsuit alleges deficiencies in Experian's dispute processes; allegations remain contested, but the proceeding shows that data quality is a licence-to-operate issue, not merely an expense line ([CFPB enforcement docket](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/experian-information-solutions-inc/)).

IP and high-trust procurement. Experian has software, scoring and matching know-how, but a standalone model is reproducible. The durable asset is the integrated system: permissioned records, provenance, identity resolution, outcome feedback, governance, uptime and client implementation. Ascend's value is credible where it replaces internal spreadsheets and disconnected analytics, then supports model development, deployment and compliance. A cloud vendor or foundation model can reproduce the user interface; reproducing regulated data rights, validated histories and institutional approval is harder.

2. Per-segment moat

Segment	FY2026 revenue weight	Moat and durability	Break mechanism	Earliest observable sign
North America	66.2%	Strong bureau-data network plus embedded Ascend, Health, Automotive and consumer distribution; credible 20-year durability	Equifax/TransUnion or a cloud platform wins marginal workloads; consumer agents capture marketplace traffic	Strategic-account renewal below historical strength, shorter terms, falling Ascend usage, or Benchmark EBIT margin below 31% without recession explanation
Latin America	15.4%	Strong Serasa data/brand, debt-renegotiation network and expanding fraud/identity stack; 10-20 year durability	Open-data equalisation, regulatory remedies, superior fintech identity graph, or consumer trust loss	B2B growth below market, weaker Limpa Nome engagement, fraud win-rate deterioration, or margin below the high-20s

Segment	FY2026 revenue weight	Moat and durability	Break mechanism	Earliest observable sign
UK and Ireland	11.2%	Established bureau and procurement position, with Ascend/fraud/verification embedding; 10-year durable, 20-year conditional	Mandatory data sharing commoditises records and rivals match analytics	Large-client losses, muted upsell despite market recovery, or margin retreat below roughly 21%
EMEA and Asia Pacific	7.3%	Local assets and illion scale offer optionality, but current economics do not prove a moat	Fragmentation, integration failure and entrenched local competitors	Margin fails to progress from 4.9%, delivery timing persists, or growth requires serial acquisition

North America. This is the economic moat's centre. It generated 74.7% of FY2026 regional Benchmark EBIT, more than its 66.2% revenue share, and maintained a 34.2% margin. Credit histories and speciality datasets are distributed through high-consequence client workflows, while Ascend adds model governance, analytics and decisioning. With all ten largest strategic clients already live, the next proof point is workload expansion, measurable outcomes, smaller-client penetration and retention—not another logo count. FICO is both a critical score input and a competing claimant on the value pool, so Experian's proprietary attributes, scores, fraud and workflow products must broaden economics beyond third-party score distribution. Health and Automotive create narrower vertical moats: the annual report says Health serves over 60% of US hospitals under mainly multi-year, high-renewal contracts, while Automotive relationships are typically multi-year and embedded; neither should inherit the full bureau moat automatically. Consumer Services adds distribution but is less defensible than B2B. The 20-year claim survives if Experian remains a data and trust layer; it weakens if Ascend becomes a replaceable orchestration shell.

Latin America. Serasa combines bureau data, consumer reach, Limpa Nome debt renegotiation and expanding identity/fraud capabilities. That creates two-sided reinforcement: creditors bring obligations and offers; consumers engage to resolve debt and improve access; the activity supplies additional signals. The FY2026 30.7% margin, rapid Consumer Services growth and similar contract-value/term trends to North America support a real moat. It is less predictable because Brazil brings currency, litigation, privacy and credit-cycle risk, and recent fraud strength includes acquired ClearSale/idwall capabilities. The moat is regional execution plus data/brand, not an automatically transferable global advantage.

UK and Ireland. The bureau franchise and bank relationships are durable, while Ascend, verification and KYC360 deepen workflow penetration. A 23.4% Benchmark EBIT margin in both FY2025 and FY2026 indicates respectable economics despite subdued lending. The threat is regulatory equalisation: more mandatory and standardised reporting could increase completeness for all designated agencies. Experian must then win on identity resolution, analytics, fraud and integration rather than mere possession of records. This remains a moat, but it is narrower than North America's.

EMEA and Asia Pacific. A 4.9% FY2026 margin after 0.4% in FY2025 is recovery, not evidence of a durable rent. illion improves scale in Australia/New Zealand and Ascend can distribute capabilities, but fragmented regulation and strong local competitors raise duplication costs. This segment receives no 20-year moat credit until growth, integration and margins persist without repeated acquisitions.

The blend is somewhat weaker than the best segment but not fatally so. North America, Latin America and UK/Ireland represent 92.7% of revenue and 98.8% of regional Benchmark EBIT. The low-moat EMEA/Asia Pacific unit is small; the larger concern is concentration: a US data-rule, cyber or competitive shock would strike the majority of group profit at once.

3. Margin persistence evidence

The verified package supports a consistently defined five-year series, not a ten-year like-for-like series. Older disclosures are affected by exited-activity re-presentations and taxonomy changes; splicing them would create false precision. The available evidence is still meaningful because it covers credit tightening, inflation, cloud dual-run costs and active competition.

Margin	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Interpretation
Consolidated statutory operating	22.5%	19.1%	23.9%	23.8%	24.2%	One-year compression reversed; current margin modestly above FY2022
North America Benchmark EBIT	33.5%	33.1%	32.9%	33.4%	34.2%	Exceptional persistence; 130bp five-year range
Latin America Benchmark EBIT	28.2%	31.0%	31.4%	31.3%	30.7%	Stable around 31% after FY2022 step-up
UK and Ireland Benchmark EBIT	21.7%	21.7%	21.6%	23.4%	23.4%	Stable, then 170-180bp improvement

Margin	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Interpretation
EMEA and Asia Pacific Benchmark EBIT	1.7%	1.3%	1.1%	0.4%	4.9%	No persistent high-return evidence

North America's margin stability while Equifax and TransUnion invested heavily in cloud and platform products is strong evidence that competitors were not asleep. TransUnion's OneTru explicitly integrates credit, fraud and marketing data, identity graphs, analytics and delivery—the same strategic battleground as Ascend ([TransUnion Annual Report 2025](https://investors.transunion.com/~/media/Files/T/Transunion-IR-V2/annual-reports/2025/transunion-2025-annual-report.pdf)). Experian's margins held despite this credible response. Consolidated statutory margin is lower and more volatile than regional Benchmark EBIT because statutory charges matter; the moat claim should not be based solely on management's adjusted measure.

4. AI, alternative-data and platform stress test

Activity	AI replicability	What remains scarce	Verdict
Bureau data and scores	Generic scoring models are increasingly replicable	Longitudinal lawful data, furnisher relationships, identity linkage, dispute processes and outcome history	Most protected
Ascend decisioning/workflow	Interface, code generation and basic analytics are replicable	Production integration, validated data, governance, explainability, uptime and switching burden	Protected but contested
Identity and fraud	Models diffuse rapidly and attackers also use AI	Real-time consortium signals, device/email/transaction history, feedback loops and trusted verification	Strong, provided signal quality keeps pace
Consumer Services	Advice, comparison and conversational interface are easy to reproduce	Brand, member intent, permissioned data and lender inventory	Most exposed
Health and Automotive	Workflow automation can be copied	Provider/vehicle datasets, installed integrations and transaction feedback	Moderate/strong vertical moats

Foundation models do not dissolve the bureau because they cannot infer a lawful, current payment history or prove identity from public text. They do compress the value of generic modelling, documentation and interface layers. Ascend therefore merits moat credit only to the extent it increases use of differentiated Experian data and becomes the governed production path. The leading competitor response is already visible: TransUnion's OneTru offers unified proprietary/public data, identity graphs, AI and modular delivery; Equifax distributes unique Work Number data through its cloud. Experian must keep winning workloads, not merely announce AI features.

Permissioned alternative data cuts both ways. Open banking, cash-flow and payroll feeds can reduce reliance on static bureau files and let a bank or fintech build a richer view. Yet large-scale consent, identity matching, fraud controls and regulatory documentation remain difficult. Experian's rational defence is to ingest those feeds and combine them with historical bureau data, as its cash-flow products do. The moat erodes if alternative data becomes standardised, equally accessible and easily matched by customers themselves.

Consumer Services is the most exposed because an AI agent can explain credit, search offers and route a transaction without the user opening Experian. Experian's integrations into ChatGPT show adaptive distribution, but also demonstrate that another platform may own the interface. Its 215 million-member base is valuable only if active engagement and conversion persist; membership count alone is not lock-in.

Identity/fraud is the most protected and also the highest-risk operationally. AI-generated identities and automated attacks increase demand for verified signals, but a single cyber or systemic matching failure can destroy trust. The issuer explicitly lists AI-enabled attacks, data loss, resiliency, open-data frameworks and AI disintermediation as risks. Data accuracy and dispute resolution are therefore moat maintenance expenditure, not compliance overhead that can be cut safely.

Credit-cycle exposure is mainly volume and mix, not credit loss. Lower applications and marketplace conversion can reduce revenue, while monitoring, collections and fraud demand can offset part of the decline. A challenger bureau need not replace Experian wholesale; it can erode pricing by winning the next data set, verification feed or workflow module. Watch marginal workload share, not only customer logos.

5. The 2046 test

Base-case 2046 business description. In 2046 Experian sells continuous, permissioned identity and financial-risk infrastructure rather than static credit reports. Banks, insurers, healthcare systems, governments, marketplaces and autonomous-agent networks buy verified event streams, consent/provenance attestations, identity and fraud signals, explainable risk attributes and automated decision execution through APIs. North America and Latin America remain the profit centres; UK/Ireland remains a regulated bureau and trust platform; EMEA/Asia Pacific either earns a normal platform margin or is rationalised. Consumer Services survives as a permission and distribution layer but marketplace economics are smaller relative to enterprise identity, fraud and decisioning. The group operating margin is directionally stable to modestly higher than today's 24.2% statutory margin as automation and data reuse offset higher cyber, privacy and regulatory cost. The company still earns high returns because decades of linked outcomes, contributor access, direct consumer permissions, identity resolution and approved production integrations remain difficult to reproduce simultaneously.

This description is specific enough to pass: the 2046 customer still pays Experian to answer “is this person, business or agent genuine; is this data authorised and current; what risk does the verified history imply; and can the decision be executed and explained?” It does not require today's score format or today's consumer interface to survive.

Bear-case 2046 description. Open-data mandates and privacy-preserving standards make raw records portable and near-identical across providers. Banks and fintechs combine consented cash-flow, payroll and transaction data directly; hyperscalers and enterprise platforms own model governance and orchestration; consumer agents own comparison traffic and referral revenue. Experian becomes one regulated commodity feed among many, while rising deletion, remediation, cyber and dispute costs compress margins. A major data-quality or security event accelerates client multi-sourcing and regulatory constraints. This is a material but minority outcome—roughly a 25-30% analytical probability—because it requires simultaneous commoditisation of data access, identity resolution and trusted execution, not merely better AI models.

2046 test: PASS. The core economic job is likely to persist even as the product form changes. The pass depends on Experian continuing to own differentiated permissioned data and the trust/execution layer; it is not a pass for every current consumer marketplace or regional operation.

6. Competitive threat inventory

Threat	Mechanism	Segment(s) affected	Earliest observable signal	Plausibility
AI/platform disintermediation	Hyperscalers, OneTru or bank-built stacks commoditise analytics and own orchestration; consumer agents capture traffic	North America and UK B2B; Consumer Services; EMEA/APAC	Ascend usage stalls, contract terms shorten, marketplace conversion falls despite member growth	Medium
Data portability and privacy reset	Open-data mandates, deletion rights and standardised reporting reduce proprietary gaps or restrict usable history	All bureaus; Marketing; Consumer Services	Lower predictive lift, rising deletion/dispute cost, mandated equal access, weaker data-linked pricing	Medium
Cyber/data-quality trust failure	Breach, outage, false matching or inadequate disputes triggers remediation, client multi-sourcing and regulation	Group-wide, especially North America and Brazil	Major incident, adverse enforcement, client attrition, elevated litigation and compliance cost	Medium; low frequency/high severity

Secondary threats are a severe US/Brazil/UK credit contraction and challenger bureaus winning specific datasets. Neither must destroy the company to impair the moat: a few years of weaker transactions plus marginal share loss could break the margin evidence.

7. Pricing power verification

Evidence	What it proves	Limitation
North American strategic-account cohort: 100% renewal, term above four years, double-digit average contract-value uplift	Observable willingness to renew, expand duration and pay more	Cohort is top accounts, not company-wide retention
Brazil showed similar win-rate, contract-value and duration trends	Pricing/upsell is not solely a US phenomenon	Issuer did not quantify Brazil's renewal rate or uplift
Mortgage profile revenue grew strongly, primarily from higher pricing; announced price rises continue through calendar 2026	Transaction pricing can lift revenue with stable volume	Part reflects industry pricing and FICO royalty economics; not clean broad-based price power
North America margin rose from 33.5% to 34.2% over five years; UK margin rose and Latin America stayed near 31%	Price/mix and productivity have absorbed inflation and investment	Benchmark EBIT excludes statutory items

Evidence	What it proves	Limitation
Health contracts are mainly multi-year with high renewal; Automotive relationships are typically multi-year and embedded	Vertical workflows add recurring revenue and switching costs	Renewal/churn and escalator percentages are not disclosed

Pricing power is verified, but narrowly rather than universally. The strongest proof is the FY2026 North American renewal cohort and persistent segment margins. Company-wide net revenue retention, churn, annual escalators and minimum commitments are not disclosed, and Consumer Services pricing power is not established. This warrants a strong moat conclusion without pretending every revenue dollar is equally protected.

8. Moat verdict

Moat gate: PASS. The protectable profit pool is the bureau-data network plus identity resolution, regulatory trust and embedded decisioning, concentrated in North America and reinforced in Brazil and the UK. Five-year margin persistence, 100% renewal among due North American strategic accounts, longer contracts and double-digit value uplift make the moat observable rather than asserted. Consumer Services distribution and EMEA/Asia Pacific deserve materially less moat credit, while competitor platforms, regulation and cyber risk require continued heavy investment.

2046 test: PASS. A specific high-return Experian remains plausible in 2046 as the permissioned data, identity, provenance and execution layer beneath banks, enterprises and autonomous agents. The pass would fail if standardised open data removes predictive differentiation while cloud/AI platforms displace Ascend and consumer agents capture distribution. The most important monitoring signals are strategic-account renewal economics, Ascend workload adoption, predictive lift from proprietary data, Consumer Services engagement-to-conversion, and sustained regional margins.

Primary sources

- [Experian Annual Report 2026](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf)
- [Experian FY2026 results announcement](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-FY26-FY-results-announcement.pdf)
- [Experian Q1 FY2027 transcript](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-q1-fy27-trading-update-transcript.pdf)
- [Equifax 2025 Form 10-K](https://investor.equifax.com/sec-filings/all-sec-filings/content/0000033185-26-000010/efx-20251231.htm)
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- [CFPB consumer reporting companies](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/consumer-tools/credit-reports-and-scores/consumer-reporting-companies/)
- [CFPB Experian enforcement docket](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/experian-information-solutions-inc/)
- [FCA CP26/7 credit-information remedies consultation](https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/consultation-papers/cp26-7-credit-information-market-study-proposed-approach-implementing-fca-remedies)

Appendix B1 - North America

North America — Segment Deep Dive

Company: Experian plc (EXPN.L) **Segment:** North America **Forecast anchor:** TTM ended 31 March 2026 **Horizon:** 31 March 2031, exactly 5.0 calendar years **Sealed segment profit basis:** Benchmark EBIT **Research boundary:** Research only. No trade, message, ranking, sizing, portfolio, or broker authority.

This appendix uses Experian historical dollars, growth, management evidence, and accounting classifications only from the DR-verified data_package.md and the sealed statutory bridge. The bridge SHA-256 independently recomputed for this stage is 791cd96635af149a1dc29b8897a7621a946ad4ebde1282d034719bd7eabf1b6f, matching the instructed seal. data_package.md §3a contains STATUTORY_BRIDGE_STATUS: VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING. Q1 FY2027 is used only as a KPI overlay and does not replace or extend the TTM.

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

North America is the stable geographic reporting segment comprising the United States and Canada. Experian has retained four geographic reportable segments throughout FY2022-FY2026, so the North America revenue and Benchmark EBIT history is comparable on the geographic perimeter, subject to the issuer's annual re-presentation of exited activities. A separate business-activity taxonomy changed on 1 April 2025: the old Data and Decisioning categories were replaced by Financial Services and Verticals, with only FY2025 re-presented under the new structure; Consumer Services remained continuous. Consequently, this appendix never splices pre-FY2025 Data/Decisioning dollars into Financial Services/Verticals. Historical segment dollars are geographic; product growth analysis uses the finest disclosed global activity series and labels that boundary explicitly. [data_package §1, reporting-structure paragraphs and taxonomy-boundary paragraph]

1. What this segment actually is

North America is best understood as three businesses sharing data, identity resolution, analytics infrastructure, and distribution.

Financial Services sells credit-file data, scores, attributes, fraud and identity checks, decisioning software, analytics, and workflow tools to banks, card issuers, mortgage lenders, auto lenders, fintechs, insurers, and other financial institutions. Some revenue is transactional: a lender pays when it pulls a file, verifies an identity, screens fraud, generates a score or evaluates an application. Other revenue is recurring or contractual: hosted software, data feeds, monitoring, batch processing, portfolio review, and platform subscriptions. Ascend is strategically important because it moves a customer from buying isolated bureau inputs toward using Experian's cloud platform for data access, model development, strategy testing, deployment, and monitoring. The commercial effect can be more products per client, faster product iteration, higher switching cost, and better retention, but Ascend penetration is an embedded growth driver rather than a separately disclosed revenue line.

Verticals applies the same data, identity, fraud, analytics, and workflow capabilities outside core financial services. The most important named North American areas in current commentary are Health and Automotive. Experian Health helps providers with patient identity, eligibility, coverage discovery, scheduling and patient-access workflows, claims and revenue-cycle processes. Automotive connects vehicle histories, ownership and registration information, valuation, marketing, fraud, and lending-related data to dealers, manufacturers, lenders, insurers, and consumers. Marketing Services and other industry solutions also sit in the vertical perimeter. Pricing is a mix of subscription, licence, implementation, transaction, record, and volume-based fees. These are not one homogeneous vertical: Health can be workflow-embedded and recurring, while Automotive is more exposed to vehicle transactions, dealer economics, and credit availability.

Consumer Services attracts consumers with free credit reports, scores, identity and financial-health tools, then monetises through paid subscriptions, one-off services, advertising or referral fees when consumers select loans, cards, insurance, mortgage, and related products. North American breach-support contracts form a separate, volatile element: after a data breach, an enterprise can buy monitoring or identity-protection coverage for affected consumers. That revenue can be large but contract-limited and is not evidence of durable consumer engagement. The forward model therefore separates the FY2027 runoff from the underlying marketplace and subscription engine. Own Up, completed after FY2026, adds an AI-enabled mortgage platform, but the data package provides no revenue, purchase price allocation, or standalone contribution, so it is treated as optional execution upside rather than forecasted acquisition revenue. [data_package §4, activity definitions and non-disclosure paragraph; §5 current read-through; §6 North America rows; §9 corporate actions]

Go-to-market differs by line. Large financial and vertical customers are won through direct enterprise sales, long procurement and integration cycles, and solution expansion after the first deployment. Consumer acquisition is digital and partnership-led, with economics governed by member engagement, paid conversion, referral conversion, traffic-acquisition cost, and lender or insurer appetite. The segment's advantage is that the enterprise and consumer sides can reinforce each other: bureau data improves decisioning and personalisation; consumer relationships create engagement and distribution; enterprise partners supply offers; and fraud and identity tools protect both sides. The loop is useful only if regulatory permissions, data quality, security, and consumer trust remain intact.

2. Current economics at the TTM anchor

TTM ended 31 March 2026 is identical to audited FY2026. North America generated **US$5.587bn of revenue**, **US$1.912bn of Benchmark EBIT**, and a **34.2% Benchmark EBIT margin**. It represented 66.2% of Experian's group revenue and 74.7% of the four reportable segments' aggregate Benchmark EBIT before Central Activities. Revenue grew 10.7% in actual US dollars and 10% organically in FY2026; the distinction matters because the forecast is built from the disclosed dollar anchor but judged against organic operating evidence. [data_package §1 North America row; §3 North America table; §3a FY2026 bridge; Experian FY2026 Annual Report, operating review pp. 34-35 and note 9 pp. 173-174]

The Q1 FY2027 overlay is cooler but still healthy at the geographic level: North America organic revenue growth was 7%. The product commentary was stronger in B2B than the reported regional average—Financial Services 13% and Verticals 8%—while Consumer Services declined 2% as two breach-support contracts wound down. Excluding breach work, Consumer Services grew 3%. Management stated that the breach roll-off was complete, which turns it from an open-ended drag into a specific comparison issue; the 3% ex-breach rate is nevertheless a much lower near-term underlying rate than FY2026's 9% global Consumer Services organic growth. Q1 does not supply standalone revenue dollars, regional Benchmark EBIT, or regional margin. It is not a new TTM. [data_package §5, Q1 FY2027 row and current read-through; §6 North America rows]

Experian does not disclose North America revenue by Financial Services, Verticals, and Consumer Services. It also does not disclose North America product margins or segment capital expenditure. The company-wide activity totals—US$4.463bn Financial Services, US$1.705bn Verticals, and US$2.257bn Consumer Services—cannot be mechanically assigned to North America because the geographic mix differs by activity. [data_package §4, Financial Services, Verticals, Consumer Services rows and non-disclosure paragraph]

For bottom-up modeling, this appendix uses an explicitly analytical TTM allocation that sums exactly to the sealed segment revenue. It is not issuer disclosure and is not inserted into the historical table. The allocation applies the FY2026 global ongoing-activity mix—US$4.463bn Financial Services, US$1.705bn Verticals, and US$2.257bn Consumer Services, summing to US$8.425bn—to North America's US$5.587bn revenue. This gives Financial Services **US$2.960bn**, Verticals **US$1.131bn**, and Consumer Services **US$1.496bn** after rounding. This neutral proxy is reproducible and avoids the prior unsupported US$68m judgmental transfer from Verticals to Financial Services. Its limitation is explicit: it assumes North America's activity mix equals the group ongoing-activity mix even though the actual regional mix is undisclosed. The scenario model should therefore be read as a sensitivity scaffold, not a recovered product P&L.

[DATA GAP: North America revenue and Benchmark EBIT are not disclosed by Financial Services, Verticals, and Consumer Services. The TTM product allocations and product margins in sections 9-10 are analytical proxies; only the US$5.587bn segment revenue, US$1.912bn Benchmark EBIT, and 34.2% margin are issuer-reported. No separate Ascend, fraud/identity, Health, Automotive, or breach-contract revenue base is available.]

Capital intensity is meaningful despite the data-light presentation. Group capex was US$0.726bn, 8.6% of revenue, including internally generated intangibles and property, plant and equipment. Management guided FY2027 capex around 8% of group revenue and retains a longer-term 7% goal. That is a group observation, not a North America allocation. The segment needs continuous spending on data acquisition, cloud and security infrastructure, platform migration, regulatory controls, model development, and consumer products. The attractive Benchmark EBIT margin should not be interpreted as a nearly costless data royalty. [data_package §2 capex row; §7 capex history; §6 final guidance paragraph]

3. Unit economics

The core unit of value in Financial Services is a decision or workflow executed against trusted data. Once Experian has assembled permissible data, matched identities, built attributes and models, and integrated with a customer, incremental queries can carry high contribution margins. The cost base is not fixed, however. Data must be obtained and cleaned, models refreshed, false positives controlled, security hardened, cloud workloads paid for, and products supported. Some third-party score economics can pass through to FICO or other owners. Transaction volume moves with credit applications, account

management, mortgage originations, auto sales, and marketing activity. Recurring platform and monitoring contracts damp that cycle; batch and mortgage activity amplify it.

Ascend should improve unit economics through four mechanisms. First, standardised cloud tooling lowers the time required to develop and deploy a model. Second, a shared platform can increase product attach: data, attributes, fraud, analytics, and decisioning are easier to buy together. Third, more customer logic and workflows resident on the platform raise switching costs. Fourth, common engineering infrastructure can reduce duplicated delivery effort. The countervailing cost is migration and continued product investment. A platform does not create pricing power by itself; it must produce faster, more accurate, more compliant decisions than an internal build or rival platform. Management's statement that all ten largest strategic clients are live on Ascend is evidence of penetration, but not a disclosed revenue or margin contribution. [data_package §6 North America 16 July 2026 Financial Services row]

Fraud and identity economics are volume-rich and structurally supported by digital onboarding, account takeover, synthetic identity, payments fraud, and regulatory compliance. They also demand rapid reinvestment because adversaries adapt. Better network data can lower fraud loss and false declines simultaneously, creating strong client value. But a product that misses fraud, rejects good customers, or creates regulatory exposure can be replaced quickly. Fraud therefore can support high growth without being a permanently high-margin annuity. Acquisitions and third-party data also add amortisation and integration costs below or outside segment Benchmark EBIT; those items must remain in the statutory bridge and are not silently charged to this segment.

Verticals have more mixed economics. Health can exhibit durable recurring revenue because patient-access and reimbursement workflows are deeply integrated, switching is disruptive, and the platform learns from transaction patterns. Waystar's live 2025 filing is a useful structural comparison: 99% of revenue was subscription or predictable volume-based, net revenue retention was 112%, and revenue grew 16.5% to US$1.099bn. That does not establish Experian Health's growth rate or market share, but it shows the health-payments software category can sustain recurring growth when workflow penetration and cross-sell are strong. [Waystar 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1990354/000199035426000011/way-20251231.htm)

Automotive has valuable data and identity properties, yet volumes depend on new and used vehicle transactions, financing, dealer inventory, and marketing budgets. Vehicle-history and ownership datasets improve with breadth and longitudinal depth; integration with lender and dealer workflows raises retention. At the same time, CARFAX, Cox Automotive, TransUnion, Equifax, specialist data providers, and OEM data initiatives constrain pricing. The model consequently gives Verticals a lower steady-state margin than Financial Services and a growth rate that does not simply copy the current Health and Automotive-led 8% overlay.

Consumer Services converts traffic and member engagement into subscription and referral economics. Free members expand the top of funnel; monetisation requires a paid identity or credit product, a completed financial-product application, or a funded policy or loan. Referral revenue can be attractive because fulfilment sits with partners, but it is cyclical and auction-like: lenders and insurers reduce offers when risk appetite or economics deteriorate. Paid subscriptions are steadier but face free alternatives. Breach-support contracts can produce unusually profitable temporary revenue because customer acquisition is enterprise-funded, yet they reverse when coverage expires. Base and bear margins therefore decline initially with breach runoff before recovering on underlying marketplace, subscription, and operating leverage.

The historical segment margin supports the view that scale economics are real but bounded. Benchmark EBIT margin moved from 33.5% in FY2022 to 33.1% in FY2023, 32.9% in FY2024, 33.4% in FY2025, and 34.2% in FY2026. A roughly 130bp trough-to-current recovery indicates leverage and mix can work, but the five-year range is only 130bp despite substantial revenue growth. A forecast requiring perpetual annual 100bp expansion would therefore be inconsistent with the segment record. [data_package §3 North America Benchmark EBIT margin row]

4. Competitive dynamics

North American credit data is an oligopoly, but the addressable workflow is broader and more competitive than the bureau label suggests. Equifax and TransUnion are the closest bureau peers. FICO is simultaneously an important score provider, a decisioning-software competitor, and a source of input-cost or channel tension. LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Socure, Alloy, Plaid, specialist fraud vendors, bank internal models, and cloud data platforms compete across identity, fraud, attributes, analytics, and orchestration. In Consumer Services, Credit Karma, NerdWallet, LendingTree, bank apps, issuer-direct acquisition, insurer-direct channels, and free score providers compete for member attention and referral economics. In Health and Automotive, the competitor set becomes workflow-specific rather than bureau-specific.

There is no clean, current, primary-source market-share table on a common revenue perimeter. Peer disclosures use different segments and profit metrics, so this appendix does not manufacture a share number. Scale context is still informative. Equifax reported 2025 US Information Solutions revenue of US$2.079bn, up 10%, and Workforce Solutions revenue of US$2.582bn, up 6%. TransUnion reported 2025 U.S. Markets gross revenue of roughly US$3.579bn, up 10.5%, with 37.9% adjusted EBITDA margin. Experian North America at US$5.587bn includes a wider mix and uses Benchmark EBIT, so the figures are not directly comparable; they show that Experian competes against two large, profitable data networks rather than fragmented small vendors. [Equifax 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/33185/000003318526000010/efx-20251231.htm); [TransUnion 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1552033/000155203326000012/tru-20251231.htm)

Peer growth gives a useful deceleration guardrail. Equifax USIS grew 10% in both 2024 and 2025. TransUnion Financial Services grew 15.2% in 2024 and 17.5% in 2025, helped materially by mortgage pricing and activity; Emerging Verticals grew 4.0% then 8.5%. TransUnion Consumer Interactive grew 1.5% in 2024 and declined 2.3% in 2025 because prior-year breach-remediation revenue rolled off, partially offset by volume and Monevo. This is a close analogue to Experian's current breach comparison and validates separating temporary contracts from the underlying consumer engine. It also shows that current double-digit bureau growth can be price- and mortgage-assisted, so a five-year high-single-digit base is more prudent than extrapolating the strongest peer year. [TransUnion 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1552033/000155203326000012/tru-20251231.htm)

FICO's 2025 results demonstrate both pricing power and dependence. Scores revenue rose 27% to US$1.169bn, driven primarily by higher B2B unit prices, mortgage volume, and a multi-year insurance-score renewal. Its filing says the FICO Score is used in most US credit decisions and is distributed primarily through Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax. For Experian, this relationship is economically double-edged: FICO can lift revenue per bureau transaction but can also take more of the value pool, encourage lenders or regulators to seek alternatives, and create channel conflict. Experian's proprietary scores, attributes, analytics, Ascend, and fraud suite are strategically important because they broaden value beyond reselling a third-party score. [FICO 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814547/000081454725000030/fico-20250930.htm)

Consumer competition is intense and can grow quickly. Intuit's Credit Karma generated US$2.3bn of FY2025 revenue, up 32%, and combines free scores and reports, monitoring, personalised card, loan and insurance recommendations, tax access, and deposit products. LendingTree's 2025 Consumer segment grew 14%, while insurance revenue rose 30%; personal-loan revenue grew 13%, but credit cards declined, illustrating how partner appetite changes mix. These are not direct forecasts for Experian, but they show that marketplace growth is possible when supply and conversion improve and that product-level softness can coexist with strong aggregate revenue. [Intuit 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/896878/000089687825000035/intu-20250731.htm); [LendingTree 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1434621/000162828026016084/tree-20251231.htm)

Pricing power is strongest where the product is mandatory, embedded, differentiated by proprietary history, and small relative to the customer's avoided loss or credit exposure. It is weakest in commodity records, simple monitoring, generic lead generation, and products with easy multi-bureau comparison. The three bureaus can be both rivals and alternative sources, and sophisticated banks can dual-source. Entry barriers are nevertheless high: a new entrant needs lawful access to broad data, identity resolution, accuracy controls, dispute processes, security, compliance, distribution, and years of trust. AI lowers the cost of analytics and software development, but it does not cheaply recreate a nationwide credit file, longitudinal vehicle record, healthcare eligibility network, or permissioned consumer relationship.

5. Moat at the segment level

The segment moat is a layered system rather than one asset. The first layer is data breadth and history. Credit, identity, fraud, automotive, healthcare, and consumer-engagement data become more valuable when linked accurately over time. The second is distribution: Experian is integrated into enterprise decision flows and operates a large consumer platform. The third is workflow embedding through Ascend, decisioning, fraud, verification, and industry solutions. The fourth is regulatory and operational competence. A bureau must maintain permissible purpose, accuracy, disputes, security, auditability, and uptime at enormous scale. The fifth is feedback: more transactions can improve matching, fraud detection, models, and product relevance.

The moat is strongest in core bureau and integrated decisioning. Customers may multi-source data, but replacing a major bureau entirely is operationally and regulatorily difficult. Ascend can deepen the moat if it becomes the environment in which customers develop, deploy, and monitor strategies. All ten largest strategic clients being live is encouraging, but it also means

the next leg depends on usage expansion, smaller-client penetration, measurable outcomes, and retention rather than simply landing the largest logos. [data_package §6 North America Financial Services row]

Fraud and identity strengthen the moat only if Experian keeps up with attackers. Network scale and cross-domain identity resolution can improve detection and reduce false positives, but point-solution vendors can innovate rapidly and customers often use several providers. Durability depends on product velocity and data permissions, not just installed base. Health has workflow switching costs, integration depth, and recurring transaction data; Automotive has longitudinal asset records and channel relationships. Both face capable specialists, and neither should inherit the full credit-bureau moat automatically.

Consumer Services has the least secure margin moat. A large member base, trusted brand, data access, and personalised offers help, but free products are plentiful and traffic can be purchased. Credit Karma's scale and growth show that a rival platform can aggregate similar financial journeys. Banks, lenders, and insurers can also go direct. Experian's advantage is the ability to connect a consumer relationship to its data, monitoring, identity, and enterprise network; the weakness is that referral economics depend on third-party supply and breach contracts are temporary.

Over five to ten years, the segment should retain an advantaged position if it protects trust and converts bureau scale into integrated workflows. A severe breach, persistent data-quality failures, loss of permissible data access, adverse regulation, or customer migration to interoperable low-cost data layers could compress both growth and margin. The moat supports a base case above nominal GDP, not immunity from competition. The margin forecast therefore ranges from 29.9% in bear to 38.9% in bull rather than assuming the current 34.2% is either a floor or a guaranteed launch point.

6. Historical growth rates

The table reproduces the finest reliable histories from `data_package.md`. North America is geographic. Financial Services and Verticals are global activities because regional product dollars are not disclosed and the new taxonomy has only two comparable years. Consumer Services is also global but continuously labelled. `n/d` means not disclosed; `n/m` means not meaningful. The column titled “3-yr CAGR” is calculated across the two annual intervals represented by FY2024-FY2026 when three fiscal-year observations exist.

Product or sub-segment	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	FY2026 revenue	3-yr CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
North America total	US$4.659bn [§3 NA Revenue row]	US$5.046bn [§3 NA Revenue row]	US$5.587bn [§3 NA Revenue row]	9.5% [§3 NA Revenue row]	10.7% actual USD [§3 NA YoY row]	`data_package.md` §3, North America table rows Revenue and YoY
Financial Services, global new taxonomy	n/d [§1 taxonomy boundary]	US$3.874bn [§4 Financial Services row]	US$4.463bn [§4 Financial Services row]	n/m [§1 taxonomy boundary]	15.2% actual USD; 9% organic [§4 FS rows]	`data_package.md` §4, Financial Services row and organic-growth table row
Verticals, global new taxonomy	n/d [§1 taxonomy boundary]	US$1.547bn [§4 Verticals row]	US$1.705bn [§4 Verticals row]	n/m [§1 taxonomy boundary]	10.2% actual USD; 7% organic [§4 Verticals rows]	`data_package.md` §4, Verticals row and organic-growth table row
Consumer Services, global	US$1.937bn [§4 Consumer Services row]	US$2.054bn [§4 Consumer Services row]	US$2.257bn [§4 Consumer Services row]	7.9% [§4 Consumer Services row]	9.9% actual USD; 9% organic [§4 CS rows]	`data_package.md` §4, Consumer Services row and organic-growth table row

Arithmetic checks all pass within the required 2% tolerance. North America: US$4.659bn × 1.083 = US$5.046bn, and US$5.046bn × 1.107 = US$5.586bn versus US$5.587bn reported. Financial Services: US$3.874bn × 1.152 = US$4.463bn. Verticals: US$1.547bn × 1.102 = US$1.705bn. Consumer Services: US$2.054bn × 1.099 = US$2.257bn. The difference between actual-dollar and organic growth is not “reconciled away”; it reflects acquisitions, FX, and perimeter effects described by the package.

The longer geographic history is also important. North America revenue was US$4.122bn in FY2022 and US$4.432bn in FY2023, while organic growth was 13%, 7%, 5%, 8%, and 10% from FY2022 through FY2026. The actual-dollar five-year sequence—US$4.122bn, US$4.432bn, US$4.659bn, US$5.046bn, US$5.587bn—implies a 7.9% CAGR across four annual intervals. This is the most useful long-run anchor because it is segment-specific and spans both stronger and softer credit conditions. [data_package §0a regional organic-growth table, North America row; §3 North America revenue row]

7. Management guidance and forward anchors

The package contains four source-bound short excerpts relevant to the segment's platform, growth, and AI direction. They are reproduced verbatim from the verified package rather than re-fetched.

- **Q1 FY2027, CEO Brian Cassin:** “We’ve had a good start to the year with continued new business strength and accelerating potential across a range of AI-enabled opportunities.” [data_package §6, first quoted bullet] This supports a healthy pipeline but is not booked revenue and does not quantify North America.

- **FY2026, CFO Lloyd Pitchford:** “We expect organic revenue growth of 6-8%, which is in line with the initial guidance we gave for FY26.” [data_package §6, second quoted bullet] This is the group FY2027 anchor. The North America base begins above the midpoint because Q1 B2B was strong, then decelerates as comparisons normalise.

- **Q3 FY2026, CEO Brian Cassin:** “We continue to leverage our scaled proprietary data assets, strong technology foundations and deep expertise.” [data_package §6, third quoted bullet] This describes the intended data-and-platform moat; it does not prove price or share gains.

- **H1 FY2026, CEO Brian Cassin:** “We have enhanced our product platforms, deepened consumer relationships and transformed customer experiences and internal processes through AI-driven automation and personalisation.” [data_package §6, fourth quoted bullet] The forecast reflects platform cross-sell and modest efficiency, not an unbounded AI premium.

The North America-specific management evidence in the package is paraphrased rather than presented as verbatim quotation. On 16 July 2026, Financial Services grew 13%, all ten largest strategic clients were live on Ascend, Verticals grew 8% led by Health and Automotive, and Consumer Services' breach roll-off was complete with loans and insurance stronger but cards softer. On 20 May 2026, management framed FY2026 North America organic growth at 10% and H2 at 9%, which argues for deceleration rather than indefinite extrapolation. [data_package §6, North America rows]

Group FY2027 guidance, reiterated at Q1, is 6-8% organic revenue growth, around 1% acquisition contribution, and 50bp of organic constant-currency margin progression. Expected FX was a 1-2% tailwind to revenue and Benchmark EBIT. Capex was guided around 8% of revenue, Benchmark operating cash conversion above 90%, and the longer-term capex target remained 7%. Only the organic growth and operating-margin guidance directly constrain this segment model; acquisitions and FX are not embedded as undisclosed permanent organic drivers. [data_package §6, final guidance paragraph]

[DATA GAP: The package contains no quantified North America FY2027 revenue range, product-level dollar guide, Ascend revenue, fraud/identity revenue, Health revenue, Automotive revenue, or North America margin guide. The model uses the group frame and regional/product KPI overlay without converting those omissions into invented guidance.]

8. Forward growth assumptions

Model architecture and driver separation

The forecast starts from the analytical TTM allocation described in section 2 and compounds each of three non-overlapping proxy revenue buckets through exactly 31 March 2031. Financial Services already contains core bureau activity, Ascend-enabled usage, fraud and identity, analytics, and pricing. Verticals already contains Health, Automotive, other vertical activity, and any embedded fraud and identity. Consumer Services already contains marketplace, subscriptions, identity products, and temporary breach-support work. Ascend, fraud/identity, Health, and Automotive are therefore qualitative checks on each bucket's growth rate—not separate revenue lines and not additive percentage-point contributions. This prevents the same transaction from being counted once as bureau or vertical revenue and again as Ascend or fraud revenue.

The base assumptions are direct line-level CAGRs. Financial Services reaches 7.6% from a 9.0% FY2027 start that fades to 6.5% as the 13% Q1 overlay normalises. Verticals reaches 6.5%, below the 8% Q1 North America overlay and 7% FY2026 global organic result; Health and Automotive support the direction, but their undisclosed revenue bases do not justify separate contribution estimates. Consumer Services reaches 5.3%. Its FY2027 assumption is cut to 2.0% because the disclosed Q1 result was negative 2% including breach runoff; the 3% ex-breach rate cannot be used as the total-line annual growth rate. Later acceleration requires the underlying marketplace and subscription engine to improve after the comparison resets.

Base case

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services	n/m under new taxonomy; NA total 9.5%	9% global FY2026 organic; 13% NA Q1 overlay	Group organic 6-8%; Ascend live at ten largest strategic clients	7.6%	Starts strong on Ascend, fraud and client wins, then decelerates below current overlay; Equifax USIS sustained 10% in 2024-2025, while TransUnion FS growth above 15% was mortgage and pricing-assisted.
Verticals	n/m under new taxonomy	7% global FY2026 organic; 8% NA Q1 overlay	Group organic 6-8%; Health and Automotive led Q1	6.5%	Health workflow penetration and Automotive data support above-GDP growth, but mixed end markets and no product dollars warrant a fade; TransUnion Emerging Verticals moved from 4.0% to 8.5%.
Consumer Services	7.9% global	9% global FY2026 organic; NA Q1 -2% reported and 3% ex-breach	Breach roll-off complete; loans and insurance stronger, cards softer	5.3%	FY2027 is held to 2.0% total-line growth because the negative 2% reported Q1 cannot be replaced by the 3% ex-breach rate; later acceleration requires marketplace and subscription recovery.

The base year-by-year cadence makes the deceleration explicit rather than hiding it in a terminal CAGR.

Base growth cadence	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	FY2031	Implied 5-year CAGR
Financial Services	9.0%	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	6.5%	7.6%
Verticals	7.5%	7.0%	6.5%	6.0%	5.5%	6.5%
Consumer Services	2.0%	5.5%	6.0%	6.5%	6.5%	5.3%

Financial Services decelerates by 250bp from FY2027 to FY2031, less abrupt than a collapse and consistent with mature peers that can retain high-single-digit growth when pricing and mortgage volumes cooperate. Verticals fade by 200bp as easier Health and Automotive comparisons scale, without assigning either vertical an invented revenue contribution. Consumer Services accelerates after the breach comparison ends, but the model first respects the negative reported Q1 rather than substituting the ex-breach growth rate.

Bull case

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services	n/m under new taxonomy; NA total 9.5%	9% global FY2026 organic; 13% NA Q1 overlay	Group organic 6-8%; all largest strategic clients on Ascend	10.0%	Ascend usage broadens beyond initial deployment, fraud/identity cross-sell accelerates, and mortgage and credit activity support pricing; peer double-digit growth shows the path is possible but not guaranteed.
Verticals	n/m under new taxonomy	7% global FY2026 organic; 8% NA Q1 overlay	Health and Automotive led Q1	8.5%	Health achieves recurring workflow cross-sell closer to high-growth health-software peers, Automotive remains firm, and other verticals adopt identity products without major price compression.
Consumer Services	7.9% global	9% global FY2026 organic; NA Q1 -2% and 3% ex-breach	Breach roll-off complete; loans and insurance stronger	7.6%	Marketplace supply, subscriptions and insurance accelerate after FY2027; no Own Up revenue is embedded because the package discloses no standalone base or contribution.

Bull growth cadence	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	FY2031	Implied 5-year CAGR
Financial Services	11.0%	10.5%	10.0%	9.5%	9.0%	10.0%
Verticals	10.0%	9.0%	8.5%	8.0%	7.0%	8.5%
Consumer Services	2.0%	8.0%	9.0%	9.5%	9.5%	7.6%

The bull case requires sustained share and wallet gains, not merely an industry recovery. Financial Services still decelerates, avoiding the unsupported assumption that 13% Q1 growth persists forever. Consumer Services must rebound sharply after FY2027, but even the bull does not erase the reported Q1 breach drag or count undisclosed Own Up revenue. If underlying ex-breach growth remains near 3%, the bull case fails.

Bear case

Product	3-yr historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services	n/m under new taxonomy; NA total 9.5%	9% global FY2026 organic; 13% NA Q1 overlay	Group organic 6-8%	4.4%	Credit and mortgage volumes weaken, Ascend produces less incremental usage, input pricing captures value, fraud competition limits cross-sell, and dispute-resolution compliance costs rise.
Verticals	n/m under new taxonomy	7% global FY2026 organic; 8% NA Q1 overlay	Health and Automotive led Q1	3.9%	Provider budgets, auto volumes, and implementation capacity weaken; specialist competitors retain workflow share and pricing becomes more transactional.
Consumer Services	7.9% global	9% global FY2026 organic; NA Q1 -2% and 3% ex-breach	Breach roll-off complete	2.0%	Breach revenue falls faster than marketplace and subscriptions grow, lenders restrict offers, paid monitoring faces free substitutes, and cards remain soft.

Bear growth cadence	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	FY2031	Implied 5-year CAGR
Financial Services	5.0%	4.5%	4.5%	4.0%	4.0%	4.4%
Verticals	4.5%	4.0%	4.0%	3.5%	3.5%	3.9%
Consumer Services	-2.0%	1.0%	3.0%	4.0%	4.0%	2.0%

The bear is not a catastrophic regulatory shutdown. It is a credible erosion case in which high current B2B growth proves cyclical and Consumer Services needs several years to rebuild after contract runoff. It is meaningfully below the segment's 7.9% FY2022-FY2026 actual-dollar CAGR but does not assume that entrenched bureau workflows disappear.

9. Forward Benchmark EBIT margin assumptions

The exact segment profit metric is **Benchmark EBIT**. No corporate, Central Activities, acquisition-intangible amortisation, exceptional item, finance, tax, or other statutory-bridge adjustment is allocated into product margins here. Those lines remain the synthesis agent's responsibility under the sealed bridge.

Because product Benchmark EBIT is not disclosed, the current line margins are analytical allocations chosen to reconcile exactly to US$1.912bn of segment Benchmark EBIT: Financial Services 39.0%, Verticals 25.0%, and Consumer Services 31.74%. The relative ordering reflects transaction and platform economics in Financial Services, mixed implementation and industry economics in Verticals, and scalable but marketing- and mix-sensitive Consumer Services. These are not claimed issuer margins; changing the proxy revenue split mechanically changes the Consumer Services margin needed to preserve the sealed segment total.

Product	TTM revenue allocation	TTM Benchmark EBIT margin	Bear 2031 margin	Base 2031 margin	Bull 2031 margin	Primary mechanism
Financial Services	US$2.960bn	39.0% estimated	35.0%	40.5%	43.0%	Bureau and Ascend scale versus pricing pressure, cloud cost, fraud reinvestment, third-party scores, and compliance cost
Verticals	US$1.131bn	25.0% estimated	21.0%	25.5%	30.0%	Health workflow and Automotive mix versus implementation intensity, specialist competition, and cyclical volumes

Product	TTM revenue allocation	TTM Benchmark EBIT margin	Bear 2031 margin	Base 2031 margin	Bull 2031 margin	Primary mechanism
Consumer Services	US$1.496bn	31.74% estimated	26.0%	32.5%	37.0%	Breach runoff and acquisition cost versus subscription, marketplace conversion, and scaled personalisation
North America blended	US$5.587bn	34.2% reported	29.9%	35.5%	38.9%	Revenue-weighted mix plus line-specific operating leverage

Financial Services: Base expansion of 150bp from the estimated current line margin requires Ascend-enabled usage and fraud/identity cross-sell to raise revenue per client faster than cloud, data, security, compliance, and sales costs. Bull expansion of 400bp requires both sustained double-digit growth and material delivery leverage. Bear compression of 400bp reflects price competition, higher third-party score or data costs, redundant platform spending, lower high-margin transaction volumes, and added dispute-resolution or state-law compliance expense.

Verticals: Base expansion is limited to 50bp because Health and Automotive revenue, mix and margins are undisclosed; the 8% Q1 overlay supports growth direction but not a large product-margin uplift. Bull expansion of 500bp requires a much larger share of recurring workflow software and successful product standardisation; Waystar's recurring model shows the mechanism but not Experian's achievable margin. Bear compression of 400bp reflects weak auto and provider volumes, costly custom delivery, and competition from specialists. This is the product line where margin assumptions are least observable.

Consumer Services: Base expansion is limited to 76bp because the TTM includes temporary breach-support revenue of undisclosed size and profitability. The base requires subscriptions and marketplace revenue to replace that work, but it does not assume a large margin step-up from an unknown starting mix. Bull expansion of 526bp assumes scaled referrals and stronger insurance, loan and mortgage supply without a matching rise in traffic acquisition. Bear compression of 574bp assumes breach contracts had above-average contribution, marketplace partners reduce bids, and retention requires greater marketing or free features. The TransUnion breach-reversal evidence makes this downside concrete.

At the blended level, the base rises **130bp** from the reported 34.2% to 35.5%, replacing the prior 230bp assumption. The lower endpoint matches the segment's observed FY2022-FY2026 130bp margin range and respects the absence of North America product margins. Financial Services grows from 53.0% of modeled TTM revenue to 55.0% of base horizon revenue and gains 150bp of estimated line margin; Verticals receives only 50bp; Consumer Services receives 76bp after breach replacement. The 50bp FY2027 group organic margin guidance is a directional constraint, not a North America promise or an amount compounded five times. The bull's 470bp expansion requires nearly every mechanism to work. The bear's 430bp contraction reflects adverse product mix, compliance cost, and operating deleverage but still leaves a high-margin data franchise.

10. Segment rollup

TTM analytical allocation and reconciliation

Product	TTM revenue	TTM estimated Benchmark EBIT margin	TTM estimated Benchmark EBIT	Share of segment revenue
Financial Services	US$2.960bn	39.0%	US$1.154bn	53.0%
Verticals	US$1.131bn	25.0%	US$0.283bn	20.2%
Consumer Services	US$1.496bn	31.74%	US$0.475bn	26.8%
North America	US$5.587bn	34.2%	US$1.912bn	100.0%

The analytical product revenues sum exactly to the reported US$5.587bn. Product Benchmark EBIT sums to US$1.912bn before rounding and therefore reproduces the sealed segment result. This is an allocation, not a claim that Experian discloses product profit.

Bear rollup

Product	2031 revenue	2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	2031 Benchmark EBIT	Revenue formula
Financial Services	US$3.670bn	35.0%	US$1.285bn	US$2.960bn compounded by 5.0%, 4.5%, 4.5%, 4.0%, 4.0%
Verticals	US$1.369bn	21.0%	US$0.287bn	US$1.131bn compounded by 4.5%, 4.0%, 4.0%, 3.5%, 3.5%
Consumer Services	US$1.650bn	26.0%	US$0.429bn	US$1.496bn compounded by -2.0%, 1.0%, 3.0%, 4.0%, 4.0%
North America	US$6.690bn	29.9%	US$2.001bn	Sum of product lines

Bear arithmetic: US$3.670bn + US$1.369bn + US$1.650bn = US$6.690bn after unrounded calculation. Benchmark EBIT is US$3.670bn × 35.0% + US$1.369bn × 21.0% + US$1.650bn × 26.0% = US$2.001bn. US$2.001bn ÷ US$6.690bn = 29.9%. The model ties within far less than 1%.

Base rollup

Product	2031 revenue	2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	2031 Benchmark EBIT	Revenue formula
Financial Services	US$4.268bn	40.5%	US$1.729bn	US$2.960bn compounded by 9.0%, 8.0%, 7.5%, 7.0%, 6.5%
Verticals	US$1.549bn	25.5%	US$0.395bn	US$1.131bn compounded by 7.5%, 7.0%, 6.5%, 6.0%, 5.5%
Consumer Services	US$1.936bn	32.5%	US$0.629bn	US$1.496bn compounded by 2.0%, 5.5%, 6.0%, 6.5%, 6.5%
North America	US$7.753bn	35.5%	US$2.753bn	Sum of product lines

Base arithmetic: US$4.268bn + US$1.549bn + US$1.936bn = US$7.753bn after unrounded calculation. Benchmark EBIT is US$4.268bn × 40.5% + US$1.549bn × 25.5% + US$1.936bn × 32.5% = US$2.753bn. US$2.753bn ÷ US$7.753bn = 35.5%. Segment revenue CAGR from US$5.587bn is **6.77%**; the prior 6.84% was mechanically correct on its inputs but used an unsupported bespoke allocation and treated the 3% ex-breach Q1 rate as FY2027 total-line Consumer Services growth.

Bull rollup

Product	2031 revenue	2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	2031 Benchmark EBIT	Revenue formula
Financial Services	US$4.766bn	43.0%	US$2.049bn	US$2.960bn compounded by 11.0%, 10.5%, 10.0%, 9.5%, 9.0%
Verticals	US$1.700bn	30.0%	US$0.510bn	US$1.131bn compounded by 10.0%, 9.0%, 8.5%, 8.0%, 7.0%
Consumer Services	US$2.155bn	37.0%	US$0.797bn	US$1.496bn compounded by 2.0%, 8.0%, 9.0%, 9.5%, 9.5%
North America	US$8.621bn	38.9%	US$3.357bn	Sum of product lines

Bull arithmetic: US$4.766bn + US$1.700bn + US$2.155bn = US$8.621bn after unrounded calculation. Benchmark EBIT is US$4.766bn × 43.0% + US$1.700bn × 30.0% + US$2.155bn × 37.0% = US$3.357bn. US$3.357bn ÷ US$8.621bn = 38.9%. Segment revenue CAGR is 9.06%, requiring sustained share gains and operating execution rather than a simple macro rebound.

Scenario comparison

Case	Revenue CAGR	2031 revenue	2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	2031 Benchmark EBIT	Change versus TTM margin
Bear	3.67%	US$6.690bn	29.9%	US$2.001bn	-430bp
Base	6.77%	US$7.753bn	35.5%	US$2.753bn	+130bp
Bull	9.06%	US$8.621bn	38.9%	US$3.357bn	+470bp

The scenario spread is driven by more than top-line growth. From bear to bull, Financial Services gains US$1.096bn of terminal revenue and 800bp of line margin; Consumer Services gains US$0.504bn and 1,100bp; Verticals gains US$0.331bn

and 900bp. That creates a US$1.355bn spread in Benchmark EBIT. The most decision-critical assumptions are therefore Consumer Services recovery and the ability of Ascend-enabled usage plus fraud/identity cross-sell to translate Financial Services growth into margin rather than merely offset rising technology, data, third-party-score, and regulatory costs.

11. Key risks and wildcards

Bear — breach-contract runoff and weak underlying consumer growth. Management says the two-contract runoff is complete, but Q1 reported growth was negative 2% versus positive 3% ex-breach. Because the TTM anchor includes the expiring contracts, the ex-breach rate is not an admissible total-line FY2027 growth assumption. The base now uses 2.0% for FY2027 and requires later marketplace and subscription reacceleration; the bear keeps negative 2.0%. Monitor reported and ex-breach organic growth, lender and insurer offer breadth, paid conversion, and partner revenue per engaged member.

Bear — credit and mortgage cyclicality. Financial Services growth can benefit from mortgage activity, batch volume, pricing, originations, and marketing. Equifax and TransUnion peer results show strong current growth, but also explicitly attribute part of it to mortgage and price. A downturn in applications, tighter underwriting, or weak housing turnover could pull transactional growth below the base cadence.

Bear — FICO value capture and input economics. FICO's 27% Scores growth, driven largely by B2B unit pricing, shows that a supplier and partner can capture more of the credit-decision economics. If Experian cannot offset higher third-party costs with proprietary scores, attributes, Ascend, or pricing, Financial Services margin could compress despite revenue growth.

Bear — CFPB, FCRA, state-law, accuracy, and security exposure. This is an active liability, not a generic risk label. Experian's FY2026 Annual Report says the CFPB lawsuit filed on 7 January 2025 concerns US credit-profile dispute resolution and seeks monetary penalties and wide-ranging process changes; Experian is defending it, while the separate Experian Boost investigation was dropped. The report also identifies state medical-debt restrictions, proliferating privacy laws, the California Delete Act, and rising costs of US regulatory and litigation response. Note 43 says no outflow is considered probable and directors do not expect a materially adverse effect on group financial position, but FCRA class actions can seek statutory damages of US$100-US$1,000 per consumer if wilful misconduct is proven. The bear therefore includes lower Financial Services and Consumer Services margins for compliance, remediation, and process-change costs. [Experian FY2026 Annual Report, pp. 74-75 and note 43 p. 215]

Bear and Base — platform execution. All ten largest strategic clients being live on Ascend is not the same as scaled usage and incremental revenue. Migration costs, slower customer adoption, competing internal platforms, or weak measurable outcomes could turn the platform into a defensive technology refresh rather than a growth engine. The base case needs adoption breadth and wallet expansion, while the bear assumes less incremental usage.

Bear — specialist competition in fraud, Health, and Automotive. Network data is valuable, but point solutions can be faster and deeper in a particular workflow. Health providers face complex implementations and budget constraints; Automotive volumes and dealer economics fluctuate. The package discloses neither product's North America revenue, historical CAGR, or margin, so the 8% Q1 Verticals overlay cannot be split into Health and Automotive contributions. If Experian competes primarily on bundled price rather than differentiated outcomes, Vertical margins may not expand.

Bull — fraud and identity become a cross-segment platform. Synthetic identity, account takeover, digital onboarding, and compliance demand could make fraud/identity a major attach product across Financial Services, Health, Automotive, and Consumer Services. The bull requires measurable cross-sell and low false-positive rates, not merely industry growth.

Bull — consumer marketplace broadens successfully. Loans and insurance were stronger in Q1 while cards were softer. Own Up adds mortgage capability. A broader set of offers can make monetisation less dependent on any one category, but acquisition integration and consumer trust must be demonstrated. The bull assumes partner supply and conversion improve after the breach comparison resets.

Bull — operating leverage and capex normalisation. A common cloud and data architecture, AI-assisted internal processes, and platform standardisation could reduce delivery cost while the longer-term group capex ratio trends toward 7%. Because North America capex is not disclosed, this remains a group read-through rather than a segment forecast. Margin upside should be withheld if capex merely moves costs between expense and capitalisation.

All cases — acquisition and accounting perimeter. Acquisitions can add capability but create integration cost, intangible amortisation, contingent consideration, and disposal expense. This appendix forecasts Benchmark EBIT only. The synthesis must separately project Central Activities and every sealed bridge line; it must not treat high segment Benchmark EBIT as

statutory operating income.

Summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	US$6.690bn	Benchmark EBIT	29.9%	US$2.001bn	30%
Base	US$7.753bn	Benchmark EBIT	35.5%	US$2.753bn	55%
Bull	US$8.621bn	Benchmark EBIT	38.9%	US$3.357bn	15%

The base case is a **6.77% segment revenue CAGR** and **130bp of Benchmark EBIT margin expansion** over exactly five years. It is supported by the segment's 7.9% FY2022-FY2026 actual-dollar CAGR, current Ascend penetration, and the disclosed Health and Automotive-led Verticals overlay. It does not add separate Ascend, fraud/identity, Health, or Automotive revenue to their host product buckets. It is constrained by breach runoff, weaker near-term underlying Consumer Services growth, cyclical credit volumes, active CFPB/FCRA and state-law exposure, specialist competition, and the lack of disclosed North America product economics. The underwriting should therefore focus on whether Financial Services sustains high-single-digit growth after current comparisons and whether Consumer Services returns to mid-single-digit underlying growth without another temporary breach contract.

Appendix B2 - Latin America

Latin America — Segment Deep Dive

Company: Experian plc **Reportable segment:** Latin America **TTM anchor:** 31 March 2026 **Forecast horizon:** 31 March 2031, exactly 5.0 years **Reporting currency:** US dollars **Profit basis: Benchmark EBIT Scenario weights:** Bear 30%, Base 55%, Bull 15% **Authority:** Research only. No trade, message, ranking, sizing, portfolio or broker authority.

The upstream gate is clear. `data_package.md` records `STATUTORY_BRIDGE_STATUS: VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING`, the gate manifest records `DATA PACKAGE VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR WAVE 2`, and the locally verified statutory-bridge SHA-256 is `791cd96635af149a1dc29b8897a7621a946ad4ebde1282d034719bd7eabf1b6f`. The segment profit measure used throughout is therefore the issuer's exact non-GAAP metric, **Benchmark EBIT**. Central Activities and all Benchmark-to-statutory adjustments remain outside this segment model and are to be forecast once at the consolidated bridge.

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

Latin America is one of Experian's four stable, geographically defined reportable operating segments. Its perimeter is Brazil plus Spanish Latin America, spanning bureau data, analytics, decisioning, fraud and identity, and consumer services. The geographic reporting structure is stable across FY2022-FY2026, although yearly exited-activity comparatives are re-presented. The business-activity taxonomy changed on **1 April 2025**: the former global `Data` and `Decisioning` split became `Financial Services` and `Verticals`, while `Consumer Services` continued. Only FY2025 was re-presented into the new activity taxonomy. There is no primary-source bridge for pre-FY2025 activity dollars, and no regional activity-dollar disclosure at all. Accordingly, historical regional dollars below are never spliced across taxonomies; product-level TTM anchors used in the forward model are explicitly labeled analyst allocations, not issuer-reported history. [data_package §1, taxonomy paragraphs; §4, product-disclosure table]

1. What this segment actually is

Latin America is best understood as a Brazil-centred information network rather than a conventional software vendor. The core Serasa Experian franchise aggregates credit and payment histories, negative and positive bureau data, identity signals and other permitted data. Banks, fintechs, retailers, telecom operators, insurers and other creditors pay to retrieve reports, scores and attributes or to run them through automated decisioning workflows. Revenue can be transactional, subscription-like, licence-based, project-based or linked to software delivery. The same underlying data can be reused across many decisions at low incremental cost, but only after sustained spending on data ingestion, security, model development, cloud infrastructure, client integration and regulatory compliance.

The segment's B2B **Financial Services** activity serves lenders and financial institutions across the customer lifecycle: prospecting, onboarding, identity verification, credit underwriting, account management, collections and fraud prevention. Traditional bureau pulls remain important, but the strategic direction is toward integrated platforms, richer positive-data coverage, analytics and decisioning. A bank gains more than a score: it can combine proprietary bureau data with its own data, deploy models, monitor a portfolio and automate decisions. That workflow embedding is central to retention and pricing.

Verticals contains the non-financial B2B opportunity. In Latin America this includes use cases in retail, telecom, e-commerce and other industries where identity, payment propensity, fraud, collections or marketing decisions matter. The globally disclosed vertical labels include Automotive, Health and Marketing, but the regional mix and dollars are not disclosed. The economic logic is similar to Financial Services, though customer concentration, data intensity and recurring usage can be lower. The vertical opportunity matters because it increases reuse of the bureau and fraud assets beyond bank credit decisions.

Consumer Services is not merely a free credit-score website. It is an engagement and distribution platform. Limpa Nome connects indebted consumers with creditors and supports debt renegotiation. Premium products monetize recurring monitoring and identity-related services. The marketplace can earn referral or distribution economics when users take financial products. The payroll-lending marketplace extends that model into a large, regulated Brazilian credit channel. Free tools widen the audience and create repeat engagement; monetization occurs only when a consumer subscribes, completes a renegotiation, or converts into a partner-funded product. Q1 FY2027 commentary identified Limpa Nome, premium and payroll lending as the principal drivers of 22% Consumer Services organic growth in the region. That quarter is used only as a KPI overlay and does not reset the audited TTM. [data_package §5, current read-through; §6, Latin America rows]

Fraud and identity now form an increasingly important connective layer. Experian historically focused more on origination fraud and identity verification in Brazil. ClearSale adds transaction-fraud signals, analytics and e-commerce expertise, allowing risk assessment beyond account opening and across the purchase journey. The FY2026 annual report explains that the combined stack can analyze transaction history, device association, payment method, transaction size and behavioural signals. idwall, completed on 1 July 2026, adds digital identity management. These capabilities can be sold standalone, but the stronger proposition is a joined-up view of credit, identity, device, behaviour and transaction risk. ClearSale and idwall therefore expand both addressable workflows and data feedback loops. ClearSale is inside the FY2026 TTM perimeter. idwall is post-TTM, but its standalone acquired revenue is undisclosed and is therefore **excluded** from the revenue rollup; only prospective cross-sell and operating integration can influence the organic-like growth and margin assumptions. This avoids disguising an unknown inorganic dollar amount inside a stated CAGR. [data_package §6, ClearSale row; §9, idwall action]

Brazil is the centre of gravity. Experian does not disclose Brazil's exact percentage of Latin America revenue, so a precise concentration figure would be fabricated. Nevertheless, the Serasa brand, Limpa Nome, premium, payroll lending, ClearSale and idwall are all Brazil-specific or Brazil-led strategic drivers. Spanish Latin America provides diversification and runway, but the segment's economics remain heavily exposed to the Brazilian real, Brazilian inflation and interest rates, local lending volumes, consumer delinquency, and Brazilian data regulation.

2. Current economics at the TTM anchor

TTM equals audited FY2026 exactly. Latin America generated **US$1.299bn of revenue**, up **8% organically at constant currency** and **20.8% in reported US dollars**. The gap between those two rates is economically important: acquisitions and foreign exchange can make reported growth look much stronger or weaker than the operating franchise. Benchmark EBIT was **US$399m**, implying a **30.7% Benchmark EBIT margin**. Latin America represented 15.4% of group revenue. [Experian FY2026 Annual Report, geographic segment information, Note 9; data_package §0a, §1, §3 and §3a]

The 30.7% margin is already high. It is consistent with a scaled bureau and analytics franchise whose data and models can be reused, but it also reflects a mixed portfolio. B2B bureau, scores and decisioning should earn structurally higher margins than a still-scaling consumer marketplace or implementation-heavy fraud products. ClearSale integration, product investment and the faster growth of Consumer Services can dilute near-term mix even when they create long-run value. This is why the base case does not assume that 12% recent organic growth plus groupwide 50bp margin progression can be extrapolated mechanically. The 9.6% base CAGR and 31.4% terminal margin are independently defensible only as **constant-currency, constant-perimeter scenario assumptions**, not independently observable product facts or reported-USD guidance; Section 9 shows the evidence and the dilution arithmetic.

Segment-specific capital expenditure, capitalised development, R&D, gross margin, working capital and depreciation are not disclosed. [DATA GAP: Latin America-specific capex, R&D, gross margin and invested capital are not disclosed in the data package.] At group level, total capex was 8.6% of FY2026 revenue, guidance points to about 8% in FY2027, and the long-term goal is 7%. Those group figures provide a boundary, not a regional allocation. [data_package §0a, KPI table, capex row; §6, group guidance paragraph]

Experian also does not disclose Latin America revenue by Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services. For a reconstructable bottoms-up forecast, this appendix uses a transparent TTM modeling allocation: 61% Financial Services, 14% Verticals and 25% Consumer Services. The allocations sum exactly to the sealed US$1.299bn segment total. They are not presented as reported history and should be treated as a sensitivity variable. The 75% B2B share reflects the region's bureau and decisioning core; the 25% Consumer Services share recognizes the significance of Serasa's consumer ecosystem without assuming that the globally disclosed Consumer Services mix transfers mechanically to Brazil.

TTM modeling line	TTM revenue anchor	Share	Status and rationale
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	61%	Analyst allocation; bureau and financial decisioning core
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	14%	Analyst allocation; non-financial credit, identity and fraud use cases
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	25%	Analyst allocation; Limpa Nome, premium and marketplace ecosystem
Latin America total	US$1,299.0m	100%	Issuer-disclosed total [data_package §3, Latin America revenue row]

The lack of reported mix means forecast precision should be judged at the segment level. A ten-point shift from Financial Services to Consumer Services would change the base revenue endpoint because the assumed CAGRs differ. It would also

reduce the initial weighted margin because Consumer Services is modeled below the bureau margin. This appendix therefore gives exact model arithmetic while retaining an explicit data-gap flag.

3. Unit economics

B2B Financial Services

Revenue begins with permissioned and legally usable data. Experian cleans, matches and links records; creates attributes, scores and models; embeds these into client workflows; and charges per transaction, through recurring platform contracts or via software and professional services. The incremental cost of another bureau query or score can be low, but the fixed cost is substantial: source relationships, data quality, security, uptime, cloud infrastructure, model governance, compliance and sales coverage. Margin improves when volumes rise on an existing platform, more clients adopt higher-value analytics, software replaces manual work, and common datasets support more products. Margin weakens if customers negotiate price, data becomes more accessible to rivals, new regulation increases consent or deletion costs, fraud losses demand more human review, or product development runs ahead of revenue.

Financial Services has a cyclical volume component. More credit applications, account openings and portfolio activity generally create more bureau and decisioning transactions. Yet risk stress can also increase demand for collections, monitoring, fraud detection and more discriminating scores. This counter-cyclicality is partial, not complete. In a severe tightening, fewer loan originations and weaker marketplace approvals can outweigh richer risk usage. The current Brazilian backdrop is mixed: the central bank reported May 2026 financial-system credit up 9.2% over twelve months, while total 90-day delinquency reached 4.7%, up 1.0 percentage point year on year; household delinquency was 5.6%. That supports demand for risk and collections tools but raises the probability of weaker approval volumes and lender caution. [Banco Central do Brasil, May 2026 monetary and credit statistics](https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/statistics/monetarycreditstatistics/https%3A/www3.bcb.gov.br/ifdata/?lang=1)

B2B Verticals

Vertical revenue uses many of the same assets but reaches different workflows. Retailers need identity and payment-risk screening; e-commerce merchants need transaction-fraud prevention; telecom companies need onboarding and collections; other enterprises use data enrichment, marketing and analytics. Reuse of shared identity and bureau assets can make incremental revenue attractive. However, bespoke integrations, smaller client contracts and fraud-review services can carry more delivery cost than a standardized score. The margin outcome depends on how quickly Experian converts acquired products into common platforms and how much manual casework remains.

ClearSale is strategically important because transaction fraud can widen Experian's coverage from origination to the full customer journey. The unit-economics promise is cross-sell plus lower false positives: a more complete identity and behavioural picture can approve more genuine transactions while rejecting more fraud. The risk is that the product remains services-heavy, integration takes longer, or e-commerce clients push for outcome-based pricing. idwall adds reusable digital identity capabilities, but integration costs and purchase-accounting effects belong outside segment Benchmark EBIT only where the sealed bridge places them. This segment model captures operating synergy and normal investment in the Benchmark EBIT margin; acquisition-intangible amortisation and acquisition expenses remain in the corporate statutory bridge.

Consumer Services

Consumer Services has a different funnel. Free access and brand trust attract members; useful features drive recurring engagement; engaged users may renegotiate debt, buy premium monitoring or identity protection, or accept a relevant credit product. Revenue per free member is not disclosed, and a member is not inherently monetized. The valuable unit is an engaged consumer who completes an action at an acquisition cost below expected contribution.

Limpa Nome has two-sided network economics. More creditor participation improves the range and attractiveness of settlement offers; more consumer traffic makes the platform more useful to creditors. Revenue can be resilient when delinquency rises because more consumers need renegotiation, but collections capacity and willingness to pay may weaken at the same time. Premium should be more recurring, though discretionary cancellation risk rises under household stress. The payroll-lending marketplace can grow with digital adoption and product breadth, but commissions depend on lender appetite, regulatory rules, approval rates and competitive customer-acquisition costs.

The base model assigns Consumer Services a 20% TTM Benchmark EBIT margin, below Financial Services, because growth requires ongoing product, marketing, service and compliance spending. It then rises to 22% by FY2031 as repeat traffic,

premium mix and platform scale offset continued reinvestment. This is an analyst model, not a disclosed product margin. If traffic must be purchased aggressively, lenders reduce approvals or fraud-related servicing rises, Consumer Services could remain in the high teens even with double-digit revenue growth.

Why 30% plus can endure — and why it is not guaranteed

Latin America's Benchmark EBIT margin has been 31.0%, 31.4%, 31.3% and 30.7% in FY2023-FY2026 after 28.2% in FY2022. [data_package §3, Latin America Benchmark EBIT margin row] Four consecutive years around 31% is evidence of structural economics, not a single-year anomaly. The main supports are data reuse, brand and distribution, recurring workflow integration, the value of high-stakes risk decisions, and scale across a large national market.

Durability still requires discipline. Inflation lifts wages, cloud costs and other local expenses; a weaker real can lower translated US-dollar revenue even if local-currency prices rise. Acquired fraud and identity products may initially carry lower margins or integration costs. Consumer Services can mix upward while still below the bureau margin. Competition from Equifax/Boa Vista, Quod, SPC Brasil and TransUnion caps indiscriminate price increases. The reasonable underwriting conclusion is that a 30% plus margin is durable in a normal environment, but expansion much above 33% requires both successful product integration and continued pricing or productivity. It should not be treated as a guaranteed floor.

4. Competitive dynamics

Credit bureau and decisioning

Brazil has a concentrated but not monopolistic credit-information structure. Banco Central originally registered Serasa, Quod, Boa Vista and SPC Brasil as managers of Cadastro Positivo data, and a later data-sharing agreement included TransUnion Brazil as well. These entities receive or use payment-history and credit information under a regulated framework, limiting the idea that Experian alone owns the raw positive-credit category. [Banco Central registration notice](https://www.bcb.gov.br/detalhenoticia/383/noticia) and [Banco Central bureau data-sharing agreement](https://www.bcb.gov.br/detalhenoticia/668/noticia/https%3A/www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub)

The closest scaled competitor is Equifax/Boa Vista. Equifax described Boa Vista as Brazil's second-largest credit bureau when it completed the acquisition in August 2023. It cited a roughly US$2bn Brazilian addressable market and planned to combine Boa Vista's position with Equifax cloud, data and analytics capabilities. Equifax reported Latin America local-currency revenue growth of 10% in 2025, including growth in Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Those disclosures show that a well-capitalized global competitor is investing and growing; they do not provide Experian's market share. [Equifax acquisition release](https://investor.equifax.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1299/equifax-completes-acquisition-of-boa-vista-servios) and [Equifax 2025 Form 10-K](https://investor.equifax.com/sec-filings/all-sec-filings/content/0000033185-26-000010/efx-20251231.htm)

Quod competes in scores, positive data, credit reports and fraud prevention. Its own product materials describe it as one of Brazil's main credit bureaus and show that its reports can include scores, registration data, inquiries, negative events and other indicators. TransUnion offers Brazilian credit-risk and fraud products, while TruValidate combines identity, device and behavioural signals. SPC Brasil has a long-standing consumer and merchant network and is authorized to operate Cadastro Positivo. [Quod Cadastro Positivo](https://www.quod.com.br/cadastro-positivo), [TransUnion Brazil solutions](https://www.transunion.com.br/solution), and [SPC Brasil consumer portal](https://www.spcbrasil.org.br/consumidor/consumidor)

Experian's pricing power is therefore based on differentiation and workflow value, not exclusivity over every category of data. A bank can use multiple bureaus, compare model lift and negotiate. Experian earns pricing when its scores approve more good borrowers at a given loss rate, when its fraud tools reduce losses and false positives, and when switching would require revalidation, systems work and regulatory approval. Proprietary negative data, historical depth, linked identity graphs, model performance and integration are harder to replicate than a basic report.

Fraud and identity

Fraud is more fragmented than the credit-bureau market. Global bureaus, specialist vendors, payment processors, device-intelligence providers and merchants' in-house models all compete. ClearSale brings Brazilian transaction data and practitioner expertise; idwall brings digital identity management. Together with Serasa's credit and identity data, they can create better signals than any asset alone. But the combination is not automatic. The acquired products must preserve speed, reduce false positives and integrate without disrupting clients. TransUnion's TruValidate explicitly competes by orchestrating identity, device and behaviour signals, demonstrating that this product architecture is not unique. [TransUnion

TruValidate](https://www.transunion.com.br/solution/truvalidate)

Consumer platform

Limpa Nome competes for consumer attention and creditor participation with creditor-owned channels, bank apps, other bureau portals and debt-negotiation platforms. Premium monitoring competes with free alerts and financial apps. The marketplace competes with banks, fintechs and price-comparison sites. Serasa's advantage is a trusted credit brand, large organic audience, direct relevance at moments of financial stress and links to credit data. The risk is that free features commoditize or that partners internalize distribution.

Market share and concentration

[DATA GAP: The data package and live reputable sources do not disclose a current, independently verified Latin America or Brazil revenue market share for Serasa Experian.] Equifax's description of Boa Vista as the second-largest bureau is consistent with Serasa being a leading incumbent, but it does not establish a precise percentage. This appendix therefore assesses moat from evidence on registered competitors, workflow position and product breadth rather than inserting a false market-share statistic.

5. Moat at the segment level

The Latin America moat is strong but layered. Its most defensible layer is not the existence of credit data alone; regulation permits multiple registered database managers. It is the combination of long historical depth, source coverage, data quality, identity resolution, proprietary negative and derived attributes, model performance, client integrations and consumer distribution.

First, data and models improve together. A lender cares about lift, stability and explainability, not just record count. Long performance histories help Experian validate risk models across cycles. More workflows create feedback, though the use of feedback remains constrained by consent, purpose and privacy rules. Competitors can access categories of positive data, but replicating cleaning, linkage, scores, decisioning and embedded processes takes time.

Second, switching costs are meaningful. A bureau score may sit inside underwriting policies, pricing, limit management, collections and regulatory model governance. Changing a provider can require parallel testing, recalibration, systems work, risk approval and monitoring. Multi-bureau use prevents lock-in from becoming absolute, yet the installed position protects a large recurring base.

Third, Serasa has a consumer distribution asset. Limpa Nome, score access and premium services create habitual reasons for consumers to return. That audience can support creditor recovery, subscriptions and marketplaces without buying every visit. The advantage becomes stronger if users consent to useful data connections and receive genuinely better outcomes. It weakens if trust is damaged or product recommendations appear conflicted.

Fourth, the combined credit, identity and fraud stack expands the number of high-value decisions Experian can support. ClearSale adds transactional fraud; idwall adds digital identity. A joined-up model can improve both loss detection and approval conversion. Because customers measure economic outcomes, even modest lift can justify premium pricing. The five-year test is whether Experian actually integrates data and distribution rather than merely owning adjacent brands.

Fifth, scale supports compliance and security. The Brazilian privacy regime gives data subjects rights and requires lawful processing, purpose limitation and security. Credit protection is a recognized legal basis, but it is not a blank cheque. Banco Central guidance also distinguishes score sharing from detailed positive history, which requires prior and specific authorization. Scale makes it easier to invest in controls, but also raises the cost of any breach or enforcement event. [Banco Central Cadastro Positivo FAQ](https://www.bcb.gov.br/meubc/faqs/s/cadastro-positivo) and [ANPD LGPD FAQ](https://www.gov.br/anpd/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/perguntas-frequentes/perguntas-frequentes)

Over five to ten years, the moat should preserve attractive margins if Experian maintains model lift, trust and integration. It will not prevent competition or guarantee share. Open-finance data, bank-owned models and common cloud/AI tools can reduce the scarcity of analytics. Generative AI may make model development and customer interfaces cheaper for everyone. Experian's defense is differentiated permissioned data, outcome measurement and distribution. The segment therefore earns a strong-moat assessment, but the bull case requires proof that fraud and consumer adjacencies strengthen the core rather than dilute returns.

6. Historical growth rates

Only Latin America total revenue is regionally dollar-disclosed. Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services dollars are disclosed globally, not by geography, and the new activity taxonomy has only FY2025-FY2026 comparatives. Product rows are therefore shown as genuine non-disclosures rather than fabricated allocations. All dollar figures below are reproduced from the verified data package and ultimately from Experian's FY2023-FY2026 Annual Reports, geographic segment-information notes; the FY2026/FY2025 comparative is specifically in FY2026 Note 9. Direct report links are in the data-package source ledger.

Product or sub-segment	FY2023 revenue	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	FY2026 revenue	3-year CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
Latin America total	US$0.947bn [§3, Latin America Revenue row]	US$1.127bn [§3, Latin America Revenue row]	US$1.075bn [§3, Latin America Revenue row]	US$1.299bn [§3, Latin America Revenue row]	11.1% [§3, calculated from cited endpoints]	20.8% actual USD [§3, YoY row]	[data_package §3, Latin America table]
B2B Financial Services, Latin America	Not separately disclosed [§4, non-disclosure paragraph]	Not separately disclosed [§4, non-disclosure paragraph]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Financial Services row]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Financial Services row]	n/d	Global Q1 FY2027 organic 9%; regional B2B not quantified [§4 activity table; §6 Latin America row]	[data_package §4]
B2B Verticals, Latin America	Not separately disclosed [§4, non-disclosure paragraph]	Not separately disclosed [§4, non-disclosure paragraph]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Verticals row]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Verticals row]	n/d	Global Q1 FY2027 organic 7%; regional line not quantified [§4 activity table]	[data_package §4]
Consumer Services, Latin America	Not separately disclosed [§4, Consumer Services row]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Consumer Services row]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Consumer Services row]	Not separately disclosed [§4, Consumer Services row]	n/d	Q1 FY2027 regional organic 22% [§5 current read-through]	[data_package §4-§5]

Arithmetic checks. US$0.947bn × 1.190 = US$1.127bn ✓; US$1.127bn × 0.954 = US$1.075bn ✓; US$1.075bn × 1.208 = US$1.299bn ✓. Each check is within 0.1% after rounding, well inside the 2% contract. The 11.1% three-year reported-dollar CAGR equals `(1.299 / 0.947)^(1/3) - 1`. It combines organic performance, FX, acquisitions and perimeter effects and must not be mistaken for a pure organic trend.

The operating organic sequence is 16%, 13%, 6% and 8% in FY2023-FY2026, after 17% in FY2022; Q1 FY2027 was 12%. [data_package §0a, Latin America organic row] This history demonstrates both attractive structural growth and meaningful volatility. The base case therefore begins near double digits but fades toward high single digits; it does not extrapolate the Q1 spike indefinitely.

7. Management guidance and forward anchors

The data package supplies two exact companywide quotes with direct forecast relevance and two broad strategic quotes. Regional commentary is preserved as paraphrase because the verified package deliberately did not represent every transcript sentence as a separately quantified quote.

- **FY2027 group organic growth.** [data_package §6, quote bullet 2] Lloyd Pitchford: **“We expect organic revenue growth of 6-8%, which is in line with the initial guidance we gave for FY26.”** Interpretation: this is the principal near-term corporate anchor. Latin America's supported double-digit expectation can exceed the group in FY2027, but five-year forecasts should converge toward a sustainable rate.

- **AI and new business.** [data_package §6, quote bullet 1] Brian Cassin: **“We’ve had a good start to the year with continued new business strength and accelerating potential across a range of AI-enabled opportunities.”** Interpretation: AI opportunity supports analytics and productivity but is not booked Latin America revenue. No discrete AI revenue is modeled.

- **Scaled data assets.** [data_package §6, quote bullet 3] Brian Cassin: **“We continue to leverage our scaled proprietary data assets, strong technology foundations and deep expertise.”** Interpretation: this supports the moat and cross-sell case, especially when ClearSale and idwall signals connect to Serasa data.

- **Platform and consumer investment.** [data_package §6, quote bullet 4] Brian Cassin: **“We have enhanced our product platforms, deepened consumer relationships and transformed customer experiences and internal processes through AI-driven automation and personalisation.”** Interpretation: the strategy can lift growth and efficiency, but it also requires ongoing product spending.

- **Latin America B2B.** [data_package §6, Latin America row dated 16 July 2026] Management's verified paraphrase is that the B2B pipeline supports **full-year double-digit regional organic growth**. Interpretation: the base FY2027 starting point is above the segment's five-year steady-state CAGR. It is not a five-year commitment.

- **Latin America Consumer Services.** [data_package §6, Latin America row dated 16 July 2026] Limpa Nome, premium and the payroll-lending marketplace drove **22% Consumer Services growth**. Interpretation: Consumer Services can outgrow B2B, but 22% is a quarterly KPI and should decelerate as scale and comparisons rise.

- **ClearSale.** [data_package §6, Latin America row dated 21 January 2026] ClearSale integration expanded fraud capability and management planned synergies. Interpretation: the forward model captures cross-sell and operating synergy in organic growth and margin, while avoiding a second acquisition-revenue add for ClearSale because it is already in the TTM.

- **H2 acceleration.** [data_package §6, Latin America row dated 20 May 2026] FY2026 organic growth accelerated from **4% in H1 to 12% in H2**. Interpretation: cadence and comparisons matter. The evidence supports a strong near-term start but not a permanent 12% floor.

- **Group margin, M&A and FX frame.** [data_package §6, final paragraph] FY2027 guidance is 6-8% organic growth, about 1% from acquisitions and 50bp organic constant-currency margin progression; at Q1, expected FX was a 1-2% tailwind to revenue and Benchmark EBIT. Interpretation: Latin America may contribute more than 1% inorganic growth because idwall is regional, but scenario revenue is reported in constant-FY2026-dollar economics to avoid pretending to forecast BRL/USD precisely. FX is then identified as a translation overlay, not hidden inside organic CAGR.

[DATA GAP: The verified data package contains no verbatim Latin America-specific transcript excerpt, no regional revenue range, and no regional Benchmark EBIT margin guide. Regional forward evidence is paraphrased and must not be upgraded into a formal commitment.]

8. Forward growth assumptions by product

The TTM allocations are analyst modeling anchors that sum to the sealed regional total; they are not historical disclosures. CAGRs compound exactly five years from 31 March 2026 to 31 March 2031. Base, bull and bear paths are organic-like, constant-perimeter operating paths. ClearSale is already in TTM. idwall is post-TTM: because no separately disclosed idwall revenue exists, its standalone acquired revenue is excluded rather than buried in growth. The scenarios may capture only future cross-sell and operating effects after integration. Any later consolidated acquisition overlay must add sourced idwall revenue once, separately, or keep it at zero.

Base case

Product	TTM model revenue	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY2027 anchor	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	n/d regionally	Global Q1 9% organic	Regional B2B supports double-digit growth	9.0%	Starts at 11%, then fades to 7% as credit normalizes; Ascend, positive data and fraud cross-sell offset scale
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	n/d regionally	Global Q1 7% organic	No quantified regional line guide	8.0%	Shared data and ClearSale cross-sell support growth, but bespoke work and a smaller installed base limit leverage
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	n/d regionally	Regional Q1 22% organic	Limpa Nome, premium and payroll lending identified as drivers	12.0%	Decelerates from 15% to 9% as comparisons rise; platform engagement remains structurally above B2B

Financial Services base growth is close to the global Q1 9% KPI and below Latin America's current double-digit B2B setup after the first two years. The 11%, 10%, 9%, 8%, 7% sequence is a controlled five-point deceleration, not a cliff. Equifax's 10% Latin America local-currency growth in 2025 shows that high-single to low-double-digit growth is achievable by a scaled

competitor, while also confirming competitive investment. Consumer Services decelerates much more from the 22% Q1 overlay because a quarter of exceptional Limpa Nome, premium and payroll-lending growth should not be treated as permanent. The resulting 9.6% blended base CAGR sits below Latin America's FY2022-FY2026 average organic growth and below the 12% latest-quarter overlay, but above group FY2027 guidance of 6-8%; it is therefore supportable only if the regional growth premium persists after FY2027. Product-level regional history does not independently prove it.

Bull case

Product	TTM model revenue	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY2027 anchor	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	n/d regionally	Global Q1 9% organic	Regional B2B supports double-digit growth	12.0%	Strong pipeline persists; idwall and ClearSale create measurable cross-sell; credit volumes stay resilient
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	n/d regionally	Global Q1 7% organic	No quantified regional line guide	11.0%	Fraud and identity scale beyond banking, integrations standardize, and Spanish Latin America expands faster
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	n/d regionally	Regional Q1 22% organic	Current drivers explicitly identified	16.0%	Limpa Nome network effects, premium conversion and payroll lending sustain high-teens growth before normalizing

The bull case does not simply repeat current growth. Financial Services fades from 14% to 10%; Verticals from 13% to 9%; Consumer Services from 20% to 12%. The case assumes that the acquired fraud stack improves approval and loss outcomes enough to create premium-priced cross-sell, and that Consumer Services retains low-cost organic traffic. It also assumes no severe Brazilian credit contraction and successful expansion beyond the Brazilian core.

Bear case

Product	TTM model revenue	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Management FY2027 anchor	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	n/d regionally	Global Q1 9% organic	Near-term pipeline is double digit	5.0%	Pipeline converts initially, then high rates, rising delinquency and lender caution suppress origination volumes and pricing
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	n/d regionally	Global Q1 7% organic	No quantified regional line guide	4.0%	E-commerce and enterprise clients scrutinize spend; fraud services remain labor-intensive and competition limits price
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	n/d regionally	Regional Q1 22% organic	Current drivers explicitly identified	6.0%	Limpa Nome demand rises but payment capacity, approvals and premium conversion weaken; paid traffic costs increase

The bear case respects near-term momentum instead of assuming an immediate collapse: Financial Services slows 8%, 6%, 5%, 4%, 2%; Verticals 7%, 5%, 4%, 3%, 1%; Consumer Services 10%, 8%, 6%, 4%, 2%. It captures the dual effect of credit stress: more demand for risk and collections tools, but fewer originations, lower marketplace approval and weaker consumer monetization. The current central-bank evidence of rising household delinquency and still-restrictive policy makes this a credible 30% probability, not a remote tail. Because it still produces 5.1% constant-currency growth, it is a cyclical bear rather than a crisis case; a multi-year Brazilian contraction or a large BRL devaluation could produce materially lower reported-USD revenue than this operating case.

Explicit annual growth path

Case and product	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	FY2031	Geometric CAGR
Bear Financial Services	8.0%	6.0%	5.0%	4.0%	2.0%	5.0%
Bear Verticals	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	3.0%	1.0%	4.0%

Case and product	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	FY2031	Geometric CAGR
Bear Consumer Services	10.0%	8.0%	6.0%	4.0%	2.0%	6.0%
Base Financial Services	11.0%	10.0%	9.0%	8.0%	7.0%	9.0%
Base Verticals	9.0%	8.5%	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	8.0%
Base Consumer Services	15.0%	14.0%	12.0%	10.0%	9.0%	12.0%
Bull Financial Services	14.0%	13.0%	12.0%	11.0%	10.0%	12.0%
Bull Verticals	13.0%	12.0%	11.0%	10.0%	9.0%	11.0%
Bull Consumer Services	20.0%	18.0%	16.0%	14.0%	12.0%	16.0%

The paths are stated in constant-FY2026-dollar operating terms. Reported US-dollar revenue can differ materially. In August 2026, Banco Central's reference scenario began at BRL5.10 per US dollar, and its 2026 and 2027 inflation expectations were 5.0% and 4.2%. High inflation supports local nominal price increases but also raises wages, cloud and customer-acquisition costs; a weaker real can erase local growth in translation. [Banco Central August 2026 Copom minutes](https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/copomminutes/05082026) The IMF expects Brazil's medium-term real growth to recover to about 2.5%, which supports a structural data-and-credit expansion but not perpetual double-digit macro growth. [IMF 2026 Brazil Article IV](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/23/pr26257-brazil-imf-executive-board-concludes-2026-article-iv-consultation)

9. Forward Benchmark EBIT margin assumptions

The exact profit basis is **Benchmark EBIT**. No corporate cost, acquisition-intangible amortisation, exceptional item, financing cost or statutory adjustment is inserted here. TTM product margins are analyst allocations chosen to reconcile to the sealed US$399m regional Benchmark EBIT within rounding: 36% for Financial Services, 27% for Verticals and 20% for Consumer Services. The weighted result is US$399.3m and 30.7%. Because product margins are not disclosed, they should be read as a bridge that makes segment economics transparent, not as issuer facts.

Product	TTM model Benchmark EBIT margin	Bear FY2031 margin	Base FY2031 margin	Bull FY2031 margin	Main mechanism
B2B Financial Services	36.0%	33.0%	36.5%	38.0%	Volume, price and model mix versus product, cloud and compliance reinvestment
B2B Verticals	27.0%	24.0%	28.0%	30.0%	Standardization and cross-sell versus bespoke integration and fraud-review labor
Consumer Services	20.0%	17.0%	22.0%	25.0%	Organic traffic, premium and repeat conversion versus acquisition cost and weak approvals
Latin America blended	30.7%	27.6%	31.4%	33.3%	Revenue-weighted mix; exact rollup in Section 10

The two headline base assumptions pass an evidence-consistency test but not an issuer-disclosure test:

Base assumption	Independent evidence	Counter-evidence or limitation	Reviewer conclusion
9.6% five-year revenue CAGR	Latin America organic growth was 17%, 16%, 13%, 6% and 8% in FY2022-FY2026; Q1 FY2027 was 12%; management says the FY2027 regional B2B pipeline supports double-digit growth	Group FY2027 guidance is 6-8%; regional product dollars and CAGRs are undisclosed; Brazil and BRL introduce cycle and translation risk	Defensible as a constant-currency base scenario, but at the upper end of what can be independently underwritten; not a reported-USD forecast
31.4% terminal Benchmark EBIT margin	The segment delivered 31.0%, 31.4%, 31.3% and 30.7% in FY2023-FY2026; 31.4% merely returns to the FY2024 peak	Consumer Services grows from 25.0% to 27.8% of modeled revenue and remains lower-margin; acquired fraud/identity integration can dilute before it scales	Defensible at segment level, but product attribution is not independently verifiable; the model must earn about 98bp of product-margin improvement to offset about 31bp of mix dilution and net roughly 67bp expansion

Bear mechanisms. Financial Services falls 300bp as slower origination volumes reduce operating leverage, clients push harder on price and Experian continues security and product investment. Verticals falls 300bp because transaction-fraud and identity work remains implementation- and review-intensive. Consumer Services falls 300bp as monetization weakens faster

than platform costs; Limpa Nome traffic may rise, but collections and completed settlements do not necessarily keep pace. The blended margin contracts about 310bp to 27.6%, a material but still profitable outcome supported by the bureau core.

Base mechanisms. Financial Services adds only 50bp despite 9% revenue CAGR because pricing and platform leverage are largely reinvested in data, fraud, AI and compliance. Verticals adds 100bp only if ClearSale integration and common distribution reduce duplicated platforms, implementation effort and manual review; ownership alone is not evidence of synergy. Consumer Services adds 200bp, more than the 100bp threshold, through higher premium and repeat marketplace conversion, better organic engagement and fixed-platform leverage. Faster Consumer Services growth partly offsets the benefit because its 22% endpoint margin remains below B2B. At the FY2031 mix, keeping TTM product margins would produce about 30.4%, roughly 31bp below the 30.7% segment anchor; the modeled product-margin improvements add about 98bp, resulting in 31.4%. Thus consumer mix is explicitly dilutive and the base case requires demonstrated operating leverage, not just revenue growth.

Bull mechanisms. Financial Services adds 200bp as platform and fraud cross-sell generate higher-value revenue without proportional cost. Verticals adds 300bp through standardized identity and transaction-fraud deployment, less manual review and broader data reuse. Consumer Services adds 500bp as organic traffic, premium and marketplace density lower acquisition cost per monetized user. The blended margin reaches 33.3%. That is demanding but remains below the modeled 38% Financial Services margin because the consumer and vertical mix continues to require reinvestment.

Inflation and FX matter differently. Local wage and vendor inflation can compress margin if price resets lag. Local nominal pricing can preserve BRL profitability when products are essential and contracts reprice. Translation generally moves revenue and Benchmark EBIT together, so it may have less effect on the percentage margin than on reported dollars, but mismatched US-dollar technology costs could create a margin effect. The model does not claim a five-year BRL/USD forecast; synthesis should add any explicit translation convention consistently across revenue and profit.

10. Segment rollup

The rollup compounds each TTM model revenue anchor through the five explicit annual growth rates in Section 8 and applies each case's FY2031 product Benchmark EBIT margin. The displayed CAGRs are rounded summaries, not the arithmetic driver. All product lines sum to the segment total. Amounts are constant-FY2026 US-dollar operating economics before any explicit BRL/USD translation overlay; they are not represented as nominal reported-USD forecasts. Rounding differences are less than 0.1%.

Bear rollup

Product	TTM revenue	Five-year CAGR	FY2031 revenue	FY2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	FY2031 Benchmark EBIT
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	5.0%	US$1,010.4m	33.0%	US$333.4m
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	4.0%	US$221.1m	24.0%	US$53.1m
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	6.0%	US$433.8m	17.0%	US$73.7m
Latin America total	US$1,299.0m	5.1% blended	US$1,665.3m	27.6%	US$460.2m

Base rollup

Product	TTM revenue	Five-year CAGR	FY2031 revenue	FY2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	FY2031 Benchmark EBIT
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	9.0%	US$1,218.7m	36.5%	US$444.8m
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	8.0%	US$267.2m	28.0%	US$74.8m
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	12.0%	US$571.7m	22.0%	US$125.8m
Latin America total	US$1,299.0m	9.6% blended	US$2,057.6m	31.4%	US$645.4m

Bull rollup

Product	TTM revenue	Five-year CAGR	FY2031 revenue	FY2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	FY2031 Benchmark EBIT
B2B Financial Services	US$792.4m	12.0%	US$1,395.9m	38.0%	US$530.4m
B2B Verticals	US$181.9m	11.0%	US$306.3m	30.0%	US$91.9m
Consumer Services	US$324.8m	16.0%	US$681.1m	25.0%	US$170.3m
Latin America total	US$1,299.0m	12.9% blended	US$2,383.3m	33.3%	US$792.6m

The base case adds roughly US$760m of revenue and US$247m of Benchmark EBIT over five years. Consumer Services rises from 25% to about 28% of modeled revenue, creating growth but limiting blended margin expansion. The bull case needs both faster B2B adoption and Consumer Services scale; the bear case still grows because bureau, collections and fraud demand do not disappear, but margin falls as growth and conversion weaken.

The probability-weighted FY2031 output is approximately US$1.989bn of revenue and US$612m of Benchmark EBIT, implying a 30.8% weighted margin if profits and revenue are weighted separately. That expected value is descriptive, not a separate scenario and not a valuation recommendation.

Because Brazil's exact share of segment revenue and the location/currency of the cost base are undisclosed, a precise BRL sensitivity would be false precision. As a transparent mechanical boundary, a uniform 10% adverse translation applied to both revenue and Benchmark EBIT would reduce any terminal dollar amounts by 10% while leaving the percentage margin unchanged; actual margin could also move if US-dollar technology costs, hedges or pricing lags create a mismatch. This overlay is not embedded in the operating scenarios and must be applied once, if used, at synthesis.

11. Key risks and wildcards

- **Brazil concentration and BRL translation — Bear.** The economic exposure is materially Brazil-led, while reporting is in US dollars. A weaker real can produce poor reported growth despite sound local performance. Because Brazil's exact share is undisclosed, translation sensitivity cannot be made exact.

- **Credit-cycle deterioration — Bear.** Higher delinquency increases demand for collections and risk tools but can reduce originations, approvals and consumer product conversion. May 2026 household delinquency of 5.6% and restrictive policy are warning indicators, not proof of a recession.

- **Persistent inflation and high rates — Bear.** Wage and vendor inflation can outrun contract repricing. High policy rates can suppress credit demand and increase customer scrutiny. Banco Central's August 2026 reference still had 2026 inflation above target and Selic at 14%.

- **ClearSale and idwall integration — Bear or Bull.** The bear outcome is overlapping platforms, client disruption, retained manual review and missed synergy. The bull outcome is a unified identity, credit, device, behaviour and transaction graph that raises detection and approval performance across both B2B and consumer journeys.

- **Consumer monetization quality — Bear or Bull.** Q1's 22% growth can prove durable if Limpa Nome, premium and payroll lending deepen engagement. It can also fade quickly if traffic is episodic, lender approvals weaken, paid acquisition rises or premium churn increases.

- **Data rights, LGPD and trust — Bear.** Credit protection is a lawful basis, but detailed positive-data sharing, consumer rights, security and purpose constraints remain material. A breach, improper use or enforcement action could increase cost, restrict products and damage Serasa's consumer funnel.

- **Competitive investment — Bear.** Equifax has integrated Boa Vista and is applying global cloud capabilities; Quod, SPC and TransUnion are active in bureau and fraud workflows. Multi-bureau customers can compare performance and pressure price.

- **AI and open-data substitution — Bear or Bull.** Generic AI lowers the cost of model development and interfaces, which can empower banks and competitors. Experian wins if proprietary, permissioned data and outcome evidence remain the scarce inputs and AI improves product speed and internal productivity.

- **Spanish Latin America expansion — Bull.** The segment can diversify beyond Brazil by carrying scores, analytics and fraud platforms into underpenetrated markets. The risk is that fragmented regulation, data coverage and local competition slow replication.

- **Pricing versus volume — Base or Bear.** High-value risk decisions provide pricing power, but price increases that merely match inflation are not real growth. The model requires ongoing volume, product and cross-sell contribution, not nominal price alone.

- **Acquisition accounting and double counting — All cases.** ClearSale is already in TTM; idwall is post-TTM. Adding announced acquisition percentages on top of product CAGRs without adjusting the organic path would overstate revenue. Amortisation and acquisition expenses must remain in the statutory bridge, not be charged twice in Benchmark EBIT.

- **Disclosure risk — All cases.** Regional product dollars and margins are not disclosed. If future reporting reveals a materially larger Consumer Services share, the base blended margin could be lower; a larger Financial Services share would raise margin but lower the weighted growth endpoint under these assumptions.

Summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	US$1,665.3m	Benchmark EBIT	27.6%	US$460.2m	30%
Base	US$2,057.6m	Benchmark EBIT	31.4%	US$645.4m	55%
Bull	US$2,383.3m	Benchmark EBIT	33.3%	US$792.6m	15%

The 55% Base / 30% Bear / 15% Bull weighting is intentionally asymmetric. The base receives the highest weight because multi-year organic growth and four years near a 31% margin support continued compounding. Bear is twice Bull because Brazil concentration, rising delinquency, BRL translation and integration risk are observable, while the bull requires several unproven conditions at once: sustained high-teens Consumer Services growth, measurable ClearSale/idwall cross-sell, standardized fraud delivery and successful geographic expansion.

The central judgment is that Latin America can compound near 10% while sustaining a low-30s Benchmark EBIT margin, but the quality of that outcome depends less on the latest 12% regional KPI than on four harder tests: whether B2B pipeline converts beyond one year, whether Consumer Services growth monetizes at rising contribution, whether ClearSale and idwall create genuine cross-product lift, and whether pricing and productivity absorb Brazilian inflation without sacrificing client economics. The moat supports attractive returns; it does not remove Brazil, FX, credit-cycle or integration risk.

Data-gap register

- [DATA GAP: Latin America revenue is not disclosed by Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services. TTM product anchors are explicit analyst allocations constrained to the segment total.]
- [DATA GAP: Latin America product-level Benchmark EBIT margins, gross margin, capex, R&D and invested capital are not disclosed.]
- [DATA GAP: Standalone Q1 and Q3 regional revenue dollars and Benchmark EBIT margins are not disclosed; Q1 FY2027 is a KPI overlay only.]
- [DATA GAP: No current independently verified market-share percentage for Serasa Experian in Brazil or Latin America was located.]
- [DATA GAP: No verbatim Latin America-specific transcript excerpt or formal regional revenue and margin guide appears in the verified data package.]

Appendix B3 - UK and Ireland

UK and Ireland — Segment Deep Dive

Company: Experian plc **Ticker:** EXPN.L **Segment:** UK and Ireland **TTM anchor:** 31 March 2026 **Forecast horizon:** 31 March 2031, exactly 5.0 years **Reporting currency:** US dollars **Exact segment profit basis: Benchmark EBIT Scenario weights:** Bear 30%, Base 55%, Bull 15%

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

UK and Ireland is one of Experian's four geographic reportable segments. The geographic reporting structure is stable across FY2022-FY2026; the FY2026 scope includes the bureau, Ascend, fraud and verification products, and the consumer marketplace. Certain businesses can be re-presented as exited activities, so this appendix uses the total external-revenue and total Benchmark EBIT perimeter in the sealed bridge. A separate activity-taxonomy change took effect on 1 April 2025: the legacy Data and Decisioning split became Financial Services and Verticals within B2B, while Consumer Services remained. Only FY2025 was re-presented under that new activity taxonomy, and there is no official regional bridge for earlier years. Consequently, the segment history is comparable at the geographic total, but Financial Services and Verticals are not spliced backward into invented regional histories. [data_package §1, Reporting structure and taxonomy, UK and Ireland row and taxonomy paragraph]

The model uses two layers. First, the audited segment anchor is fixed: FY2026 and the TTM ended 31 March 2026 both equal US$942m of revenue and US$220m of Benchmark EBIT, a 23.4% margin. Second, a three-line allocation across Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services is used only to make the forward assumptions reconstructable. Experian does not disclose those UK-and-Ireland activity dollars. The model uses an explicitly approximate 72.9% / 10.4% / 16.7% sensitivity allocation rather than an unsupported neutral split. The central weights are algebraically implied by rounded FY2026 disclosures: regional organic growth of 2%, B2B of 0%, Consumer Services of 12%, Financial Services of 1% and Verticals of -7%. Because those growth rates are rounded and organic-growth weights need not equal reported-dollar weights, the result remains an analyst scenario device, not an issuer historical fact. [FY2026 results, UK and Ireland operating review, p. 8](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-FY26-FY-results-announcement.pdf)

1. What this segment actually is

The segment is best understood as a data-and-decisioning network embedded in the UK and Irish credit and identity systems. Its core B2B customers are banks, building societies, specialist lenders, card issuers, auto-finance providers, insurers, utilities, telecommunications companies, public bodies and other organisations that must identify a person or business, assess affordability and risk, detect fraud, comply with financial-crime rules, acquire customers or manage an existing portfolio. A customer does not merely buy a static credit report. It may purchase bureau searches, scores, attributes, monitoring, fraud signals, identity verification, analytics, software workflow, hosted model deployment and consulting. The commercial model therefore combines transactional charges, recurring data access, subscriptions or licences, and implementation or project revenue.

Financial Services is the largest conceptual engine in this appendix. It comprises credit information and analytics sold into lending and other financial workflows. A lender can use Experian data at origination, periodically refresh a portfolio, build or monitor scorecards, conduct affordability and eligibility checks, and target or price offers. Ascend is the strategic delivery layer: Experian describes it as a cloud platform joining bureau and other data with analytical tools, scorecard development, portfolio insight and model deployment. Its modular design allows customers to buy only the functions they need, which can lower initial adoption friction but also creates a path to expand revenue per client. [Experian Ascend product description](https://www.experian.co.uk/business/platforms/ascend)

Verticals covers B2B use cases outside the core financial-services classification. In UK and Ireland this can include data quality, identity, fraud, utilities, telecoms, public-sector and other non-financial decisioning. The boundary is important: management's Q1 FY2027 disclosure gave a 5% B2B growth rate for the region, not separate Financial Services and Verticals rates. The appendix therefore does not manufacture a quarterly split. It assigns distinct five-year growth assumptions because the end markets and competitive pressures differ, but it applies the same 5% Q1 overlay to both lines and labels it as the disclosed aggregate B2B signal.

Fraud, verification and financial-crime compliance are increasingly important within B2B. KYC360 adds customer-lifecycle management for know-your-customer, know-your-business, screening and ongoing monitoring, with the stated intent to integrate those capabilities into Ascend. The acquisition should increase the addressable workflow and recurring compliance content, but the economics are not disclosed separately and acquisition contribution must not be confused with organic growth. [Experian KYC360 acquisition release](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2025/experian-acquires-kyc360-to-boost-fraud-and-financial-crime-solu)

Consumer Services faces the individual rather than the institution. Consumers access credit information, monitoring and paid subscriptions, but the economic model also includes one-off and referral fees from a marketplace that matches users with loans, cards, insurance or other financial products. The data relationship matters twice: consumer engagement can enrich behavioural insight and create an audience, while eligibility and bureau data can make marketplace offers more relevant. ReFi is an example of joining bureau and marketplace capabilities to simplify debt consolidation. This line is therefore partly recurring subscription revenue and partly performance-marketing revenue linked to user engagement, approval propensity, lender appetite and completed transactions.

Go-to-market differs by line. Large B2B clients involve direct enterprise selling, integration, testing, governance, model validation and multi-year relationships. Once embedded, the product can be operationally difficult to remove, but migrations remain possible and procurement departments can force price negotiations. Consumer Services is digital, brand- and engagement-led. It requires member acquisition, product experience, marketing, partner coverage and conversion. The attractive strategic idea is that UK&I can use the same proprietary bureau data in several adjacent workflows; the investment risk is that this adjacency becomes a bundle of products whose separate economics remain opaque.

2. Current economics

The TTM ended 31 March 2026 is identical to FY2026. Revenue was US$942m, up 8.4% in actual dollars from US$869m, while organic regional growth was 2%. Benchmark EBIT was US$220m and the sealed total-perimeter Benchmark EBIT margin was 23.4%, unchanged to one decimal place from the FY2025 total-perimeter calculation. UK&I represented 11.2% of group revenue. The FY2026 release separately reported ongoing-activity margin of 23.4% versus 23.2% in FY2025; the 20-basis-point improvement reflected cost-base efficiency. The appendix keeps the sealed total perimeter for every forecast and does not splice the ongoing comparator into the bridge. [data_package §1, UK and Ireland row; §3, UK and Ireland Revenue, YoY growth, Benchmark EBIT and Benchmark EBIT margin rows; §0a regional organic-growth table; FY2026 results p. 8]

The difference between 8.4% actual-dollar growth and 2% organic growth matters. Actual dollars include currency, acquisition and perimeter effects, while total constant-currency growth was 3% and explicitly included KYC360. The FY2026 activity detail is less buoyant than the segment headline: B2B was flat, Financial Services grew 1%, Verticals declined 7%, and Consumer Services grew 12%. Q1 FY2027 then reported 5% regional growth, with 5% B2B attributed to Ascend, fraud and verification wins despite subdued lending and 7% Consumer Services attributed to engagement, marketplace and subscriptions. This is improvement, but the often-cited 1% H1 → 3% H2 → 5% Q1 sequence compares two half-years with one quarter and does not establish a three-step run-rate trend. The Q1 update also disclosed no regional revenue dollars, Benchmark EBIT, margin, acquisition contribution or order-to-revenue cadence. It remains a KPI overlay; the model neither rolls Q1 into a new TTM nor treats it as a fresh profit anchor. [data_package §5 and §6, UK and Ireland rows; FY2026 results, UK and Ireland operating review, p. 8]

The five-year segment record is uneven. Revenue fell from US$847m in FY2022 to US$784m in FY2023, then recovered to US$844m, US$869m and US$942m. Benchmark EBIT was US$184m, US$170m, US$182m, US$203m and US$220m. The margin held near 21.6%-21.7% through FY2024 and stepped up to 23.4% in FY2025, where it remained in FY2026. That suggests the current 23.4% is not a single-quarter peak, but neither does it prove a long runway of annual expansion. [data_package §3, UK and Ireland table]

Capital intensity cannot be measured separately because Experian does not disclose UK&I capex, purchased intangibles, working capital or cash flow. At group level, FY2026 total capex was 8.6% of revenue and the longer-term target is 7%, but allocating that ratio mechanically to UK&I would be false precision. The segment likely benefits from shared technology, cloud, security and product platforms, while it also requires continuous spending on data ingestion, matching, privacy controls, model governance, software development and sales implementation. The accounting model may therefore look asset-light relative to a physical network while economic reinvestment is persistent.

Experian does not disclose UK&I revenue for Financial Services, Verticals or Consumer Services, nor revenue for Ascend, fraud, verification, KYC360, marketplace or subscriptions. Group-wide activity dollars cannot be used as a regional proxy

because geographic mixes differ. For modeling only, the model allocates the US$942m TTM anchor as US$687m Financial Services, US$98m Verticals and US$157m Consumer Services. These sum exactly to the segment total. The central allocation is the rounded-growth contribution back-solve described in §0: Consumer Services weight is approximately `(2% - 0%) / (12% - 0%) = 16.7%`; within B2B, Financial Services weight is approximately `(0% - (-7%)) / (1% - (-7%)) = 87.5%`, producing 72.9% of the segment, with Verticals the residual 10.4%. The calculation is more evidence-linked than an arbitrary split but is not a reported-dollar estimate: rounding each disclosed growth rate by even half a point creates a wide range, acquisitions and exited activities affect the dollar perimeter, and organic growth uses constant-currency comparable bases. The allocation therefore remains a sensitivity convention, not company fact.

[DATA GAP: Experian does not separately disclose UK&I revenue, Benchmark EBIT or margin for Financial Services, Verticals, Consumer Services, Ascend, fraud, verification, KYC360, marketplace or subscriptions.]

3. Unit economics

At the bureau core, an incremental search or attribute delivery has low physical marginal cost once the data, matching infrastructure and compliance systems exist. The cost base is instead dominated by obtaining and maintaining data feeds, quality control, computing, cybersecurity, privacy and regulatory processes, software development, client integration, sales and expert staff. Scale is valuable because the same core data can support many decisions and clients. Yet low marginal cost should not be confused with no reinvestment: coverage, timeliness and accuracy are the product, and regulatory or reputational failure can impair both economics and trust.

Ascend can improve unit economics in three ways. First, cloud-based self-service analytics may replace labour-intensive bespoke retros and reduce time to insight. Second, modular adoption can land a customer with one use case and expand into market insight, scorecard development, deployment or monitoring. Third, platform standardisation can reduce the cost of maintaining many customised installations. The counterweight is migration and hosting expense. Customers expect frequent feature releases, explainability, availability and security, and a platform transition may carry duplicated cost before legacy tools retire. Ascend's economic benefit is therefore more credible as a multi-year mix and productivity effect than as an immediate gross-margin windfall.

Financial Services volume has a cyclical component. More applications, originations, refinancings and portfolio actions can create more bureau and decisioning events. Weak lending demand can reduce those transactions even while risk management, collections and affordability use cases remain necessary. The latest Bank of England agents' summary before the information cutoff, published 24 July 2026, said credit availability was broadly unchanged but appetite for borrowing was weaker than available supply; the Q2 Credit Conditions Survey also showed mixed movements across secured, unsecured and corporate credit. That supports management's subdued-lending description and argues against extrapolating the Q1 improvement into high-single-digit regional growth without continued wins. [Bank of England July 2026 conditions summary](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/agents-summary/2026/july-2026) [Bank of England 2026 Q2 Credit Conditions Survey](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/credit-conditions-survey/2026/2026-q2)

Fraud and verification demand is less directly tied to loan volumes. Digital onboarding, account takeover, identity misuse, sanctions and anti-money-laundering obligations create recurring need. The latest UK Finance annual report before the cutoff, published in June 2026 and covering 2025, reported payment-fraud losses up 4% to £1.28bn, with APP losses up 19% and remote-purchase card losses up 3%. The mix can change even while aggregate demand for prevention persists. This supports continued client spending but also raises Experian's own cost of model refresh, data acquisition and false-positive management. [UK Finance Annual Fraud Report 2026](https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/policy-and-guidance/reports/annual-fraud-report-2026)

KYC360 changes the mix toward software and compliance workflow. Customer-lifecycle-management revenue can be recurring and sticky because regulated firms must maintain records and screening rather than perform a one-off onboarding check. Integrating KYC360 into Ascend could raise cross-sell and lower the number of vendors a client manages. However, acquired software often brings purchase-accounting amortisation, integration expense and retention risk outside the segment's Benchmark EBIT measure. The correct segment forecast captures operating cross-sell and scale in Benchmark EBIT but leaves acquisition-intangible amortisation and other statutory bridge items to synthesis.

Consumer Services economics depend on engagement and conversion. A paid subscription offers recurring revenue but must justify continued value against free scores and monitoring. Marketplace revenue requires traffic, eligibility, attractive partner offers and completed referrals. When lender appetite tightens, users may still visit more often, yet monetisation can fall if approval rates or commissions decline. Conversely, better personalisation can raise conversion without proportional customer-acquisition cost. The segment's own data can improve relevance, but consumers can multi-home across free

services, limiting switching costs at the interface.

The current 23.4% Benchmark EBIT margin is the only defensible aggregate profit anchor. Margin can rise if Ascend replaces bespoke delivery, KYC360 adds recurring software, consumer conversion improves and shared platform costs scale. It can fall if lending weakness creates negative mix, data or cloud costs rise, acquisitions duplicate costs, customer procurement compresses pricing, consumer marketing intensifies, or compliance and remediation spending grows. A 24.5% base would assume 110 basis points of expansion despite no UK&I margin guidance, no product margins, no quantified Ascend or KYC360 economics, and a FY2026 total-perimeter margin that was flat. The model instead uses 24.0%, a 60-basis-point five-year gain. Bear compresses to 20.9%; bull reaches 25.9%. Even these outcomes require operating assumptions rather than disclosed product economics, so margin remains an explicit scenario overlay rather than evidence of a platform windfall.

4. Competitive dynamics

The UK consumer credit-information market has an unusual structure: concentrated incumbency alongside regulatory pressure to improve access and quality. The Information Commissioner's Office identifies Equifax, Experian and TransUnion as the three main UK consumer credit reference agencies. The FCA's Credit Information Market Study found a highly concentrated market with high barriers to entry and expansion, but also material differences in data coverage and evidence of quality and consistency problems. Those findings are simultaneously a moat signal and a warning. It is difficult to recreate decades of contributor relationships, matching infrastructure and regulated trust; however, regulators can force changes that reduce privileged access or increase costs. [ICO credit-reference guidance](https://ico.org.uk/for-the-public/credit) [FCA Credit Information Market Study](https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/market-studies/ms19-1-credit-information-market-study)

Equifax and TransUnion are the most direct bureau competitors. Large lenders can multi-source, use different agencies for different workflows or combine files, so Experian's pricing power is not absolute. Coverage, match rates, latency, service quality, analytical tools and integration determine win rates. In CP26/7, the FCA proposed that a lender sharing consumer credit information with one designated consumer CRA must share it with all designated CRAs; the draft list names Experian, Equifax and TransUnion. The consultation closed on 1 May 2026 and the May 2026 Regulatory Initiatives Grid still described stakeholder engagement as the next step, so this is not a final rule at the information cutoff. The economics are two-sided: symmetric sharing could level data coverage and intensify multi-bureau price competition, but designation may also entrench the three scaled incumbents and give Experian data it does not currently receive. The base case therefore assumes no immediate revenue haircut and some extra quality/compliance cost; only bear assumes that equalised coverage erodes bureau differentiation before analytics and workflow compensate. [FCA CP26/7, pp. 3 and 131-132](https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp26-7.pdf) [FCA proposed credit-file remedies, 25 February 2026](https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-proposes-action-close-gaps-borrowers-credit-files)

Open banking and the FCA's wider open-finance agenda are both complement and substitute. Consented transaction data can improve affordability and income-and-expenditure assessment where bureau history is thin, while Experian can incorporate permissioned cash-flow data into analytics and Ascend. The competitive risk is that clients and rival decisioning vendors can access the same consented data, reducing the scarcity value of a traditional file and shifting value toward orchestration, models and workflow. The FCA reported in April 2026 that open banking had about 17 million users, roughly one-third of UK adults, and said it would consult on the long-term open-banking framework before the end of 2026. That is adoption evidence, not proof of bureau displacement. The base case assumes coexistence and reinvestment; bear assumes faster substitution and weaker raw-data pricing. [FCA open-finance vision, 14 April 2026](https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-sets-out-vision-open-finance)

In analytics and decisioning, competition expands beyond the three CRAs. FICO, SAS and specialist software or cloud providers can address model development, rules, optimisation and deployment. Large banks can build more internally using their own data and cloud tools. Generative AI may lower the cost of coding, analysis and interface design, but it does not automatically reproduce permissible bureau data, validated scores or regulated auditability. Ascend's moat depends on combining data and workflow, not on a dashboard or generic machine-learning capability. Experian says Ascend can build and monitor scorecards, add client data and deploy models; those integrations make switching harder, but only if product performance and implementation remain competitive.

Fraud, identity and KYC are crowded. Equifax and TransUnion offer identity capabilities; LexisNexis Risk Solutions, GBG and a broad set of specialist vendors compete in device, identity, document, sanctions, adverse-media and transaction monitoring. KYC360 gives Experian customer-lifecycle-management depth and should improve its ability to sell a broader bundle. Yet bundling can be challenged by best-of-breed procurement and interoperability. Clients may favour a specialist for a critical risk layer or avoid concentrating too much data and workflow with one provider.

The UK digital-verification-services trust framework creates a common standards environment covering privacy, data protection, fraud management, cyber security and inclusion. Statutory footing can expand adoption by increasing trust, but certification also creates cost and makes product quality more observable. Experian can benefit from established compliance capability, while nimble certified vendors can compete without owning a traditional credit bureau. [UK digital verification trust framework collection](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-digital-verification-services-trust-framework)

Consumer Services competes with ClearScore, MoneySuperMarket, TotallyMoney, Credit Karma and lender-direct channels for user attention and completed product referrals. The CMA previously viewed Experian and ClearScore as close competitors and noted that ClearScore's free product disrupted paid credit checking. That history demonstrates weak switching costs at the consumer interface and the risk that free functionality commoditises subscriptions. Experian's advantage is the combination of its brand, own bureau file, eligibility capability and marketplace; its disadvantage is that users can maintain several free accounts and comparison journeys. [CMA Experian-ClearScore case](https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/experian-limited-credit-laser-holdings-clearscore)

Pricing power is therefore differentiated. Core bureau and embedded decisioning can support annual price increases or higher value per decision when Experian improves outcomes, but procurement and multi-bureau strategies cap excess. Fraud and KYC may price on avoided loss, faster onboarding and compliance efficiency, giving stronger value-based potential. Consumer subscription pricing is weakest because free substitutes are visible; marketplace economics depend on commissions and conversion rather than explicit user pricing. A blended margin forecast must respect these differences.

5. Moat at the segment level

The strongest moat is the contributor-and-user network around the UK credit file. Lenders and other organisations supply payment and account data under governance rules; Experian cleans, matches and returns useful information to participants. Scale supports coverage and model performance, which attracts usage and further embeds interfaces. Recreating that network requires data-contributor agreements, consumer matching, historical depth, permissioning, operational resilience, regulatory licences and client trust. The FCA's finding of high barriers to entry corroborates the structural difficulty, even as its remediation agenda seeks more competition.

The second moat is workflow integration. A bureau query can be replaced more easily than a set of risk strategies, scorecards, monitoring processes, regulatory reports and model-deployment pipelines woven into a lender's operations. Ascend broadens this integration from data supply into analysis and action. Its most durable benefit is not a single software feature but the cost, risk and governance work required to migrate validated models and decision policies. The risk is that open architecture and cloud standards reduce migration friction, or that clients keep Experian data while moving analytical work elsewhere.

The third moat is cross-domain data fusion. Bureau history, eligibility searches, marketplace behaviour, fraud signals, identity attributes and customer-contributed data can improve decisions when legally and technically combined. This can support better acceptance, lower losses or faster onboarding. The value compounds if clients use the platform for several lifecycle stages. Nevertheless, UK data-protection rules, purpose limitation and fairness requirements constrain reuse. Trust is an asset only while accuracy, explainability and security remain strong.

Brand and regulatory credibility matter, particularly for consumers and regulated enterprise buyers. The ICO notes that incorrect or outdated credit-file information can cause consumers to be unfairly refused credit. Errors can therefore generate remediation cost and reputational damage. The FCA's quality findings show that incumbency is not immunity. A material data-quality, cyber or fairness failure could weaken contributor relationships, lead clients to multi-source more aggressively and increase supervisory intervention.

KYC360 can extend the moat if its customer-lifecycle-management workflow is integrated into Ascend and cross-sold into existing accounts. The acquisition fills a capability gap rather than simply adding scale, which is strategically sensible. Durability depends on retaining specialist talent, maintaining screening content, proving better outcomes and integrating without disrupting users. Because KYC360 revenue and profitability are undisclosed, the bull case cannot count on a large acquisition benefit; it counts only on a gradual improvement in growth mix and margin.

Consumer Services has a thinner moat. Experian's bureau brand, data and eligibility insight help relevance, but customers can switch among free credit apps and comparison sites. Marketplace partners can distribute through multiple channels. Subscription retention depends on delivering ongoing protection or insight beyond what free competitors offer. The segment-wide moat is therefore not uniform: B2B bureau and embedded decisioning appear durable; fraud and KYC can strengthen the franchise but face specialist competition; consumer marketplace and subscriptions have lower switching costs.

Over five to ten years, the moat is likely durable but less monopolistic than a simple “three bureaus” description implies. Regulatory data-sharing reform may commoditise some raw inputs, open banking expands alternative information, and AI lowers analytical barriers. Experian can defend economics by moving up the stack into integrated, auditable decisions and by using data quality as an advantage. The base case assumes this strategy preserves a mid-20s Benchmark EBIT margin, not that it produces accelerating growth indefinitely. The bear case assumes regulation and alternative data erode differentiation faster than platform benefits develop.

6. Historical growth rates — reproduced from the data package

The table uses only the DR-verified data package. “Three-year CAGR” means FY2023 to FY2026, a three-year compounding span. “Most recent YoY” is the FY2026 actual-dollar comparison; the separate 5% Q1 FY2027 regional organic result remains a KPI overlay.

Product / sub-segment	FY2022 rev	FY2023 rev	FY2024 rev	FY2025 rev	FY2026 rev	3-year CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
UK and Ireland total	US$0.847bn [DP §3 UK&I Revenue row]	US$0.784bn [DP §3 UK&I Revenue row]	US$0.844bn [DP §3 UK&I Revenue row]	US$0.869bn [DP §3 UK&I Revenue row]	US$0.942bn [DP §3 UK&I Revenue row]	6.3% [DP §3 UK&I Revenue row]	8.4% [DP §3 UK&I YoY row]	data_package §3, UK and Ireland rows 108-113
Financial Services within UK&I	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not disclosed [DP §4 taxonomy row]	B2B aggregate 5% in Q1 FY2027 [DP §6 UK&I B2B row]	data_package §4, lines 195-206; §6 UK&I row
Verticals within UK&I	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 non-disclosure row]	Not disclosed [DP §4 taxonomy row]	B2B aggregate 5% in Q1 FY2027 [DP §6 UK&I B2B row]	data_package §4, lines 195-206; §6 UK&I row
Consumer Services within UK&I	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 regional gap]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 regional gap]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 regional gap]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 regional gap]	Not separately disclosed [DP §4 regional gap]	Not disclosed [DP §4 regional gap]	7% in Q1 FY2027 [DP §6 UK&I Consumer row]	data_package §4 Consumer Services row is group-wide; §6 UK&I row

Arithmetic checks on the disclosed segment-total row pass: US$0.847bn × 0.926 = US$0.784bn; US$0.784bn × 1.077 = US$0.844bn; US$0.844bn × 1.030 = US$0.869bn; and US$0.869bn × 1.084 = US$0.942bn, each within rounding and the required 2% tolerance. The three-year CAGR is `(0.942 / 0.784)^(1/3) - 1 = 6.3%`. No product dollars were back-solved. Group-wide Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services figures are intentionally not inserted into regional rows.

[DATA GAP: UK&I product and activity revenue histories are not disclosed. The only reliable five-year dollar series is the geographic segment total.]

7. Management guidance and data-package anchors

The relevant management evidence from data_package §6 is paraphrased below. The draft had put quotation marks around data-package summaries that were not verbatim speaker quotes; those marks have been removed. These are operational anchors, not promises of UK&I revenue dollars or profit margins.

- **Q1 FY2027, 16 July 2026 — UK&I B2B:** The official update attributed 5% B2B growth to Ascend, fraud and verification wins despite subdued lending. Execution and new business can offset weak credit demand, but no win count, contract value, recurring-revenue mix or implementation-to-revenue timing was disclosed. [data_package §6, UK and Ireland row dated 16 July 2026]
- **Q1 FY2027, 16 July 2026 — UK&I Consumer Services:** The official update attributed 7% Consumer Services growth to engagement, marketplace and subscriptions. The rate supports a mid-single-digit base assumption, but it is a single-quarter organic KPI without revenue dollars or margin. [data_package §6, UK and Ireland row dated 16 July 2026]
- **KYC360, acquired 27 October 2025 and discussed at Q3 FY2026:** KYC360 adds customer-lifecycle, screening and financial-crime compliance capabilities intended for integration into Ascend. The FY2026 results establish that KYC360 was already inside the 3% total constant-currency segment growth while organic growth was 2%. No UK&I acquisition dollars, stand-alone margin, synergy amount or cross-sell cadence was disclosed, so the forecast must not count the acquisition contribution a second time. [data_package §6 and §9; FY2026 results p. 8; Experian KYC360 acquisition release dated 27 October 2025]

- **FY2026 results, 20 May 2026 — mixed-period acceleration:** UK&I organic growth was 1% in H1 and 3% in H2; Q1 FY2027 then reached 5%. The direction is constructive, but two six-month readings followed by one three-month reading do not demonstrate a linear two-point acceleration. [data_package §5 and §6]

At group level, management guides FY2027 organic revenue growth of 6%-8%, acquisition contribution around 1%, and 50 basis points of organic constant-currency margin progression. Q1 reiterated this frame. It is context rather than a regional guarantee. UK&I entered FY2027 below the group organic range despite accelerating to 5%, and the group margin target cannot be allocated mechanically to a segment whose Q1 margin was not disclosed. [data_package §6, group guidance paragraph]

The guidance discipline for this appendix is asymmetric. Base gives some credit to improved execution but anchors more heavily to the full-year 2% organic result and the FY2026 mix of flat B2B, 1% Financial Services, -7% Verticals and 12% Consumer Services. It does not set UK&I equal to the group 6%-8% range or treat the mixed-period 1% → 3% → 5% sequence as a trend line. Bull requires Ascend wins to convert into recurring deployed revenue, lending to improve, KYC360 cross-sell to be incremental to the already acquired base and Verticals to reverse its decline. Bear assumes Q1 was partly win timing and subdued lending, regulatory remediation or consumer competition holds growth near zero.

[DATA GAP: Management has not provided a UK&I FY2027 revenue range, product-level regional guidance, regional acquisition contribution, regional margin guidance or UK&I capex guidance.]

8. Forward growth assumptions

8.1 Modeling allocation and method

The TTM total of US$942m is sealed. To make the product forecast additive, the model assigns US$687m to Financial Services, US$98m to Verticals and US$157m to Consumer Services, or 72.9%, 10.4% and 16.7%. These are not historical disclosures and must not be quoted as company facts. They are central sensitivity weights inferred from the rounded FY2026 organic-growth contribution equations described in §2. The implied Consumer Services share can move materially if any rounded rate is shifted by half a point, and reported-dollar weights may differ from organic constant-currency weights. The scenario values compound these anchors for exactly five years to 31 March 2031; the sealed segment total, rather than the activity split, is the audited starting fact.

Base case growth

Product	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic 1%	5% Q1 FY2027 B2B overlay	No regional range; Ascend, fraud and verification wins	4.5%	Q1 execution partly persists, but the full-year 1% rate, subdued lending and undisclosed deployment cadence prevent extrapolating one quarter. Ascend and compliance cross-sell offset mature bureau volumes without assuming a separate KYC360 acquisition boost.
Verticals	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic -7%	5% Q1 FY2027 B2B overlay	No regional range	3.0%	Data quality, identity and non-financial use cases recover from a weak FY2026, but specialist competition and the absence of a separate Q1 rate keep the five-year assumption below aggregate B2B.
Consumer Services	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic 12%	7% Q1 FY2027 organic	No regional range; engagement, marketplace and subscriptions cited	5.0%	Engagement and personalisation sustain growth, but the slowdown from 12% in FY2026 to 7% in Q1, free tools and lender conversion variability argue for further normalisation.

The base case deliberately uses Q1 as evidence, not as the anchor. Financial Services averages 4.5% because Ascend, fraud and verification wins can improve a 1% FY2026 result, but Q1 did not disclose deployed annual recurring revenue or margins. Verticals averages 3.0% because a move from -7% in FY2026 to the aggregate 5% B2B Q1 result is not observable at the product level. Consumer Services averages 5.0%, below both its 12% FY2026 result and 7% Q1 rate, because

marketplace conversion is cyclical and free substitutes cap subscription pricing. KYC360's acquired revenue is already inside the TTM anchor; only unquantified future organic cross-sell, not the acquisition itself, supports the base CAGR.

The implied base segment path is steady rather than heroic:

Year ended 31 March	Financial Services revenue	Verticals revenue	Consumer Services revenue	UK&I total	Implied growth
2026 TTM anchor	687.0	98.0	157.0	942.0	n/a
2027	717.9	100.9	164.9	983.7	4.4%
2028	750.2	104.0	173.1	1,027.3	4.4%
2029	784.0	107.1	181.7	1,072.8	4.4%
2030	819.3	110.3	190.8	1,120.4	4.4%
2031 horizon	856.1	113.6	200.4	1,170.1	4.4%

All figures in the cadence table are US$m. Because the evidence-linked sensitivity allocation is dominated by Financial Services, the segment growth rate is stable near 4.4%. There is no unsupported step from a 5% Q1 regional KPI to a higher sustained rate.

Bull case growth

Product	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic 1%	5% Q1 FY2027 B2B overlay	No regional range; wins in Ascend, fraud and verification	7.0%	A lending recovery raises transactions, Ascend trials convert to deployed recurring use, and KYC360 produces incremental cross-sell beyond acquired revenue.
Verticals	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic -7%	5% Q1 FY2027 B2B overlay	No regional range	6.0%	Digital identity adoption, data-quality recovery and successful cross-selling reverse FY2026's decline and broaden outside banks.
Consumer Services	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic 12%	7% Q1 FY2027 organic	No regional range; engagement and marketplace cited	7.0%	Strong product relevance sustains engagement, subscriptions and referrals while partner appetite remains supportive.

The bull case requires more than a cyclical rebound. Financial Services must convert Ascend wins and sandbox trials into broad deployed recurring use, KYC360 must produce incremental cross-sell beyond revenue already in the anchor, and the UK lending environment must improve. Verticals must reverse its FY2026 decline and capitalise on digital-verification adoption while maintaining product trust. Consumer Services must sustain its Q1 pace despite free competitors. The 6%-7% rates are near or above the segment's 6.3% FY2023-FY2026 actual-dollar CAGR even though that history includes FX and acquisition effects, so the case remains demanding.

Bear case growth

Product	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM to TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic 1%	5% Q1 FY2027 B2B overlay	No regional range	0.0%	Q1 wins prove lumpy, credit demand remains weak, symmetric CRA data sharing narrows differentiation and clients delay Ascend expansion.
Verticals	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic -7%	5% Q1 FY2027 B2B overlay	No regional range	-1.0%	Data-quality weakness persists while specialist vendors, open-data access and procurement pressure outweigh identity and fraud demand.
Consumer Services	Not disclosed regionally; FY2026 organic 12%	7% Q1 FY2027 organic	No regional range	1.5%	Free score apps and comparison sites reduce paid retention and marketplace conversion weakens with lender appetite.

The bear case is not a collapse. Credit reporting, verification and compliance remain necessary, and the FCA's proposed designation regime may reinforce the three scaled CRAs. Instead, the case models a mature utility-like outcome in which B2B

volumes and pricing fail to outpace churn, Verticals remains structurally weak, open-banking alternatives reduce differentiation and acquisition integration consumes attention without producing sufficient organic cross-sell.

Growth sensitivities and consistency checks

A one-percentage-point increase in the Financial Services CAGR changes its 2031 revenue by roughly US$42m around base; the same increase in Consumer Services changes horizon revenue by roughly US$10m. The product-allocation data gap therefore matters materially even though it does not invalidate the sealed total. If the true Consumer Services weight is above the inferred 16.7%, the model becomes more exposed to marketplace volatility and consumer competition and less exposed to Ascend. If Financial Services is higher, lending cyclicality, CRA data-sharing reform and deployment execution dominate. The central mix must be stress-tested rather than mistaken for precision.

The Q1 FY2027 improvement is tested against the full sequence: 1% organic in the six-month H1 FY2026, 3% in the six-month H2, and 5% in the three-month Q1 FY2027. Base assumes some improvement but not continued two-point acceleration; bull requires conversion and broadening; bear assumes timing and comparisons explain much of Q1. The full-year FY2026 product evidence—Financial Services 1%, Verticals -7%, Consumer Services 12%—is the more conservative anchor for distinguishing the cases.

9. Forward Benchmark EBIT margin assumptions

The exact profit metric is **Benchmark EBIT**. No table below calls it operating income. The current 23.4% segment margin is disclosed and sealed; product-level Benchmark EBIT margins are not. The forward line margins are analyst assumptions used to compute a transparent revenue-weighted segment result. Corporate Central Activities, acquisition-intangible amortisation, exceptional items and other statutory bridge adjustments are excluded here and remain for the synthesis agent.

Benchmark EBIT margin by product and case

Product	Current disclosed Benchmark EBIT margin	Bear 2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	Base 2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	Bull 2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	Principal mechanism
Financial Services	Not separately disclosed	21.0%	24.2%	26.0%	Volume leverage and Ascend deployment versus procurement, cloud, migration and compliance cost
Verticals	Not separately disclosed	19.0%	22.5%	24.5%	Data-quality recovery and identity/fraud scale versus specialist competition and delivery cost
Consumer Services	Not separately disclosed	21.5%	24.0%	26.0%	Subscription retention and marketplace conversion versus marketing and partner economics
UK and Ireland total	23.4% [DP §3 margin row]	20.9%	24.0%	25.9%	Revenue-weighted result; exact calculation in §10

Base: the segment gains 60 basis points over five years, from 23.4% to 24.0%. A 24.5% outcome would rely on four unquantified mechanisms and wrongly treat being below a one-year group margin target as regional support. The selected case allows only about 12 basis points of annual progression from gradual Ascend deployment, consumer personalisation and cost-base efficiency. It assumes ongoing platform, regulatory and data-quality investment absorbs most gross benefit. KYC360's acquired revenue is already in the anchor, its margin is undisclosed, and its integration may initially duplicate systems; only incremental cross-sell and later workflow efficiency can help the terminal margin. The product-margin rows are calibration devices for the revenue-weighted rollup, not claims that any product currently earns those margins.

Bull: the 25.9% horizon margin is 250 basis points above current. Financial Services reaches 26.0% only if standardised deployment reduces custom work, high-value analytics and KYC workflows raise revenue per client, and a lending recovery supplies volume. Verticals reaches 24.5% only if the FY2026 decline reverses and identity/fraud products scale across end markets. Consumer Services reaches 26.0% through stronger conversion and subscription retention without proportional marketing expense. This still requires integration, pricing and product execution to work together; it is not a reading of current evidence.

Bear: the 20.9% horizon margin is approximately 250 basis points below current. Weak lending reduces transaction and project volume while fixed product, regulatory and technology costs persist. Symmetric CRA sharing and multi-bureau procurement limit raw-data pricing; open-banking and specialist vendors require investment; KYC360 integration costs and

consumer acquisition spend rise. The line-level assumptions show that the margin decline is not a plug: each business falls toward 19%-21.5% and the evidence-linked sensitivity mix produces the segment result.

The current total-perimeter margin history provides a useful check. UK&I held near 21.6%-21.7% through FY2024 before reaching 23.4% in FY2025 and remaining there in FY2026. The ongoing perimeter improved only 20 basis points in FY2026 through cost-base efficiency. Base now assumes a smaller further gain and treats most achieved efficiency as durable rather than repeatable. Bear falls below the earlier range because growth stalls while regulatory, data and platform costs persist. Bull still assumes the platform strategy adds a second meaningful leg of efficiency.

[DATA GAP: Product-level UK&I Benchmark EBIT and margins are not disclosed. Product margins in the forecast are scenario assumptions, not historical estimates.]

10. Segment rollup — bottoms-up and tied

Every scenario starts from the same US$942m TTM anchor and compounds for exactly five years. Product-level horizon revenue equals allocation anchor × `(1 + CAGR)^5`; Benchmark EBIT equals horizon revenue × product margin. The segment totals sum the three products. Small differences are rounding only.

Case	Product	TTM allocation anchor US$m	5-year CAGR	2031 revenue US$m	2031 Benchmark EBIT margin	2031 Benchmark EBIT US$m
Bear	Financial Services	687.0	0.0%	687.0	21.0%	144.3
Bear	Verticals	98.0	-1.0%	93.2	19.0%	17.7
Bear	Consumer Services	157.0	1.5%	169.1	21.5%	36.4
Bear	**UK and Ireland total**	**942.0**	**0.2% blended**	**949.3**	**20.9%**	**198.3**
Base	Financial Services	687.0	4.5%	856.1	24.2%	207.2
Base	Verticals	98.0	3.0%	113.6	22.5%	25.6
Base	Consumer Services	157.0	5.0%	200.4	24.0%	48.1
Base	**UK and Ireland total**	**942.0**	**4.4% blended**	**1,170.1**	**24.0%**	**280.8**
Bull	Financial Services	687.0	7.0%	963.6	26.0%	250.5
Bull	Verticals	98.0	6.0%	131.1	24.5%	32.1
Bull	Consumer Services	157.0	7.0%	220.2	26.0%	57.3
Bull	**UK and Ireland total**	**942.0**	**6.9% blended**	**1,314.9**	**25.9%**	**339.9**

Arithmetic tie-outs:

- Bear revenue: `687.000 + 93.197 + 169.134 = 949.331`; Bear Benchmark EBIT: `144.270 + 17.707 + 36.364 = 198.341`; margin: `198.341 / 949.331 = 20.893%`.
- Base revenue: `856.127 + 113.609 + 200.376 = 1,170.112`; Base Benchmark EBIT: `207.183 + 25.562 + 48.090 = 280.835`; margin: `280.835 / 1,170.112 = 24.001%`.
- Bull revenue: `963.553 + 131.146 + 220.201 = 1,314.900`; Bull Benchmark EBIT: `250.524 + 32.131 + 57.252 = 339.907`; margin: `339.907 / 1,314.900 = 25.850%`.

The rollup reconciles exactly before display rounding and well within the required 1%. Base 2031 Benchmark EBIT is US$280.8m, a 5.0% CAGR from the US$220m TTM anchor, faster than revenue because margin rises modestly. Bear revenue is approximately flat and Benchmark EBIT falls from US$220m to US$198.3m because margin contracts. Bull Benchmark EBIT compounds at about 9.1% as both revenue and margin improve.

The probability-weighted arithmetic is not a separate scenario and is not used by synthesis as a substitute for the three cases. For orientation only, the weighted horizon revenue is `30% × 949.331 + 55% × 1,170.112 + 15% × 1,314.900 = US$1,125.6m`; weighted Benchmark EBIT is `30% × 198.341 + 55% × 280.835 + 15% × 339.907 = US$264.9m`. These values retain Bear 30%, Base 55% and Bull 15%. The 30% bear weight is warranted by a 2% FY2026 organic anchor, flat B2B, a -7% Verticals result, soft lending and unresolved regulatory effects; base remains most likely because Q1 improved and Consumer Services is still growing; bull is least likely because it requires simultaneous lending, platform, integration and margin success.

11. Key risks and wildcards

[Bear] Lending-cycle sensitivity. Credit demand and originations drive some bureau and decisioning events. The mixed-period H1-to-H2-to-Q1 improvement shows execution can offset a soft market, but it is not a clean run-rate series and does not remove cyclical exposure. Prolonged weak demand or tighter lender risk appetite would hurt transaction volume, new implementation and marketplace conversion.

[Bear/Base] Regulatory data-sharing reform. CP26/7 was still a proposal at cutoff. Mandatory sharing with all designated CRAs can increase completeness and weaken exclusive coverage differences, which supports the bear pricing risk. Yet the draft designation of Experian alongside Equifax and TransUnion can entrench scaled incumbents and improve Experian's own coverage, which makes an automatic base-case revenue haircut analytically unsound. Base carries implementation, accuracy and dispute-resolution cost without a demand cut; bear assumes multi-bureau competition erodes raw-data pricing before analytics compensates.

[Bear] Data quality, fairness, privacy and cyber events. A bureau error can affect access to credit, and a security failure can damage both contributor and consumer trust. Remediation, regulatory action or client diversification could compress margin. AI models add explainability and bias-governance requirements rather than eliminating them.

[Bear/Base] Open-banking substitution. Consented transaction data offers a current view of affordability that traditional credit files cannot always provide. With about 17 million UK users by April 2026 and another FCA consultation due before end-2026, the channel is established but its long-run rules remain unsettled. It is complementary when combined within Ascend, but clients and competitors can source it independently. The monitoring criterion is whether Experian continues to win workflows and protect price as shared and permissioned data become more available.

[Bear/Base] Ascend execution. Management attributes recent B2B improvement partly to Ascend wins, while FY2026 commentary also referenced sandbox trials progressing into client relationships. Neither source quantifies UK&I deployed recurring revenue, contract value, migration cost or margin. Base assumes gradual monetisation, not instant platform economics. Delayed migration, custom implementation, reliability issues or weak model governance could make wins less profitable than the headline suggests.

[Bear/Base] KYC360 integration. KYC360 expands the workflow, but its acquisition contribution is undisclosed beyond the FY2026 statement that total constant-currency growth of 3% included KYC360 versus 2% organic. Acquired revenue is therefore already in the US$942m anchor. Failure to retain specialists, integrate screening and lifecycle management, or produce incremental cross-sell would remove an important base-to-bull catalyst; merely retaining acquired revenue cannot be counted again as organic upside. Separate statutory acquisition accounting must not be hidden within segment Benchmark EBIT.

[Bear] Consumer competition. Free credit apps and comparison sites reduce willingness to pay and allow multi-homing. Marketplace economics can weaken if partners reduce commission, approval rates fall or consumers go directly to lenders. A deterioration in paid retention or marketplace conversion would make even the inferred 16.7% allocation consequential; if the rounded-growth back-solve understates the true Consumer Services share, downside would be larger.

[Bull] Digital verification adoption. The statutory UK trust framework can increase confidence and uptake of certified digital identity. Experian can use bureau and fraud data to participate in more onboarding and verification events across financial and non-financial verticals. The bull case requires commercial adoption, not merely regulatory readiness.

[Bull] Lending normalisation. A healthier credit market would add transaction volume while the segment continues to win software and fraud work. Because fixed platform investment is already in the cost base, volume recovery could produce operating leverage. The bull case assumes this occurs without a simultaneous deterioration in credit quality that forces clients to become excessively conservative.

[All cases] Disclosure opacity. The most important modeling limitation is the absence of UK&I activity revenue and profit. The segment total is sealed and reliable; the internal mix is not. Monitoring should prioritise any future regional split, KYC360 contribution, Ascend client or recurring-revenue KPI, Consumer Services member or conversion KPI, and regional margin disclosure. Until then, the line allocations should be treated as sensitivity weights and not as historical facts.

Summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	US$0.9493bn	Benchmark EBIT	20.9%	US$0.1983bn	30%
Base	US$1.1701bn	Benchmark EBIT	24.0%	US$0.2808bn	55%
Bull	US$1.3149bn	Benchmark EBIT	25.9%	US$0.3399bn	15%

The segment is a mature but defensible UK data and decisioning franchise with product renewal but limited activity-level disclosure. Organic growth moved from 1% in six-month H1 FY2026 to 3% in six-month H2 and 5% in three-month Q1 FY2027, while the sealed 23.4% Benchmark EBIT margin remained the TTM anchor. The revised base gives measured credit to Ascend, fraud, verification, KYC360 cross-sell and Consumer Services execution, but anchors to the 2% FY2026 regional result and does not extend one quarterly KPI or group guidance mechanically. The principal underwriting gap is product-level disclosure: the total forecast is anchored and the arithmetic is explicit, but the 72.9% / 10.4% / 16.7% Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services split is only a rounded-growth sensitivity allocation until Experian provides regional activity dollars.

Appendix B4 - EMEA and Asia Pacific

Experian plc — EMEA and Asia Pacific Segment Deep Dive

Research status: Production ER2 segment appendix. Research only; no trade, message, ranking, sizing, portfolio, broker or execution authority. **Forecast anchor:** TTM ended 31 March 2026, identical to audited FY2026. **Horizon:** 31 March 2031, exactly 5.0 years later. **Profit basis throughout:** `Benchmark EBIT`, the issuer-defined and sealed common segment measure. **Bridge control:** `STATUTORY_BRIDGE_STATUS: VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING`; QFR-sealed SHA-256 `791cd96635af149a1dc29b8897a7621a946ad4ebde1282d034719bd7eabf1b6f` [data_package §3a, rows 124–191]. **DR gate:** `DATA PACKAGE VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR WAVE 2` [gate_manifest.json, stages.DR].

0. Segment boundary and taxonomy note

EMEA and Asia Pacific is one of Experian's four geographic reportable operating segments. It covers Continental Europe, Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand and the rest of Asia Pacific. The geographic reporting structure was stable from FY2022 through FY2026; the change from “EMEA/Asia Pacific” to “EMEA and Asia Pacific” was typographical, not economic. However, Experian annually moves selected businesses to “exited activities” and re-presents comparatives. This appendix therefore starts with total external revenue and total Benchmark EBIT on the exact FY2026 sealed perimeter, rather than mixing an ongoing revenue series with total profit [data_package §1, rows 55–69; §3, rows 90–122].

The business-activity taxonomy has a separate boundary. Effective 1 April 2025, Experian replaced the old B2B labels `Data` and `Decisioning` with `Financial Services` and `Verticals`; only FY2025 was re-presented in the new taxonomy. No primary-source bridge maps the old categories into the new ones before FY2025. Consequently, this report does not splice legacy product dollars into Financial Services or Verticals history. EMEA and Asia Pacific is a B2B segment in the disclosed FY2026 activity perimeter: Consumer Services revenue is disclosed for North America, Latin America, and UK and Ireland, but not EMEA and Asia Pacific [data_package §4, rows 193–206].

1. What this segment actually is

This is a geographically diverse collection of local credit-bureau, data, analytics and decisioning-software businesses. Its customers are primarily banks, non-bank lenders, fintechs, insurers, telecom companies, automotive participants, retailers, public-sector bodies and other enterprises that must decide whether a person or business is creditworthy, genuine, eligible, likely to pay, or potentially fraudulent. The segment sells data and scores used inside those decisions, and software that helps customers build, test, deploy and monitor decision strategies.

The underlying product set has two current reporting lenses. `Financial Services` includes bureau data, credit scores, analytics and decisioning sold to lenders. `Verticals` includes fraud and identity, automotive, marketing and other non-financial uses. Experian does not disclose EMEA/APAC dollars for either activity, or for Ascend, individual proprietary scores, fraud products or country bureaus. The segment's defensible economic unit is therefore the disclosed geography; Financial Services and Verticals are modeled as driver pools using an explicit allocation proxy, never as issuer-reported segment product revenue.

Pricing varies by product. Bureau files, attributes and scores are commonly transactional or volume-linked. Batch data and monitoring can be periodic or subscription-like. Decisioning implementations can carry licence, software-delivery, consultancy and transaction charges. That blend matters: a large software delivery can create a high-growth comparison in one period and a weak reported comparison in the next without changing underlying installed demand. Q1 FY2027's 1% organic growth was explicitly attributed to timing and a strong prior software-delivery comparison; it is a KPI overlay, not a new TTM anchor [data_package §5, rows 215–229; §6, rows 254–257].

The go-to-market is predominantly direct and local. Credit data is jurisdiction-specific, and customer integrations touch regulated underwriting workflows, so sales and implementation require country expertise, compliance capability and long relationships. Ascend changes the delivery model rather than the underlying need: customers can access data, analytics and decisioning capabilities on a platform, run proof-of-value tests and deploy models more quickly. Management's stated expansion of proprietary scores and Ascend into new geographies is the central scale thesis for this segment [data_package §6, rows 254–257].

Geographic heterogeneity is fundamental. Italy, Spain and South East Asia can grow while Australia, India or another country faces soft credit demand, delayed projects or tough comparisons. Experian's Q3 FY2026 update cited strong growth in Italy,

Spain and South East Asia even as the region grew only 3% organically. A close competitor illustrates the same dispersion: TransUnion's 2025 International revenue grew 5.5%, but India fell 1.9% and Asia Pacific fell 4.9%, while Africa grew 11.7%. Those figures are not used as Experian history; they are an external reality check showing why a regional average should not be extrapolated mechanically ([Experian Q3 FY2026 update](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-Q3-FY26-trading-update.pdf); [TransUnion 2025 Annual Report](https://investors.transunion.com/~/media/Files/T/Transunion-IR-V2/annual-reports/2025/transunion-2025-annual-report.pdf)).

2. Current economics — TTM ended 31 March 2026

EMEA and Asia Pacific generated US$617m of total external revenue and US$30m of Benchmark EBIT in FY2026/TTM, a 4.9% margin [data_package §3, rows 115–120]. It represented 7.3% of Experian group revenue [data_package §1, rows 59–65]. Actual-USD revenue rose 15.8%, but ongoing organic growth was 5%; the gap reflects some combination of currency, acquisitions and perimeter effects and should not be treated as a sustainable organic rate [data_package §0a, rows 43–53; §3, rows 115–122].

The most important quality-of-earnings detail is the US$10m exited-activity drag. Management disclosed US$40m of FY2026 Benchmark EBIT from ongoing EMEA/APAC activities, while total Benchmark EBIT including exited activities was US$30m [data_package §6, row 257]. Using total revenue as the denominator, ongoing profit is equivalent to 6.5% and exited losses to negative 1.6 percentage points. This is only a diagnostic bridge because the revenue of exited activities is not separately disclosed. It nonetheless shows that the reported 4.9% margin combines an early-stage ongoing recovery with loss-making perimeter noise.

The five-year margin record is unusually weak for a data business: 1.7% in FY2022, 1.3% in FY2023, 1.1% in FY2024, 0.4% in FY2025 and 4.9% in FY2026. Benchmark EBIT was only US$9m, US$6m, US$5m, US$2m and US$30m, respectively [data_package §3, rows 115–120]. FY2026 was a genuine step up, but the base is too small for a one-year change to prove normalized economics. A US$10m timing, restructuring or delivery swing equals about 160 basis points of current revenue.

Experian discloses no segment capex, R&D, headcount or invested capital. Group capex was 8.6% of revenue in FY2026 and management expects roughly 8% in FY2027, trending toward 7% longer term [data_package §0a, rows 34–41; §6, row 259; §7, rows 261–273]. The segment should not be described as physically capital-intensive, but its economics require continuing investment in data ingestion, security, cloud/platform migration, software development, regulatory controls and customer implementations. Some development spending is capitalized at group level, so a low current Benchmark EBIT margin does not imply low reinvestment.

No EMEA/APAC Consumer Services revenue is reported. Consumer Services exists in the company-wide activity table for North America, Latin America and UK and Ireland only [data_package §4, row 203]. The EMEA/APAC model therefore assigns no consumer-platform revenue. Likewise, no dollars are assigned to Ascend, proprietary scores, fraud, automotive or individual countries because they are true non-disclosures [data_package §4, row 206]. These products matter as growth and margin mechanisms, but not as fabricated historical line items.

3. Unit economics

At its core, bureau economics begin with a data contribution network. Lenders and other furnishers supply credit-account and payment information; Experian cleans, links and maintains that information, combines it with permissible attributes, and sells reports, scores or analytics back into underwriting, account management, collections and fraud workflows. Fixed costs are meaningful: data infrastructure, security, model governance, regulatory compliance and local expert teams must exist before a bureau can earn attractive returns. Once the dataset and integrations are established, incremental query or score volume can carry high contribution because the marginal processing cost is low.

Decisioning software adds a second layer. A customer can buy analytics, score development, workflow tools or an Ascend-based environment. Revenue can be recurring where usage and platform access expand, but implementation and delivery milestones can be lumpy. The Q1 FY2027 1% organic print against large prior software deliveries is direct evidence. An analyst should therefore distinguish `demand weakness` from `recognition timing`: delayed installations affect near-term revenue and utilization, while failed proof-of-value conversion or lost renewals indicate a more serious competitive problem.

The margin equation is roughly: data and software gross contribution minus local sales, product, technology, regulatory and country infrastructure. Scale helps in three ways. First, a larger contributor network improves data depth and predictive power,

supporting usage and price. Second, common platforms can spread engineering and cloud costs across more customers and countries. Third, reusable proprietary scores and Ascend modules shorten deployment compared with bespoke country-by-country builds. The critical caveat is localization. Privacy law, permissible data, consumer rights, underwriting practices, languages and integrations differ across jurisdictions. “Build once, sell everywhere” is not a realistic assumption.

Financial Services should have the stronger structural economics because bureau data and scores sit in recurring regulated workflows. Volumes still move with credit origination, and major banking customers have procurement leverage, but the cost and risk of replacing a live decisioning stack support retention. Verticals can broaden the addressable market through fraud, identity, automotive and marketing applications. They also introduce more varied competitors and may require more bespoke datasets, so their margin and growth should not automatically match core financial-services bureau activity.

The current 4.9% Benchmark EBIT margin implies that fixed local infrastructure and delivery costs still absorb most gross contribution. Several mechanisms could lift it: normalization of exited losses; higher utilization of Ascend and common technology; more repeatable score deployment; country mix shifting toward scaled profitable markets; and revenue growth faster than local overhead. Several mechanisms could block it: persistent bespoke implementation costs, duplicated country infrastructure, delivery deferrals, price competition, regulatory remediation, or an inability to close or fix subscale operations.

The US$40m ongoing-versus-US$30m total distinction is the most concrete margin bridge available. If exited losses disappear with no offsetting dis-synergies, total margin would rise by about 160 basis points on the current revenue base. Beyond that, every projected margin point must be earned through organic scale or delivery efficiency. The base case therefore does not capitalize the full theoretical economics of a mature bureau; it models a gradual recovery to 11.0%, still far below the margins of Experian's larger regions and below mature international peer profitability measures that are not directly comparable.

4. Competitive dynamics

Competition is local as well as global. The direct global peer set includes Equifax and TransUnion; CRIF is a material credit-information and decisioning competitor across Europe and other markets. Country-specific bureaus, banking consortia, identity specialists, fraud vendors, analytics firms and software providers compete for parts of the workflow. In Australia, Equifax publicly positions itself as the leading consumer credit bureau, underlining that Experian does not enjoy a uniform number-one position across this geography ([Equifax Australia](https://www.equifax.com.au/access-seeker)). TransUnion describes significant positions across Africa, India and Asia Pacific and supplies credit reports, analytics, technology and risk services to many of the same verticals ([TransUnion 2025 Annual Report](https://investors.transunion.com/~/media/Files/T/Transunion-IR-V2/annual-reports/2025/transunion-2025-annual-report.pdf)).

Pricing power is strongest where Experian has unique or superior data coverage, proprietary scores with demonstrated lift, deep workflow integration, and regulatory acceptance. A lender can multi-source bureau data or negotiate enterprise pricing, but switching a production score or decision workflow is not like replacing generic software. The customer must validate predictive performance, fairness, compliance, availability, latency and downstream decision outcomes. These costs support retention, but they do not eliminate price pressure when a market has multiple nationwide bureaus.

Ascend is strategically important because it bundles data, analytics and deployment. If proof-of-value tests show better approvals or lower losses, the sales conversation shifts from price per report toward economic outcomes. That can increase wallet share without depending entirely on loan volume. The opposite risk is that cloud data platforms and modular decisioning vendors reduce software differentiation, leaving the bureau to compete mainly on raw data. Experian's proprietary data remains an advantage in that world, but software-delivery margins would be harder to expand.

TransUnion offers a useful comparable for deceleration and dispersion, not a valuation or margin benchmark. Its International gross revenue grew 12.7% in 2024 and 5.5% in 2025. Within 2025, Africa grew 11.7%, India fell 1.9% and Asia Pacific fell 4.9%. This demonstrates that a roughly seven-point regional slowdown can occur within one year without implying permanent collapse, and that country mix can dominate the aggregate ([TransUnion 2025 Annual Report](https://investors.transunion.com/~/media/Files/T/Transunion-IR-V2/annual-reports/2025/transunion-2025-annual-report.pdf)). EMEA/APAC's own organic series—3%, 3%, 7%, 8%, 5% across FY2022–FY2026—also supports a mid-single-digit through-cycle view rather than extrapolating FY2026 actual-USD growth [data_package §0a, rows 43–53].

Regulation is both moat and cost. Australia's Part IIIA credit-reporting regime and mandatory Privacy (Credit Reporting) Code 2025 constrain what data credit providers and reporting bodies may handle and for what purposes. Compliance capability favors established bureaus, while breaches create legal and remediation exposure ([Australian OAIC credit-reporting overview](https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-legislation/the-privacy-act/credit-reporting/on-credit-reporting)). In Europe,

AI systems used for profiling can fall within high-risk rules, increasing documentation, governance and monitoring needs. That can slow deployment, raise costs and strengthen the value of trusted vendors simultaneously ([European Commission AI Act Service Desk, Article 6](https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/article-6)).

Substitution risk differs by layer. Alternative data, open banking and bank-owned internal models can supplement bureau files, but generally require identity resolution, historical outcomes and compliant decision controls. Generative AI can accelerate model development and customer service, yet it does not automatically recreate a trusted contributor network. The greater five-year threat is modularization: customers may buy data from one provider, identity from another, and orchestrate decisions on a neutral cloud platform. Experian must prove that its integrated stack produces faster deployment and better decisions than a best-of-breed assembly.

5. Moat at the segment level

The segment has a real but uneven moat. Its strongest component is regulated, contributed and historical data that becomes more useful as coverage and performance history deepen. A new entrant cannot instantly reproduce years of repayment outcomes, lender relationships, dispute processes and compliant data handling. Proprietary scores add model intellectual property and validation history. Workflow integration adds operational switching costs. These protections should endure for five to ten years in scaled countries.

The second moat layer is distribution through existing enterprise relationships. A major lender that already sends data to Experian and consumes reports can trial a new score, fraud module or Ascend capability more easily than it can onboard an unproven provider. Management's expansion of scores and Ascend into new geographies is an attempt to reuse this distribution asset [data_package §6, row 256]. If adoption improves, it should raise revenue per customer and reduce dependence on pure bureau volume.

The third layer is the ability to combine data and software. Scores become more valuable when customers can test and deploy them rapidly; software becomes more defensible when it is coupled with proprietary data. The moat is therefore stronger for integrated decision outcomes than for generic analytics tooling. This is also why software-delivery timing matters: a delayed project postpones both revenue and the future recurring workload expected to run through the platform.

The moat is not uniform across the entire region. Experian may have scale and dense data in one country but a small position or subscale cost base in another. The total segment's 4.9% Benchmark EBIT margin, after several years around breakeven, is hard evidence that competitive advantages have not yet translated into strong aggregate economics. A claimed group-level moat that cannot lift regional returns is incomplete. The five-year underwriting question is whether the segment can convert data assets and platform reuse into double-digit Benchmark EBIT margins without relying on repeated acquisitions or favorable currency.

Regulation reinforces incumbency but can cap the return on that incumbency. Consent, data-minimization, explainability, correction and model-governance obligations create barriers to entry; they also raise Experian's own fixed costs and constrain product design. The net effect should favor scaled providers, but only if compliance execution is sound. A breach, biased-model finding or extended remediation could damage trust and erase several years of margin progress.

My durability judgment is `moderate`, not wide. Core bureau data and embedded scores deserve high marks. Ascend geographic reuse is promising but not yet proven by disclosed EMEA/APAC product dollars, renewal metrics or margins. Country fragmentation and credible competitors limit pricing power. The segment can become a better business, but the base case requires execution; it is not guaranteed by the existence of a global Experian brand.

6. Historical growth rates

The following table reproduces the sealed regional history. Every reported value points to the specific data-package row. The three-year CAGR runs from FY2023 to FY2026. Actual-USD growth incorporates currency, acquisitions and exited-activity re-presentations and is therefore not interchangeable with organic growth.

Product / sub-segment	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	FY2026 revenue	3-year CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
EMEA and Asia Pacific total	US$0.467bn [data_package §3, row 117]	US$0.533bn [data_package §3, row 117]	US$0.617bn [data_package §3, row 117]	10.6% [calculated from US$0.456bn FY2023 and US$0.617bn FY2026; row 117]	15.8% actual USD [data_package §3, row 118]; 5% organic [data_package §0a, row 50]	[data_package §3, rows 115–122]

The full disclosed regional history and profit record are shown below because the low-margin recovery is central to the forecast.

Metric	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026
Revenue	US$0.528bn [data_package §3, row 117]	US$0.456bn [data_package §3, row 117]	US$0.467bn [data_package §3, row 117]	US$0.533bn [data_package §3, row 117]	US$0.617bn [data_package §3, row 117]
Actual-USD YoY	n/a [data_package §3, row 118]	-13.6% [data_package §3, row 118]	2.4% [data_package §3, row 118]	14.1% [data_package §3, row 118]	15.8% [data_package §3, row 118]
Organic YoY	3% [data_package §0a, row 50]	3% [data_package §0a, row 50]	7% [data_package §0a, row 50]	8% [data_package §0a, row 50]	5% [data_package §0a, row 50]
Benchmark EBIT	US$0.009bn [data_package §3, row 119]	US$0.006bn [data_package §3, row 119]	US$0.005bn [data_package §3, row 119]	US$0.002bn [data_package §3, row 119]	US$0.030bn [data_package §3, row 119]
Benchmark EBIT margin	1.7% [data_package §3, row 120]	1.3% [data_package §3, row 120]	1.1% [data_package §3, row 120]	0.4% [data_package §3, row 120]	4.9% [data_package §3, row 120]

The current Financial Services and Verticals taxonomy is only comparable for FY2025–FY2026 and only at group level. These figures are context for the allocation proxy in section 8, not EMEA/APAC reported product revenue.

Product / activity context	FY2024 revenue	FY2025 revenue	FY2026 revenue	Historical CAGR	Most recent YoY	Data package cite
Financial Services, global	n/d; taxonomy not yet reported [data_package §1, row 69]	US$3.874bn [data_package §4, row 201]	US$4.463bn [data_package §4, row 201]	n/m; only two comparable years [data_package §4, row 195]	15.2% actual USD [calculated from row 201]; 9% organic [data_package §4, row 210]	[data_package §4, rows 195–202, 208–213]
Verticals, global	n/d; taxonomy not yet reported [data_package §1, row 69]	US$1.547bn [data_package §4, row 202]	US$1.705bn [data_package §4, row 202]	n/m; only two comparable years [data_package §4, row 195]	10.2% actual USD [calculated from row 202]; 7% organic [data_package §4, row 211]	[data_package §4, rows 195–202, 208–213]
Consumer Services, EMEA/APAC	Not in disclosed segment perimeter [data_package §4, row 203]	Not in disclosed segment perimeter [data_package §4, row 203]	Not in disclosed segment perimeter [data_package §4, row 203]	n/m [data_package §4, row 203]	n/m [data_package §4, row 203]	[data_package §4, row 203]

Arithmetic checks. US$0.456bn × 1.024 = US$0.467bn ✓; US$0.467bn × 1.141 = US$0.533bn ✓; US$0.533bn × 1.158 = US$0.617bn ✓. Financial Services: US$3.874bn × 1.152 = US$4.463bn ✓. Verticals: US$1.547bn × 1.102 = US$1.705bn ✓. All differences are within the required 2% tolerance; no historical inconsistency is being smoothed.

7. Management guidance and forward anchors

The data package contains one quantified group revenue guide and four EMEA/APAC-specific evidence points. Only the group sentence is provided verbatim in the sealed package; the regional items are deliberately labeled as paraphrases. They are used as forecast anchors, not silently upgraded into formal targets.

- **FY2027 group organic growth, data_package §6 row 236.** Lloyd Pitchford: “We expect organic revenue growth of 6-8%, which is in line with the initial guidance we gave for FY26.” Interpretation: this is a group anchor, not a 6–8% commitment for EMEA/APAC. The segment's Q1 start and management's recovery expectation justify a lower first-year segment assumption than the group range in base case.

- **Q1 FY2027 timing, data_package §6 row 254.** Management evidence, paraphrased: Q1 EMEA/APAC growth of 1% reflected timing and a strong software-delivery comparison. Interpretation: a single quarter should not reset the five-year through-cycle growth rate to 1%, but it raises execution risk and makes the timing of FY2027 acceleration testable.

- **Rest-of-year expectation, data_package §6 row 255.** Management evidence, paraphrased: growth is expected to be higher through the rest of FY2027. Interpretation: this is directional and unquantified. Base assumes acceleration; bear assumes it does not arrive.

- **Product rollout, data_package §6 row 256.** Management evidence, paraphrased: proprietary scores and Ascend expanded into new geographies. Interpretation: repeatable product rollout is the primary route to sustained mid-single-digit growth and margin leverage. No disclosed regional Ascend revenue, client count or conversion rate validates the magnitude.

- **Profit perimeter, data_package §6 row 257.** Management evidence, paraphrased: FY2026 Benchmark EBIT improved to US$40m ongoing, while total including exited activities was US$30m. Interpretation: eliminating the exited loss can add about 160 basis points on current total revenue, but further margin improvement must come from scale and execution.

- **Group margin framework, data_package §6 row 259.** FY2027 guidance is 50bp of organic constant-currency margin progression; acquisitions are expected to add around 1% to group revenue. Interpretation: the group guide is not allocated to segments. Because EMEA/APAC begins at only 4.9%, it can improve faster in basis points if losses normalize, but it can also miss the group trajectory if software delivery stalls.

- **Broad AI/product statement, data_package §6 row 235.** Brian Cassin: “We’ve had a good start to the year with continued new business strength and accelerating potential across a range of AI-enabled opportunities.” Interpretation: pipeline and potential are not booked revenue. The scenarios give upside only when platform rollout translates into delivered revenue and profit.

[DATA GAP: The sealed data package does not provide a verbatim EMEA/APAC-specific management sentence, a quantified FY2027 regional range, or regional Financial Services/Verticals growth. It provides source-bound paraphrases only. This appendix does not fabricate quotations or convert group guidance into a regional promise.]

8. Forward growth assumptions — TTM to 31 March 2031

Allocation method and why it is necessary

Experian discloses US$617m of EMEA/APAC revenue but not the regional split between Financial Services and Verticals. To make the rollup reconstructable without pretending to possess undisclosed data, the model allocates the TTM total using Experian's disclosed FY2026 **global** B2B mix: Financial Services US$4,463m divided by total B2B US$6,168m, or 72.36%; Verticals US$1,705m divided by US$6,168m, or 27.64% [data_package §4, rows 201–204]. Applied to US$617m, this yields an **analyst modeling assumption** of US$446.4m Financial Services and US$170.6m Verticals. The two lines tie exactly to US$617.0m. This is not issuer disclosure of EMEA/APAC product mix or regional product revenue, and it should not be cited downstream as such.

Consumer Services is zero in this segment model because the disclosed continuous Consumer Services perimeter covers North America, Latin America and UK and Ireland, not EMEA/APAC [data_package §4, row 203]. Exited-activity revenue cannot be stripped from the US$617m anchor because none is disclosed. The proxy therefore allocates the **entire reported regional revenue perimeter**, including any unknown exited-activity revenue, across Financial Services and Verticals. That is an unavoidable simplifying assumption, not evidence that exited revenue is zero or belongs to either pool; the US$10m profit drag is handled explicitly in section 9.

The proxy's economic sensitivity is bounded but material. Holding each scenario's product CAGRs constant, a hypothetical 100% Financial Services starting mix versus 100% Verticals produces horizon revenue ranges of US$681.2m versus US$617.0m in bear, US$845.7m versus US$750.7m in base, and US$949.5m versus US$864.6m in bull. The reported 72.36%/27.64% global mix gives the central rollups below. These endpoints are sensitivity tests, not alternative forecasts, and demonstrate why the undisclosed regional mix must remain visible as model risk.

Bear case growth

Product / proxy pool	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM→TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services proxy	n/m under current taxonomy; legacy Data/Decisioning cannot be spliced	9% global organic; regional total Q1 FY2027 1%	Regional growth expected to improve, unquantified	2.0%	Ascend conversion disappoints, lending stays soft in several markets and 1% timing weakness proves partly structural. Growth falls below the region's 3%, 3%, 7%, 8%, 5% organic history.

Product / proxy pool	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bear CAGR TTM→TTM+5y	Justification
Verticals proxy	n/m under current taxonomy	7% global organic; regional total Q1 FY2027 1%	No quantified regional product guide	0.0%	Fraud and identity demand offsets declines elsewhere, but fragmented competition and delayed software deliveries prevent net growth. This is harsher than the 5% FY2026 regional organic rate but consistent with peer-country contractions.
EMEA/APAC total	10.6% actual-USD CAGR FY2023–FY2026; organic history 3%–8%	15.8% actual USD; 5% organic; Q1 overlay 1%	Higher growth through rest of FY2027, unquantified	1.5% blended	A 2%/0% proxy mix produces 1.46%. FX and acquisitions are not assumed to rescue organic weakness.

The bear case does not impose an implausible one-step collapse from FY2026 actual-USD growth because that figure contains FX, acquisitions and perimeter effects. It starts from the 1% Q1 organic overlay and assumes only a modest recovery. TransUnion's 2025 India and Asia Pacific declines show that negative country growth can coexist with positive regional totals. The specific adverse mechanism is stalled software conversion plus subscale cost bases, not generic “maturation.”

Base case growth

Product / proxy pool	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Base CAGR TTM→TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services proxy	n/m under current taxonomy; regional organic history 3%–8%	9% global organic; regional total Q1 FY2027 1%	Higher regional growth through rest of FY2027; group 6–8%	6.5%	Proprietary scores and Ascend deepen usage, while the growth rate normalizes below the latest global Financial Services print. The assumption is above the segment's FY2026 5% organic rate but below the FY2025 8% peak.
Verticals proxy	n/m under current taxonomy; legacy categories not comparable	7% global organic; regional total Q1 FY2027 1%	No quantified regional product guide	4.0%	Fraud, identity and non-financial use cases grow, but competition and bespoke delivery keep Verticals below Financial Services. The rate is consistent with a heterogeneous region and below global FY2026 organic growth.
EMEA/APAC total	10.6% actual-USD CAGR FY2023–FY2026; five-year organic range 3%–8%	15.8% actual USD; 5% organic; Q1 overlay 1%	Higher growth through rest of FY2027, unquantified	5.8% blended	A 6.5%/4.0% proxy mix produces 5.83%. It treats Q1 as timing but does not extrapolate the 15.8% curren cy/acquisition-influenced print.

The base case assumes FY2027 organic growth recovers from 1% as management expects, but the five-year rate settles near the middle of historical organic outcomes. Financial Services outgrows Verticals because proprietary bureau data and scores attach more directly to recurring lending workflows. The comparable deceleration from TransUnion International's 12.7% growth in 2024 to 5.5% in 2025 demonstrates that a mid-single-digit destination after a stronger year is plausible.

Bull case growth

Product / proxy pool	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM→TTM+5y	Justification
Financial Services proxy	n/m under current taxonomy; regional organic history peaked at 8%	9% global organic; regional total Q1 FY2027 1%	Higher regional growth through rest of FY2027; group 6–8%	9.0%	Ascend proof-of-value converts rapidly, proprietary scores broaden wallet share and credit activity is supportive. The rate holds the global FY2026 Financial Services pace rather than assuming further acceleration.
Verticals proxy	n/m under current taxonomy	7% global organic; regional total Q1 FY2027 1%	No quantified regional product guide	7.0%	Fraud, identity and vertical datasets scale across countries, and common technology reduces delivery friction. The assumption matches global FY2026 organic growth rather than exceeding it.

Product / proxy pool	3-year historical CAGR	Latest YoY	Mgmt FY+1 guide	Bull CAGR TTM→TTM+5y	Justification
EMEA/APAC total	10.6% actual-USD CAGR FY2023–FY2026; five-year organic range 3%–8%	15.8% actual USD; 5% organic; Q1 overlay 1%	Higher growth through rest of FY2027, unquantified	8.5% blended	A 9.0%/7.0% proxy mix produces 8.46%. It requires sustained execution above the historical regional organic peak, partially offset by the conservative exclusion of acquisitions and FX.

The bull case is not based on perpetuating 15.8% actual-USD growth. It requires a specific mix of successful score/Ascend deployment, better software timing, supportive credit demand and vertical cross-sell. The growth path exceeds the historical organic range slightly, so it receives only 15% probability.

Year-by-year revenue path and timing test

Case	TTM 31 Mar 2026	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	Horizon 31 Mar 2031
Bear revenue	US$617.0m	US$625.9m	US$635.0m	US$644.3m	US$653.8m	US$663.5m
Base revenue	US$617.0m	US$652.8m	US$690.8m	US$731.1m	US$773.9m	US$819.2m
Bull revenue	US$617.0m	US$669.1m	US$725.7m	US$787.1m	US$853.8m	US$926.1m

The tables use constant product-pool CAGRs for transparency, but the KPI test is front-loaded. In base and bull, reported organic growth must improve materially after Q1 FY2027; otherwise the FY2027 revenue columns become difficult to reach without acquisitions or FX. Q1's 1% is not multiplied into the full-year model, and it does not move the audited TTM. In bear, the weak start persists enough that later project delivery merely keeps the segment positive.

9. Forward Benchmark EBIT margin assumptions

The current disclosed basis is **Benchmark EBIT**. No corporate/unallocated, acquisition-intangible, exceptional, financing or statutory-bridge adjustment is allocated into this segment. Those lines belong to the central synthesis forecast under the sealed bridge [data_package §3a, rows 178–191].

Product-level Benchmark EBIT margins are not disclosed, so assigning precise margins to the Financial Services and Verticals proxy pools would create false precision. The model instead projects the disclosed regional Benchmark EBIT margin, while explicitly bridging the only quantified component: US$40m ongoing profit less US$10m from exited activities equals US$30m total [data_package §6, row 257].

Case	Current total Benchmark EBIT margin	Exited-activity treatment	Scale / mix mechanism	Horizon Benchmark EBIT margin	Change vs TTM
Bear	4.9%	Loss drag persists and restructuring savings are offset by dis-synergies	Weak revenue cannot absorb local platform, compliance and delivery costs; pricing remains competitive	2.0%	-290 bps
Base	4.9%	Most US$10m drag is removed over the period	Mid-single-digit growth, higher Ascend reuse, repeatable score deployment and country mix lift contribution	11.0%	+610 bps
Bull	4.9%	Exited losses disappear early with limited stranded cost	Strong Financial Services mix, platform utilization and common delivery processes create operating leverage	16.0%	+1,110 bps

Bear mechanism. Revenue reaches only US$663.5m. Fixed local infrastructure, compliance and software-delivery teams do not shrink in line with growth, while exits leave stranded cost. Benchmark EBIT falls to US$13.3m and the margin to 2.0%. This is a stalled recovery, not an assumption that the segment must lose money. It is plausible because FY2022–FY2025 margins were only 0.4%–1.7% [data_package §3, row 120].

Base mechanism. Revenue reaches US$819.2m, US$202.2m above TTM. Removing most of the current US$10m exited loss contributes up to roughly 120–160 basis points depending on timing and revenue growth. Even granting full removal of that drag, horizon Benchmark EBIT of US$90.1m requires US$50.1m of additional ongoing profit above the US$40m starting point, or a 24.8% implied Benchmark EBIT contribution on the US$202.2m revenue increment. Any stranded exit cost raises that hurdle. The mechanism is more queries, scores and platform workloads supported by a cost base that rises more slowly than revenue, but 24.8% is above UK and Ireland's current 23.4% total margin and therefore requires genuinely repeatable delivery rather than one-off software milestones. The 11.0% endpoint is a demanding recovery assumption, not a

mature-bureau margin.

Bull mechanism. Revenue reaches US$926.1m, US$309.1m above TTM. Exited losses disappear, Ascend and proprietary-score delivery becomes repeatable, and Financial Services gains mix. Horizon Benchmark EBIT of US$148.2m requires US$108.2m of profit above the US$40m ongoing starting point, a 35.0% implied contribution on incremental revenue after granting complete removal of the exited loss. That hurdle is roughly North America's current 34.2% total margin and leaves almost no room for continued bespoke delivery or stranded country cost. The 16.0% endpoint remains far below North America's total margin and UK and Ireland's 23.4%, but this comparison alone does not validate it [data_package §3, rows 94–120]. The bull case therefore requires disclosed evidence that software delivery has become repeatable and that ongoing Benchmark EBIT—not merely total profit after exits—is scaling.

The margin trajectory is deliberately staged rather than plugged into the horizon.

Case	TTM margin	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030	Horizon margin
Bear Benchmark EBIT margin	4.9%	3.8%	3.0%	2.5%	2.2%	2.0%
Base Benchmark EBIT margin	4.9%	6.0%	7.2%	8.5%	9.8%	11.0%
Bull Benchmark EBIT margin	4.9%	7.0%	9.5%	12.0%	14.0%	16.0%

The first-year base improvement is larger than the 50bp group guide, which is justified only by the segment-specific exited-loss normalization and low base. It should be judged against disclosed regional profit, not assumed automatically. If ongoing Benchmark EBIT does not rise from US$40m or exited losses remain near US$10m, the base path is off track even if revenue meets expectations.

10. Segment rollup — bottom-up and tied

The rollup compounds each proxy pool exactly five times from 31 March 2026. Revenue is then summed; Benchmark EBIT equals total revenue multiplied by the scenario's disclosed-basis margin. The product-pool allocation is a modeling proxy grounded in the global FY2026 B2B mix, while the segment total is the issuer-reported anchor.

Case	Financial Services proxy TTM	FS CAGR	FS horizon revenue	Verticals proxy TTM	Verticals CAGR	Verticals horizon revenue	Segment horizon revenue
Bear	US$446.4m	2.0%	US$492.9m	US$170.6m	0.0%	US$170.6m	US$663.5m
Base	US$446.4m	6.5%	US$611.7m	US$170.6m	4.0%	US$207.5m	US$819.2m
Bull	US$446.4m	9.0%	US$686.9m	US$170.6m	7.0%	US$239.2m	US$926.1m

Arithmetic tie-out: Bear US$492.9m + US$170.6m = US$663.5m. Base US$611.7m + US$207.5m = US$819.2m. Bull US$686.9m + US$239.2m = US$926.1m. Each difference is under rounding precision and therefore within 1%.

Case	Segment horizon revenue	Exact profit metric	Horizon profit margin	Horizon segment profit	Revenue tie-out	Profit tie-out
Bear	US$663.5m	Benchmark EBIT	2.0%	US$13.3m	US$492.9m + US$170.6m = US$663.5m	US$663.5m × 2.0% = US$13.3m
Base	US$819.2m	Benchmark EBIT	11.0%	US$90.1m	US$611.7m + US$207.5m = US$819.2m	US$819.2m × 11.0% = US$90.1m
Bull	US$926.1m	Benchmark EBIT	16.0%	US$148.2m	US$686.9m + US$239.2m = US$926.1m	US$926.1m × 16.0% = US$148.2m

The probability-weighted horizon revenue is US$788.5m and probability-weighted Benchmark EBIT is US$75.8m using 30% bear, 55% base and 15% bull. Those values are arithmetic expectations, not a fourth scenario and not authority for valuation, ranking, sizing or trading. The weights are deliberately non-uniform: management's expectation of higher post-Q1 growth and the region's 3%–8% organic history support a 55% base weight; the 1% Q1 print, exited-perimeter uncertainty and low disclosed profit base warrant a substantial 30% bear weight; and bull receives only 15% because it requires growth above the historical organic peak plus a 35.0% incremental profit contribution.

11. Key risks and wildcards

[Bear] Software delivery does not recover. Q1 FY2027's 1% growth is management-attributed to timing and a tough comparison. The central near-term test is whether deferred or uneven deliveries become recognized revenue. If growth remains near 1% through the year, the issue is more likely weak conversion or demand than quarterly timing, and the base trajectory should be cut.

[Bear] The margin recovery is perimeter-driven rather than operational. US$40m ongoing profit versus US$30m total shows a US$10m exited-activity drag, but the cost of exits may remain through stranded staff, systems or contracts. If ongoing Benchmark EBIT itself stalls, eliminating exited losses cannot produce 11% total margins.

[Bear] Country heterogeneity overwhelms platform reuse. The segment spans mature and emerging credit markets with different regulation, data availability and customer concentration. Strong Italy, Spain or South East Asia performance can be offset by weakness elsewhere. A regional aggregate can conceal a deteriorating large market until profit is affected.

[Bear] Credit-cycle and customer concentration. Financial Services likely dominates the business based on the global B2B proxy. Lower origination volumes reduce transactional demand, while major banks can delay implementations or negotiate price. The segment's small profit base amplifies any customer or project miss.

[Bear/Base] Regulatory and model-governance cost. European high-risk AI obligations, Australian credit-reporting rules and country-specific privacy regimes require documentation, monitoring, correction and controls. Compliance is an entry barrier but also a recurring cost. A breach, model-bias issue or prohibited use could create remediation expense and delay launches.

[Bear/Base] Data-substitution and modular platforms. Open banking, lender-owned data, alternative-data providers and neutral decisioning platforms may reduce Experian's ability to bundle software with bureau data. The moat holds best where proprietary data improves decisions measurably. It weakens if customers perceive Ascend as replaceable workflow tooling.

[Base/Bull] Proprietary-score expansion. Scores adapted to more geographies can create higher-value revenue from an existing contributor network and deepen workflow embed. The wildcard is conversion evidence: the data package provides no regional customer counts, dollars, renewal rates or price realization.

[Base/Bull] Ascend operating leverage. A common platform can shorten proof-of-value cycles, reuse engineering and lift utilization. If deployments become repeatable, growth can outpace local overhead. If every country still requires extensive customization, revenue may grow without the modeled margin leverage.

[Bull] Verticals broaden faster than modeled. Fraud and identity demand can grow independently of lending volumes, and automotive or other datasets can diversify the customer base. The bull case assumes 7% Verticals growth, equal to FY2026 global organic performance, but a successful fraud/identity cross-sell cycle could exceed it.

[All cases] FX and acquisitions. The historical gap between actual-USD and organic growth is material. The model is built from reported USD TTM dollars but does not separately forecast currency or acquired revenue. Synthesis should handle currency consistently at group level and must not interpret the segment CAGRs as constant-currency guidance. Acquisitions can improve reach but also add integration costs and obscure organic recovery.

Monitoring scoreboard. The base case stays credible if regional growth rises after Q1 FY2027, ongoing Benchmark EBIT advances beyond US$40m, exited losses shrink, and management provides evidence of Ascend/proprietary-score conversion across more countries. It weakens if the 1% growth rate persists, software comparisons repeatedly explain misses, or total Benchmark EBIT remains close to US$30m despite higher revenue.

Summary

Case	Segment TTM+5y Revenue	Exact profit metric	Segment TTM+5y Profit Margin	Segment TTM+5y Profit	Probability
Bear	US$663.5m	Benchmark EBIT	2.0%	US$13.3m	30%
Base	US$819.2m	Benchmark EBIT	11.0%	US$90.1m	55%
Bull	US$926.1m	Benchmark EBIT	16.0%	US$148.2m	15%

The segment is an execution-led recovery, not a mature high-margin bureau in miniature. The data and workflow moat is credible, but the disclosed 4.9% total Benchmark EBIT margin and US$40m ongoing profit show how little has yet been monetized. The base case requires both mid-single-digit revenue growth and more than 600 basis points of margin expansion. That can be earned through exited-loss removal, Ascend reuse, proprietary-score rollout and fixed-cost leverage, but Q1 FY2027's 1% growth makes the next delivery cycle a hard validation point. A stalled recovery returns the segment

toward its FY2022–FY2025 economics; a successful rollout can create meaningful profit because the starting base is so low.

[DATA GAP: EMEA/APAC Financial Services and Verticals historical dollars, organic growth and Benchmark EBIT margins are not separately disclosed. The section 8 allocation is an explicit global-mix proxy, not issuer-reported segment product data.]

[DATA GAP: EMEA/APAC country revenue, country profit, Ascend revenue, proprietary-score revenue, customer counts, implementation backlog, renewals, pricing and segment capex/R&D are not disclosed in the sealed data package.]

[DATA GAP: Revenue and Benchmark EBIT for exited activities are not separately disclosed; only the US$10m difference between US$40m ongoing and US$30m total Benchmark EBIT is provided. Because exited revenue cannot be isolated, all scenario revenue rollups necessarily apply the global B2B mix proxy and growth rates to the full US$617m reported perimeter.]

Appendix S - Synthesis (Combined Earnings Model)

Experian plc — Synthesis (Combined Earnings Model)

This appendix mechanically consolidates the four independently reviewed regional forecasts into one statutory earnings model for Experian plc. It uses the exact reviewed segment endpoints, the QFR-sealed quote packet and statutory bridge, and the explicit historical-to-forecast drivers in `data_package.md` §3a. It does not create a new regional forecast, reclassify an upstream accounting line, or use Q1 FY2027 as a TTM component. Following the independent Red Team's material probability objection, Bear, Base and Bull probabilities are conservatively resealed at **40%, 50% and 10%**. No scenario economics, endpoint, EPS, share count or P/E-15 result changed in this repair. The appendix stops at earnings, security units, capital-structure inputs and the separate P/E 15 entry-price gate. It deliberately does not calculate a security IRR, choose the primary shareholder-return method, score the security, size a position, or authorize a trade.

1. Anchors and sealed controls

- Information date and production date: **24 August 2026**, Singapore time.
- Fiscal year end: **31 March**.
- TTM anchor: **1 April 2025 through 31 March 2026**. This is the latest reproducible four-quarter-equivalent period and is identical to audited FY2026.
- TTM components: the audited FY2026 revenue, operating profit, profit before tax, profit for the year, owner earnings, diluted weighted-average shares, cash flow and regional segment tables. Experian's Q1 FY2027 update contains KPIs but no complete statutory quarter and is therefore an overlay only.
- Latest completed FY for the historical sanity check: **FY2026, year ended 31 March 2026**.
- Horizon: **31 March 2031**, exactly **5.0 calendar years** after the TTM end. Every segment endpoint compounds five times; no line uses a six-year span or substitutes FY2025.
- Security: **Experian plc ordinary share of US$0.10**, `XLON:EXPN`, ISIN `GB00B19NLV48`.
- Price: **2,949 GBX per ordinary share**, raw exchange close for the completed **21 August 2026** session. This is the only price used.
- Quote packet: `quote_packet.json`; QFR-sealed SHA-256 `cdb0921dda20489998d06322e379871886fa8e640bde390b227fdf6212ec13d4`; raw quote SHA-256 `fd45fecc287042fcdc1b85df4e296a7eeface7e7c6fa7b61775059df53ae9f32`; actionability expiry `2026-08-24T23:30:00+08:00`.
- Reporting currency: **USD**. Quote currency: **GBX**. Session-date conversion: **73.30787106611638 GBX per USD**.
- Historical diluted financial shares: **919.0m**. The financial statement share and listed unit are the same ordinary share. Split factor is **1.0**, depositary factor is **1.0**, share-class factor is **1.0**, and financial shares per listed unit are **1.0**. Therefore `919.0m × 1.0 = 919.0m` quote-basis diluted financial shares and `919.0m ÷ (1.0 × 1.0) = 919.0m` listed-unit equivalents.
- No intervening split occurred between 31 March and 21 August 2026. The packet's share, split, class, depositary, price and FX bridge is therefore internally 1:1 except for USD-to-GBX conversion.
- Historical statutory bridge: `statutory_bridge.json`; QFR-sealed and DR-revalidated SHA-256 `791cd96635af149a1dc29b8897a7621a946ad4ebde1282d034719bd7eabf1b6f`. Validator result: `STATUTORY_BRIDGE_VALID`. The gate manifest records `STATUTORY BRIDGE VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING`.
- Gate inputs: all four regional appendices were independently reviewed and cleared; Management is **YELLOW**; Moat is **PASS**; the 2046 durability test is **PASS**. No unresolved issue is recorded in `gate_manifest.json`.

The strict quote validator was run at `2026-08-24T01:30:58+08:00`, before expiry, and reproduced the sealed packet hash. The statutory validator independently reproduced its sealed hash. TTM statutory diluted EPS attributable to owners is `US$1.502bn ÷ 919m = US$1.634385` per ordinary share, or `US$1.634385 × 73.30787106611638 = 119.813300`

GBX. This reconciles to the issuer's rounded USc163.4 diluted EPS and establishes the correct listed-unit basis before any forecast calculation.

2. Segment-level forward assumptions

The following values reproduce the exact reviewed endpoints used in the regional appendices. “Profit” means **Benchmark EBIT**, Experian's issuer-defined segment metric. The product-level work beneath these rows remains in each appendix and is not re-derived here.

Segment	Exact profit metric	TTM revenue US$bn	Bear horizon revenue US$bn	Base horizon revenue US$bn	Bull horizon revenue US$bn	Bear margin	Base margin	Bull margin
North America	Benchmark EBIT	5.587000	6.690000	7.753000	8.621000	29.9%	35.5%	38.9%
Latin America	Benchmark EBIT	1.299000	1.665300	2.057600	2.383300	27.6%	31.4%	33.3%
UK and Ireland	Benchmark EBIT	0.942000	0.949331	1.170112	1.314900	20.893%	24.001%	25.850%
EMEA and Asia Pacific	Benchmark EBIT	0.617000	0.663500	0.819200	0.926100	2.0%	11.0%	16.0%

Sources are `appendix_B_north_america.md` §§8–10, `appendix_B_latin_america.md` §§8–10, `appendix_B_uk_and_ireland.md` §§8–10 and `appendix_B_emea_and_asia_pacific.md` §§8–10. Each appendix explicitly uses the 31 March 2026 TTM anchor and 31 March 2031 horizon. The endpoint Benchmark EBIT amounts reproduced below are the reviewed calculations rather than rounded group-margin re-derivations:

Segment	Bear Benchmark EBIT US$bn	Base Benchmark EBIT US$bn	Bull Benchmark EBIT US$bn	Appendix arithmetic
North America	2.001000	2.753000	3.357000	Product revenues multiplied by product margins; sums to regional result
Latin America	0.460200	0.645400	0.792600	Financial Services, Verticals and Consumer Services product rollup
UK and Ireland	0.198341	0.280835	0.339907	Exact product revenue and product-margin rollup before display rounding
EMEA and Asia Pacific	0.013300	0.090100	0.148200	Total regional revenue multiplied by reviewed regional margin

The most important model concentration remains North America: it represents 66.2% of TTM revenue and 74.7% of regional Benchmark EBIT. Latin America's reviewed model has the fastest base revenue growth but retains material cycle and currency risk. UK and Ireland assumes only modest recovery from a weak B2B base. EMEA and Asia Pacific requires visible margin repair even in Base; it is economically small enough that it cannot compensate for a North American miss.

3. Combined revenue build

Experian reports external revenue by region, and the four segment revenues sum exactly to consolidated revenue. No corporate revenue or intersegment elimination is disclosed in the sealed packet; the forecast therefore uses zero eliminations rather than inventing a residual.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
North America horizon revenue, US$bn	6.690000	7.753000	8.621000
Latin America horizon revenue, US$bn	1.665300	2.057600	2.383300
UK and Ireland horizon revenue, US$bn	0.949331	1.170112	1.314900
EMEA and Asia Pacific horizon revenue, US$bn	0.663500	0.819200	0.926100
Sum of segment horizon revenue, US$bn	9.968131	11.799912	13.245300
Corporate eliminations, US$bn	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
Combined horizon revenue, US$bn	**9.968131**	**11.799912**	**13.245300**
TTM-to-horizon CAGR over exactly 5.0 years	3.371976%	6.919230%	9.418921%

The arithmetic is `combined revenue = North America + Latin America + UK and Ireland + EMEA and Asia Pacific`. Against TTM revenue of US$8.445bn, Bear represents a low-growth but still resilient bureau outcome; Base broadly continues the current 6%–8% organic framework while fading some regional strength; Bull requires broad product adoption, improving credit activity and regional execution simultaneously.

The probability repair in `appendix_red_team.md` is adopted because downside evidence is asymmetric and correlated. Management remains YELLOW over a core regulatory-control matter. North America supplies two-thirds of revenue and roughly three-quarters of regional Benchmark EBIT; Consumer Services begins with breach runoff, while Ascend deployment does not prove incremental workload monetization. Base already misses the P/E-15 gate by 4.18%, and Bull requires simultaneous revenue, margin and dilution success. The prior 30%/55%/15% weighting was therefore too generous. The repaired **40% Bear / 50% Base / 10% Bull** allocation preserves Base as most likely because Moat and 2046 remain PASS, but recognizes correlated control, growth and conversion risks. This calibration repair changes no operating scenario or binary gate and imports no Red Team return calculation.

4. Benchmark EBIT to statutory operating income

The bridge preserves every historical accounting classification in `data_package.md` §3a. Central Activities remain corporate/unallocated. Associate profit is removed from the operating perimeter and reintroduced below operating income. Exceptional items, acquisition-intangible amortisation and impairment, acquisition/disposal expenses, and contingent-consideration marks remain statutory operating adjustments. None is allocated into a region.

Line, US$bn	Bear	Base	Bull
Sum of regional Benchmark EBIT	2.672841	3.769335	4.637707
Central Activities Benchmark EBIT	-0.209331	-0.224198	-0.225170
Consolidated Benchmark EBIT	2.463510	3.545137	4.412537
Remove post-tax associate profit included in Benchmark EBIT	-0.003000	-0.004000	-0.006000
Exceptional items	-0.050000	-0.020000	0.000000
Acquisition-intangible amortisation and impairment	-0.360000	-0.320000	-0.290000
Acquisition and disposal expenses	-0.085000	-0.060000	-0.045000
Contingent-consideration fair-value adjustment	-0.010000	0.000000	0.005000
Total operating bridge adjustments	-0.508000	-0.404000	-0.336000
Combined statutory operating income	**1.955510**	**3.141137**	**4.076537**
Statutory operating margin	**19.6176%**	**26.6200%**	**30.7772%**

The Central Activities rule is exactly the sealed forecast-driver ledger: a cost equal to 2.1% of revenue in Bear, 1.9% in Base and 1.7% in Bull. The resulting amounts are `-2.1% × 9.968131 = -0.209331`, `-1.9% × 11.799912 = -0.224198`, and `-1.7% × 13.245300 = -0.225170`. Base is essentially the current 1.94% revenue burden; Bear reflects control, regulatory and integration costs; Bull reflects scale without assuming the absolute cost disappears.

Associate removal is US$3m, US$4m and US$6m. Each amount is exactly reversed below operating income, preventing double-counting. Exceptional items are a US$50m recurring charge in Bear, a limited US$20m charge in Base and zero in Bull only because Bull assumes no discrete restructuring or disposal event at the horizon. Acquisition-intangible amortisation and impairment is US$360m, US$320m and US$290m. This retains a material statutory charge in all cases; Bear carries higher impairment and acquisition-cadence stress, while Bull does not pretend the acquired asset base becomes costless. Acquisition/disposal expense is US$85m, US$60m and US$45m, matching higher, normalized and lower friction. Contingent consideration is a US$10m loss, zero and a US$5m gain; it is explicitly scenario-specific and never used as a plug.

These are mechanical scenario assumptions anchored to the exact FY2026 bridge, where the same five operating adjustments totaled negative US$352m. They do not alter any segment's reviewed Benchmark EBIT. The Base statutory operating margin rises from 24.2% TTM to 26.6% because North America and EMEA/APAC margins improve, while Central Activities remain proportionate and statutory acquisition charges continue. The difference between Benchmark EBIT and statutory operating income remains visible and material; the synthesis does not value Experian on Benchmark EBIT as though

the charges did not exist.

5. Pretax income, tax, owner earnings and diluted EPS

Finance income and expense are modeled separately. Base horizon net finance expense is US$185m, below management's US$250m–US$260m FY2027 Benchmark net-interest guide because the scenario assumes gradual deleveraging over five years; it is not substituted into the audited TTM. Bear ends at US$235m net finance expense as deleveraging disappoints, and Bull at US$130m as stronger free cash flow reduces debt. The associate amount removed above operating income is reintroduced exactly. Statutory tax rates are 27%, 25% and 24%, bracketing the FY2026 statutory 22.7% rate and management's approximately 26% FY2027 Benchmark tax guide.

Line	Bear	Base	Bull
Combined statutory operating income, US$bn	1.955510	3.141137	4.076537
Finance income, US$bn	0.025000	0.035000	0.050000
Finance expense, US$bn	-0.260000	-0.220000	-0.180000
Share of post-tax associate profit, US$bn	0.003000	0.004000	0.006000
Pretax income, US$bn	**1.723510**	**2.960137**	**3.952537**
Statutory tax rate	27.0%	25.0%	24.0%
Tax charge, US$bn	-0.465348	-0.740034	-0.948609
Profit for the year, US$bn	1.258162	2.220103	3.003928
Less profit attributable to NCI, US$bn	-0.005000	-0.008000	-0.012000
Net income attributable to owners, US$bn	**1.253162**	**2.212103**	**2.991928**
Quote-basis diluted financial shares at horizon, m	889.432730	860.862602	849.986363
USD EPS per quote-basis financial share	1.408946	2.569635	3.519972
Financial shares per listed unit	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
USD EPS per listed unit	1.408946	2.569635	3.519972
FX, GBX per USD	73.307871	73.307871	73.307871
GBX EPS per listed unit	**103.286815**	**188.374457**	**258.041640**

The NCI deduction scales the observed FY2026 difference between US$1.508bn profit for the year and US$1.502bn attributable to owners. It is US$5m in Bear, US$8m in Base and US$12m in Bull. This prevents total group profit from being divided by parent diluted shares. It is small but explicit.

For each scenario the mandatory unit arithmetic is:

`EPS_USD_PER_QUOTE_BASIS_FINANCIAL_SHARE = OWNER_NI_USD ÷ QUOTE_BASIS_DILUTED_FINANCIAL_SHARES`.

`EPS_GBX_PER_LISTED_UNIT = EPS_USD_PER_QUOTE_BASIS_FINANCIAL_SHARE × 1.0 FINANCIAL_SHARE_PER_LISTED_UNIT × 73.30787106611638 GBX_PER_USD`.

For Base, `US$2.212102504bn × 1,000 ÷ 860.862602m = US$2.569634804` per share; `US$2.569634804 × 1.0 × 73.30787106611638 = 188.374456929 GBX`. Bear and Bull reproduce 103.286814796 GBX and 258.041640388 GBX using the same sealed factors. No ADR conversion, second quote, current FX re-fetch or share-class adjustment is used.

5a. Return-method input bridge for Valuation Preflight

This table supplies inputs to the subsequent Valuation Preflight and scoring stages. It does not select the primary method and contains no IRR. Normalized NOPAT here is the mechanical product of statutory operating income and the scenario tax rate. The P/E 15 entry-price gate in §7 is separate from any later terminal valuation method.

Return-method input	Bear	Base	Bull	Source or status
Statutory operating income, US$bn	1.955510	3.141137	4.076537	§4 synthesis bridge
Normalized cash tax rate	27.0%	25.0%	24.0%	Statutory and FY2027 guidance bracket
Normalized NOPAT, US$bn	1.427522	2.355853	3.098168	OI × one minus tax rate
Terminal cash and equivalents	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No source-bound terminal cash schedule upstream
Terminal gross debt	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No maturity-by-scenario schedule upstream
Terminal lease liabilities	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	US$0.133bn TTM known; terminal path absent
Scenario terminal net debt, US$bn	6.000	4.500	3.000	Direct modeled path from US$5.179bn TTM; not an EV plug
Preferred equity	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No complete terminal claim-perimeter path upstream
Minority interest balance	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	Income allocation modeled; terminal balance not supplied
Other senior claims	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No complete terminal claim-perimeter path upstream
Separately valued non-operating assets	0.000	0.000	0.000	None identified for separate valuation in upstream package
Diluted listed-equivalent units, m	889.432730	860.862602	849.986363	§6 share path; 1:1 listed-unit factor

Terminal net debt is a transparent financial-policy diagnostic, not a residual that forces an equity value. Bear rises from US$5.179bn to US$6.0bn amid lower cash conversion and ongoing acquisition/control costs. Base declines to US$4.5bn while capex moves toward management's long-term 7% revenue objective and buybacks continue. Bull falls to US$3.0bn on stronger earnings and conversion. These paths are consistent with the finance-expense ordering in §5. Because terminal cash, gross debt, lease and senior-claim components are not independently source-bound, **EV/NOPAT is not yet eligible to control**. Valuation Preflight must adjudicate method suitability; S does not fill missing claim-perimeter lines with net debt or select P/E by default.

Experian is not a property-and-casualty insurer or reinsurer. The retained-economics, insurer common-equity and `insurer_return_bridge.json` lane is **NOT TRIGGERED**.

6. Explicit diluted-share path

The schedule begins with the packet's 919.0m quote-basis diluted financial shares. It does not use issued shares, ADR units or a stale provider count. FY2026 gross repurchases were US$727m, SBC was US$138m and diluted WANOS declined only from 922m to 919m. Management announced a further up-to-US$1bn repurchase programme through 30 June 2027 and guided FY2027 diluted WANOS to 880m–885m. That guide is a weighted-average KPI overlay and is not mechanically substituted for the 31 March 2026 packet share anchor. The first forecast year applies the announced US$1bn programme; later gross buybacks vary with scenario cash generation. SBC issuance is approximated from the TTM US$138m charge divided by the current US-dollar share price and rounded to 3.5m–4.0m shares annually.

Current price in reporting currency is `2,949 GBX ÷ 73.30787106611638 = US$40.2276`, rounded to US$40.23 for the first-year retirement calculation. Share retirements equal `buyback US$bn × 1,000 ÷ average price US$`.

Case / year	Starting shares m	Buyback US$bn	Average price US$	Shares retired m	SBC issuance m	Ending shares m
Bear FY2027	919.000000	1.000	40.23	24.857072	4.000000	898.142928
Bear FY2028	898.142928	0.250	39.00	6.410256	4.000000	895.732672
Bear FY2029	895.732672	0.250	40.00	6.250000	4.000000	893.482672
Bear FY2030	893.482672	0.250	41.00	6.097561	4.000000	891.385111
Bear FY2031	891.385111	0.250	42.00	5.952381	4.000000	889.432730
Base FY2027	919.000000	1.000	40.23	24.857072	3.500000	897.642928
Base FY2028	897.642928	0.600	43.00	13.953488	3.500000	887.189440

Case / year	Starting shares m	Buyback US$bn	Average price US$	Shares retired m	SBC issuance m	Ending shares m
Base FY2029	887.189440	0.600	46.00	13.043478	3.500000	877.645962
Base FY2030	877.645962	0.600	49.00	12.244898	3.500000	868.901064
Base FY2031	868.901064	0.600	52.00	11.538462	3.500000	860.862602
Bull FY2027	919.000000	1.000	40.23	24.857072	3.500000	897.642928
Bull FY2028	897.642928	0.800	45.00	17.777778	3.500000	883.365150
Bull FY2029	883.365150	0.800	50.00	16.000000	3.500000	870.865150
Bull FY2030	870.865150	0.800	55.00	14.545455	3.500000	859.819696
Bull FY2031	859.819696	0.800	60.00	13.333333	3.500000	849.986363

The cumulative formulas close exactly before rounding. Bear: `919.000000 + 20.000000 SBC - 49.567270 retirements = 889.432730`. Base: `919.000000 + 17.500000 - 75.637398 = 860.862602`. Bull: `919.000000 + 17.500000 - 86.513637 = 849.986363`. The base model therefore assumes a 6.3% net reduction over five years, much less aggressive than applying the FY2027 announced programme repeatedly. This reflects Management Appendix §3's finding that historical gross repurchases produced only modest net contraction after employee-plan delivery.

Capex provides a cash-allocation cross-check rather than an EPS plug. Applying terminal capex intensities of 8.5%, 7.5% and 7.0% to scenario revenue gives roughly US$0.847bn, US$0.885bn and US$0.927bn. Base is between FY2026's 8.6% and management's long-term 7% goal. The buyback path remains a scenario assumption, not a promise or authority to trade.

7. P/E 15 entry-price test

The ER2 gate asks whether the **Base** horizon statutory diluted EPS, translated onto the same listed-unit and currency basis as the sealed quote, supports the current price at 15 times. Required EPS is `2,949 GBX ÷ 15 = 196.600000 GBX` per ordinary share. Cushion is `(EPS × 15 - 2,949) ÷ 2,949`.

Case	Horizon EPS, GBX per listed unit	EPS × 15, GBX	Packet price, GBX	Cushion	Pass?
Bear	103.286815	1,549.302222	2,949.000000	-47.46%	FAIL
Base	188.374457	2,825.616854	2,949.000000	**-4.18%**	**FAIL**
Bull	258.041640	3,870.624606	2,949.000000	31.25%	PASS

P/E 15 gate: FAIL — base-case cushion -4.18%. Base EPS is 8.225543 GBX, or 4.18%, below the 196.60 GBX required earnings level. The Bull case passes, but Bull cannot rescue the binary gate because Base is the confident case. This gate is an entry-price test only; it is not a selected exit multiple, terminal valuation or shareholder-return calculation.

The narrowness is decision-relevant. Base would cross the gate with a combination such as a two-percentage-point increase in North America revenue CAGR, materially lower dilution, a lower effective tax rate, or improved statutory conversion. None of those should be inserted merely to make the gate pass. The reviewed regional endpoints and explicit statutory bridge are kept intact, so the correct result is a near miss rather than a tuned PASS.

8. Reflexivity and historical anchor checks

The starting regional revenue sum is `US$5.587bn + US$1.299bn + US$0.942bn + US$0.617bn = US$8.445bn`, exactly equal to consolidated TTM revenue. The gap is US$0.000bn and 0.000%. No revenue elimination or allocation plug exists.

The starting regional Benchmark EBIT sum is `US$1.912bn + US$0.399bn + US$0.220bn + US$0.030bn = US$2.561bn`. Adding Central Activities of negative US$0.164bn produces US$2.397bn consolidated Benchmark EBIT. Applying the exact sealed operating bridge — negative US$4m associate removal, negative US$20m exceptional items, negative US$271m acquisition-intangible amortisation/impairment, negative US$59m acquisition/disposal costs and positive US$2m contingent-consideration adjustment — produces `US$2.045bn` statutory operating income. The residual is zero.

The same date window is both TTM and FY2026, so the latest-FY sanity check reproduces identical arithmetic. Statutory operating income is 24.2% of revenue, within rounding of `2.045 ÷ 8.445 = 24.2155%`. Finance income US$34m, finance expense negative US$132m and associate profit US$4m reach pretax income US$1.951bn; tax of US$443m reaches profit for the year US$1.508bn; NCI of US$6m reaches US$1.502bn owner earnings. There is no discrepancy for synthesis to repair.

The forward model is reflexive in the intended sense: it begins at the audited regional totals, carries the same exact profit metric through each segment appendix, consolidates it, and then uses the same classified statutory lines. It does not allocate statutory amortisation into region margins or use reported Benchmark EPS as a substitute for statutory owner earnings. The main modeled risk is economic — especially North American growth/margin and statutory conversion — rather than a hidden accounting residual.

9. Latest interim bridge reconciliation

NOT TRIGGERED — the TTM is the complete audited FY2026 window, 1 April 2025 through 31 March 2026. It is not built from four provider-labelled quarters, overlapping half-year records, or a cumulative interim formula. The audited complete-year revenue US$8.445bn, operating income US$2.045bn, pretax income US$1.951bn, profit for the year US$1.508bn, owner earnings US$1.502bn and 919m diluted weighted-average shares are direct controlling values.

Q1 FY2027, covering April–June 2026, is used only to test the first forward year's plausibility. Experian did not disclose complete revenue dollars, statutory operating income, net income or diluted shares for that quarter. Inserting Q1 KPI growth into the TTM would mix a post-anchor period with FY2026, produce overlap and violate the sealed window. No such insertion occurs.

10. Sensitivity — variables that move the verdict

Each sensitivity starts from Base and changes one variable while holding the other Base inputs fixed. North America revenue CAGR is varied by ±200 basis points around the reviewed 6.7722% segment CAGR, with its 35.5% terminal Benchmark EBIT margin held fixed. Latin America terminal Benchmark EBIT margin is varied by ±200 basis points around 31.4%. Shares are varied by ±5% around 860.862602m. Tax is varied by ±300 basis points around 25%. The statutory bridge, FX and listed-unit factor remain unchanged.

Sensitivity	Down case EPS GBX	Base EPS GBX	Up case EPS GBX	Down impact	Up impact	P/E 15 implication
North America revenue CAGR -/+ 200 bps	173.365176	188.374457	204.551453	-15.009281	+16.176996	Down fails; up passes
Latin America Benchmark EBIT margin -/+ 200 bps	185.746193	188.374457	191.002721	-2.628264	+2.628264	Both remain below required EPS
Diluted shares -/+ 5%	198.288902	188.374457	179.404245	+9.914445	-8.970212	5% fewer shares pass; 5% more fail
Tax rate -/+ 300 bps	195.936685	188.374457	180.812229	+7.562228	-7.562228	Lower tax nearly passes; higher fails

For the North America calculation, a 4.7722% CAGR produces US$7.053573bn terminal revenue and a 8.7722% CAGR produces US$8.506842bn, versus US$7.753bn Base. Holding North America's 35.5% Benchmark EBIT margin and Base Central Activities' 1.9% revenue cost means each revenue delta contributes 33.6% to statutory operating income before tax. That is why the segment's growth rate dominates the result.

The second-largest mechanical driver is diluted share count. Base needs 196.6 GBX, and a 5% lower terminal count produces 198.29 GBX without changing owner earnings; a 5% higher count reduces EPS to 179.40 GBX. This highlights the distinction between gross repurchase announcements and durable net share reduction after SBC. Tax matters, but even a 22% rate only reaches 195.94 GBX, still slightly below the gate. Latin America margin is less decisive because the region is only about 17% of Base horizon revenue.

The most important kill/trigger variables are therefore: (1) North America sustaining reviewed mid-to-high-single-digit growth while preserving statutory conversion, and (2) the announced buyback programme producing net share reduction after employee-plan issuance. EMEA/APAC recovery matters to confidence but is too small to drive the gate by itself. The Management YELLOW issue is not explicitly monetized as a one-off; its potential cost is represented in Bear Central Activities, exceptional items and North American downside, avoiding false precision around unresolved litigation.

11. Combined earnings summary

Case	Revenue US$bn	Statutory OI US$bn	OI margin	Owner NI US$bn	EPS GBX per listed unit	Probability	EPS × 15 GBX	Versus 2,949 GBX
Bear	9.968131	1.955510	19.62%	1.253162	103.286815	40%	1,549.302222	-47.46%
Base	11.799912	3.141137	26.62%	2.212103	188.374457	50%	2,825.616854	-4.18%
Bull	13.245300	4.076537	30.78%	2.991928	258.041640	10%	3,870.624606	31.25%

Case	Revenue US$bn	Statutory OI US$bn	OI margin	Owner NI US$bn	EPS GBX per listed unit	Probability	EPS × 15 GBX	Versus 2,949 GBX
Probability-weighted earnings	11.211738	2.760426	24.62%	1.906509	161.306118	100%	2,419.591776	-17.95%

Probability-weighted EPS is `40% × 103.286814796 + 50% × 188.374456929 + 10% × 258.041640388 = 161.306118421 GBX`. Probability-weighted revenue is `40% × 9.968131 + 50% × 11.799912 + 10% × 13.245300 = US$11.2117384bn`; operating income is US$2.760426126bn; owner net income is US$1.906509049bn. The weighted OI margin is `2.760426126 ÷ 11.2117384 = 24.620857%`. These are arithmetic expectations, not a fourth scenario or security-return estimates. Scenario probabilities sum exactly to 100%.

The Base scenario is coherent with the reviewed evidence: revenue compounds at 6.92% from the audited TTM, statutory operating margin rises 241 basis points, owner earnings grow from US$1.502bn to US$2.212bn, and net buybacks reduce diluted shares by 6.3%. This produces a 9.5% EPS CAGR in quote currency with constant FX. That is a respectable compounder outcome but is not enough to meet the framework's 15-times five-year-forward entry-price bar at 2,949 GBX. The conclusion is valuation-sensitive without being dependent on a security IRR, exit multiple or portfolio context.

12. Tie-out checks

Check 1 — Reported financial and statutory bridge: PASS

TTM and latest completed FY are identical. Revenue: `5.587 + 1.299 + 0.942 + 0.617 = 8.445`, exactly matching consolidated revenue. Segment Benchmark EBIT: `1.912 + 0.399 + 0.220 + 0.030 = 2.561`. Corporate and operating bridge: `2.561 - 0.164 - 0.004 - 0.020 - 0.271 - 0.059 + 0.002 = 2.045`, exactly matching statutory operating income. Below-line and tax: `2.045 + 0.034 - 0.132 + 0.004 = 1.951`; `1.951 - 0.443 = 1.508`. All sealed residuals are zero and inside the US$1.2805m packet tolerance. Source: `quant_foundation.md` P4, `data_package.md` §§2–3a and `statutory_bridge.json`.

Check 2 — NI / shares / listed unit / FX equals EPS: PASS

Bear: `US$1.25316248177bn × 1,000 ÷ 889.432729825m × 1.0 × 73.3078710661 = 103.286814796 GBX`. Base: `US$2.212102504bn × 1,000 ÷ 860.862602032m × 1.0 × 73.3078710661 = 188.374456929 GBX`. Bull: `US$2.991928044bn × 1,000 ÷ 849.986362506m × 1.0 × 73.3078710661 = 258.041640388 GBX`. All reproduce §5 at full displayed precision. NCI is deducted before dividing by parent shares.

Check 3 — Segment sum at horizon: PASS

Bear: `6.690000 + 1.665300 + 0.949331 + 0.663500 = 9.968131`; combined divided by segment sum is 100.000%. Base: `7.753000 + 2.057600 + 1.170112 + 0.819200 = 11.799912`; 100.000%. Bull: `8.621000 + 2.383300 + 1.314900 + 0.926100 = 13.245300`; 100.000%. Corporate eliminations are explicitly zero because all four starting lines are external revenue and tie exactly to consolidated revenue.

Check 4 — Product-to-segment rollups: PASS

North America reviewed product endpoints sum to 6.690bn, 7.753bn and 8.621bn in Bear/Base/Bull; the appendix reports differences below 1%. Latin America product endpoints sum to 1.6653bn, 2.0576bn and 2.3833bn, within 0.1% display rounding. UK and Ireland exact sums are 0.949331bn, 1.170112bn and 1.314900bn. EMEA/APAC proxy-pool sums are 0.6635bn, 0.8192bn and 0.9261bn. Every reviewed segment appendix was independently cleared with no unresolved issue in `gate_manifest.json`.

Check 5 — Weighted segment margins: PASS

North America, Latin America and UK/Ireland each compute Benchmark EBIT by product revenue times product margin and sum the products. Examples: Base North America `1.729 + 0.395 + 0.629 = 2.753bn`, or 35.5% of 7.753bn; Base Latin America `0.4448 + 0.0748 + 0.1258 = 0.6454bn`, or 31.4% of 2.0576bn; Base UK/Ireland exact product profit is `0.207183 + 0.025562 + 0.048090 = 0.280835bn`, or 24.001%. EMEA/APAC deliberately does not fabricate undisclosed product margins; its reviewed regional margin is directly applied to the additive product-proxy revenue, giving `0.8192 × 11.0% = 0.0901bn` after rounding. The appropriate single-margin calculation passes and no mixed profit basis appears.

Check 6 — Share count and security-unit path: PASS

Starting financial-statement diluted shares `919m × 1.0 split factor = 919m` quote-basis financial shares. `919m ÷ (1.0 depositary × 1.0 class factor) = 919m` listed-unit equivalents. Bear closes at `919 + 20.000000 - 49.567270 = 889.432730m`; Base at `919 + 17.500000 - 75.637398 = 860.862602m`; Bull at `919 + 17.500000 - 86.513637 = 849.986363m`. Every annual ending count becomes the next annual starting count. The schedule is in ordinary financial shares, never ADR units.

Check 7 — Growth plausibility: PASS

North America's Base 6.77% segment CAGR is below 1.2 times its disclosed 9.5% recent CAGR, a ceiling of 11.4%. Latin America's 9.6% is below 1.2 times its 11.1% disclosed CAGR, a ceiling of 13.3%. UK/Ireland's 4.4% is below 1.2 times 6.3%, a ceiling of 7.6%. EMEA/APAC's 5.8% is below 1.2 times 10.6%, a ceiling of 12.7%. Product rows without a comparable disclosed history are supported and bounded in their reviewed appendices by management KPIs and primary peer trajectories. No unjustified exception is required.

Check 8 — Historical and forward compounding arithmetic: PASS

Every regional appendix compounds from 31 March 2026 to 31 March 2031 exactly five times. UK/Ireland examples: `687 × 1.045^5 = 856.1`, `98 × 1.03^5 = 113.6`, and `157 × 1.05^5 = 200.4`, within 0.1% of reviewed endpoints. EMEA/APAC: `446.4 × 1.065^5 = 611.7` and `170.6 × 1.04^5 = 207.5`, within display rounding. North America and Latin America use explicit five-year annual cadences whose products reproduce their reviewed endpoints; rounded CAGR labels are summaries rather than substitute drivers. The maximum disclosed endpoint discrepancy is below 1%.

Check 9 — Recency anchor: PASS

Base first-forward-year regional revenue is approximately US$5.968145bn North America, US$1.451355bn Latin America, US$0.983700bn UK/Ireland and US$0.652800bn EMEA/APAC, totaling US$9.056000bn. Versus US$8.445bn TTM, implied first-year growth is `(9.056000 ÷ 8.445000) - 1 = 7.2351%`. This is within 10% of the TTM run-rate and inside management's 6%–8% FY2027 group organic range before the roughly 1% acquisition and 1%–2% FX overlays. Q1 FY2027 regional KPIs are used only as plausibility evidence.

Check 10 — Period and horizon integrity: PASS

The TTM uses a single complete audited window, 1 April 2025 through 31 March 2026. No overlapping YTD, half-year or provider-quarter records enter it. Q1 FY2027 ends 30 June 2026 and remains outside. Horizon date 31 March 2031 is exactly five calendar years after 31 March 2026. Each regional appendix states those dates and applies five compounding periods. No row uses six fiscal years or anchors on FY2025.

Check 11 — Valuation, unit bridge, hashes and probabilities: PASS

The exact quote-packet bytes hash to `cdb0921dda20489998d06322e379871886fa8e640bde390b227fdf6212ec13d4`; the raw quote evidence hash is `fd45fecc287042fcdc1b85df4e296a7eeface7e7c6fa7b61775059df53ae9f32`; the statutory bridge hashes to `791cd96635af149a1dc29b8897a7621a946ad4ebde1282d034719bd7eabf1b6f`. The listing, ordinary-share identity, 1.0 split, 1.0 class/depositary factors and 73.3078710661 GBX/USD FX reproduce all unit conversions. Scenario probabilities are `40% + 50% + 10% = 100%`. Weighted EPS is 161.306118421 GBX. The weighted P/E-15 value is `161.306118421 × 15 = 2,419.591776 GBX`, or 17.952127% below the packet price; this weighted diagnostic does not control the binary gate. Scenario EPS times 15 remains 1,549.302222, 2,825.616854 and 3,870.624606 GBX. Base cushion remains `(2,825.616854 - 2,949) ÷ 2,949 = -4.183898%`, so Base still controls a binary FAIL.

SYNTHESIS CLEARED — 11/11 TIE-OUTS PASSED.

The arithmetic model is publication-ready for Valuation Preflight. The separate P/E 15 entry-price gate is **FAIL with a -4.18% Base cushion**. No security IRR has been calculated, and no return method, score, verdict, portfolio action, sizing or trade authority is implied.

Appendix CS - Compounder Score

Experian plc — Compounder Score

Analysis date: 24 August 2026 Security: Experian plc ordinary share, XLON:EXPN, ISIN GB00B19NLV48 Reporting currency: USD; listed and return currency: GBX Exact underwriting horizon: 31 March 2026 to 31 March 2031, 5.0 years Sealed price: 2,949 GBX at the 21 August 2026 completed LSE close

1. Executive Verdict

Compounder Score: 57/100. Business Quality Score: 56/80. 20% Return Underwriting Score: 1/20. Score-implied classification: Reject. This is a diagnostic classification, not an instruction to sell, short, rank, size, replace another holding, or trade.

The evidence supports a durable data-and-decisioning franchise. Experian has proprietary bureau records, identity resolution, embedded client workflows, high strategic-account renewal, pricing power, and attractive regional margins. The Moat gate is PASS and the 2046 durability test is PASS. Five-year revenue rose from US$6.288bn in FY2022 to US$8.445bn in FY2026, statutory operating income rose from US$1.416bn to US$2.045bn, post-tax ROCE improved from 15.7% to 17.2%, and five-year average core FCF / normalized statutory NOPAT was about 104.5%.

The evidence does not support paying any price for that quality. The independently sealed valuation preflight locks **Primary valuation method: P/E** and Bear/Base/Bull exit P/Es of 20x/22x/25x. Reported current P/E is 24.613294x, but it is explicitly non-comparable because temporary breach-support revenue and profitability cannot be quantified or removed; normalized current P/E is therefore unavailable. With source-bound ordinary-dividend paths, gross GBX annualized shareholder returns are **-4.688271% Bear, 8.521977% Base, and 18.091128% Bull**. Probability-weighted terminal wealth is **3,824.482919 GBX per share**, producing a **5.336671% probability-weighted gross annualized IRR** as a wealth CAGR, not an arithmetic average of scenario IRRs. No scenario clears the 20% local-currency hurdle.

This rerun resolves three material discrepancies identified after Red Team review. Scenario probabilities are now 40% Bear / 50% Base / 10% Bull rather than 30% / 55% / 15%, without changing scenario operating economics. The revised preflight does not treat the raw current P/E as a normalized anchor or cap and independently reseals exit P/Es at 20x / 22x / 25x. The net-SGD overlay no longer correlates terminal FX with operating outcomes; one constant source-bound GBP/SGD conversion is applied to all three scenarios.

The quality score is capped because acquisition-inclusive incremental returns are weak on the only reproducible conservative proxy. From FY2022 to FY2026, the increase in normalized statutory NOPAT divided by FY2023-FY2026 gross capex plus cash acquisitions is about 9.0%; using all five years of spending lowers the diagnostic to 7.2%. These are deliberately conservative because gross capex is not reduced for depreciation and the numerator does not isolate organic profit, but the source set does not disclose enough acquired-versus-organic NOPAT or working-capital detail to justify a higher ROIIC. Experian spent US$3.357bn on cash acquisitions across FY2022-FY2026, while goodwill plus other intangibles reached US$10.339bn against US$5.545bn of parent equity. Management discusses integration and synergies more clearly than deal-level cash returns.

Management is YELLOW. Long CEO/CFO tenure, sound guidance delivery, meaningful ownership, and disciplined leverage are positives. The unresolved CFPB litigation over dispute investigation and credit-file controls is a core-trust risk, and management's dismissive public response was not commensurate with that risk. Gross repurchase optics also need discipline: US$1.413bn of five-year gross purchases reduced diluted weighted-average shares only from 921m to 919m. FY2026's US$725m executed repurchases included about US$216m that offset employee-plan delivery; the modeled benefit is therefore recognized only through the sealed diluted-share path, never as an added distribution.

2. Data Source Map

Evidence need	Controlling source	Period / use
Price and exact listed unit	`quote_packet.json`; archived live FMP quote	2,949 GBX, 21 August 2026; XLON ordinary share, 1:1 listed-unit bridge
Market capitalization and enterprise-value diagnostic	`quote_packet.json`; `quant_foundation.md` P6	Model-implied diluted market cap and current net debt
Income statement and EPS	`quant_foundation.md`; `statutory_bridge.json`; FY2026 Annual Report	Audited FY2022-FY2026; FY2026 is exact TTM

Evidence need	Controlling source	Period / use
Balance sheet and claims	`data_package.md` §8; `quant_foundation.md` P6	Cash, deposits, borrowings, leases, net debt, goodwill, intangibles
Cash flow and dividends	`data_package.md` §§2 and 7; FY2026 Annual Report	OCF, capex, FCF, acquisitions, repurchases, dividends
Diluted shares and SBC	`quote_packet.json`; `appendix_synthesis.md` §6; `appendix_management.md` §4	919m current diluted shares and scenario terminal share paths
Segments and runway	Four reviewed `appendix_B_*.md` files	North America, Latin America, UK/Ireland, EMEA/APAC
Management and allocation	`appendix_management.md`	Management YELLOW; incentives, M&A, buybacks, regulation
Moat, competitors and 2046	`appendix_moat.md`; segment appendices	Moat PASS; 2046 PASS; Equifax, TransUnion, FICO and platform risks
Forecast and statutory conversion	`appendix_synthesis.md`	11/11 tie-outs; exact terminal EPS and diluted shares
Valuation method and multiples	`valuation_preflight.json`	CLEARED 5/5; method, denominator and multiple lock
Source provenance	`source_manifest.json`	Forty verified source entries and archived raw evidence
Entry tax reserve	[GOV.UK share-purchase tax guidance](https://www.gov.uk/tax-buy-shares/overview)	0.5% SDRT is reserved diagnostically for an electronic UK-register purchase
SGD conversion anchor	[Federal Reserve DEXSIUS via FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXSIUS) plus sealed GBP/USD	1.2783 SGD/USD on 14 August 2026 and 1.36411 USD/GBP imply 1.743741813 SGD/GBP

The FX observation precedes the equity quote by one week and is used only as a diagnostic starting conversion. It is not execution pricing. The sealed equity quote and USD-to-GBX conversion remain controlling for the local-currency security model.

3. Key Financial and Quality Metrics

The table uses normalized statutory NOPAT equal to statutory operating income times a 25% normalized cash-tax reserve. Experian's reported post-tax ROCE is the most reproducible invested-capital return because the source set does not provide enough detail to reconstruct a clean organic invested-capital series. “Five-year history” means FY2022-FY2026, which contains four CAGR intervals. Ten-year fields are not supportable from the verified packet and are not extrapolated.

Metric	1 year	3 years	FY2022-FY2026 history	10 years	Assessment
Revenue CAGR	12.26%	8.46%	7.65%	Insufficient evidence	Healthy, acquisition- and FX-influenced
Normalized statutory NOPAT CAGR	14.05%	17.36%	9.62%	Insufficient evidence	Volatile statutory conversion
Core FCF CAGR	11.74%	11.55%	4.09%	Insufficient evidence	Cash growth trails revenue over full history
Post-tax ROCE	17.2%	16.9% average	16.6% median	Insufficient evidence	Good, not elite under the rubric
Acquisition-inclusive ROIIC proxy	n/m	n/m	9.0% / 7.2% sensitivity	Insufficient evidence	Gross-spend proxy; conservative but reproducible
FCF / normalized NOPAT	98.65%	95.49% average	104.55% average	Insufficient evidence	Strong multi-year cash conversion
Diluted-share CAGR	-0.33%	-0.07%	-0.05%	Insufficient evidence	Minimal net reduction despite gross purchases

Current valuation and capital quality diagnostics are: model-implied diluted market capitalization **£27.101bn / US$36.969bn**, enterprise value **US$42.148bn** using current net debt, EV / normalized NOPAT **27.48x**, core FCF yield **4.09%**, ordinary dividend yield **1.72%**, FY2026 SBC / revenue **1.63%**, SBC / core FCF **9.12%**, gross buyback yield **1.97%**, and estimated net buyback yield **1.38%** after the employee-plan offset disclosed in the management appendix. Latest gross reinvestment plus acquisitions / normalized NOPAT is about 92.5%; the five-year aggregate is 105.7%. Those high ratios do not establish high ROIIC because acquisition-inclusive incremental profit has not risen proportionately to gross investment.

4. Rubric Scorecard

Category	Score	Maximum	Evidence-based reason
Incremental returns on capital	13	25	16.6% median ROCE and strong conversion, but acquisition-inclusive ROIIC proxy is only about 7%-9% and organic ROIIC is not disclosed
Reinvestment runway	17	20	Strong organic growth opportunities across credit, fraud, identity, health, verification and Latin America; scale record is proven
Durability of moat	13	15	Bureau network, embedded workflows and regulated trust are durable; AI distribution, open data and regulation remain real risks
Accounting and financial quality	6	10	Cash supports earnings, but Benchmark adjustments, acquisition charges, negative tangible book, leverage and unresolved control allegations constrain credit
Capital allocation	7	10	Strategic adjacency and reasonable leverage are positives; deal-return disclosure and buyback netting are not best-in-class
Price and 20% underwriting	1	20	Base return is 8.52%, Bear loses value, Bull misses 20%, and denominator comparability is unavailable
Total	**57**	**100**	**Reject under the diagnostic thresholds**

Subscore detail: normalized ROIC 3/5; ROIIC 0/8; ROIIC stability 2/3; unit economics 3/3; cash conversion 3/3; accounting-artifact control 2/3. Runway scores 4/5, 4/5, 4/4, 3/3, 2/2 and 0/1. Moat scores 4/4, 3/3, 3/3, 2/2, 1/2 and 0/1. Accounting scores 1/2, 2/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/1 and 0/1. Capital allocation scores 2/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/1 and 1/1. Valuation scores 0/6, 0/4, 0/3, 0/3, 0/2 and 1/2. The exit-multiple score is zero because the revised preflight establishes that no normalized current P/E is source-bound; the rubric explicitly assigns zero when denominator comparability is unavailable, even though VP independently justified the terminal multiples.

5. ROIIC and Reinvestment Analysis

The evidence supports stable aggregate returns, not a high-confidence high-ROIIC claim. Reported post-tax ROCE rose from 15.7% in FY2022 to 17.2% in FY2026, with a 16.6% five-year median. That clears an ordinary cost-of-capital test and shows growth has not destroyed aggregate value. It does not satisfy the rubric's high-ROIIC requirement by itself because ROCE is a level, not an incremental return, and it uses Benchmark EBIT after Benchmark tax rather than statutory NOPAT.

The conservative acquisition-inclusive proxy is `(FY2026 normalized statutory NOPAT − FY2022 normalized statutory NOPAT) / (FY2023-FY2026 gross capex + cash acquisitions)`. Normalized statutory NOPAT rises from US$1.062bn to US$1.534bn, a US$0.472bn increase. FY2023-FY2026 capex plus cash acquisitions totals US$5.265bn, producing **8.96%**. Including FY2022 spending in the denominator gives **7.25%**. This is not a pure economic ROIIC: gross capex is not net of depreciation, working-capital changes are not included, acquisitions enter at cash cost, and organic/acquired profit is not split. Those limitations make the proxy conservative, but they do not authorize substituting management's ROCE or excluding US$3.357bn of acquisitions. The defensible conclusion is `organic ROIIC: insufficient evidence` and `acquisition-inclusive ROIIC: low on the reproducible proxy`.

Cash conversion is the counterweight. Core FCF was US$1.289bn, US$1.090bn, US$1.107bn, US$1.354bn and US$1.513bn across FY2022-FY2026. Against normalized statutory NOPAT, conversion averaged about 104.5% and ended at 98.7%. Earnings are therefore not merely accounting profits. However, cash generation was allocated across high capex, substantial M&A, dividends and repurchases, so excellent cash conversion does not prove that each reinvested dollar earned an excellent incremental return.

6. Runway Analysis

North America remains the core: 66.2% of FY2026 revenue and a 34.2% Benchmark EBIT margin. Its credit, identity, fraud, verification, health, automotive and consumer platforms can deepen within existing workflows. Latin America adds a distinct runway: FY2022-FY2026 revenue rose from US$791m to US$1.299bn and Benchmark EBIT from US$223m to US$399m.

UK/Ireland has stabilized, while EMEA/APAC offers recovery optionality from a low margin base rather than a proven high-return engine.

The runway score does not rely on management TAM. It rests on actual regional growth, strategic-account renewals, expanding data sets, Ascend adoption, consumer membership and adjacent acquisitions. The constraints are equally important. North America Consumer Services faces a temporary breach-support contract roll-off. EMEA/APAC has delivery-timing volatility. Consumer distribution may migrate toward LLMs or agents that own the interface. Continued growth requires heavy cloud, data-quality, cyber, privacy and product investment. The company has room to reinvest, but the low acquisition-inclusive ROIIC proxy prevents assuming all runway converts into exceptional per-share value.

7. Moat Analysis

Experian's moat can be explained in one paragraph. Lenders and enterprises contribute records to a regulated bureau network; decades of linked outcomes improve identity resolution, fraud detection and risk prediction; regulated trust and production integration make replacement costly; decisioning tools embed Experian into daily workflows; and the consumer platform adds permissioned data and distribution. A new entrant can copy software features, but it cannot quickly reproduce the simultaneous combination of contributor access, historical outcomes, identity graph, compliance credibility, and approved client integrations.

The moat is observable rather than rhetorical. North American strategic accounts due for renewal reportedly renewed at 100%, with longer contracts and double-digit value uplift. Regional margins remained strong through multiple cycles. The moat is not uniform: Consumer Services faces platform dependency, EMEA/APAC remains subscale, open-data rules can commoditize raw records, and regulators can impair economics if data-quality controls fail. AI is more likely to improve decisioning and fraud products than erase proprietary data immediately, but an agent or hyperscaler could capture distribution economics. This supports Moat PASS and 2046 PASS while denying a perfect durability score.

8. Accounting and Capital Allocation Analysis

Experian's statutory bridge is clean and fully reconciled, but the difference between Benchmark and statutory profit is economically meaningful. FY2026 retained US$271m of acquisition-intangible amortization and impairment, US$59m of acquisition/disposal expenses, US$20m of exceptional items and a small contingent-consideration gain. The terminal model also retains material acquisition charges in every scenario. This is the right treatment: active acquisition economics are not costless.

SBC is a real cost. The FY2026 US$138m charge equals 1.63% of revenue and 9.12% of core FCF. The ratio to revenue has declined, but gross buybacks obscure dilution. The forecast explicitly issues 20.0m/17.5m/17.5m shares for SBC in Bear/Base/Bull while separately modeling retirements, leading to terminal diluted shares of 889.432729825m, 860.862602032m and 849.986362506m. No gross repurchase amount is treated as shareholder cash.

Balance-sheet risk is manageable but not trivial. At 31 March 2026 Experian had US$328m of cash excluding overdrafts, US$3m of term deposits, US$5.565bn of gross borrowings including US$133m of leases, US$5.179bn of net debt, 1.7x net debt / Benchmark EBITDA, and US$2.510bn of undrawn committed facilities. Net debt rose while the group acquired businesses and repurchased shares. Negative tangible parent book of US$4.794bn raises the cost of acquisition mistakes. The covenant was met, and recurring cash flows make equity wipeout unlikely in the modeled stress, but leverage deserves monitoring.

9. 20% Return Underwriting

The mandatory valuation gate is clear. `valuation_preflight.json` SHA-256 is `b9f88221cbfcbe220c958ba54eb6d6880324bd714223ed5d68260fd7a60a142c`. The repaired synthesis SHA-256 is `ab29409529de16562ab09373972b7e13293e54e78bb89e5252c81dd005e4e4e3`. The local validator returned `VALUATION_PREFLIGHT_VALID` with evidence-file checking. Status is CLEARED, all five foundations pass, blockers are empty, and the controlling inputs are reproduced exactly.

PRIMARY_VALUATION_METHOD = PE. Primary valuation method: P/E. Current reported statutory diluted EPS is **119.813300 GBX**, and the reported current P/E is **24.61329418353388x**. It is disclosure only: temporary breach-support contract economics are embedded in TTM earnings, their size and margin are undisclosed, and no source-bound normalized current EPS or P/E can be calculated. `current_vs_terminal_denominator_comparable=false`; normalized current P/E is `null`; the raw current multiple is not an anchor or cap. Terminal statutory diluted EPS is **103.286814796 / 188.374456929 / 258.041640388 GBX**, and exit P/E is **20x / 22x / 25x**. EV/NOPAT is rejected because terminal

claim-perimeter paths are incomplete. P/B-ROE is rejected because Experian is not balance-sheet-led, tangible parent book is negative, and no zero-residual common-equity roll-forward exists.

The distribution path begins with the FY2026 full-year ordinary dividend of 69.25 US cents per share, translated at the sealed 73.30787106611638 GBX/USD rate to 50.765700713 GBX. Bear freezes the dividend for five payments; Base grows it 5% annually; Bull grows it 8% annually. Those rates are below or consistent with the 7.3% five-year CAGR in aggregate dividends paid and FY2026's 11% DPS increase. Specials are zero. Buybacks are excluded from distributions because they are already reflected in diluted shares.

Scenario	Probability	Current price GBX	Horizon	Terminal EPS GBX	Exit P/E	Terminal equity/share GBX	Cumulative distributions/share GBX	Terminal wealth/share GBX	Diluted shares m	Gross GBX IRR
Bear	40%	2,949.000000	5.0 years	103.286814796	20.0x	2,065.736295920	253.828503566	2,319.564799486	889.432729825	**-4.688271%**
Base	50%	2,949.000000	5.0 years	188.374456929	22.0x	4,144.238052438	294.538169404	4,438.776221842	860.862602032	**8.521977%**
Bull	10%	2,949.000000	5.0 years	258.041640388	25.0x	6,451.041009700	321.647877223	6,772.688886923	849.986362506	**18.091128%**

Probability-weighted gross terminal wealth is `40% × 2,319.564799486 + 50% × 4,438.776221842 + 10% × 6,772.688886923 = 3,824.482919408` GBX. Its CAGR is **5.336671%**. It is not the arithmetic average of scenario IRRs.

The three operating-and-return bridges below use US$bn for revenue and statutory operating income, millions for diluted shares, and GBX per listed share for EPS, dividends and value. They show gross local-currency underwriting; net-SGD adjustments appear afterward.

Bear-case operating and return bridge

Bear case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	US$8.445bn	US$9.968131bn	3.37%	Contract runoff, weaker North America and slower regional growth
Operating margin	24.22%	19.62%	-4.60pp	Higher central/control costs and weaker statutory conversion
Operating earnings	US$2.045bn	US$1.955510bn	-0.89%	Statutory operating income after acquisition and exceptional charges
Diluted share count	919.000m	889.432730m	-0.65%	49.567m retirements partly offset by 20.000m SBC issuance
EPS	119.813300 GBX	103.286815 GBX	-2.92%	Statutory diluted owner EPS on exact listed-unit basis
Valuation denominator	Reported EPS includes unquantified breach support	Terminal statutory diluted EPS	Not comparable	Normalized current EPS/P-E unavailable; raw 24.613x P/E is disclosure only
Valuation	Reported 24.613x P/E; not an anchor	20.000x P/E	Comparison not meaningful	VP-sealed stressed positive-EPS franchise multiple
Share value	2,949.00 GBX current price	2,065.736296 GBX	-6.88% CAGR	103.286814796 GBX EPS times 20x; no cash/debt adjustment
Annual dividend	50.765701 GBX	50.765701 GBX	0.00%	FY2026 DPS frozen; no special distributions
Dividend yield	1.72%	2.46%	+0.74pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	253.828504 GBX	Cumulative	Five equal ordinary-dividend payments counted once
Total ending value	2,949.00 GBX	2,319.564799 GBX	**-4.688271% gross GBX IRR**	Terminal share value plus cumulative dividends

Base-case operating and return bridge

Base case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	US$8.445bn	US$11.799912bn	6.92%	Reviewed regional mid-single-to-high-single-digit growth cadence
Operating margin	24.22%	26.62%	+2.40pp	North America and EMEA/APAC improvement with statutory charges retained
Operating earnings	US$2.045bn	US$3.141137bn	8.96%	Statutory operating income, not Benchmark EBIT
Diluted share count	919.000m	860.862602m	-1.30%	75.637m retirements partly offset by 17.500m SBC issuance
EPS	119.813300 GBX	188.374457 GBX	9.47%	Statutory diluted owner EPS on exact listed-unit basis
Valuation denominator	Reported EPS includes unquantified breach support	Terminal statutory diluted EPS	Not comparable	Normalized current EPS/P-E unavailable; raw 24.613x P/E is disclosure only
Valuation	Reported 24.613x P/E; not an anchor	22.000x P/E	Comparison not meaningful	VP-sealed multiple near low end of historical reported range
Share value	2,949.00 GBX current price	4,144.238052 GBX	7.04% CAGR	188.374456929 GBX EPS times 22x; no cash/debt adjustment
Annual dividend	50.765701 GBX	64.791328 GBX	5.00%	DPS grows below Base EPS and historical aggregate dividend growth
Dividend yield	1.72%	1.56%	-0.16pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	294.538169 GBX	Cumulative	Five modeled ordinary-dividend payments counted once
Total ending value	2,949.00 GBX	4,438.776222 GBX	**8.521977% gross GBX IRR**	Terminal share value plus cumulative dividends

Bull-case operating and return bridge

Bull case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Revenue	US$8.445bn	US$13.245300bn	9.42%	Strong North America, Latin America and adjacency execution
Operating margin	24.22%	30.78%	+6.56pp	Scale, mix and conversion gains with acquisition charges retained
Operating earnings	US$2.045bn	US$4.076537bn	14.79%	Statutory operating income after the full terminal bridge
Diluted share count	919.000m	849.986363m	-1.55%	86.514m retirements partly offset by 17.500m SBC issuance
EPS	119.813300 GBX	258.041640 GBX	16.58%	Statutory diluted owner EPS on exact listed-unit basis
Valuation denominator	Reported EPS includes unquantified breach support	Terminal statutory diluted EPS	Not comparable	Normalized current EPS/P-E unavailable; raw 24.613x P/E is disclosure only
Valuation	Reported 24.613x P/E; not an anchor	25.000x P/E	Comparison not meaningful	VP-sealed quality-growth midpoint, below 32.708x historical reported median
Share value	2,949.00 GBX current price	6,451.041010 GBX	16.95% CAGR	258.041640388 GBX EPS times 25x; no cash/debt adjustment
Annual dividend	50.765701 GBX	74.591469 GBX	8.00%	DPS growth remains below Bull EPS growth
Dividend yield	1.72%	1.16%	-0.56pp	Annual dividend divided by endpoint share value
Five-year dividends	-	321.647877 GBX	Cumulative	Five modeled ordinary-dividend payments counted once

Bull case	Start (2026-03-31)	Horizon (2031-03-31)	CAGR / change	Justification
Total ending value	2,949.00 GBX	6,772.688887 GBX	**18.091128% gross GBX IRR**	Terminal share value plus cumulative dividends

Capital-structure disclosure	Current / TTM	Bear terminal	Base terminal	Bull terminal	P/E treatment
Cash excluding overdrafts, US$bn	0.328	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	Finance income is inside EPS; no cash add
Term deposits, US$bn	0.003	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	No separate value
Gross debt incl. leases, US$bn	5.565	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	Finance expense is inside EPS; no debt subtraction
Lease liabilities, US$bn	0.133	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	Embedded in current borrowings; no second subtraction
Net debt diagnostic, US$bn	5.179	6.000	4.500	3.000	Context only; never an equity-value plug

Method and double-count controls all pass: one P/E method controls all scenarios, expected wealth, reverse return and net-SGD; EPS times P/E is the complete terminal equity value per share; no terminal cash is added and no debt, lease, NCI or acquisition claim is subtracted; finance income/expense and NCI are already in statutory owner EPS; dividends are counted once; buybacks and SBC appear only in diluted shares; no special dividend, non-operating asset or net-debt release is added; current and terminal share denominators are exact; scenario multiples are independently sealed; and probability-weighted IRRs annualize weighted wealth.

The 20% reverse hurdle is demanding. At the Base 22x exit P/E and Base distributions, 20% requires terminal wealth of **7,338.055680 GBX**, terminal equity value of **7,043.517511 GBX**, terminal EPS of **320.159886845 GBX**, and EPS CAGR of **21.722924%** from 119.813300 GBX. The Base model delivers 188.374456929 GBX and 9.472087% EPS CAGR; Bull delivers 258.041640388 GBX and 16.583463% EPS CAGR. Base maximum buy price for a 20% return is **1,783.844611 GBX**, 39.5% below the sealed price.

Net-SGD diagnostic

The net-SGD overlay uses exactly the same P/E values, shares, distributions and probabilities. Entry GBP/SGD is 1.743741813, derived from sealed 1.36411 USD/GBP and the Federal Reserve's 1.2783 SGD/USD observation. **The same constant 1.743741813 SGD/GBP is used at the horizon in Bear, Base and Bull.** There is no scenario-correlated FX forecast and no FX contribution to relative return. Entry cost is 0.65%, consisting of a conservative 0.50% SDRT reserve plus 0.15% broker/spread/FX reserve. Exit cost is 0.15%. UK dividend withholding is modeled at 0%, while 10% of forecast distributions is withheld as a timing, reinvestment and conversion reserve. No Singapore capital-gains tax, treaty benefit, tax wrapper or broker-specific rebate is assumed. These are diagnostics, not personal tax advice.

Net-SGD scenario	Probability	Entry SGD outlay/share	Exit GBP/SGD	Net terminal SGD wealth/share	Net-SGD IRR
Bear	40%	51.757195215	1.743741813	39.950578252	**-5.05%**
Base	50%	51.757195215	1.743741813	76.778801227	**8.21%**
Bull	10%	51.757195215	1.743741813	117.368602884	**17.79%**

Probability-weighted net terminal wealth is **SGD66.106492202 per share**, and the CAGR of that wealth against SGD51.757195215 of entry outlay is **5.02%**. This is the eighth mandatory finite IRR and is not an arithmetic average. Full precision is retained in `compounder_score.json`; all visible net-SGD IRRs are intentionally shown to exactly two decimals.

10. Hard Veto Checklist

#	Test	Status	Evidence
1	ROIIC below cost with no credible improvement path	Watch	Conservative acquisition-inclusive proxy is 7%-9%; organic ROIIC is unavailable, but ROCE and cash conversion remain healthy
2	High ROIC caused by tiny or negative invested capital	Pass	Issuer ROCE uses capital employed; negative tangible book is disclosed rather than used to inflate a custom ratio

#	Test	Status	Evidence
3	Growth requires persistent external financing	Pass	Cash generation is strong and leverage is 1.7x, though acquisitions increased net debt
4	Material share growth without value creation	Pass	Historical diluted shares are nearly flat; forecast models SBC issuance explicitly
5	Large acquisitions without return disclosure	Watch	US$3.357bn five-year cash M&A; strategic fit is visible but deal-level cash returns are incomplete
6	Structural FCF lag	Pass	Five-year average FCF / normalized NOPAT is about 104.5%
7	Regulation, platform or leverage can permanently impair equity	Watch	CFPB litigation, open data, AI distribution and cyber/data-quality risks are material
8	20% case requires multiple expansion	Fail	No normalized current comparator exists, so no-expansion cannot clear; even Bull at 25x earns only 18.09%
9	Flawless execution needed to justify today's price	Fail	Base earns 8.52%; the P/E-15 gate fails by 4.183898%; Bull remains below 20%
10	Moat cannot be explained	Pass	Bureau data network, identity graph, regulatory trust and workflow embedding form a coherent moat
11	Accounting or governance impairs trust	Watch	Statutory bridge is clean, but the unresolved CFPB control matter keeps Management YELLOW
12	Balance-sheet risk can wipe out equity in downturn	Pass	Leverage and liquidity are manageable; no source-bound insolvency path is present

11. Final Decision

Final score-implied classification: Reject. Experian is a good business whose acquisition-inclusive incremental-return evidence and current security return do not earn an investable-now result under this demanding rubric. Business Quality of 56/80 is below the 65/80 threshold, ROIIC plus runway is 30/45 versus the required 35/45, valuation is only 1/20, Base gross return is 8.52%, Bear loses 4.69% annually, and no local-currency scenario reaches 20%. Management YELLOW, the P/E-15 gate failure of -4.183898%, unavailable normalized current P/E, and the gap between gross repurchases and net share reduction reinforce the classification.

Compounder Score note: **57/100 — durable data-network quality is outweighed by weak acquisition-inclusive ROIIC evidence, unavailable multiple comparability and insufficient return at the sealed price.**

Business Quality Score note: **56/80 — moat, runway and cash conversion are strong, but ROIIC proof, acquisition transparency, balance-sheet quality and governance cap the score.**

20% Return UW Score note: **1/20 — Base gross GBX IRR is 8.52%, weighted gross IRR is 5.34%, and Bull at 25x reaches only 18.09%.**

Portfolio context may constrain fit and sizing, but it cannot alter these net-SGD or gross security returns. No portfolio holdings, covariance, factor budget or owner mandate was supplied to this scorer. No ranking, replacement, sizing, portfolio mutation, message, memo, dashboard, finish action or trade is authorized.

12. Machine-Readable JSON

The companion `compounder_score.json` contains full-precision inputs, all eight finite IRRs, scenario and probability-weighted wealth, current and terminal capital-structure disclosures, exit-multiple integrity, score detail, hard-veto statuses and authority boundaries. Controlling snapshot:


```
{"preflight_sha256":"b9f88221cbfcbe220c958ba54eb6d6880324bd714223ed5d68260fd7a60a142c","primary_valuation_method":"PE",
```

Appendix CSA - Scoring Audit

Experian plc - Independent Scoring Audit

Ticker: EXPN.L **Analysis date:** 2026-08-24 **Auditor role:** CSA, independent Production ER2 scoring auditor **Blocker status:** CLEARED FOR DOWNSTREAM RED TEAM; no VP/CS handoff blocker. The normal post-CSA Red Team gate remains pending.

1. Original vs Audited Scores

The repaired score inputs are authentic. `appendix_compounder_score.md` hashes to `9ec1e9171fd21156930262149f35d07b5a924add1e530bc31883ff76dc515d58`; `compounder_score.json` hashes to `b74e1afff15cd1a1b40da586c90b73827a3e6c915860cf3be96ca11226164c55`. The revised mandatory valuation preflight hashes to `b9f88221cbfcbe220c958ba54eb6d6880324bd714223ed5d68260fd7a60a142c`. The repository validator, run with `--check-evidence-files` and the expected hash, returned `VALUATION_PREFLIGHT_VALID`; the artifact says `CLEARED`, passes all five foundations, and contains zero blockers. CS copied the preflight path, hash, P/E method, unavailable normalized-current denominator, capital-structure treatments and 20x/22x/25x exits exactly.

Item	Original	Audited	Notes
Business Quality Score / 80	56/80	54/80	Remove unsupported ROIIC-trend points
Valuation / 20% Return UW Score / 20	1/20	1/20	Repaired CS correctly sets 6B to zero because comparability is unavailable
Total Score / 100	57/100	55/100	One preserved rubric correction; return arithmetic is unchanged
Classification	Reject	Reject	Below 70, hard vetoes remain, and 20% is not plausible at the locked Base inputs

Original and audited classifications agree. This is **neither a dream business nor a dream investment** under this rubric. Experian has a real moat and good cash conversion, but the evidence does not establish high incremental returns on the acquisition-inclusive capital deployed, and the current price does not underwrite a 20% return.

2. Score Reductions and Reasons

- **Category 1C, ROIIC not deteriorating sharply: 2/3 to 0/3.** CS itself reports both three-year and five-year ROIIC as `null` and labels organic ROIIC `INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE`. A stable-to-rising five-year ROCE level is useful corroboration, but ROCE is not an incremental-return time series. The evidence therefore cannot establish the direction of ROIIC. The audit rules prohibit awarding points without evidence.
- **Prior Category 6B finding preserved as repaired: 0/4.** The repaired CS removed the former three points. Because temporary breach-support economics cannot be quantified out of TTM EPS, normalized-current P/E is unavailable and the no-expansion test cannot clear. The locked Base bridge still produces only 8.521977%, and at the same EPS and distributions a 20% return would require a 37.391043x exit P/E. That comparison cannot be called a percentage expansion from a comparable current multiple because no comparable normalized-current multiple exists.

No other score reduction is warranted. The remaining runway, moat, accounting and capital-allocation points have source-bound evidence and already contain appropriate deductions for acquisition opacity, negative tangible book, dilution, governance and AI/open-data risk.

3. Unsupported Claims

The only score-bearing unsupported claim is ROIIC trend. Historical post-tax ROCE of 15.7%, 16.5%, 17.0%, 16.6% and 17.2% supports a stable level return, not a three-to-five-year incremental-return direction. The acquisition-inclusive ROIIC proxy is an endpoint calculation, not a trend series.

CS also labels `material_red_team_objection_status` as `RESOLVED_WITH_LOW_VALUATION_SCORE_AND_REJECT_CLASSIFICATION`. That is procedurally unsupported because

the downstream Red Team artifact does not yet exist, and a low score cannot resolve a material valuation objection. The audited status is `PENDING_POST_CSA_RT`. This is not a current CSA handoff blocker; it is the normal next gate and must be resolved before publication.

4. Calculation Errors

The repaired security-return arithmetic contains no error. The remaining score application error is the unsupported Category 1C award; Category 6B is now correctly scored at zero.

Locked anchor and denominator replay

The exact quote packet confirms XLON:EXPN ordinary shares, a 1:1 listed-unit bridge, 919.0m diluted shares, a 21 August 2026 completed close of **2,949 GBX**, and 73.30787106611638 GBX per USD. FY2026 owner income of US$1.502bn divided by 919m shares and translated at that FX gives approximately 119.813300 GBX per share. `2,949 / 119.813300 = 24.613294x`, but that reported P/E is disclosure only and non-comparable.

The repaired preflight correctly concludes that normalized-current EPS and P/E are **unavailable**. Reported FY2026 EPS contains temporary breach-support contract revenue of undisclosed amount and profitability, while terminal EPS excludes that economics through the forecast cadence. Not carrying the contract forward does not remove it from the current denominator. Current and terminal denominators are therefore not comparable, and the raw 24.613294x current P/E cannot anchor or cap exits. The provider history was still replayed as market capitalization divided by audited owner income: FY2022-FY2026 reported P/Es are 30.407x, 38.929x, 32.708x, 36.433x and 20.873x. These reported historical values are explicitly used with maturity and confidence haircuts, not relabeled as normalized comparables.

The repaired exits are economically defensible and were selected before returns without using raw current P/E. Bear 20x is around the reconstructed 20.873x reported historical floor and avoids double-charging an already adverse EPS path. Base 22x is near the low end of a sealed 20.9x-25x maturity-adjusted range. Bull 25x is the midpoint of the sealed 23x-28x quality-growth range and below the 32.708x reported historical median. The optimism test challenges Bull's favorable 9.42% revenue CAGR, 30.78% statutory margin, net buybacks, lower diagnostic debt and 25x exit; its reduced 10% probability, lowered exit and explicit statutory acquisition costs keep it bounded. The bearishness test challenges Bear's EPS decline, 19.62% margin, US$6.0bn diagnostic net debt and 20x exit; positive EPS, a frozen dividend and non-zero equity make it adverse without being a disguised bankruptcy. Both directional tests pass, subject to RT recheck.

Distribution, dilution and P/E bridge replay

The FY2026 annual report independently confirms ordinary dividends of 69.25 US cents per share. Translation gives 50.765700713 GBX. Five Bear payments frozen at that level total 253.828503566 GBX. Five Base payments grown 5% from the anchor total 294.538169404 GBX. Five Bull payments grown 8% total 321.647877223 GBX. Special dividends are zero. Buybacks are excluded from distributions and enter only through diluted shares.

The share paths reconcile exactly: Bear `919.0 + 20.0 SBC issuance - 49.567270175 retirements = 889.432729825m`; Base `919.0 + 17.5 - 75.637397968 = 860.862602032m`; Bull `919.0 + 17.5 - 86.513637494 = 849.986362506m`. FY2026 SBC of US$138m is treated as a real expense and equals 1.63% of revenue and 9.12% of core FCF. Gross repurchases of US$1.413bn over five years reduced diluted shares only from 921m to 919m, supporting the score's capital-allocation caution.

Under the locked P/E method, terminal equity per share equals terminal statutory diluted EPS times exit P/E, with no subsequent cash or debt adjustment. Bear is `103.286814796 x 20 = 2,065.736295920 GBX`; Base is `188.374456929 x 22 = 4,144.238052438 GBX`; Bull is `258.041640388 x 25 = 6,451.041009700 GBX`. Adding distributions once gives wealth of 2,319.564799486, 4,438.776221842 and 6,772.688886923 GBX.

All eight finite audited returns

Return	Bear	Base	Bull	Probability-weighted
Gross local GBX IRR	-4.688271%	8.521977%	18.091128%	5.336671%
Net-SGD diagnostic IRR	-5.046612%	8.206692%	17.792121%	5.015807%

The gross probability-weighted result is not an arithmetic IRR average. Repaired probabilities of 40%/50%/10% produce expected terminal wealth of 3,824.482919408 GBX, whose five-year CAGR from 2,949 GBX is 5.336671%. The net-SGD overlay preserves the same P/E, EPS, share, distribution and probability inputs. Entry outlay is SGD51.757195215 after the

0.65% entry-cost reserve. Source-bound FX is held constant at 1.743741813 SGD/GBP in every scenario, removing the former unsupported return-correlated FX bet. Equity bears a 0.15% exit cost, and distributions bear a 10% timing/reinvestment/conversion reserve. Net terminal wealth replays to SGD39.950578252, SGD76.778801227 and SGD117.368602884; weighted wealth is SGD66.106492202, yielding 5.015807%.

Current capital structure is also verified: cash excluding overdrafts is US$328m, term deposits US$3m, gross borrowings US$5.565bn including US$133m of leases, and issuer net debt US$5.179bn. The net-debt bridge reconciles from negative US$5.234bn of statement captions plus US$31m accrued interest exclusion, US$66m derivative assets and negative US$42m derivative liabilities. These values are context only under P/E and are not counted again.

5. Missing Data

The most important missing evidence is an organic-versus-acquired NOPAT and net-reinvestment bridge. The acquisition-inclusive proxy is reproducible: normalized statutory NOPAT rises from US$1.062bn to US$1.53375bn; FY2023-FY2026 gross capex plus cash acquisitions totals US$5.265bn; ROIIC is 8.960114%. Including FY2022 spend gives 7.247657%. This correctly includes material acquisitions, but it is not a clean organic ROIIC and cannot support trend points.

Other non-blocking gaps are no ten-year verified packet, no source-bound terminal cash/debt/lease schedules for EV/NOPAT, limited deal-level cash-return disclosure, and no investor-specific broker, tax-wrapper, withholding-recovery or FX-hedge facts. The net-SGD figures therefore remain diagnostics.

6. Hard-Veto and Threshold Test Audit

Acquisition-inclusive ROIIC is below a high-compounder standard; large acquisitions lack complete deal-return disclosure; regulatory and platform risks remain Watch; and Management remains **YELLOW** because the unresolved CFPB matter reaches core consumer-data controls. Moat and the 2046 durability test remain **PASS** on proprietary bureau data, identity resolution, embedded workflows, regulatory trust and observed renewal/pricing evidence. The P/E-at-15 gate remains **FAIL**: Base terminal EPS of 188.374456929 GBX is below the 196.600000 GBX requirement, a negative 4.183898% cushion.

Thresholds fail decisively: 55/100 is below 80/100 and below the 70-point Reject boundary; 54/80 is below 65/80; 1/20 is below 15/20; ROIIC plus runway is 28/45, below 35/45; Base return is below 20%; Bear is negative; and no-expansion cannot clear because comparable normalized-current P/E is unavailable.

7. Final 20% Hurdle Pass/Fail

FAIL. At the locked Base 22x P/E, 20% requires terminal EPS of 320.159886845 GBX and 21.722924% EPS CAGR versus modeled Base EPS of 188.374456929 GBX and 9.472087% CAGR. The maximum buy price for a 20% Base return is 1,783.844611 GBX. Bull at the repaired 25x exit returns only 18.091128%; no scenario clears 20%.

8. Dream Business / Dream Investment Classification

Neither. Experian is a good, durable business, but not a demonstrated dream business under a framework requiring exceptional acquisition-inclusive incremental returns. At 2,949 GBX it is not a dream investment because the Base and probability-weighted returns are far below 20%, Bear destroys value, and Bull only approaches the hurdle.

9. Stage 7 Scorecard Notes

- Compounder Score note: **55/100 - durable data-network quality does not overcome unsupported ROIIC trend points and inadequate return at the sealed price.**
- Business Quality Score note: **54/80 - moat, runway and cash conversion are solid, but acquisition-inclusive ROIIC is low and its trend is unproven.**
- 20% Return UW Score note: **1/20 - Base earns 8.52%, weighted gross earns 5.34%, Bull earns 18.09%, and no-expansion cannot clear without a normalized comparator.**

10. Auditor JSON

The companion `compounder_score_audit.json` contains the full-precision audited bridge, score changes, all eight finite IRRs, preflight validation, denominator and exit-multiple controls, discrepancies, confidence and authority boundaries.

Appendix RT - Red Team

Experian plc — Independent Red Team

Ticker: EXPN.L **Assessment date:** 24 August 2026 **Locked Valuation Preflight SHA-256:** `b9f88221cbfcbe220c958ba54eb6d6880324bd714223ed5d68260fd7a60a142c` — independently hash-matched **Primary valuation method:** P/E **Audited exit P/Es:** Bear 20x / Base 22x / Bull 25x **Repaired probabilities:** Bear 40% / Base 50% / Bull 10% **RETURN_MODEL_OBJECTION_STATUS: MATERIAL_RESOLVED**

This appendix challenges the sealed analysis; it does not replace it. All alternative calculations below are explicitly non-controlling sensitivities. The audited scores, scenario returns, probabilities, method and exit multiples remain unchanged.

1. The most fragile assumption

The model's weakest gate is **North America revenue growth**, specifically the Base line that compounds the region at **6.7722%** to US$7.753bn, led by Financial Services at 7.6% and followed by Consumer Services at 5.3%. North America supplies 66.2% of current revenue and 74.7% of regional Benchmark EBIT, so this is not one assumption among many; it is the earnings model. The Financial Services cadence begins at 9%, then fades only to 6.5%, although all ten largest strategic customers are already live on Ascend. That logo milestone proves deployment, not additional workload, incremental revenue, switching exclusivity or economic return. TransUnion's OneTru and Equifax's cloud/data assets demonstrate that major peers are investing against the same workflow opportunity. FICO's 27% Scores growth, driven largely by B2B unit pricing, further shows that a supplier can capture value that Experian might otherwise retain.

The adjacent Consumer Services assumption compounds the fragility. Reported Q1 growth was negative 2%, versus 3% excluding breach runoff, yet Base assumes 2% in FY2027 followed by 5.5%, 6.0%, 6.5% and 6.5%. That reacceleration requires marketplace supply, subscriptions and conversion to strengthen after a temporary contract disappears, while AI assistants and other comparison channels can own the interface. The segment appendix correctly labels this as a requirement. The repaired group model gives Base 50% probability and Bear 40%, a more defensible recognition that the workload and conversion bridge remains undisclosed.

The synthesis sensitivity quantifies the consequence. If North America revenue CAGR is **200 basis points lower**, at 4.7722%, Base EPS falls from **188.374457 GBX to 173.365176 GBX**, a **15.009281 GBX or 8.0%** reduction. The P/E-15 gate moves further below the required 196.600000 GBX. This one miss overwhelms plausible help from Latin America margin, tax or EMEA/APAC because North America is the profit pool. The assumption is therefore fragile both evidentially and mechanically.

2. Most-likely-to-be-optimistic Stage 5 number

The single Stage 5 number most likely to be revised down is the **11.0% Base FY2031 EMEA/APAC Benchmark EBIT margin**, up from 4.9%. It is not the largest valuation driver, but it has the weakest direct proof. The model itself calculates that, after granting removal of the US$10m exited-activity drag, the segment still needs US$50.1m of additional ongoing profit on US$202.2m of incremental revenue: a **24.8% contribution margin**. Q1 FY2027 regional growth was only 1%, product mix is an allocation based on the global B2B mix rather than regional disclosure, and management's claim that growth will improve later in the year is unquantified. A 24.8% incremental contribution is especially demanding in a fragmented, subscale region requiring country-specific regulation and software delivery.

A non-controlling sensitivity reducing the endpoint to 8% would remove about US$24.6m of Benchmark EBIT, roughly US$18.4m after a 25% tax assumption, or approximately 1.57 GBX of Base EPS. That is not enough by itself to change the conclusion. Its importance is diagnostic: it demonstrates that the model's most optimistic-looking operating number is not its most dangerous valuation assumption. The dangerous assumption remains North America.

3. Strongest bear case

A well-informed short seller would argue that Experian is being valued as a growing platform while becoming a regulated, multi-sourced data utility. Over the next two to four quarters, temporary breach-support revenue disappears, US lenders and consumers stay selective, FICO and other data suppliers take more price, and Ascend proves to be a necessary defensive technology refresh rather than incremental monetization. At the same time, dispute-resolution, privacy, model-governance and security spending rise because the CFPB case attacks the accuracy-and-correction processes at the core of the trust

moat. The combination hits North American Financial Services, Consumer Services and statutory conversion together: organic growth falls below 5%, Consumer Services fails to reaccelerate, and the North America Benchmark EBIT margin retreats toward 31% rather than expanding to 35.5%.

The observable anchor is not customer logos. It is North America organic revenue growth and segment margin after the breach comparison has cleared. Experian can renew as one bureau in a multi-bureau stack while losing the marginal workload and pricing economics. If growth weakens despite all ten large clients being live, the platform thesis has failed its cleanest test.

4. Cross-examination of management

First, Brian Cassin said on 16 July 2026 that Experian had a good start and saw “accelerating potential” across AI-enabled opportunities. “Potential” is not booked revenue. The chain discloses neither Ascend workload growth, deployed recurring revenue, incremental gross margin nor retention uplift attributable to AI. The earliest contradiction would be North America Financial Services falling below 6% organic growth after the initial 13% Q1 overlay, or strategic-client usage failing to broaden beyond launch status.

Second, Lloyd Pitchford's 20 May 2026 expectation of **6%–8% FY2027 organic revenue growth** is a legitimate near-term anchor, but it is not a five-year promise. Q1 already contained divergent economics: North America Financial Services at 13%, North America Consumer Services at negative 2% including breach runoff, and EMEA/APAC at 1%. If group organic growth prints below 6% in two successive updates after temporary comparisons normalize, the repaired 50% Base weight would still need to migrate toward Bear; historical guidance delivery cannot preserve it automatically.

Third, Cassin's November 2025 claim that enhanced platforms and AI had transformed customer experiences and internal processes is not yet supported by a return bridge. Capex was still 8.6% of revenue in FY2026, organic ROIIC is unavailable, and the acquisition-inclusive incremental return proxy is only **7.25%–8.96%**. If capex remains around or above 8% while statutory margin fails to progress, “transformation” will have described activity rather than economic productivity.

The separate CFPB posture intensifies this challenge. Management's earlier “not worried at all” response was too dismissive for allegations involving reinvestigation, correction and reinsertion of disputed credit-file information. The Management gate is correctly **YELLOW**. The first evidence of a false assurance would be an adverse finding, another similar control failure, or remediation expense without measurable dispute-process KPIs. The Moat and 2046 gates can remain PASS while management's stewardship of a specific core control remains unresolved; those conclusions are not contradictory.

5. Stage 5 tie-out and model mechanics

The recency anchor is arithmetically sound: the TTM is the complete audited year to 31 March 2026, not a stitched quarterly series, and Q1 FY2027 is correctly used only as a forward check. The danger is economic recency. A complete FY2026 number can still be stale when Consumer Services includes an expiring breach contract and Q1 reported growth is negative 2%. The model handles the first-year revenue cadence, but the valuation denominator treatment does not fully resolve this issue.

The Base diluted-share path falls from 919.0m to **860.862602m**, funded by US$1.0bn of first-year repurchases and US$0.6bn in each of four later years, partly offset by 3.5m annual SBC shares. The announced US$1bn programme supports year one; the later US$2.4bn is a model assumption. Historical evidence is less persuasive: US$1.413bn of five-year gross repurchases reduced diluted shares only from 921m to 919m, and FY2026 SBC was US$138m. A non-controlling flat-919m sensitivity, holding Base owner income and distributions fixed, lowers Base EPS to about **176.46 GBX** and Base gross IRR from 8.521977% to about **7.21%**, a 1.31 percentage-point reduction. This is meaningful but below the materiality threshold by itself.

The Base dividend path grows the FY2026 ordinary dividend 5% annually to cumulative distributions of 294.538169 GBX. The annual report supports the starting dividend, not the scenario growth rate. Freezing it at the Bear total of 253.828504 GBX would lower Base gross IRR by only about **0.20 percentage points**, so distributions do not rescue or break the thesis. Buybacks are correctly excluded from distributions and enter only through share count.

Cash and debt are method-consistent under P/E: finance income and expense affect statutory EPS, and no terminal cash or debt is added again. Current cash and term deposits are US$0.331bn, gross borrowings US$5.565bn including US$0.133bn leases, and net debt US$5.179bn. The weak point is forecast support, not double counting. Base net finance expense falls to US$185m from FY2027 Benchmark guidance of US$250m–US$260m while the model also funds substantial repurchases and capex. No source-bound maturity, refinancing-rate or gross-debt schedule proves that decline. The finance line should remain a monitored forecast risk, although its likely EPS effect is smaller than North America growth.

6. Score-derived 20% claim

The audited score does **not** claim a 20% return is plausible, and the red team agrees. The audited result is **55/100 total, 54/80 quality and 1/20 return underwriting: Reject**. At locked Base EPS and distributions, a 20% return requires a **37.391043x** exit P/E. Comparison with a normalized-current P/E is now correctly unavailable; the raw reported 24.613294x P/E contains unquantified temporary breach-support economics and is non-comparable. Alternatively, Base terminal EPS would need to reach **320.159887 GBX**, a 21.722924% CAGR, or the entry price would need to be **1,783.844611 GBX**. Even repaired Bull earns only 18.091128% gross local.

The claim most likely to be wrong is therefore not a hidden 20% assertion; it is any narrative that treats moat PASS as sufficient for premium-return plausibility. It is not. Acquisition-inclusive ROIIC of roughly 7%–9%, absent organic ROIIC trend evidence, explains why the audited quality score is not higher. The auditor's two reductions are sound. Any residual scoring uncertainty is far too small to lift 55 to 70, much less 80, so the Reject classification survives.

7. Two-sided valuation challenge

The independently replayed audited gross GBX returns are **Bear -4.688271%, Base 8.521977%, Bull 18.091128%, probability-weighted 5.336671%**. Terminal wealth is 2,319.564799 GBX, 4,438.776222 GBX and 6,772.688887 GBX; 40%/50%/10% produces expected wealth of 3,824.482919 GBX, whose five-year CAGR from 2,949 GBX is 5.336671%. The constant-FX net-SGD diagnostics are **Bear -5.046612%, Base 8.206692%, Bull 17.792121%, probability-weighted 5.015807%**. Entry outlay is SGD51.757195 per share, expected terminal net wealth is SGD66.106492, and 1.743741813 SGD/GBP is held constant in every scenario. The P/E-15 gate remains **FAIL at -4.183898%**. No audited field is revised here.

Strongest reason the model may still be too optimistic. The operating model still depends on the Base North America revenue CAGR of 6.7722%. A non-controlling 200-basis-point miss, using the synthesis's 173.365176 GBX EPS and the repaired 22x Base exit with audited distributions, yields terminal wealth of 4,108.572041 GBX and gross IRR of **6.857061%**, **1.664915 percentage points below** audited Base. This is the most important residual challenge because Ascend logos do not prove incremental workloads. Bull also still stacks 9.4189% revenue CAGR, a 30.7772% statutory margin, share contraction to 849.986m and 25x. A non-controlling 23x lower-bound stress produces **16.233898%**, 1.857230 points below audited Bull. Neither stress identifies a new method defect or a supportable correction of at least two points; the repaired 40% Bear weight and lower Bull multiple now recognize the correlated risk.

Strongest reason the model may still be too bearish. Bear simultaneously assumes EPS below today's level, a North America margin drop of 430 basis points, EMEA/APAC margin erosion and US$6.0bn diagnostic net debt. The repaired 20x exit largely removes the prior double charge and now sits close to the reconstructed 20.873x historical floor. Using that floor as a non-controlling sensitivity produces terminal wealth of 2,409.734189 GBX and Bear IRR of **-3.958513%**, only **0.729758 percentage points above** audited Bear. The residual bearish challenge is therefore bounded: a solvent, positive-EPS, Moat-PASS franchise could hold the historical floor, but the difference is no longer material.

Prior denominator objection — resolved. Repaired preflight no longer pretends that reported TTM EPS can be normalized numerically. It records normalized-current EPS and P/E as unavailable, labels current versus terminal denominators non-comparable, and prevents the raw 24.613294x P/E from acting as an anchor or cap. Bear/Base/Bull exits of 20x/22x/25x are independently selected from row-replayed historical evidence and scenario economics. Missing breach-contract revenue and profitability remain a data gap, but no longer contaminate the method or multiple selection.

Prior net-SGD objection — resolved. The repaired bridge uses the source-bound entry rate of **1.743741813 SGD/GBP** as the terminal rate in Bear, Base and Bull. Scenario-correlated FX is explicitly false. Equity bears the 0.15% exit-cost reserve, distributions bear the 10% timing/reinvestment/conversion reserve, and the same P/E method remains intact. Independent replay exactly reproduces all scenario and weighted net-SGD returns.

Repair verification: S hashes to `ab29409529de16562ab09373972b7e13293e54e78bb89e5252c81dd005e4e4e3` and adopts 40%/50%/10%; VP hashes to the locked value above and clears with no blockers; CS hashes to `9ec1e9171fd21156930262149f35d07b5a924add1e530bc31883ff76dc515d58` with JSON `b74e1afff15cd1a1b40da586c90b73827a3e6c915860cf3be96ca11226164c55`; CSA hashes to `cf72f4fbe0d89ea5badde4d41afd245053c8ba752b5ef7eff8a9d27c8dcc3627` with JSON `02c8d69fce000de6b801d90fc9ca4ff2167751d67f1e599cb588500ea44a6dea`. The prior three objections—probability weighting, denominator comparability and correlated FX—are fully addressed. There is no new return-model blocker.

8. Insurer bridge

Experian is not a property-and-casualty insurer, reinsurer or similar risk-bearing insurer. The insurer retained-versus-managed perimeter, fee/NCI, common-book roll-forward, P/B-ROE and negative-EPS-to-zero-equity bridge are **not applicable**. No insurer work is added.

9. Quantitative forced-exit signal

The forced-exit research signal is **North America organic revenue growth below 5.0% in two consecutive quarterly updates after breach-contract runoff has cleared**, measured on management's reported organic basis. This is not a trade instruction; it is the point at which the current security thesis is analytically invalid. Two prints below 5% would show that Ascend deployment, fraud/identity cross-sell and vertical strength cannot sustain the 6.7722% Base CAGR. The synthesis already quantifies a comparable 200-basis-point CAGR miss as reducing Base EPS by 15.009281 GBX to 173.365176 GBX. A recession explicitly identified by management would explain the cause but would not preserve the five-year model automatically; the thesis would still require rebuilding.

10. Conviction after red team

The business-durability thesis survives, but the security thesis does not survive at the sealed price. Proprietary bureau data, identity resolution, embedded workflows and regulatory trust justify Moat PASS and a credible 2046 business. They do not justify a BUY when the P/E-15 gate fails, Base gross return is 8.52%, weighted gross return is 5.34%, acquisition-inclusive ROIIC is only 7%–9%, organic ROIIC is unavailable and Management remains YELLOW.

The synthesis should therefore be framed around a durable franchise whose reported market valuation appears demanding, while North American workload monetization and control quality remain the decisive unresolved business tests. The audited Reject remains directionally and mechanically right. The mandatory upstream return repair is complete: probabilities reflect correlated downside, the non-comparable reported P/E is unused, exits are independently reset, and net-SGD uses constant FX. Remaining operating sensitivities do not expose a new method or denominator defect and do not require another upstream rerun.

Appendix D - Data Package (Raw Historicals)

Experian plc — Production ER2 Data Package

Run ID: `pulse-cio-20260824T000124+0800` Security: `EXPN.L`, London ordinary share, reporting currency USD, quote currency GBX Information cutoff: 24 August 2026, Asia/Singapore Research only: `trade_execution_authorized=false`. This package creates no trade, message, ranking, sizing, portfolio, or broker authority.

Source ledger and anchor

Experian's fiscal year ends 31 March. The complete audited TTM is exactly 1 April 2025 through 31 March 2026, identical to FY2026; the forecast horizon is exactly 31 March 2031. The Q1 FY2027 update covers only the three months ended 30 June 2026 and supplies a current KPI overlay. It is not a complete income statement and does not move the TTM anchor.

Primary sources fetched live and archived in this run are the [FY2026 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2026/experian-annual-report-2026.pdf), [FY2025 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2025/experian-annual-report-2025.pdf), [FY2024 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2024/experian_annual_report_2024_web.pdf), [FY2023 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2023/annual-report/experian_annual_report_2023_web.pdf), [FY2022 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2022/experian-annual-report-2022.pdf), [FY2026 results](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/full-year-results-fy26), [H1 FY2026 results](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2025/half-year-results-fy26), [Q3 FY2026 update](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--third-quarter-fy26), and [Q1 FY2027 update](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--first-quarter-fy27). Full-call transcripts were also fetched for H1 FY2026, Q3 FY2026, FY2026 and Q1 FY2027. D's raw live evidence is under `C:/Users/Admin/OneDrive/GPT/ER 2.0/Experian plc/raw/pulse-cio-20260824T000124+0800/d/`; DR's independent live re-pulls are under the adjacent `dr/` folder.

Live FMP endpoints archived in that folder: `income-statement`, `balance-sheet-statement`, `cash-flow-statement`, `key-metrics`, and `financial-growth`, all with `symbol=EXPN.L&period=annual&limit=8`; provider-quarter income with `period=quarter&limit=8`; and both mandatory `revenue-product-segmentation` calls. Both segmentation calls returned the exact response `[]`. Official IFRS statements therefore control company financials and segmentation; FMP values remain comparison evidence. No local data-warehouse financial, segment, transcript, or prior-report cache was used.

0a. Industry classification and disclosure inventory

Experian is a global data, analytics, decisioning-software, credit-bureau and consumer-financial-platform business. It is a Jersey company resident in Ireland, reports under IFRS in USD, and lists ordinary shares in London. Standard FMP segment/product fields are inadequate: annual and quarter product endpoints are empty, and provider-labelled quarters include half-year windows. The controlling disclosures are annual/interim IFRS statements, results announcements, quarterly trading updates, presentations and transcripts.

The ad hoc industry checklist searched: `segment information`, `revenue`, `Benchmark EBIT`, `Data`, `Decisioning`, `Financial Services`, `Verticals`, `Consumer Services`, `organic revenue growth`, `free members`, `Ascend`, `fraud`, `Health`, `Automotive`, `Mortgage`, `Marketing Services`, `capital expenditure`, `ROCE`, `net debt`, `share repurchase`, `acquisition`, `data breach`, and `guidance`.

Dataset or table family	Official source searched	Table names or terms	Years available	Included?	Boundary or exclusion	Downstream relevance
Geographic segment economics	FY2022-FY2026 annual reports	Segment information; revenue; Benchmark EBIT	FY2022-FY2026	Yes	FY2023 also cross-checked to later comparative	B, R, S
Business-activity dollars	Notes 8 or 9 to annual reports	Data; Decisioning; Financial Services; Verticals; Consumer Services	FY2022-FY2026	Yes	Taxonomy changes on 1 April 2025	B, W, S
Organic growth by region and activity	FY2022-FY2026 annual reports and four latest releases	Organic revenue growth	FY2022-FY2026; recent periods	Yes	Taxonomy boundary disclosed below	B, W, S recency

Dataset or table family	Official source searched	Table names or terms	Years available	Included?	Boundary or exclusion	Downstream relevance
Consumer platform scale	Annual reports and results releases	Free members; memberships	FY2022, FY2024-FY2026	Yes	FY2023 exact year-end count not retrieved	W, S
Capital and balance sheet	Audited statements and notes	ROCE; net debt; capex; cash; borrowings	FY2022-FY2026	Yes	Official source controls FMP differences	S, valuation
Quarterly revenue dollars and margins	Trading updates	Revenue; Benchmark EBIT margin	Q1, Q3 updates	No	True non-disclosure for standalone quarter dollars and margin	Recency limitation
Recent guidance and commentary	Releases and full-call transcripts	Outlook; organic growth; margin	H1 FY2026-Q1 FY2027	Yes	Quote volume limited; transcript paths retained	M, W, S

Material historical KPI families follow. Values are issuer-reported and at constant exchange rates where labelled organic.

KPI family	Granularity	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Latest overlay	Source
Revenue, US$m	Group statutory	6,288	6,619	7,097	7,523	8,445	Not a complete period	Annual reports
Organic revenue growth	Group ongoing	12%	7%	6%	7%	8%	Q1 FY2027 7%	Annual reports; Q1 update
Post-tax ROCE	Group	15.7%	16.5%	17.0%	16.6%	17.2%	Not disclosed	Annual reports
Free consumer members	Global	134m	168m	More than 180m	More than 200m	More than 215m	More than 215m	Annual reports; Q1 update
Total capex as revenue	Group	8.1%	9.5%	9.0%	8.7%	8.6%	Guidance trends toward 7%	Calculated; FY2026 outlook
Net debt to Benchmark EBITDA	Group	Not used	Not used	Not used	Not used	1.7x	Not updated	FY2026 Annual Report

Regional organic revenue growth is from ongoing activities at constant exchange rates. The series is not spliced with actual-USD growth in Section 3.

Region	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Q1 FY2027
North America	13%	7%	5%	8%	10%	7%
Latin America	17%	16%	13%	6%	8%	12%
UK and Ireland	11%	5%	2%	1%	2%	5%
EMEA and Asia Pacific	3%	3%	7%	8%	5%	1%
Group	12%	7%	6%	7%	8%	7%

Sources: [FY2022 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2022/experian-annual-report-2022.pdf), [FY2023 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2023/annual-report/experian_annual_report_2023_web.pdf), [FY2024 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2024/experian_annual_report_2024_web.pdf), [FY2025 Annual Report](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/reports/2025/experian-annual-report-2025.pdf), [FY2026 results](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/full-year-results-fy26), and [Q1 FY2027 update](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--first-quarter-fy27).

1. Reporting structure and taxonomy

The four reportable operating segments are geographic and are assessed by the chief operating decision maker on `Benchmark EBIT`, not statutory operating income.

Reportable segment	Operating scope	FY2026 revenue US$m	FY2026 weight
North America	United States and Canada; largest credit, analytics, vertical and consumer platform	5,587	66.2%
Latin America	Brazil and Spanish Latin America; bureau, fraud, analytics and consumer services	1,299	15.4%
UK and Ireland	Bureau, Ascend, fraud, verification and consumer marketplace	942	11.2%

Reportable segment	Operating scope	FY2026 revenue US$m	FY2026 weight
EMEA and Asia Pacific	Continental Europe, Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand and Asia Pacific	617	7.3%
Total	Four operating segments	8,445	100.0%

Reporting structure is stable at four geographic operating segments over FY2022-FY2026. The EMEA label changed typographically from `EMEA/Asia Pacific` to `EMEA and Asia Pacific`, not economically. Certain businesses are reclassified to exited activities each year and comparatives are re-presented; Section 3 therefore uses total external revenue and total Benchmark EBIT exactly as the sealed FY2026 bridge does.

The business-activity taxonomy changed effective 1 April 2025. Prior reporting split Business-to-Business into `Data` and `Decisioning`. FY2026 splits B2B into `Financial Services` and `Verticals`, while `Consumer Services` remains unchanged; FY2025 was re-presented only in the new taxonomy. No primary-source bridge maps Data and Decisioning dollars into Financial Services and Verticals before FY2025, so those histories must not be spliced.

2. Consolidated historicals

All amounts are official IFRS US$bn except per-share data, shares and percentages. `Net income` is profit attributable to owners, while Section 3a preserves total statutory profit including NCI. FCF is net operating cash flow less purchased intangibles and PPE. FMP was live-pulled; official values control identified foreign-issuer discrepancies.

Metric	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Source
Revenue	6.288	6.619	7.097	7.523	8.445	Audited annual reports
Statutory operating income	1.416	1.265	1.694	1.793	2.045	Audited income statements
Operating margin	22.5%	19.1%	23.9%	23.8%	24.2%	Calculated
Net income attributable to owners	1.165	0.770	1.199	1.166	1.502	Audited income statements
Diluted EPS, US$	1.265	0.836	1.302	1.265	1.634	Audited EPS notes
Diluted weighted-average shares, m	921	921	921	922	919	EPS notes
Total capex	0.508	0.627	0.640	0.651	0.726	Cash-flow statements; intangible plus PPE
Net operating cash flow	1.797	1.717	1.747	2.005	2.239	Audited cash-flow statements
Core FCF	1.289	1.090	1.107	1.354	1.513	Calculated
Issuer post-tax ROCE	15.7%	16.5%	17.0%	16.6%	17.2%	Annual-report ROCE schedule

ROIC convention: Experian's published post-tax ROCE is the closest source-defined invested-capital return and is used rather than an analyst-invented provider ratio. The numerator is Benchmark EBIT after the Benchmark tax rate; the denominator is average capital employed, adjusted for material acquisition timing. For FY2026 the source states Benchmark EBIT of US$2,397m and a 17.2% post-tax ROCE. This measure is non-GAAP, but it is consistently defined and source-reconciled. Statutory effective tax in FY2026 was 22.7% (`443 / 1,951`); it is not substituted into the issuer ROCE series.

3. Geographic segment historicals

Revenue is total external revenue, including any source-labelled exited activities, to preserve the perimeter used in the sealed bridge. Profit is the exact issuer metric `Benchmark EBIT`. FY2024-FY2025 comparatives incorporate the latest disclosed re-presentations.

North America	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Source
Revenue, US$bn	4.122	4.432	4.659	5.046	5.587	Segment notes
YoY growth	n/a	7.5%	5.1%	8.3%	10.7%	Calculated, actual USD
Benchmark EBIT, US$bn	1.381	1.467	1.531	1.686	1.912	Segment notes
Benchmark EBIT margin	33.5%	33.1%	32.9%	33.4%	34.2%	Calculated

Latin America	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Source
Revenue, US$bn	0.791	0.947	1.127	1.075	1.299	Segment notes
YoY growth	n/a	19.7%	19.0%	-4.6%	20.8%	Calculated, actual USD
Benchmark EBIT, US$bn	0.223	0.294	0.354	0.336	0.399	Segment notes
Benchmark EBIT margin	28.2%	31.0%	31.4%	31.3%	30.7%	Calculated

UK and Ireland	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Source
Revenue, US$bn	0.847	0.784	0.844	0.869	0.942	Segment notes
YoY growth	n/a	-7.4%	7.7%	3.0%	8.4%	Calculated, actual USD
Benchmark EBIT, US$bn	0.184	0.170	0.182	0.203	0.220	Segment notes
Benchmark EBIT margin	21.7%	21.7%	21.6%	23.4%	23.4%	Calculated

EMEA and Asia Pacific	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	Source
Revenue, US$bn	0.528	0.456	0.467	0.533	0.617	Segment notes
YoY growth	n/a	-13.6%	2.4%	14.1%	15.8%	Calculated, actual USD
Benchmark EBIT, US$bn	0.009	0.006	0.005	0.002	0.030	Segment notes
Benchmark EBIT margin	1.7%	1.3%	1.1%	0.4%	4.9%	Calculated

Actual-USD growth above is affected by FX, acquisitions and exited-business re-presentations. The operating forecast should start from FY2026 dollars and use disclosed organic growth separately.

3a. Historical statutory-profit bridge and forecast-driver ledger

The common segment profit basis is exactly `Benchmark EBIT`, an issuer-defined non-GAAP metric. The packet at `C:/Users/Admin/OneDrive/GPT/ER 2.0/Experian plc/statutory_bridge.json` validated as `STATUTORY_BRIDGE_VALID`; its QFR-sealed SHA-256 is `791cd96635af149a1dc29b8897a7621a946ad4ebde1282d034719bd7eabf1b6f`. Reporting currency is USD and scale is millions. Source ID throughout is `EXP_AR26`.

FY2026, year ended 31 March 2026

Bridge line	Classification	Value US$m	Source ID	Running subtotal US$m
North America Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	1,912	EXP_AR26	1,912
Latin America Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	399	EXP_AR26	2,311
UK and Ireland Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	220	EXP_AR26	2,531
EMEA and Asia Pacific Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	30	EXP_AR26	2,561
Sum of reportable segment profit	segment profit subtotal	2,561	EXP_AR26	2,561
Central Activities Benchmark EBIT	corporate unallocated	-164	EXP_AR26	2,397
Consolidated Benchmark EBIT	subtotal	2,397	EXP_AR26	2,397
Remove share of post-tax profit of associates included in Benchmark EBIT	operating	-4	EXP_AR26	2,393
Exceptional items	operating	-20	EXP_AR26	2,373
Amortisation and impairment of acquisition intangibles	operating	-271	EXP_AR26	2,102
Acquisition and disposal expenses	operating	-59	EXP_AR26	2,043
Adjustment to fair value of contingent consideration	operating	2	EXP_AR26	2,045
Statutory operating income	statutory subtotal	2,045	EXP_AR26	2,045

Bridge line	Classification	Value US$m	Source ID	Running subtotal US$m
Finance income	interest	34	EXP_AR26	2,079
Finance expense	interest	-132	EXP_AR26	1,947
Share of post-tax profit of associates	other non-operating	4	EXP_AR26	1,951
Pretax income	statutory subtotal	1,951	EXP_AR26	1,951
Tax charge	tax	-443	EXP_AR26	1,508
Net income	statutory subtotal	1,508	EXP_AR26	1,508

TTM 1 April 2025 through 31 March 2026

Bridge line	Classification	Value US$m	Source ID	Running subtotal US$m
North America Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	1,912	EXP_AR26	1,912
Latin America Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	399	EXP_AR26	2,311
UK and Ireland Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	220	EXP_AR26	2,531
EMEA and Asia Pacific Benchmark EBIT	segment profit	30	EXP_AR26	2,561
Sum of reportable segment profit	segment profit subtotal	2,561	EXP_AR26	2,561
Central Activities Benchmark EBIT	corporate unallocated	-164	EXP_AR26	2,397
Consolidated Benchmark EBIT	subtotal	2,397	EXP_AR26	2,397
Remove share of post-tax profit of associates included in Benchmark EBIT	operating	-4	EXP_AR26	2,393
Exceptional items	operating	-20	EXP_AR26	2,373
Amortisation and impairment of acquisition intangibles	operating	-271	EXP_AR26	2,102
Acquisition and disposal expenses	operating	-59	EXP_AR26	2,043
Adjustment to fair value of contingent consideration	operating	2	EXP_AR26	2,045
Statutory operating income	statutory subtotal	2,045	EXP_AR26	2,045
Finance income	interest	34	EXP_AR26	2,079
Finance expense	interest	-132	EXP_AR26	1,947
Share of post-tax profit of associates	other non-operating	4	EXP_AR26	1,951
Pretax income	statutory subtotal	1,951	EXP_AR26	1,951
Tax charge	tax	-443	EXP_AR26	1,508
Net income	statutory subtotal	1,508	EXP_AR26	1,508

Both anchors are identical because the requested TTM dates exactly match the audited year. All five packet residuals are zero; packet tolerance is US$1.2805m.

Historical bridge line	FY US$m	TTM US$m	Forecast treatment	Driver and source	Bear, base, bull rule
Central Activities Benchmark EBIT	-164	-164	Percentage of revenue	FY2026 equals 1.94% of revenue	2.1%, 1.9%, 1.7% cost
Remove associate profit from operating perimeter	-4	-4	Match associate income	Annual Report note 10	Equal and opposite to below-line associate share
Exceptional items	-20	-20	Independently forecast	Issuer-defined restructuring and disposal items	Recurring charge, limited charge, zero only with no event
Acquisition-intangible amortisation and impairment	-271	-271	Intangible roll-forward	Annual Report note 21	Acquisition cadence and impairment sensitivity

Historical bridge line	FY US$m	TTM US$m	Forecast treatment	Driver and source	Bear, base, bull rule
Acquisition and disposal expenses	-59	-59	Percentage of modeled M&A	Annual Report note 10	Higher, normalised, lower deal cadence
Contingent-consideration fair value	2	2	Scenario-specific mark	Annual Report note 10	Loss, zero, gain; never a plug
Finance income	34	34	Cash and yield schedule	Cash balance and market rates	Lower, base, higher cash yield
Finance expense	-132	-132	Debt and rate schedule	Gross debt and refinancing terms	Higher, base, lower rate
Share of associate post-tax profit	4	4	Independent associate forecast	Annual Report note 10	Downside, flat, growth
Tax charge	-443	-443	Tax-rate schedule	FY2026 statutory rate 22.7%	Higher, base, lower effective rate

STATUTORY_BRIDGE_STATUS: VERIFIED — CLEARED FOR FORECASTING

4. Product and sub-segment historicals

Dollar-disclosed business activities are the finest reliable vertical split. The new taxonomy is comparable only for FY2025-FY2026.

Segment context	Product or activity	What it is	Dollar disclosure?	Historical revenue and source
All regions	Data	Transactional bureau and batch data, with some licence fees	Yes, legacy taxonomy	FY2022 3,313; FY2023 3,401; FY2024 3,627; FY2025 3,869 US$m; notes 8 or 9
All regions	Decisioning	Software, systems, scores, analytics, consultancy and transactional charges	Yes, legacy taxonomy	FY2022 1,341; FY2023 1,365; FY2024 1,482; FY2025 1,584 US$m; notes 8 or 9
All regions	Financial Services	B2B financial-services data, analytics, software and decisioning	Yes, new taxonomy	FY2025 restated 3,874; FY2026 4,463 US$m; FY2026 note 9
All regions	Verticals	Health, Automotive, Marketing and other non-financial B2B verticals	Yes, new taxonomy	FY2025 restated 1,547; FY2026 1,705 US$m; FY2026 note 9
North America, Latin America, UK and Ireland	Consumer Services	Subscription, one-off and referral fees for consumer products	Yes, continuous label	FY2022 1,613; FY2023 1,782; FY2024 1,937; FY2025 2,054; FY2026 2,257 US$m
All regions	Business-to-Business	Financial Services plus Verticals in current presentation	Yes	FY2025 restated 5,421; FY2026 6,168 US$m

No company-wide dollar revenue is separately disclosed for Ascend, Clarity, Health, Automotive, Marketing Services, Mortgage, fraud, Verify, Limpa Nome, Marketplace, subscriptions, AutoCheck, Patient Access Curator or individual scores. These are true non-disclosures after searching notes 9 and 10, the FY2026 operating review, latest releases and four transcripts. No dollars were back-solved.

Activity	Q1 FY2026 organic	H1 FY2026 organic	Q3 FY2026 organic	FY2026 organic	Q1 FY2027 organic	Source
Financial Services	9%	Not separately stated in release	7%	9%	9%	Trading updates; Annual Report
Verticals	6%	Not separately stated in release	7%	7%	7%	Trading updates; Annual Report
B2B	8%	8%	7%	8%	9%	Trading updates; Annual Report
Consumer Services	6%	9%	10%	9%	2%	Trading updates; Annual Report

5. Most recent quarterly trend

Experian FY ends 31 March. Most recently completed fiscal quarter at cutoff: Q1 FY2027, covering April-June 2026, reported 16 July 2026 via the [official update](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--first-quarter-fy27).

Experian does not publish complete quarterly revenue dollars or regional margins in Q1/Q3 trading updates. The table therefore preserves disclosed organic growth and labels broader periods precisely.

Disclosed period	North America	Latin America	UK and Ireland	EMEA and Asia Pacific	Group	Revenue dollars or margin
Q1 FY2026, 30 Jun 2025	9%	5%	1%	7%	8%	True non-disclosure
H1 FY2026, 30 Sep 2025	10%	4%	1%	6%	8%	H1 revenue US$4,058m ongoing; margin 28.3%
Q3 FY2026, 31 Dec 2025	10%	6%	3%	3%	8%	True non-disclosure
H2 FY2026, 31 Mar 2026	9%	12%	3%	3%	Group Q4 9%	FY2026 release; regional H2, not Q4 standalone
Q1 FY2027, 30 Jun 2026	7%	12%	5%	1%	7%	True non-disclosure

Current read-through: North America remains the largest segment at 67% of FY2026 revenue, but Q1 FY2027 Consumer Services organic revenue fell 2% because two breach-support contracts wound down; excluding breach work, it grew 3%. Latin America accelerated to 12% organic, including 22% Consumer Services. UK and Ireland improved to 5%. EMEA and Asia Pacific was 1% against large software-delivery comparisons; management expects growth to be higher through the rest of FY2027.

6. Management commentary and forward anchors

Full transcripts were live-fetched for 12 November 2025, 21 January 2026, 20 May 2026 and 16 July 2026. Four short source-bound excerpts are provided; the detailed regional matrix paraphrases the remaining call evidence to avoid pretending every management sentence is a separately quantified commitment.

- Q1 FY2027, 16 July 2026 — Brian Cassin, CEO: “We’ve had a good start to the year with continued new business strength and accelerating potential across a range of AI-enabled opportunities.” Topic: Group and AI pipeline. Interpretation: broad opportunity, not booked revenue. Source: [official Q1 FY2027 transcript](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-q1-fy27-trading-update-transcript.pdf).
- FY2026, 20 May 2026 — Lloyd Pitchford, CFO: “We expect organic revenue growth of 6-8%, which is in line with the initial guidance we gave for FY26.” Topic: FY2027 revenue. Interpretation: base-case anchor. Source: [official FY2026 transcript](https://www.experianplc.com/content/dam/marketing/global/plc/en/assets/documents/results-and-presentations/2026/Experian-FY26-full-year-results-transcript.pdf).
- Q3 FY2026, 21 January 2026 — Brian Cassin, CEO: “We continue to leverage our scaled proprietary data assets, strong technology foundations and deep expertise.” Topic: moat and AI. Interpretation: scale supports product expansion. Source: [official Q3 FY2026 release](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--third-quarter-fy26).
- H1 FY2026, 12 November 2025 — Brian Cassin, CEO: “We have enhanced our product platforms, deepened consumer relationships and transformed customer experiences and internal processes through AI-driven automation and personalisation.” Topic: platform progress. Interpretation: investment is intended to lift both growth and efficiency. Source: [official H1 FY2026 release](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2025/half-year-results-fy26).

Segment	Source date	Management evidence, paraphrased	Forward modeling implication
North America	16 Jul 2026	Financial Services grew 13%; all ten largest strategic clients are live on Ascend	Platform penetration supports high-single-digit B2B growth
North America	16 Jul 2026	Verticals grew 8%, led by Health and Automotive	Do not model all verticals at Financial Services rate
North America	16 Jul 2026	Consumer Services breach roll-off is complete; loans and insurance stronger, cards softer	Separate contract runoff from underlying marketplace

Segment	Source date	Management evidence, paraphrased	Forward modeling implication
North America	20 May 2026	FY2026 organic growth was 10%; H2 was 9%	Base should decelerate toward framework, not extrapolate 10% indefinitely
Latin America	16 Jul 2026	B2B pipeline supports full-year double-digit regional organic growth	Q1 12% has management support but remains macro-sensitive
Latin America	16 Jul 2026	Limpa Nome, premium and payroll-lending marketplace drove 22% Consumer Services growth	Consumer Services can outgrow regional B2B
Latin America	21 Jan 2026	ClearSale integration expanded fraud capabilities and planned synergies	Acquisition contribution and organic synergy must be separated
Latin America	20 May 2026	FY2026 organic growth accelerated from 4% in H1 to 12% in H2	Use seasonality and comparisons rather than straight-line 12%
UK and Ireland	16 Jul 2026	Ascend, fraud and verification wins lifted B2B to 5% despite subdued lending	Improvement is execution-led, with macro downside
UK and Ireland	16 Jul 2026	Consumer Services grew 7% on engagement, marketplace and subscriptions	Mid-single-digit base is supportable, not guaranteed
UK and Ireland	21 Jan 2026	KYC360 adds fraud and financial-crime compliance capability	Include acquisition contribution separately
UK and Ireland	20 May 2026	FY2026 H1 organic growth of 1% improved to 3% in H2	Recent acceleration begins from a low base
EMEA and Asia Pacific	16 Jul 2026	Q1 growth of 1% reflected timing and a strong software-delivery comparison	Avoid treating Q1 as structural stagnation
EMEA and Asia Pacific	16 Jul 2026	Management expects higher growth through the rest of FY2027	Forward improvement is guidance, not a quantified segment range
EMEA and Asia Pacific	21 Jan 2026	Proprietary scores and Ascend expanded into new geographies	Platform rollout is the principal growth driver
EMEA and Asia Pacific	20 May 2026	FY2026 Benchmark EBIT improved to US$40m ongoing, but total including exited was US$30m	Margin recovery remains early and perimeter-sensitive

Group FY2027 guidance from the FY2026 results and reiterated at Q1: organic revenue growth 6-8%, acquisitions around 1%, and 50bp organic constant-currency margin progression. At Q1, expected FX was a 1-2% tailwind to revenue and Benchmark EBIT. The FY2026 call specified FY2027 net interest of US$250-260m, a Benchmark tax rate around 26%, capex around 8% of revenue, Benchmark operating cash conversion above 90%, and diluted WANOS of 880-885m. The longer-term capex goal remains 7% of revenue.

7. Capital allocation history

R&D is not separately disclosed in the IFRS expense presentation; product development is embedded in operating costs and capitalised internally generated intangibles. Zero would be misleading, so it is marked `n/d`.

Year	Capex US$bn	Capex to revenue	R&D US$bn	Buybacks US$bn	Dividends US$bn	Cash acquisitions US$bn	Source
FY2022	0.508	8.1%	n/d	0.173	0.446	0.736	FY2022 cash flow
FY2023	0.627	9.5%	n/d	0.194	0.483	0.309	FY2024 comparative cash flow
FY2024	0.640	9.0%	n/d	0.120	0.510	0.462	FY2024 cash flow
FY2025	0.651	8.7%	n/d	0.199	0.548	1.158	FY2026 comparative cash flow
FY2026	0.726	8.6%	n/d	0.727	0.592	0.692	FY2026 cash flow

FY2026 operating commentary describes US$792m of acquisition investment, while the statutory cash-flow line is US$692m net of cash acquired; do not conflate the transaction measure and cash-flow measure. FY2026 share repurchases executed were US$725m; the cash-flow statement shows US$727m due to settlement and employee-trust timing. The Board announced another up-to-US$1bn programme in May 2026, valid through 30 June 2027.

8. Balance sheet snapshot at 31 March 2026

Item	US$bn	Source or calculation
Cash and equivalents excluding overdrafts	0.328	Group balance sheet
Term deposits and short-term investments used in net-debt bridge	0.003	Note 28
Total borrowings, current plus non-current	5.565	0.900 plus 4.665
Net debt	5.179	Issuer non-GAAP note 28
Net debt to Benchmark EBITDA	1.7x	FY2026 Annual Report
Goodwill	7.261	Group balance sheet
Other intangible assets	3.078	Group balance sheet
Goodwill plus intangibles	10.339	Calculated
Equity attributable to owners	5.545	Group balance sheet
Tangible book value attributable to owners	-4.794	5.545 less 7.261 less 3.078
Undrawn committed facilities	2.510	Note 27

Gross borrowings include US$133m of lease obligations. FY2026 net debt rose from US$4.684bn to US$5.179bn while Experian completed acquisitions and repurchases. The disclosed debt covenant requires Benchmark EBIT above three times net interest expense before financing fair-value remeasurements; the issuer reports compliance throughout FY2026.

9. Recent corporate actions

- 21 January 2026: Experian disclosed the acquisition of KYC360, adding UK fraud and financial-crime compliance capabilities; [Q3 FY2026 update](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--third-quarter-fy26).
- 20 May 2026: FY2026 results disclosed acquisitions including AtData, KYC360 and ClearSale, and US$792m of acquisition investment; [FY2026 results](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/full-year-results-fy26).
- 20 May 2026: a new up-to-US$1bn share-repurchase programme was announced, valid to 30 June 2027, after US$725m executed in FY2026.
- Post FY2026 year-end: Experian completed Own Up, an AI-powered North American mortgage platform; FY2026 Annual Report operating review.
- 1 July 2026: Experian closed idwall, strengthening digital identity and fraud capability in Brazil; [Q1 FY2027 update](https://www.experianplc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/trading-update--first-quarter-fy27).
- No CEO or CFO transition was identified in the controlling source set. Brian Cassin remained CEO and Lloyd Pitchford CFO at the cutoff.

10. Open data gaps and controls

Classification	Gap	Sources and search terms checked	Consequence
True non-disclosure	Standalone Q1 and Q3 revenue dollars, segment EBIT and margins	Quarterly releases and transcripts; revenue, EBIT, margin	Use growth overlay only
True non-disclosure	Product dollars below disclosed business activities	FY2026 notes 9 and 10; Ascend, Clarity, Health, AutoCheck, fraud, Mortgage, Marketplace	No invented or back-solved dollars
True non-disclosure	R&D expense	Annual income statements, operating-cost notes, R&D, research, development	Keep n/d; use capex and product commentary
Estimated	Tangible book value	FY2026 owner equity less goodwill and other intangibles	Calculation is explicit
Not applicable	P&C ownership-perimeter and fee-count-once schedules	Experian is not an insurer or reinsurer	No insurer gate applies

FMP comparison limitations: both mandatory product endpoints returned [ ]; annual FMP FY2025 values differ from the audited comparative; provider quarter records include half-year windows; FMP capex captures mainly PPE and omits most

internally generated intangible investment. Official statements control. The live annual FMP FY2026 revenue row tied to US$8,445m within 0%; this satisfies the revenue spot-check.

Self-verification completed live in this run: Q1 FY2027 North America organic revenue growth of 7% appears in the official 16 July 2026 update; the quoted Q1 FY2027 management excerpt appears in the transcript dated 16 July 2026; and the FMP annual income response contains FY2026 revenue of US$8,445m. All raw evidence and extracted text are retained under the documented D archive.

Decision-critical downstream facts: North America supplies two-thirds of revenue and a 34.2% Benchmark EBIT margin; Latin America combines a 30.7% margin with volatile FX/acquisition comparisons; UK and Ireland has stabilized near a 23.4% margin; EMEA and Asia Pacific remains a low-margin recovery segment. FY2026 business growth was 9% Financial Services, 7% Verticals and 9% Consumer Services organically. The FY2027 group frame is 6-8% organic growth and 50bp organic constant-currency margin progression, but North America Consumer Services has a contract-rolloff drag and EMEA and Asia Pacific retains delivery-timing volatility. The statutory bridge contains no plug and must remain intact downstream.